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Abstract
Abstract
This thesis investigates the efficiency levels of the Jordanian, Egyptian, Saudi Arabian and Bahraini
banking systems. The empirical evidence on bank efficiency in these markets aims to highlight the
features associated with the role of economic and financial reforms that have taken place in these
countries over the past decade.
Our sample comprises information on 82 banks operating in Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain
over the 1992-2000 period. We use the stochastic frontier and Fourier-flexible form to estimate cost and
profit efficiency levels in these banking systems. In addition, we also estimate the scale elasticity and
scale efficiency levels in the banking sectors under study. The sample size represents 78% of the
banking sector of Jordan, just under 90% of the Egyptian banking sector, 63% of that of Saudi Arabia
and over 50% of the banking sector of Bahrain.
To derive efficiency levels, we employ three distinct economic efficiency concepts (cost, standard profit
and alternative profit efficiencies), using a number of different measurement methods (including the
stochastic frontier approach, specification of the Fourier-flexible functional form versus the translog
form, and inclusion of a banks' asset quality and financial capital in a number of different ways) to a
single data set. In choosing the 'preferred' cost and profit models to estimate efficiency levels, we
follow various contemporary methodologies that use a variety of hypotheses tests to arrive at preferred
model specifications. Given cost efficiency, the preferred model is the Fourier-truncated form that
excludes the control variables (capital adequacy, asset quality and the time trend) but includes all the
environmental variables. Given the standard and alternative profit function, the preferred model is the
Fourier-flexible that includes the control as well as the environmental variables.
The technical cost efficiency averaged around 95%, based on our preferred model, over the 1992-2000
period. Standard and alternative profit functions estimates reveal technical efficiency on average around
66% and 58% respectively. Islamic banks are found to be the most cost and profit efficient while
investment banks are the least (cost and profit efficient). This result perhaps reveals the fact that the cost
of funds for Islamic banks is relatively cheaper than the cost of funds for other financial institutions.
Large banks, in assets terms, appear to be relatively more cost and profit efficient. This possibly signals
the ability of large banks to utilise more efficient technology with less cost, the ability of these banks to
introduce more specialised staff for the most profitable activities and the ability of these banks to
provide (presumably) better quality outputs for which they can charge higher prices. Geographically,
Bahrain is the most cost and profit efficient while Jordan is the least (cost and profit efficient).
The scale efficiency results reveal that, on average, banks in the countries under study are around 65%
scale efficient in terms of cost. In terms of profit efficiency, estimates are around 60% for both standard
and alternative profit function but with rather dissimilar movements overtime for scale efficiency scores
using both sets of measures. Both cost and profit functions report Islamic and commercial banks as the
most scale efficient types of banks. Based on asset size, the results of the alternative profit function
estimates, in particular, indicate that large banks are more scale efficient than small banks.
Geographically, Saudi Arabian and Egyptian banks appear to be the most cost and profit scale efficient.
The derived efficiency levels for the banks operating in the countries under study, however, provide
little evidence to suggest that the economic and financial reforms undertaken in Jordan, Egypt, Saudi
Arabia and Bahrain over the last decade have had a noticeable impact on improvement in banking sector
efficiency. The main policy recommendation from this study, therefore, is that these countries need to
continue the reform process in order to enhance financial sector performance.
xix
Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Background of the thesis
Financial sectors in developing countries, including the Arabian systems, have
traditionally been characterised by relatively high levels of government controls where
regulatory authorities maintained a protected banking environment that inhibited
competition. However, market conditions in banking have undergone extensive
changes over the last two decades or so. On the demand side, customer preferences
have changed substantially, becoming more sophisticated and price conscious. On the
supply side, the globalisation of financial markets has been accompanied by
governmental deregulation, financial innovation and automation. Both factors imply an
increase in the number of competitors, followed by reductions in costs and narrowing
of profit margins. In addition, progress in communications technology, especially
phone-based and Internet banking has enabled the larger financial institutions to
extend their activities beyond narrow national boundaries and to increase their market
share both within national and overseas markets by providing competitive products at a
lower price. New suppliers of retail banking products, such as retailers, automobile
manufactures and so on, have entered the market. As such, banks are now faced with
strong competition from both banks and non-bank institutions, and this also
accentuates competition within the banking and financial services sector overall.
To assist banks in confronting the new challenge, financial authorities throughout the
world have become more aware of the importance of financial deregulation to promote
competition in the market, the aim being to concurrently increase both the efficiency
and soundness of banking systems. In this respect, Arabian countries, including those
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under study — namely Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, have passed a
substantial body of legislation (over the last few years) aimed at liberalising their
financial systems. The liberalisation process has been accompanied by financial
deregulation through the reduction of direct government control, at the same time, it is
associated with upgrades of prudential regulations. The main objective of these
reforms concurs with the views of McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973); namely that
liberalised financial systems direct scarce economic resources to the most efficient use
and this impacts favourably on the growth of the national economy.
The process of deregulation has some important implications for banks. First,
deregulation removes or reduces collusive and/or restrictive practices, promoting
competition between banks thereby increasing the banks' risk. Second, changes arise
from the ability of banks to seek new business in much wider fields of activity such as
loan purchases and off-balance sheet transactions. Moves into new business areas and
an increased competitive environment change the nature of the banks' risks and
perhaps substantially increase the cost of funds to the established players, thus
reducing their competitive advantage. This induces banks to pay greater attention to
the areas of pricing and upgrading the quality of their products. Therefore, banks
become more concerned about analysing and controlling their costs and revenues, as
well as dealing with risks taken to produce acceptable returns. In this context,
maximising shareholders wealth and promoting improvements in productive efficiency
have become much more important strategic targets for banks. A number of studies
have shown that efficient banks have substantial competitive advantages over those
with average or below average efficiency (Sinkey, 1992; Berger et al., 1993; Gardner,
1995 and Molyneux et al., 1996).
Given the inextricable link between financial liberalisation and efficiencies, it is
therefore interesting to highlight the impact of economic and financial reforms in
various Arabian markets on the efficiency levels of the financial institutions operating
in these countries (as suggested by Berger and Humphrey, 1997). It should be noted,
however, that the limited literature on the impact of financial deregulation on banking
2
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sector efficiency is mixed, as pointed out by Berger and Humphrey (1997). Some
studies find that financial sector deregulation has brought about higher levels of
efficiency (Berg et al., 1992; Zaim, 1995; Bhattacharya et al., 1997; Leightner and
Lovell, 1998). Others, however, argue that there was no noticeable impact from
banking sector deregulation (Bauer et al., 1993; Elyasiani and Mehdian, 1997; Griffell-
Tatje and Lovell, 1997; Humphrey and Pulley, 1997).
Despite the extensive literature that has examined productive efficiency, especially in
the US banking system and other European markets (see Berg et al., 1993; Berg et al.,
1995; Bergendahl, 1995; Pastor et al, 1995; Allen and Rai, 1996; European
Commission, 1997a), empirical research on financial sectors in developing countries,
including Arabian countries, is limited.
1.2 Aims of the thesis
The aim of this thesis is to explore efficiency levels in various Arabian banking
industries and to examine the impact of economic and financial reforms which have
taken place in these countries over the past two decades. There are various reasons for
examining efficiency levels in Arabian banking systems. First, little empirical work
has been undertaken to investigate efficiency levels in Arabian banking and as such an
empirical investigation may yield interesting insights that could be of use to policy
makers operating in these countries and to the financial institutions themselves.
Second, such a study should help assessing the impact of the economic and financial
reforms that have taken place in the countries under study. In addition, assessing the
impact of financial reforms on banking sector efficiency levels should provide useful
policy information. Furthermore, this thesis aims to provide empirical evidence about
efficiency differences across various Arabian banking industries (and across various
types of financial institutions operating in these countries such as commercial,
investment and Islamic banks). The study further seeks to assess, for instance, whether
there is a link between bank's size, and cost and profit efficiency levels. If we find a
positive size and efficiency relationship, there will be a tendency for continued
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consolidation and concentration in the industry. Furthermore, this study attempts to
reveal the determinants of Arabian banks' efficiency by examining various factors that
help explaining Arabian banking sector efficiency and reveal characteristics of
efficient banks. In particular, the thesis evaluates whether such factors as asset quality,
capital levels and other environmental variables (such as bank size, market
characteristics, geographic position and liquidity ratios) influence bank's efficiency
levels (see Mester, 1996; Berger and Mester, 1997; Berger and DeYoung, 1997; and
Altunbas et al., 1997). This thesis also presents some methodological suggestions as to
how productive efficiency is best evaluated. Finally, in general, the study ultimately
aims to extend the established literature on bank efficiency in developing countries.
1.3 Methodology of the thesis
This thesis utilises mainly the stochastic frontier and Fourier-flexible (FF) form to
estimate the cost and profit efficiency levels in the banking sectors of Jordan, Egypt,
Saudi Arabia and Bahrain over the 1992-2000 period. In addition to estimating
technical efficiency levels based on the selected preferred models, we also estimate
scale elasticity and scale efficiency levels in the banking industry under study.
The stochastic frontier methodology was proposed by Gallant (1981, 1982), discussed
later by Elbadawi, Gallant and Souza (1983), Chalfant and Gallant (1985), Eastwood
and Gallant (1991), Gallant and Souza (1991) and applied to the analysis of bank cost
efficiency by Spong et al. (1995), Mitchell and Onvural (1996) and Berger et al.
(1997). It has been shown (Tolstov, 1962), that a linear combination of the sine and
cosine function, namely the Fourier series, can fit exactly any well-behaved
multivariate function. This is the main reason why the Fourier-flexible (FF) functional
form is nowadays preferred over the translog for estimating bank efficiency. That is, it
better approximates the underlying cost (or profit) function across a broad range of
outputs as suggested by Spong et al. (1995) and Mitchell and Onvural (1996). When
using the Fourier functional form, one avoids holding any maintained hypothesis by
allowing the data to reveal the true cost function through a large value of fitted
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parameters. In addition, the FF has several appealing properties in terms of modelling
bank cost structures, as pointed out by Williams and Gardener (2000). In addition to
the aforementioned stochastic frontier methodology, we also estimate efficiency levels
utilising the non-parametric Data Envelopment Approach (DEA) to check the
robustness of the results derived from the former stochastic frontier methodology.
1.4 Data of the thesis
Our sample comprises a data set of 82 banks operating in Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia
and Bahrain over the 1992-2000 period. This sample represents around 78%, 88%,
63% and 52% respectively, of the asset size of the financial systems in these countries
(excluding the assets of the central banks and branches of foreign banks). The sample
represents the major banks that have consistently published financial statements over
the last ten years. Other reasons for the selection of these countries as a sample for
study includes: the banking systems in these countries, apart from Jordan, are the
largest in the Arabian region. In addition, the banking systems operating in some
Arabian countries, such as Iraq, Libya and Syria, are excluded, as these are dominated
by government (non-profit) institutions. Furthermore, the banking systems in
Comoros, Djibouti and Somalia are significantly underdeveloped and data is difficult
to obtain. Moreover, the banking systems in Kuwait and Lebanon have undergone
extreme economic conditions as a result of wars during our sample period. Finally, the
lack of relevant information about banking systems in other Arabian countries is the
main reason for excluding them from our sample.
• The financial system includes all financial institutions that are licensed, by financial authorities, to
borrow deposits and/or lend loans in the respective countries. These usually include commercial,
investment and Islamic banks as well as all other sorts of licensed specialised financial institutions.
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1.5 The thesis structure
Chapter 2 An overview of Arabian Economies with particular focus on Jordan,
Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain
Chapter 2 outlines developments in the economies of Arabian countries over the last
two decades with a particular focus on the countries under study; Jordan, Egypt, Saudi
Arabia and Bahrain. It presents the economic and demographical characteristics of the
Arabian countries; the living standards, poverty levels and other socio-economic
characteristics of these countries. Furthermore, this chapter reviews various economic
reforms that have been undertaken in these countries aimed at accelerating economic
development and examines the impact of these reforms on various macroeconomic
trends during the 1990s. The chapter aims to assess the impact of these reforms on the
productive efficiency of the banks and other financial institutions operating in these
countries.
Chapter 3 The Financial Systems of Jordan, Egypt, Saudi and Bahrain
Chapter 3 presents a brief historical overview and evaluates the characteristics of the
financial sectors of Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. It highlights financial
reforms that have taken place in these countries over the last decade and examines the
impact of these reforms, using a variety of financial indicators, on financial deepness
in these countries during 1990s. The chapter aims to provide a preliminary view of the
soundness of the financial systems under study as well as to indicate the anticipated
performance and efficiency trends for the banks operating in these countries.
Chapter 4 Efficiency in Banking: a theoretical outlook
Chapter 4 presents a theoretical background concerning efficiency measurement in
banking. It shows the role of the seminal studies of Aigner and Chu (1968), Afriat
(1972) and Richmond (1974) in turning the focus of researchers attention to the
importance of efficiency measurement using frontier production functions. The chapter
outlines mainly the features of economies of scale and productive efficiency concepts
and describes how productive efficiency can be decomposed into technical and
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allocative efficiency. The chapter also discusses issues relating to technical efficiency
and its decomposition into pure technical efficiency and scale efficiency. Furthermore,
the chapter presents the three main types of economic functions from which efficiency
and productivity estimates can be derived; cost, standard and alternative profit
functions. These will be utilised later in the empirical analysis undertaken to derive
efficiency levels for the banking sectors of the countries under study.
Chapter 5 Parametric and non-parametric approaches to measuring efficiency in
banking
Chapter 5 presents the theoretical framework underpinning the utilisation of the
stochastic frontier approach to derive banking efficiency levels, and reviews some
previous studies that investigate efficiency characteristics in banking and financial
systems in various countries. The chapter presents the advantages of frontier
methodology in evaluating the performance of financial institutions, and outlines the
differences between parametric and non-parametric approaches. This chapter also
reviews the features of the linear programming Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)
method, the main non-parametric approach. Furthermore, this chapter discusses the
bank production process and notes that the banking literature is still divided
concerning how one defines bank inputs and outputs.
Chapter 6 Methodology and empirical results
Chapter 6 presents the empirical part of this thesis which investigates efficiency levels
in the banking sectors of various Arabian countries; Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and
Bahrain over the period 1992-2000. The empirical evidence on bank efficiency aims to
highlight the features associated with the role of economic development and financial
reforms that have taken place in these countries over 1992-2000.
We employ three distinct economic efficiency concepts (cost, standard profit, and
alternative profit efficiencies) using a number of different measurement methods
(including stochastic frontier approach, specification of the Fourier-flexible functional
form versus the translog form, and inclusion of bank's asset quality and financial
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capital in a number of different ways) to a single data set. Given cost efficiency, the
preferred model is the Fourier-truncated form that excludes the control variables
(capital adequacy, asset quality and time trend) but includes all the environmental
variables. Given the standard and alternative profit function, the preferred model is the
Fourier-flexible including the control as well as environmental variables.
Technical cost efficiency averaged around 95%, based on our preferred model, over
the 1992-2000 period. Standard and alternative profit functions estimates reveal
technical efficiency on average around 66% and 58% respectively. Islamic banks are
found to be the most cost and profit efficient, while investment banks are the least
(cost and profit efficient). This result perhaps reveals the fact that the cost of funds for
Islamic banks is relatively cheaper than those for other financial institutions. Large
banks, in assets terms, appear to be relatively more cost and profit efficient. This
signals the ability of large banks to utilise more efficient technology with less cost, the
ability of these banks to set up more specialised staff for the most profitable activities
and the ability of these banks to provide (presumably) better quality outputs for which
they can charge higher prices. Geographically, Bahrain is the most cost and profit
efficient while Jordan is the least cost and profit efficient.
The scale efficiency results reveal that, on average, banks in the countries under study
are around 65% scale efficient in terms of cost. Scale efficiency, given the standard
and alternative profit functions, were 56% and 61% respectively but with rather
dissimilar movements for efficiency scores over time for both sets of measures.
Despite the inconsistency between cost and profit functions results, we find that the
Islamic and commercial banks are the most scale efficient types of banks. Based on
asset size, the results of the profit functions estimates, in particular, indicate that large
banks are more scale efficient than small banks. Geographically, Saudi Arabian, in
particular, and Egyptian banks appear to be the most cost and profit scale efficient.
Overall, the estimated efficiency scores for the banks in the countries under study,
differ according to the three various efficiency concepts that are used (cost, profit and
8
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alternative profit) and each method adds some independent informational value. A
somewhat interesting result is that the choices made concerning the efficiency
measurement method leads to somewhat similar model specifications.
We also present, in this chapter, the results of efficiency measures obtained utilising
the DEA procedure to compare our results with those obtained utilising the stochastic
frontier approach in order to verify the consistency of the efficiency estimates derived
from both approaches. Utilising both Pearson and Spearman rank correlations, both of
these two measures report a correlation of around 40% between the scores from both
methodologies, despite the major differences in assumptions underlying each
approach. These findings suggest that the cost efficiency estimates are robust to
differences in methodology.
Chapter 7 Conclusion and limitations
This chapter summarises the main findings of this thesis, draws attention toward the
study limitations and presents some general policy considerations. The chapter outlines
that the derived efficiency scores, for the banks operating in the countries under study,
provide little evidence to suggest that the major economic and financial reforms
undertaken in Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain over the last decade have had a
noticeable impact on the banking sector efficiency. The main policy recommendation
from this study, therefore, is that these countries need to continue the reform process in
order to enhance financial sector performance.
One shortcoming of the present study may relate to sample size, which is confined to
only four Arabian countries. It might be interesting to carry out the same research over
a larger number of Arabian countries to compare banking sector efficiency across
different Arabian regions. However, the lack of publicly available data on many
Arabic banking markets made this impractical. Furthermore, one should always bear in
mind that while frontier efficiency models have advantages over traditional measures
of efficiency, they must also be regarded as imperfect measures. For instance, it is not
possible to include every item or dimension of a bank's output in model specifications,
9
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and banks that are producing a wide range of outputs or providing specialised services
could, therefore, be judged less efficient than they really are (as these models do not
take into account factors such as service or product quality).
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Chapter 2: An overview of Arabian economies with
particular focus on Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and
Bahrain
2.1 Introduction
This chapter outlines the socio-economic trends in Arabian countries over the last
twenty years focusing on Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. The aim is to
evaluate the nature of the economic and financial reforms undertaken in these
countries and to highlight their influence on the financial sector. Section 2.2 reviews
the demographic and other socio-economic features that illustrate differences in living
standards, poverty levels and the general economic situation in these countries. Section
2.3 examines the main economic trends characteristics in Arabia over the past two
decades. This part of the chapter also notes the main structural constraints that have
been suggested as reasons for constraining economic growth in Arabia during the
1980s. The section also reviews various economic reforms initiated aimed at
accelerating economic development. Various economic growth indicators of Arabic
countries during 1990s are presented in section 2.4. Section 2.5 outlines the objectives
and achievements of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The broad features of the
countries under study in this thesis (Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain) are
presented in section 2.6 and section 2.7 is the conclusion.
2.2 Economic, social and demographical characteristics of the Arabian
countries
Arabia comprises 21 countries whose people speak the Arabic language.
Geographically, Arabia covers the largest part of the Middle East and North Africa; its
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Chapter 1: An overview of Arabian economies with particular focus on Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain
borders extend from Iran in the East to the North Atlantic Ocean in the West, and from
Turkey in the North to the Arabian Sea in the South (see figure 2.1 below).
Figure 2-1: Geographical map of Arabian countries
Northern Africa and the Middle East
Source: UT Library (http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/n_africa_mid_east_pol_95.jpg);  the
dotted lines separate the Arabian area.
Regionally, four major Arabian blocs have emerged over the last fifty years (see table
2.1). The first is the Council of Arab Economic Unity which was established in Cairo
in 1957. This bloc aimed to achieve closer economic integration among its members
through the free movements of goods, persons and capital. The second bloc is the Arab
Maghreb Union, established in 1989, with the aim of strengthening economic and
cultural ties, ensuring regional stability and promoting trade among its members. The
third bloc is the Gulf Cooperation Council which was established in 1981. This bloc
includes all the Arabian Gulf states except Iraq and has as its main objective to secure
stability in the Gulf region through economic and political cooperation, and the
12
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coordination of commercial, monetary, financial, and economic policies among
member states (further details about this bloc are considered later in this chapter). The
fourth bloc is known as the Arab Mashreq (Mashreq translates as "the Arab East") that
also aims to promote economic and political integration between its members (see
Bayomi, K. 1995, SESRTCIC, 2000b).
Table 2-1: Members of Arabian countries
Council of Arab
Economic Unity
Arab Maghreb
Union
The states of
Gulf Arab Mashreq
Other Arabian
Countries
Egypt Algeria Bahrain Egypt Comoros
Iraq Libya Iraq Jordan Djibouti
Jordan Mauritania Kuwait Lebanon Somalia
Lebanon Morocco Oman Palestine Sudan
Palestine Tunisia Qatar The Syria
Syria Saudi Arabia
The UAE
Source: Adapted from (El-Erian et al. 1996, p2 and Bayomi, K., 1995)
In addition to the above classification based on regional and trading blocs, table 2.2
shows that Arabian countries can also be classified into oil and non-oil producing
countries.
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Table 2-2: Oil and non-oil Arabian countries
Oil Producing Countries	 Non-oil producing countries*
Algeria	 Comoros
Bahrain	 Djibouti
Iraq	 Egypt
Kuwait	 Jordan
Libya	 Lebanon
Oman	 Mauritania
Qatar	 Morocco
Saudi Arabia	 Palestine
The UAE	 Somalia
Sudan
Tunisia
The Syria
Source: Adapted from (El-Erian et al., 1996, p2).
The area of individual Arabian countries varies considerably (table 2.3). The area of
the largest three (Sudan, Algeria and Saudi Arabia) is more than 7 million square
kilometres comprising about 64 percent of the total Arabia area. On the other hand, the
area of each of the smallest six countries (Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Djibouti, Lebanon
and Comoros) does not exceed 25 thousand square kilometres.
* Although other countries such as Egypt, Syria, Tunisia and the Republic of Yemen export oil, the role
of oil in their economies is relatively limited.
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Table 2-3: Area of Arabian countries (sq. km , thousands)
Arab States Area
Oil-Exporter (Total) 7,055
Algeria 2,382
Saudi Arabia 2,150
Libya 1,760
Iraq 438
Oman 212
UAE 84
Kuwait 18
Qatar 11
Bahrain 1
Non-oil Exporter (Total) 6,619
Sudan 2,506
Mauritania 1,026
Egypt, Arab Rep. 1,001
Somalia 638
Yemen, Rep. 528
Morocco 447
Syria 185
Tunisia 164
Jordan 89
Djibouti 23
Lebanon 10
Comoros 2
Middle East & North Africa 11,024
Source: The World Bank (1999/2000), p. 230-231.
The population of Arabia was around 275 million in 1999; nearly the same size as the
USA. The smallest countries, in terms of population, are Bahrain, Djibouti and Qatar
where each has less than one million persons, while the largest are Egypt, Algeria,
Morocco and Iraq, each with a population of over 20 millions person (table 2.4).
Population density in Arabia also varies considerably. While Bahrain, Lebanon and
Comoros are the most populated; Mauritania, Libya, Saudi Arabia and United Arab
Emirates are the least populated.
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Table 2-4: Population & population density of Arabian countries over 1970-1999
(In millions, figures round to nearest digit)
Population
1970 1980 1990 1999
Density/1999
Arab Oil-exporter (Total)* 29 39 70 87 130
Algeria 15 20 25 30 3
Iraq 10 13 17 22 10
Saudi Arabia 16 21 10
Libya 2 3 4 5 13
UAE 0 1 2 3 35
Oman 1 1 2 2 45
Kuwait 1 1 2 2 50
Qatar 1 1 100
Bahrain 1 1 900
Arab Non-Oil-exporter (Total)* 82 105 151 188 100
Egypt 35 40 50 62 2
Sudan 15 20 25 30 12
Morocco 15 20 25 30 15
Yemen, Republic of ... 13 15 30
Syria 6 9 12 18 30
Tunisia 5 6 8 10 50
Somalia 3 5 9 9 60
Jordan 2 3 4 5 60
Lebanon 3 4 60
Mauritania 1 2 2 3 83
Djibouti 1 300
Comoros 1 400
Arabian countries (Total)* 111 144 221 275
Middle East & North Africa 290
Source: World Bank (1991), various pages; & Arab Monetary Fund, 2002 (www.amf.org.ae ) for 1990
and 1999 data. *for countries that have available data; ( 	 = Not Available)
Arabian countries possess abundant natural resources; nevertheless, the living
standards in the individual countries exhibit a broad diversity of characteristics. While
some Arabian countries are classified among high-income countries with per capita
income of more than $7,000 (United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Libya),
others have per capita income less than $1,000 and are classified among the poorest in
the world (Morocco, Comoros and Mauritania) (the details are discussed later). The
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wide dispersion in prosperity across the region is reflected by various indicators such
as those shown in Table 2-5. For instance, around 10% of the population of Bahrain,
Lebanon and Jordan live in poverty compared to about half the population of Yemen,
Djibouti and Mauritania.
Table 2-5: Poverty in Arabian Countries (Mid11997)
	
Population suffering from	 Poverty (%) of
	
poverty (million)*	 population**
Oil-Exporter	 10.4	 19
Algeria	 8.4	 29
Saudi Arabia
Libya
	
1.0	 16
Iraq
Oman
	 0.6	 24
UAE	 0.5	 18
Kuwait
Qatar
Bahrain
	 0.1	 10
Non-oil Exporter
	
57.2	 31
Sudan
	
10.3	 37
Mauritania
	
1.1	 48
Egypt, Arab Rep.
	
20.5	 33
Somalia
Yemen, Rep.
	
8.1	 49
Morocco
	 10.7	 39
Syria	 3.0	 20
Tunisia
	
2.1	 23
Jordan
	 0.6	 10
Djibouti
	 0.3	 41
Lebanon
	 0.4	 11
Comoros
	
0.2	 34
Arabian countries	 67.6	 28
Source: * = UNDP, Human Development Report 1999, p. 146-150. **= Concluded.
Furthermore, other human development indicators (i.e., adult literacy, educational
attainment and life expectancy) have shown that only four Arabian countries, out of
the 21, rank as highly developed countries (table 2.6). These include the countries of
Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, and the Untied Arab Emirates while at the other extreme are
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Djibouti, Mauritania, Sudan and Yemen. Adult illiteracy is high in Arabia especially in
the non-oil exporting countries; for instance, in the least developed countries, it is
slightly less than 50 percent (for instance in Djibouti, Morocco and Yemen).
Table 2-6: Trends in Human Development of Arabian countries for 1997
Arab States Life expectancy at birth Adult literacy HD ranks
Oil-Exporter (Average) 71 73
Bahrain 73 86 high
Kuwait 76 80 high
Qatar 72 80 high
Libya 70 77 Medium
UAE 75 75 high
Saudi Arabia 71 73 Medium
Oman 71 67 Medium
Algeria 69 60 Medium
Iraq 62 58 Medium
Oil-Exporter (Average) 62 59
Jordan 70 87 Medium
Lebanon 70 84 Medium
Syria 69 72 Medium
Tunisia 70 67 Medium
Comoros 59 55 Medium
Sudan 55 53 Low
Egypt 66 53 Medium
Djibouti 50 48 Low
Morocco 67 46 Medium
Yemen 58 43 Low
Mauritania 54 38 Low
Somalia N/A N/A
Source: UNDP (1999), P. 135-140.
The general indicators reviewed earlier show that individual Arabian countries vary
considerably in demographical and economic characteristics. Differences in the human
* The HD rank, according to World Bank, is based on longevity as measured by life expectancy at birth;
educational attainment as measured by a combination of adult literacy (two-thirds weight) and the
combined gross primary, secondary and tertiary enrolment ratio (one-third weight); and standard of
living, as measured by real GDP per capita.
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development characteristics in these countries are, perhaps, attributed mainly to the
variations in the distribution of natural resource in these countries.
2.3 Economies of Arabian Countries
This section reviews the economic features of Arabian countries' and discusses various
features of economic growth over the last two decades or so. It examines how the role
of the public sector has changed over the last twenty years and how the authorities in
these countries have started to develop the private sector in the process of economic
development. Finally, we review the economic reforms that have been initiated in
these countries aimed at promoting economic growth.
2.3.1 An historical overview of Arabian Economies
Individual Arabian countries vary considerably in their demographic and economic
characteristics. About two thirds of the world's crude-oil reserves lie in these
countries, with one quarter located in Saudi Arabia. Arabia also possesses various non-
fuel mineral and non-mineral resources. Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan and Syria
account for about one third of the world's phosphate production. Arabia is also
endowed with other natural resources like Potash (Jordan), Iron (Mauritania), ammonia
and urea (Qatar), copper and gypsum (Mauritania), cotton (Egypt and Sudan), tobacco
(Syria) and coffee (Yemen) (El-Erian et al., 1996).
During the 1960s and 1970s, several Arabian economies experienced favourable
economic performance (Bisat et al., 1997). The discovery of natural resources,
especially oil, contributed effectively to their economic growth during this period.
Increases in the price of oil, especially between 1973 and 1979 enhanced economic
performance especially in the oil exporting countries. The other Arabian countries
experienced a positive secondary effect, primarily because of remittance flows,
receipts of financial assistance and the availability of greater financial assistance from
the rich oil countries.
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During the 1980s, the economic performance of Arabia lagged especially in
comparison with the higher rates of economic growth achieved in other developing
regions of the world (Alonso-Gamo et al., 1997a &b). The economic growth of the
Arabic countries (as measured by real GDP growth) averaged about 1.6 percent over
1982-1991. This growth rate was much lower than that of other developing countries
and Asian industrialised countries that achieved more than 4 percent annualised
growth over the same period (details are shown later). The slowness in economic
growth has been attributed mainly to the vulnerability of sources of income in Arabia
which rely heavily on exports of their natural resources.
Moreover, during the 1980s, the investment performance of Arabian countries
weakened markedly (Bisat et al., 1997). The investment levels stayed at about 20
percent of GDP from the mid 1980s until the mid 1990s; a level lower than the average
for developing countries as a whole that reached nearly 26 percent by 1996. In addition
to low levels of domestic investment, Arabia attracted only modest amounts of foreign
direct investment, a significant share of which was concentrated in the energy sector.
From the mid -1980s until 1995, the ratio of foreign direct investment to GDP
amounted to 0.5 percent annually. In comparison, the Asian region attracted foreign
direct investment flows equivalent to more than 1 percent of GDP per year over the
same period (investment details are discussed later in this chapter).
2.3.2 The role of the public sector in Arabian countries
Before 1980s, various Arabian countries relied on the public sector as a mechanism for
their economic growth (Zeinelabdin, 1997). Governments invested in areas considered
important to development, especially in projects where the private sector was either
unwilling or unable to invest because of the perceived risk or excessive capital
requirements. Fulfilling major social objectives was often behind decisions to establish
various government enterprises in 'strategic' sectors of the economy.
The macroeconomic policy in Arabia, especially in non-oil countries, started to change
during the 1980s as a result of increases in foreign indebtedness and the rise in fiscal
20
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deficits (El-Brian and Fennell, 1997). Arabic governments were forced to re-examine
their policy stance. As a consequence, various Arabian countries initiated widespread
macroeconomic reforms, especially since the early 1990s, involving substantial
privatisation programmes. The largest moves in this respect occurred in Morocco,
Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan.
Privatisation in Arabia has been viewed as a means of reducing public indebtedness as
well as a way to attract foreign technology and management; the latter is supposed to
improve economic efficiency. The objectives of privatisation enumerated by the
governments of the respective countries varied although they had identical objectives.
These were to develop a stronger private sector, improve the performance and
profitability of public enterprises, strengthen performance of financial market
institutions and improve the climate for increased private investment.
2.3.3 Constraints delaying economic growth in Arabian countries during the 1980s
In addition to the decline in oil price that heavily affected the economic performance
of Arabian countries during the 1980s and early 1990s, other important structural
constraints have been suggested as contributory factors to the sluggish economic
growth.
The dominance of the public sector in most countries has, some suggest, undermined
the productivity of the private sector ( Alonso-Gamo et al., 1997 a&b and Bisat et al.,
1997). The existence of large public sectors have crowded-out private sector initiatives
resulting in a lack of investment opportunities for foreign and domestic private capital.
On the other hand, while the large revenues derived from oil and other natural
resources have allowed many Arabian countries to finance their external account
deficits, this however has contributed to the postponent of needed internal reforms
including trade liberalisation. Moreover, the excessive reliance on volatile oil export
receipts in various Arabian countries increases the vulnerability of revenues to external
shocks.
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The financial systems of many Arabic countries are also underdeveloped. Only a few
Arabic countries have stock markets (namely Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Oman,
Kuwait, Lebanon and Bahrain) making it difficult for domestic firms in many activities
to raise equity and non-bank finance (Alonso-Gamo et al., 1997b). Furthermore, the
existence of restrictions on the establishment of foreign banks has also limited
competition and hindered the transfer of knowledge and technology for local
institutions (Alonso-Gamo et al., 1997b). While in Jordan there are no restrictions on
private or foreign ownership of banks, in countries such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, no
more than 49 percent of a domestic bank can be held by foreigners. In Lebanon, a
foreign bank can open only one branch; and in Morocco, offshore branches are
allowed but can only deal with non-residents.
Finally, the lack of adequate institutional and legal frameworks for investment in many
Arabian countries has resulted in a lack of transparency in the regulatory environment.
However, since the mid 1990s, many Arabian countries have become members of the
World Trade Organisation (WTO) and this has enhanced the transparency and
increased credibility of these countries in terms of their trading performance.
2.3.4 Economic reforms in Arabian countries
During the 1980s and early 1990s, many Arabian governments faced unfavourable
economic conditions, represented by rising rates of unemployment and increasing
social demands associated with the sluggish economic growth. In response,
governments initiated structural reforms aimed at facilitating a more efficient
allocation of resources and achieving higher rates of economic growth.
Various Arabian countries have undertaken steps to expand the role of their private
sectors through deregulation, opening their economies to greater foreign participation,
adopting transparent commercial procedures and harmonising tax provisions. The
countries that have initiated substantial privatisation programmes since the 1990s or
earlier include Egypt, Algeria, Kuwait, Yemen and Jordan (El-Erian et al. 1996). Other
countries have initiated major reform programmes including Morocco, Tunisia and
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Mauritania (see for example Alonso-Gamo et al., 1997b, El-Erian and Fennell, 1997,
Bisat et al., 1997). On the other hand, oil-exporting economies have intensified
adjustment efforts by focusing on expenditure reduction in the face of lower oil
revenues and a reduced flow of investment.
Several Arabian countries have also introduced new legislation in the second half of
the 1990s, aimed at simplifying investment procedures (particularly Mauritania,
Lebanon, Egypt, Morocco and Jordan). Further steps have also undertaken by several
Arabian countries including Egypt, Morocco, Sudan, Yemen, Algeria and Syria to
remove price distortions (such as administered prices, interest rate ceilings and
restrictions on foreign exchange) (El-Erian and Fennell, 1997, El-Erian et al. 1996).
The aforementioned policies enhanced foreign investment and increased non-oil
exports. El-Erian and Fennell (1997), for instance, note that various Arabic countries
have renewed their access capabilities to international capital markets including Egypt,
Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco and Tunisia. Furthermore, many Arabian countries have
joined the World Trade Organization (WTO): Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan,
Kuwait, Mauritania, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and United Arab Emirates.
Other countries have requested WTO membership: Algeria and Sudan (Alonso-Gamo
et al 1997b).
In addition, various Arabian countries have undertaken substantial financial sectoral
reforms to enhance the role of financial institutions and to improve the investment
climate (Alonso-Gamo et al., 1997b and El-Erian and Fennell, 1997). Such reforms,
for instance, prepared a number of Arabian countries for relatively high credit ratings
in 1997 (Table 2-7 shows the details).
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Table 2-7: Credit Ratings of Arabian countries for 1997*
Country	 Moody's	 Standard & Poor's
Bahrain	 Bal
Egypt	 Ba2	 BBB-
Jordan	 B1	 BB-
Kuwait	 Baal
Lebanon	 Bal	 BB-
Oman	 Baa2	 BBB-
Qatar	 Baa2	 BBB
Saudi Arabia	 Baa3
Tunisia	 Baa3
The UAE	 Baal
Source: Adapted from (Alonso-Gamo et al., 1997, p. 32).
A large number of Arabian countries have also embarked on comprehensive reforms of
their financial and banking sectors to promote savings and to obtain better allocation of
funds. Others also have or are considering taking steps to open their banking sectors
and stock markets to greater foreign participation. According to El-Erian and Fennell
(1997), the Arabian countries that have initiated comprehensive financial sector
reforms during the 1990s include Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt.
To sum up, Arabia possesses valuable natural resources that have helped to enhance
living standards in these countries. However, many Arabian countries have suffered
from sluggish economic growth (a long with higher levels of population growth)
during the 1980s; this has forced the authorities to initiate economic reforms aimed at
promoting the adoption of a more market-oriented environment. The impact of these
reforms on various macroeconomic indicators is outlined in the next section.
* Moody's ratings rank long-term foreign currency bonds and notes (from D, C, Ca, and Caa: default
rate; B and Ba: non-investment grade; and Baa, A, Aa, and Aaa: investment grade.) Intermediate
rankings range from 1 (highest) to 3 (lowest). S&P's ratings rank long-term foreign currency credit
(from C to CCC+: default rate; B- to BB+: non-investment grade; and BBB- to AAA: investment
grade).
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2.4 The economic performance of Arabian countries during the 1990s
This section outlines various economic indicators that illustrate the performance of
Arabian countries during 1990s.
2.4.1 Economic growth in Arabian countries during the 1990s
The growth in economic performance of Arabian countries, as measured by real GDP,
has shown substantial improvement over the period 1992-99. During this period,
growth rate exceeded 4 percent per annum compared to around 2 percent during 1982-
91. However, while annual real GDP growth hit a high of around 8 percent in 1992, it
has slowed since then, nevertheless the growth gap compared to developing countries
has been narrowed (see table 2.8).
The economic growth of Arab oil countries has improved from about 1 percent over
the period 1982-91 to around 6 percent during 1992-99. The fastest growing
economies include those of Kuwait, Qatar and Emirates while the slowest include
those of Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Algeria. The real GDP of non-oil Arab countries has
grown from around 2 percent annually during the period 1982-91 to more than 5
percent over the period 1992-99. The fastest growing non-oil countries include
Lebanon, Egypt and Jordan while those experiencing the slowest growth include
Djibouti, Libya and Mauritania. The enhanced real GDP growth of these countries is
perhaps attributed to the economic reforms undertaken and the adoption of more
market-oriented policies in these countries.
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Table 2 -8: Real GDP growth, annual percent change of Arabia over 1982-99 (US $, millions)
Real GDP
(Annual Percent Change)
1982-91
(Average)*
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1992-99
Average*
Oil-exporter (Average)* 1 16.9 3.3 1.4 5.8 9.9 5.1 -7.1 9.5 5.6
Kuwait -6 83.5 20.8 3.3 7.1 17.0 -3.4 -15.7 17.2 16.2
Qatar
-2 11.1 -6.4 3.0 10.4 11.3 24.7 -9.2 18.9 8.0
Emirates 0 4.4 0.9 7.1 11.9 12.1 5.0 -6.0 10.1 5.7
Bahrain 2 2.9 9.5 7.0 5.1 4.3 4.1 -2.6 7.1 4.7
Oman 8 9.8 0.3 3.4 6.8 10.7 3.7 -10.6 10.4 4.3
Iraq 14.2 1.5 1.5 0.3 0.0 .01 0.9 3.0 2.8
Saudi Arabia 1 4.4 -3.8 1.4 6.4 10.6 3.7 -12.4 8.4 2.3
Algeria 2 4.7 -15.7 -1.7 13.5 2.2 -1.1 1.1 0.9
Libya
1 _30. 40.03_2.
-14.0 11.8 13.8 7.2 -7.6 -0.5 -.61
Non-oil Exporter (Average)* 2 4.4
1.3
4 5.9 7.1 3.4 2.3 5.1
Lebanon
-3 24.6 35.9
21.65 2121..40
16.9 14.4 8.8 2.0 18.2
Egypt 6 22.0 12.3 10.2 17.0 11.3 12.3 9.4 7.6 12.8
Jordan 2 22.5 8.4 9.1 7.1 2.1 5.0 4.7 2.2 7.6
Tunisia 19.1 -5.7 7.0 15-3 8.7 -3.5 5.9 3.8 6.3
Sudan 3 -52.0 -3.0 7 . 7 58.0 _13.2 28.4 8.21 -8.0 4.5
Syria 2 5.2 4.7 11.4 8.4 5.9 -5.6 -3.4 4.8 3.9
Morocco 5 2.2 -5.8 13.2 8.7 11.1 -8.8 6.4 -1.2 3.2
Yemen
... -1.4 -10.8 -8.1 -7.7 12.1 21.0 -9.6 13.0 1.1
Comoros 1 9 3
-5 -4 0 1 1
Djibouti 0 0 -4 -3 -4 -4 1 1 1 1
Mauritania 4 1.3 -18.6 7.4 5.0 3.5 -1.7 -8.6 -4.4 -2.0
Somalia -47.9 ...
Arabian countries 2 7.8 0.0 1.7 7.9 9.3 3.9 -3.1 5.8 4.2
Industrial countries 2 1 1 2 2 2 3 2 2 2
Developing Countries 4 6 6 7 6 7 6 3 4 6
Middle East and North Africa 3 5 2 2 2 5 3 3 3 3
Source: Arab Monetary Fund, 2002 (www.amf.org.ae) for 1992-99 values of Arabian countries;
IMF, World Economic Outlook, May 2000 for other data (p. 203-212).
In terms of real GDP per capita, Arabian countries have not witnessed significant
changes over the last two decades, as shown in table 2.9. The lack of growth in per
capita GDP, especially in the oil exporting countries, is attributed mainly to the
negative consequences of the Gulf War in 1991 where countries in the region were
burdened with significant war expenses.
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Table 2-9: Per capita GDP for Arabian countries (US $), (figures for 1975 to 1990 adjusted using
1987 prices)
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1999
Oil-exporter (Average)* 12,057 11,825 7,950 9,074 9,158 9,686
UAE 29,200 29,900 20,000 18,250 17,755 17,745
Kuwait 24,400 18,400 11,400 8,610 13,553 13,160
Libya 10,500 13,200 6,900 7,758 5,772 5,859
Bahrain 10,000 7,300 9,004 10,103 9,956
Saudi Arabia 9,000 10,200 5,700 6,662 6,798 6,525
Oman 3,800 3,600 5,700 7,182 6,477 6,724
Iraq 5,200 6,600 3,600 4,145 3,834 3,674
Algeria 2,300 2,700 3,000 2,449 1,484 1,633
Qatar ... 17,609 16,642 21,898
Non-oil Exporter (Average)* 843 1,000 1,013 815 1,226 1,371
Jordan 1,200 2,100 2,200 1,159 1,517 1,524
Tunisia 1,000 1,200 1,300 1,520 2,013 2,201
Syria 1,000 1,200 1,100 1,147 1,171 1,044
Sudan 1,100 1,000 900 512 351 381
Morocco 600 800 800 1,055 1,216 1,197
Egypt 500 700 800 690 1,060 1,435
Mauritania 500 500 500 530 462 365
Comoros 500 500 500 500 500
Djibouti ...
Lebanon 1,124 3,656 4,676
Somalia 44 ...
Yemen 682 318 383
All developing countries 600 700 700 800 900 1030
Arabian countries 6,450 6,413 4,481 4,532 4,983 5,309
Industrialized countries 12,600 14,200 15,500 17,600 19,300 19,300
Source: UNDP (1999), "Human Development Report" (for years 1975-85) and Arab Monetary Fund,
2002 (www.amf.org.ae ) for other data. *For countries that have available data. (. = Not Available)
Concerning the composition of GDP, table 2.10 shows that the commodity sector
dominates the other economic sectors in all countries; comprising about half of the
total GDP of Arabian economies over 1990-99. The distributive sector accounted for
about 27 percent of total GDP and the services sector around 21 percent.
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Table 2-10: The composition of GDP in Arabian countries (Average 1990-99)*
(In per cent)
Commodity	 Distributive Services
Arabian countries (Average) 48.5 26.6 21.0
Arab Oil-exporter (Average) 51.3 23.7 24.5
Saudi Arabia 59.0 17.7 21.5
UAE 57.6 21.5 21.3
Algeria 56.4 22.9 12.6
Kuwait 48.7 19.6 31.9
Oman 50.1 20.6 28.4
Qatar 54.6 20.8 24.1
Bahrain 37.6 24.8 34.1
Iraq 47.3 41.7 21.4
Libya 50.7 24.0 25.3
Arab Non-oil Exporter (Average) 46.0 29.2 17.9
Egypt 46.5 30.6 17.0
Morocco 48.4 26.0 25.6
Tunisia 42.7 25.7 18.9
Syria 53.1 27.7 11.1
Lebanon 27.7 38.7 33.6
Sudan 46.3 36.4 15.3
Jordan 27.7 38.1 19.5
Yemen, Republic of 53.5 24.2 18.9
Mauritania 50.2 25.2 14.0
Djibouti
Comoros
Somalia 63.9 19.1 5.6
Source: Arab Monetary Fund, 2002 (www.amf.org.ae ); = Not available
2.4.2 External trade indicators of Arabian countries during the 1990s
Exports of Arabian countries have increased from about $135 billions in 1990 to more
than $155 billions in 1999 and averaged about $140 billions over this period (table
* The Commodity sector includes mainly agriculture, fuel, manufacturing and construction activities; the
Distribution sector includes mainly banking, insurance, finance, hotel and transport activities; and the
Services sector includes mainly government, other services activities and housing.
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2.12). The export of Arab oil countries comprised more than 85 percent of the total
exports over this period. The exports of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in
particular comprised about 63 percent of the total oil-countries exports. In terms of
annual export growth, those of Algeria, Yemen and Qatar have grown annually at
more than 5 percent during 1990-99.
On the other hand, imports to Arabian countries increased from about $100 billion in
1990 to more than $140 billion in 1999 (table 2.12). Imports of Arab oil countries
comprise about 70 percent of total Arabian imports. In particular, the imports to Saudi
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates comprise around 60 percent of imports of Arab-
oil countries while the imports of Egypt comprises around one third of those of the
non-oil countries. In terms of annual growth, import to the United Arab Emirates has
grown noticeably over the last decade.
Overall, the trade balance for Arabian countries decreased from around $ 36 billion in
1990 to around $ 14 billion in 1999. As to be expected, the trade balances of Arab oil
countries are in surplus, while those of the non-oil countries have experienced deficits
over the last decade (table 2.13).
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Table 2-11: Exports of Arabian countries, 1990-99
(Millions of US dollars)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Average*	 Average
1990-99 Annual growth
Arabian countries (Total)* 136,290 119,620 130,710 121,380 127,590 145,290 168,530 169,060 132,320 156,420 140,720 2
Arab Oil-exporter * 120,380 103,420 115,570 106,910 111,150 125,850 147,620 147,820 110,430 132,710 122190 1
Saudi Arabia 37 46 44 40 38 40 41 41 35 37 40 o
UAE 18 22 21 22 25 23 23 23 28 27 23 6
Algeria 9 9 10 9 8 8 9 9 10 7 9 -2
Kuwait 6 1 6 10 10 10 10 10 9 9 8 6
Libya 11 10 9 7 8 7 7 6 6 6 8 -5
Bahrain 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 0
Oman 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 0
Qatar 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 5 5 3 7
Iraq 9 0 1 o o o 2
Arab Non-Oil-exporter* 15,910 16,200 15,140 14,470 16,440 19,440 20,910 21,240 21,890 23,710 18,540 5
Tunisia 22 23 26 26 28 28 26 26 26 25 26 2
Morocco 27 26 26 26 24 24 23 22 33 31 26 2
Syria 15 10 8 8 7 7 5 5 3 3 7 -9
Egypt 16 22 20 22 21 18 17 18 15 15 18 -1
Yemen, Republic of 4 2 1 1 1 4 9 12 7 10 6 17
Jordan 7 7 8 9 9 9 9 9 8 8 8 2
Lebanon 3 3 4 3 3 4 5 3 3 3 4 o
Mauritania 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 2 3 -4
Sudan 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 6
Somalia 1 1
Djibouti
Comoros
Source: Arab Monetary Fund, 2002 (www.amf.org.ae ). *For countries that have available data; ... = Not
Available
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Table 2-12: Imports of Arabian countries, 1990-99
(Millions of US dollars)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Average*	 Average
1990-99 Annual growth
Arabian countries (Total)* 100,600 101,910 115,470 110,080 110,070 127,220 134,110 136,220 149,130 142,450 122,730 5
Arab Oil-exporter * 69,720 71,980 81,910 79,320 76,490 86,310 88,070 90,380 97,480 92,450 83,410 4
Saudi Arabia 35 40 41 36 31 33 32 32 31 30 34 -2
UAE 17 19 21 25 30 27 29 29 31 35 26 12
Algeria 14 9 10 11 13 12 10 10 10 10 11 -3
Kuwait 6 7 9 9 9 9 10 9 9 8 8 4
Libya 11 11 6 7 5 6 6 6 6 5 7 -6
Bahrain 5 6 5 5 5 4 5 4 4 4 5 -2
Oman 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 6 6 5 5 3
Qatar 2 2 2 2 3 4 3 4 3 3 3 6
Iraq 7 1 I 1 1 I 2
Arab Non-00-exporter* 30,880 29,930 33,560 30,760 33,580 40,910 46,040 45,840 51,650 50,000 39,315 7
Tunisia 18 17 19 20 20 19 17 17 16 17 18 -1
Morocco 22 23 22 22 21 21 18 17 20 22 21 o
Syria 5 4 4 5 6 4 3 2 2 2 4 -7
Egypt 30 26 25 27 29 29 28 29 32 32 29 1
Yemen, Republic of 4 4 3 3 1 2 3 4 4 4 3 0
Jordan 8 8 10 12 10 9 9 9 7 7 9 -1
Lebanon 8 13 12 7 8 12 16 16 14 12 12 6
Mauritania 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 I 1 1 0
Sudan 2 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 3 6
Somalia 1 1 1 I
Djibouti
Comoros
Source: Arab Monetary Fund, 2002 (www.amf.org.ae). *For countries that have available data. (... =
Not Available)
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Table 2-13: Balance of trade of Arabian countries, 1990-99
(in millions of US dollars)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Average*
1990-99
Arabian countries (Total)* 35,680 17,690 15,230 11,290 17,520 18,080 34,430 32,840 -16,820 13,960 17,990
Arab Oil-exporter * 50,640 31,440 33,640 27,580 34,650 39,550 59,550 57,440 12,960 40,260 38,770
Saudi Arabia 20,350 18,610 17,010 14,190 19,250 21,950 32,960 31,990 8,810 20,450 20,560
UAE 10,080 8,830 6,840 4,030 4,700 5,850 7,760 7,400 550 3,380 5,940
Algeria 1,160 2,590 2,580 1,340 -980 360 3,490 5,070 1,020 -240 1,640
Kuwait 2,990 -3,620 -710 3,230 4,580 5,050 6,570 6,040 1,000 4,660 2,980
Libya 5,650 2,400 5,100 2,380 4,510 4,220 4,610 3,450 380 4,220 3,690
Bahrain 50 -600 -800 -130 -130 400 430 360 -300 500 -20
Oman 2,830 1,680 1,790 1,250 1,630 1,820 2,760 2,600 -170 2,560 1,870
Qatar 1,950 1,490 1,830 1,350 1,220 80 960 530 1,670 4,710 1,580
Iraq 5,590 60 10 -60 -110 -190 880
Arab Non-Oil-exporter*
-14,960 -13,740 -18,420 -16,300 -17,140 -21,470 -25,120 -24,600 -29,780 -26,300 -20780
Tunisia
-1,980 -1,400 -2,420 -2,400 -1,930 -2,420 -2,190 -2,390 -2,600 -2,580 -2230
Morocco
-2,690 -2,580 -3,380 -2,960 -3,200 -3,820 -3,510 -3,200 -3,130 -3,430 -3190
Syria 1,050 300 -160 -370 -650 -240 -390 -30 -230 -80 -80
Egypt
-6,600 -4,140 -5,250 -5,100 -6,110 -8,310 -9,500 -9,330 -13,330 -12,460 -8010
Yemen, Republic of
-760 -720 -890 -670 -250 150 470 490 -670 380 -250
Jordan
-1,540 -1,380 -2,040 -2,290 -1,960 -1,930 -2,480 -2,270 -2,030 -1,880 -1980
Lebanon
-2,030 -3,200 -3,530 -1,820 -2,280 -4,180 -6,560 -6,820 -6,410 -5,530 -4240
Mauritania 80 40 -150 -150 -120 -70 -80 -80 -60 -70 -70
Sudan -240 -590 -500 -530 -640 -630 -880 -990 -1,330 -630 -700
Somalia -250 -90 -100
-150
Djibouti
Comoros
Source: Arab Monetary Fund, 2002 (www.amforg.ae ). *For countries that have available data. ... = Not
Available
2.4.3 Inflation in Arabian countries during the 1990s
Inflation rates in the Arabia, as measured by changes in the consumer price index,
witnessed favourable improvement during the 1990s, especially in comparison with
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the high levels experienced during the 1980s (table 2.14). Inflation averaged about 8
percent during 1992-98 compared to 12 percent during 1982-91. The lower levels of
inflation are similar to those experienced in other developing countries over the same
period. Despite the decline in general inflation rates, some Arabian economies still
suffer from relatively high rates of inflation (i.e., Algeria, Yemen, Sudan and
Lebanon). The ability of various Arabian countries to reduce their inflation rates over
the last decade is perhaps indicative of their adoption of more appropriate macro
economic policies and the gradual structural reforms that have taken place.
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Table 2-14: The rates of inflation in Arabian countries over 1987-99 (percent)
Consumer Prices 1982-91 1989 1992 1995 1998	 1992-98
(Annual Percent Change) (Average) Average*
Arab Oil-exporter (Average)* 5 4 5 4 2	 4
Oman 2 3 1 -1 -1	 0
Saudi Arabia 1 0 5 0	 2
Bahrain 1 2 3 0	 2
Kuwait 4 3 -1 3 1	 1
Qatar 3 4 3 3 3	 3
UAE 4 7 6 5 2	 4
Libya 8 18 11 7	 12
Algeria 11 10 6	 6
Iraq
Arab Non-Oil (Average)* 19 23 11 6 4	 12
Djibouti 5 3 5 2	 4
Jordan 7 6 4 2 5	 4
Morocco 7 4 6 6 3	 4
Comoros 3 1 7 1	 6
Syria 22 60 3 1 0	 6
Mauritania 8 4 10 7 8	 7
Egypt 18 13 21 9 5	 10
Lebanon 80 50 40 11 5	 24
Yemen, Republic of 11	 44
Sudan
Somalia
Arabian countries (Average)* 12 13 8 5 3	 8
Developing Countries 10 62 10 10 6	 8
Middle East and North Africa 14.6 21.9 18 24.5 9.3	 15.7
Source: Arab Monetary fund (2002) (www.amf.org.ae ) for Arabian countries over 1992-98; Zeinelabdin
(1990) for data prior to 1992. *For countries that have available data. (... = Not Available).
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2.4.4 External debt and reserves of the Arabian countries during the 1990s
The external debt of the Arabian countries has averaged about $130 billions over
1990-98, with insignificant changes during this period (table 2.15). The debt of non-oil
Arabian countries accounts for around 77% of the total debt over the whole period.
The most indebted countries include Egypt, Morocco, Algeria and Syria.
Despite insignificant changes in the absolute figures of the external debt, the external
debt as a percent of GDP (Table 2.16) has witnessed noticeable falls especially for the
non-oil countries; it fell from about 6.7 percent to 5.7 percent over the period 1990-98.
As a percent of GDP, the most indebted countries include those of Jordan, Mauritania,
Morocco and Algeria.
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Table 2-15: External debt of Arabian countries (US$, millions)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998	 1990-98
Average*
Total
Arabian
countries* 127,293 128,048 125,504 125,068 133,493 140,354 137,871 128,361 132,031
	 130,891
Oil-
exporter
(Total)* 28,816 28,443 27,829 27,162 30,786 33,679 33,708 31,277 30,697	 30,266
Iraq
Algeria 26416 25969 25489 24847 28178 31042 31062 28710 28469
	 27,798
UAE
Qatar
Kuwait
Libya
Oman 2400 2474 2340 2315 2608 2637 2646 2567 2228	 2,468
Bahrain
Saudi
Arabia
countries
Non-Oil-
exporter
(Total)* 98,477 99,605 97,675 97,906 102,707 106,675 104,163 97,084 101,334	 100625
Egypt 28,372 29,317 28,348 28,303 30,189 30,792 28,810 26,804 27,670	 28,734
Syria 14,917 16,353 15,913 16,235 16,540 16,757 16,698 16,254 16,328	 16,222
Morocco 23,101 20,792 21,030 20,680 21,530 22,085 21,134 18,978 19,325
	 20,962
Sudan 9,155 9,220 8,984 8,994 9,400 9,779 9,369 8,998 9,226	 9,236
Tunisia 6,662 7,109 7,201 7,415 8,002 9,118 9,463 9,426 9,727	 8,236
Jordan 7,043 7,458 6,922 6,770 6,883 7,023 7,091 6,960 7,388
	 7,060
Somalia 1,926 1,945 1,898 1,897 1,935 1,961 1,918 1,853 1,886	 1,913
Yemen,
Republic of 5,154 5,256 5,253 5,341 5,460 5,528 5,622 3,418 3,590	 4,958
Lebanon 358 336 301 368 778 1,551 1,933 2,353 3,980	 1,329
Mauritania 1,789 1,819 1,825 1,903 1,990 2,081 2,125 2,040 2,214	 1,976
Djibouti
Comoros
Source: Arab Monetary Fund, 2002 (www.amf.org.ae). *For countries that have available data. (... =
Not Available).
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Table 2-16: External debt of Arabia as a % of GDP
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998	 1990-98
Average*
Arabian
countries*/
Average 6.71 6.30 6.01 6.52 5.56 5.21 5.35 5.26 5.00	 5.77
Oil-
exporter
(Avg.)* 9.95 12.29 11.25 11.03 7.81 6.47 6.57 5.50 6.85	 8.63
Iraq
Algeria 13.80 19.70 18.54 17.40 11.55 9.55 8.43 8.28 9.69	 12.99
UAE
Qatar
Kuwait
Libya
Oman 6.11 4.87 3.96 4.67 4.06 3.38 4.71 2.72 4.00	 4.27
Bahrain
Saudi
Arabia
countries
Non-Oil-
per
(Avg.)* 6.06 5.10 4.97 5.52 5.06 4.93 5.08 5.20 4.58 5.17
Egypt 7.01 6.70 5.19 3.93 3.60 3.40 2.77 2.08 1.87 4.06
Syria 8.57 3.06 1.57 1.26 1.49 0.93 0.70 2.56 1.08 2.36
Morocco 5.66 7.63 12.92 11.52 11.39 10.92 8.88 9.21 7.60 9.52
Sudan 0.19 0.18 0.43 0.30 0.05 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.15
Tunisia 9.91 8.69 7.83 8.36 8.62 7.58 6.76 6.66 6.22 7.85
Jordan 13.63 14.83 12.69 9.10 7.95 8.36 14.16 11.83 11.33 11.54
Somalia 1.85 0.00 0.00 0.62
Yemen,
Republic of 1.23 2.31 1.60 1.72 1.53 1.86 1.44 1.30 1.97 1.66
Lebanon 1.36 1.06 1.17 0.90 1.33 1.42 1.66 4.05 1.58 1.61
Mauritania 11.24 6.52 6.26 12.61 9.55 9.67 9.34 9.14 9.58 9.32
Djibouti
Comoros
Source: Arab Monetary Fund, 2002 (www.amf.org.ae). *For countries that have available data. (... =
Not Available).
While total external indebtedness remained at a similar level throughout the 1990s,
Arabian countries reserves have witnessed an increase over the last 10 years, especially
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the non-oil countries (table 2.18). The non-oil Arab countries reserves increased from
about $7.7 billion in 1990 to more than $36 billion by 1999. On the other hand, the
reserves of Arab oil countries increased from about $28 billion in 1990 to reach around
$48 billion by the end of the decade. This increase, in the reserves of Arab oil
countries, came mainly from the recovery that followed the Gulf War. In particular, the
total reserves of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain comprise more than 50 percent of the total
Arab-oil countries reserves, while those of Egypt comprise more than 50% of those of
non-oil countries. The Arabian countries that have witnessed a significant increase in
their reserves over the last decade include the United Arab Emirates and Lebanon.
To conclude, the fall in external indebtedness as a percentage of GDP over the last
decade, in addition to increases in external reserves, reflects the adoption of more
prudential fiscal policies in various Arabian countries.
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Table 2-17: Monetary reserves (excluding Gold) of Arabian countries 1990-99
Country (% of total) 1990	 1991	 1992	 1993	 1994	 1995	 1996	 1997	 1998	 1999 Avg. 1990-99
Oil-countries (US $, mil.) 28,210 31,470 26,990 25,330 26,430 30,440 40,240 46,080 44,660 47,910 34,780
Saudi Arabia 41	 37	 22	 29	 28	 28	 36	 32	 32	 35 33
Emirates 16	 17	 21	 24	 25	 25	 20	 18	 21	 23 21
Libya 20	 18	 18	 13	 13	 19	 17	 16	 15	 13 16
Kuwait 7	 11	 19	 17	 13	 12	 9	 7	 9	 10 11
Algeria 3	 5	 5	 6	 10	 7	 11	 17	 15	 9 10
Oman 6	 5	 7	 4	 4	 4	 3	 3	 2	 3 4
Bahrain 4	 5	 5	 5	 4	 4	 3	 3	 3	 3 4
Qatar 2	 2	 3	 3	 3	 2	 2	 2	 3	 3 2
Iraq
Non-oil countries (US$, mil.)
	
7,720 12,690 18,630 21,260 25,160 29,190 32,760 35,420 35,240 36,180 25,440
Egypt 35	 42	 59	 61	 54	 55	 53	 53	 51	 40 51
Lebanon 9	 10	 8	 11	 15	 16	 18	 17	 19	 21 16
Morocco 27	 24	 19	 17	 17	 12	 12	 11	 13	 16 15
Tunisia 10	 6	 5	 4	 6	 6	 6	 6	 5	 6 6
Syria 2	 5	 3	 3	 4	 7	 5	 5	 5	 6 5
Jordan 11	 7	 4	 3	 2	 1	 2	 5	 3	 6 4
Yemen 5	 5	 2	 1	 1	 2	 3	 3	 3	 4 3
Mauritania 1	 1	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 1	 1	 1 0
Sudan 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 1	 0	 0	 0	 0 0
Somalia 0 0
Total (US$, mil) 35,930 44,160 45,610 46,590 51,590 59,630 73,010 81,500 79,910 84,090 60,210
Sources: Arab Monetary Fund, 2002 (www.amf.org.ae); *For countries that have available data. (... =
Not Available).
2.4.5 Investment indicators for Arabian countries during the 1990s
Fry (1988, pp. 131) indicates that the proportion of GNP allocated to capital formation
should enhance economic growth as the bulk of domestic investment is usually
provided from national savings.
The domestic investment in Arabia as a percent of GDP has increased but shown some
volatility over 1995-99. The domestic investment as a percent of GDP in oil countries
ranged from about 17 percent in 1996 to about 22 percent in 1998. The domestic
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investment in non-oil countries has stayed at a level of over 20 percent over the same
period (see table 2.19). The countries that enjoyed high rates of domestic investment
include Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, Tunisia and Algeria. These investment rates along
with their improved growth over the last decade should have enhanced economic
performance.
Regarding foreign investment, the available indicators suggest that there was an
increase in foreign direct investment to oil and non-oil Arabian countries during the
1990s. Table 2.20 shows that foreign investment almost tripled between 1982-98 in
non-oil exporting countries. Unfortunately, there is only limited information about
foreign direct investment to oil-exporting Arabian countries. Based on available data,
the top non-oil countries acquiring external investment are those of Egypt, Morocco,
Tunisia and Jordan.
Bringing together the aforementioned indicators, many Arabian countries improved
their economic stance during the 1990s, although there remain substantial differences
across individual economies. The real GDP grew at around 4 percent annually over
1992-99 compared to 2 percent during 1982-91. Inflation rates were significantly
reduced in many countries. External debt as a percent of GDP fell and the reserves,
especially of non-oil exporting countries were significantly enhanced. Domestic and
foreign investments within the Arab region have also improved. On the other hand,
despite the improvement in trade balance of various Arabian countries; many non-oil
countries are still suffering from substantial trade deficits.
Over the last twenty years or so, various initiatives have been implemented aimed at
creating trading blocs in various regions of the Arab world. These initiatives are aimed
at generating economic integration and therefore facilitating trade. These have already
been referred to earlier in table 2.1. The following section briefly discusses the most
important trading bloc in the Arab world, the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC).
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Table 2-18: Gross domestic investment of Arabian countries as % of GDP
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1995-99
Average*
Oil-exporter (Average)* 20 17 16 22 21 19
Algeria 32 25 24 27 27 27
Saudi Arabia 21 18 20 21 20
Egypt, Arab Rep. 17 17 18 22 23 19
Kuwait 15 15 14 16 12 15
Bahrain 13 9 6 10
Iraq
Libya
Oman
Qatar
UAE
Non-oil Exporter (Average)* 23 22 22 25 24 23
Lebanon 33 30 27 28 ... 29
Jordan 34 32 27 25 27 29
Syria 27 26 29 30 30 28
Tunisia 25 25 27 28 28 26
Yemen, Rep. 22 22 21 29 21 23
Morocco 21 20 21 23 23 21
Comoros 20 19 21 20 19 20
Mauritania 19 19 18 20 22 20
Djibouti 9 9 10 9
Somalia
Sudan ...
All Arabian countries (Average)* 22 20 20 24 23 22
Middle East & North Africa 24 21 21 22 22
World 22 22 22 ... ... 22
Source: World Bank (2000); *for countries that have available data. (... = Not Available).
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Table 2-19: Foreign direct investment in Arabian countries (US$, millions)
Annual average
1982-87	 1987-92 1995 1996 1997 1998
1995-98
Average*
Oil-exporter (Total)* 16 15 6 24 3 9 8
Kuwait 0 0 1 19 1 3 5
Oman 11 6 5 4 2 5 3
Algeria -1 1 0 0 0 0
Bahrain 3 3
Iraq 0 0
Libya -12 3
Qatar 0 1
Saudi Arabia 11 -2
UAE 3 3 ...
Non-oil Exporter (Total)* 84 86 93 76 97 142 92
Egypt, Arab Rep. 62 47 62 35 30 54 37
Morocco 3 12 10 20 37 16 21
Tunisia 12 9 28 13 11 33 17
Jordan 3 1 1 1 12 16 8
Yemen, Rep. 1 12 23 3 5 11 7
Sudan 0 0 0 0 3 19 5
Lebanon 0 0 4 4 5 10 5
Syria 1 4 10 5 3 4 4
Mauritania 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Djibouti 0 0 0 0 0
Comoros 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Somalia 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total Arabian countries 1,300 1,700 960 1,800 2,950 1,980 2,170
Middle East & North Africa 200 3,600 5,900 5,000 3,700
World Bank (2000) *for countries that have available data. (... = Not Available).
2.5 The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)*
This section outlines the main objectives and achievements of the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) over the last two decades, as two of the four countries under our study
(Saudi Arabia and Bahrain) belong to this bloc.
* The information in this section is adapted from publications of the Secretariat of the GCC Council
(2002).
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The GCC was founded in 1981 and includes six Arab countries: Bahrain, Kuwait,
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. It aims to coordinate,
integrate and inter-connect various policies among its member states. These include
adopting similar regulations in various fields such as economy, finance, trade,
customs, legislation and fostering technical progress among member states. The GCC
council also works to coordinate the oil policies by adopting unified policy in the
international markets, as the reserves of the GCC states comprise around 45% and 14%
of the total world reserves of oil and gas, respectively.
In the economic area, the council signed the 'Unified Economic Agreement' in 1981
aiming at unifying various economic policies relating to agriculture, industry and other
important economic areas. In addition, the GCC council approved, in 1999, a timetable
to set up a customs union by 2005. The customs union plans to unify custom tariffs,
abolish customs barriers among GCC States and exempt national products from
customs duties. Other objectives include coordinating export and import policies and
creating a collective negotiating position. Consistent with these objectives, the GCC
Member States have set up a free trade zone among themselves since 1983.
In the investment area, the GCC council operates to reach a common investment policy
that directs domestic and foreign investments, and to initiate joint investment among
member countries. In this field, the GCC established the Gulf Investment Corporation
in 1982. In terms of joint investment, the GCC set up the Gulf Investment Corporation
in Kuwait, the Standardization and Metrology Organisation for GCC in Riyadh, the
Technical Telecommunication Bureau in Bahrain, the Commercial Arbitration Centre
for GCC in Bahrain, the Regional Committee for Electrical Energy Systems registered
in Qatar, and the Electricity Grids Linking Commission in Saudi Arabia.
In the monetary area, the GCC council seeks to unify banking and monetary
regulations, as well as to boost coordination between monetary agencies among
member countries. A major accomplishment in this regard is the decision taken in
1997 permitting national banks to open branches in GCC Member States. This
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decision has helped facilitation cross-border experience by Gulf banks. The GCC also
established the Gulf National ATM Network, and approved the Centrality of Risks
Law, the Efficiency of Capital and Risks of Assets Law, and the Credit Concentration
in GCC Banks Law. Furthermore, the GCC states agreed to collectively participate in
the meetings of the Basle Committee and international conferences of banks, as well as
to coordinate their participation in meetings of the International Monetary Fund and
the World Bank. Furthermore, the GCC council approved a timetable for the monetary
union to adopt the US$ as a common peg for their currencies before the end of 2002. It
also undertook steps to reach an agreement before the end of 2005 on the standards of
economic performance that would be necessary to ensure the success of the monetary
union, so that a single currency could be launched by the year 2010 (similar in many
ways to EMU and the introduction of euro in Europe).
2.6 Economies of Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain
So far this chapter has provided an overview of the socio-economic features of the
Arab world. However, the main empirical focus of this thesis is to investigate the
efficiency of banks operating in four countries: Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and
Bahrain. As such, it is important that we provide an overview of the economies of
these countries. Jordan and Egypt belong to Arab Mashreq and they are non-oil
exporting countries. The other two are members of the Arab Gulf Council and are oil-
exporting. The four countries can be considered emerging economies because they
have experienced efforts to enhance and upgrade their economic performance, similar
to those of the world's developed nations. These countries have gone to considerable
lengths to make their economies strong, more open to international investors and more
competitive in global markets.
These countries, in particular, were selected for various reasons. Apart from Jordan,
the banking systems in the countries under study are the largest in the Arab region. In
addition, the banking systems operating in some Arabian countries such as Iraq, Libya
and Syria are primarily government banking systems. Furthermore, the banking
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systems in Comoros, Djibouti and Somalia are substantially underdeveloped.
Moreover, the banking systems in Kuwait and Lebanon have undergone extreme
economic conditions as a result of wars during the 1990s and so, we believe, are less
amenable to study. Finally, the lack of relevant information about banking systems in
other Arab countries is the main reason for excluding them from detailed empirical
study in this thesis.
This part of the chapter discusses the economic features of these countries (Jordan,
Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain). The aim is to link the economic situation in these
countries with the changes in financial trends (i.e., their impact on banking sector
efficiency) that will be discussed later on. Initially, we review various socio-economic
features such as demographic, human development and other indicators and then
examine various economic reforms undertaken and evaluate their impact on the
respective countries.
2.6.1 Demographic characteristics of Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain
Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain differ widely in terms of their socio-
economic make-up. Table 2.20 shows some of these differences. Bahrain is the
smallest in terms of both the country's area and population but is the most developed
in terms of GDP per capita. At the opposite end of the scale is Egypt, with a population
larger than any other Arabian country but with GDP per capita around US$ 1,010 over
1990-99. Both Saudi Arabia and Bahrain are oil-exporting countries and their people
enjoy relatively high living standards, while those in Jordan and Egypt are
considerably less prosperous.
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Table 2-20: General indicators for Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain
Indicators Jordan Egypt SaudiArabia Bahrain
Area (000, Sq. Km) 90 1000 2150 1
Population (millions) /1999 5 60 20 1
Population density (persons/sq. km)/1998 50 60 10 900
Population growth (Average 1995-99) 12 7 13 15
Human poverty (% of population)/mid 1997 10 30 10
Life expectancy at birth 70 65 70 70
Adult Literacy % 85 55 75 85
Human development rank Medium Medium Medium High
GDP per capita (US$, average 1990-99) 1,410 1,010 6,880 9,700
Rates of Inflation (consumer prices,
annual % change) (Average 1992-98) 4 10 1 1
Unemployment Rate, Average 1992-99 16 9 15
Source: Adapted from tables 2.3 to 2.6
Historically, Jordan's population has experienced three sharp increases due to
immigration resulting from Middle East wars. Following the 1948 and 1967 wars,
about 700,000 people moved from Palestine to Jordan and after the Gulf War in 1990,
about 400,000 Palestinians left Kuwait to Jordan (Mohammed, 1994). Such events
contributed largely to the high levels of unemployment experienced in this country,
especially during the 1990s.
Alternatively, Egypt is a non-oil country and has the largest population in the Arabian
World. This country has experienced high levels of poverty, illiteracy and
unemployment despite the conducted structural reforms undertaken to mitigate the
impacts of such factors over the last decade.
The population of Saudi Arabia has experienced substantial growth at around 3.5% per
annum during the 1990s. This high growth rate makes around 50% of Saudi's
population under the age of 18. While recent unemployment data are unavailable,
Saudi Arabia expects serious pressures for job creation in the long run. In response, the
Saudi government has pursued a programme of "Saudiization" whereby private
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companies are to increase the percentage of Saudi Arabian employees among their
workforce by 5% per annum (US Embassy Riyadh, 2001).
In Bahrain, non-Bahrainis constitute about 35 percent of the population. Bahrain's
government reported that unemployment was 2.35 percent in 1999 but the United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) estimates unemployment to be over 15
percent. Referring to the report of the World Trade Organisation (2000), Bahrain's
authorities launched in early 1996 a Bahrainization policy that defines the percent of
Bahraini employees to be employed by firms of varying sizes across varying sectors of
economy.
The human development indicators shown in Table 2.20 illustrate other significant
differences between the four countries. While Jordan and Bahrain have the lowest
illiteracy ratios (at about 15 percent), Egypt has the highest illiteracy rate, affecting
slightly less than half of its population. Poverty in both Bahrain and Jordan affects
somewhere around 10 percent of the population, compared with around 33% in Egypt
although there is little evidence of such hardship in Saudi Arabia. Whilst inflation has
not been an economic problem in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain over the last decade,
inflation rates are still relatively high in Egypt, averaging around 10 percent over the
last decade.
In general, the people of Arab oil countries (Saudi Arabia and Bahrain) enjoy
relatively high standards of living while those of the non-oil countries (Jordan and
Egypt) have much lower living standards, as clear by various economic and social
indicators (not least by the much lower per capita GDP levels experienced in these
countries).
2.6.2 Economic reforms in Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain
This section reviews the economic reforms undertaken in the countries under study
over the last decade. The impact of these reforms on various macroeconomic
indicators will be examined in the following section.
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2.6.2.1 Jordan
Jordan's was established in 1921 on the East Bank of the Jordan River. It is defined by
the UNDP (1999) as a middle-income country with a per capita GDP of about $ 1,400
over 1990-99. It has a small, open and mixed economy where the government
performs a key role in basic economic activities (i.e., transportation, communications,
electricity, large scale manufacturing, and the tourism sector). The size of the public
sector in Jordan is large in relation to the level of domestic economic activity.
According to the report of Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs — Jordan (1998),
Jordan's government remains the country's largest single employer; for instance, its
expenditure accounted for about 37% of GDP in 1999.
Historically, Jordan's economic performance was robust during the 1970s to the mid-
1980s. Domestic prices were generally stable, with inflation averaging 5 percent until
the mid-1980s. McDermott (1996) notes that real GDP rose by 9.5 percent a year
between 1976 and 1980, and investment averaged 35 percent of GDP. However, the
economic performance slowed since the mid 1980s and Jordan's government started to
face imbalances between economic growth and population growth. Over this period,
the flow of foreign grants from Arabian countries, and inflows of workers' remittances
started to decline after a fall in oil prices. By the mid-1980s, Jordan's debt service
reached 45 percent of exports and the country's fiscal deficit (excluding foreign grants)
increased to 20 percent of GDP (ibid.). During the 1988-90, the cost of living index
rose by 56%, the domestic currency lost 51% of its value against the dollar and the
country's reserves declined sharply. The growth in budget deficits forced the
authorities to borrow from domestic and foreign banks.
In addition to the aforementioned problems, Jordan's economic performance was
impeded by its limited resources as well as by policy-induced structural weaknesses in
various sectors. Jordan's trade regime was characterised by high tariff and non-tariff
barriers and by institutional inefficiencies that severely hindered its exports and
delayed the performance of the industrial sector (Alonso-Gamo et al., 1997a).
Maciejewski and Mansur (1996) indicate that the Jordan budget was affected by high
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military expenditures and extensive subsidy programmes (including those on basic
foods, energy, agricultural production and transportation). In the agriculture sector,
subsidized water and the support of producer's prices contributed to an inefficient use
of resources. The energy sector also suffered from inadequate pricing policies for oil
products and electricity.
To face the pressing social needs, Jordan's government initiated various economic
reforms in the 1990s onwards aimed at hastening economic growth, reducing
unemployment, enhancing financial stability and promoting the role of the private
sector in the process of economic development (Bureau of Economic and Business
Affairs - Jordan, 1998). Over the 1991-92 period, many economic indicators improved;
inflation fell to 3.5 percent averaging less than 5 percent during 1989-94. The fiscal
deficit (excluding foreign grants) declined from about 18 percent of GDP in 1991 to
less than 4 percent in 1992 (Maciejewski and Mansur, 1996). These improvements
were associated with a revival in investment (from 22 percent in 1989 to 29 percent in
1994) and real GDP grew by more than 7 percent a year (McDermott, 1996).
However, the decision of the Arab Gulf States to limit economic ties with Jordan after
the Gulf War in 1991/92 deprived it of the remittances of Jordanian workers in the
Gulf, traditional export markets, a secure supply of oil and substantial foreign aid
revenues. Moreover, absorbing up to 300,000 returnees from the Gulf countries
exacerbated unemployment and strained the government's ability to provide essential
services. Maciejewski and Mansur (1996) indicate that various structural measures
were introduced, after the Gulf crisis in 1991, including tariff reforms, interest rate
liberalisation and the introduction of flexible exchange rate policies.
As part of its public sector reforms, Jordan's government sold a large part of its shares
in the company of Jordan Hotels and Tourism and completed the commercialisation of
the Alia Gateway Hotels and duty-free shops at Amman International Airport in 1992.
According to IMF reports (1996 & 2000), Jordan's real GDP grew by 16 percent in
1992 but the growth momentum slowed to 6 percent a year during 1993-95. In
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addition, inflation fell to 4-5 percent during this period, unemployment declined to 12-
15 percent from about 25 percent in 1990, despite a high labour force growth.
However, the economic performance during the period 1996-98 deteriorated. While
the country maintained low inflation and started to build up its official foreign
exchange reserves, the real GDP growth slowed to about 1%.
In 1998, Jordan's government reactivated its privatisation programme commenced in
the early 1990s by selling parts of the Jordan Cement Factories Company and the
Jordan Telecommunications Company to foreign investors. The Aqaba Railway
Corporation was leased to an American consortium, and Jordan's first independent
power project (IPP) was awarded to a Belgian firm(US Commercial Service-Jordan,
2001). In addition, the government sought a strategic foreign partner for 49% of Royal
Jordanian (RJ) Airline's. Aqaba, a major Jordanian city, was designated as a Special
Economic Zone (SEZ). Apart from the mining sector (Phosphate and Potash), Jordan's
authorities plan to privatise most of remaining government-owned enterprises.
In 1999, Jordan's authorities introduced a further series of structural reforms (see table
2-21 for details). In the fiscal area, income tax reforms were introduced including the
simplification of personal income tax, treatment of dividends and interest income and
offering more investment incentives. Jordan also became a member of the WTO and as
part of the membership process, several reforms in legislation were undertaken to
harmonise the general sale tax (GST) on domestic and imported goods along with
amendments to customs law (International Monetary Fund, Jordan, 2000). These
reforms aimed at motivating foreign and private investment. The authorities also
modified Investment Law in 2000, to allow equal treatment for foreign and local
investors. Both Jordanian and foreign investors are permitted to invest in trade,
services and industrial projects in the free zones. Investment incentives take the form
of income tax and custom-duties exemptions, both of which are granted to Jordanian
and foreign investors. The ceiling on all duties was brought down to 30% as of March
2000, with a 10% ceiling on materials used as industrial inputs (US Commercial
Service-Jordan, 2001).
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Referring to the report by US Commercial Service-Jordan (2001), Jordan's authorities
have undertaken further steps to encourage investment in less-developed areas. These
include dividing the country into three development areas: zones A, B and C.
Investments in Zone C, the least developed areas of Jordan, receive the highest tax and
custom duties exemptions. Here profits are exempt from income and services taxes for
a period of 12 years and the goods imported to and/or exported from free zones are
exempt from import taxes and custom duties.
Table 2-21: Major economic reforms in Jordan over the last decade
Date The Event
1993 The Jordanian government signed an agreement with the IMF for an investment plan of $7.8
billion that relied on the Jordanian private sector to contribute between 61 percent and 67
percent of the required funding throughout the five-yew peviod (993- 097. The zz(cw \1,MS tO
enhance domestic investment and the role of the private sector in the process of economic
growth.
1994 The government enacted a general sales tax to replace a previously imposed consumption tax.
The tax applies to all durable and consumer goods except food staples and health care and
education-related products.
1996 Three main tariff reductions occurred as: the tariff on commodities between 5 and 50%; the
tariffs on tobacco and alcohol between 60 and 120%; and on automobiles between 70 and
200%. The aim is to give more incentives for foreign investment.
1996 The government left importing basic foodstuffs (such as cereals, sugar, milk and frozen meat).
The aim was to remove possible price distortions and to widen the role of the private sector.
1996 The Jordanian government issued a new income tax law; imposing a 35 percent maximum
marginal rate. Taxes on individual incomes are between 5 percent (for annual incomes less
than $3,000) and 30 percent (for annual incomes exceeding $22,500). Taxes are set at 35
percent for banks and financial institutions and 25 percent for companies engaged in brokerage
and agency activities. The law exempts re-invested profits from income tax.
1997 The Jordanian government partially privatised the state-owned Jordan Cement Company and
took steps to privatise the Aqaba railway.
1998 The government privatised the Aqaba Railway and partially privatised the state-owned cement
company. Significant progress was made towards privatising the Jordan Telecommunications
Company and Royal Jordanian, the national airline.
1999 Income tax reforms were introduced; this included the simplification of personal income tax
and tax treatment of dividends and interest income and the rationalization of investment
incentives.
Sources: Adapted from Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs 1993-1998 & International Monetary
Fund 2000 & Central Bank of Jordan 1997.
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Overall, the Jordanian authorities have undertaken various economic reforms including
widening the role of the private sector (by allowing more participation in various
governmental utilities and projects) during the 1990s. Furthermore, more market-
oriented regulations have been introduced aimed at encouraging external trade and
foreign investment. Despite the difficulties that have faced Jordan's economic
performance during 1990s (lack of natural resources and the increase in population
resulting from the resettlement of Palestinian in Jordan), the authorities succeeded in
improving various macroeconomic features of the economy.
2.6.2.2 Egypt
Egypt is a low-income country and its economic structure consists of a state sector
(estimated at 30 percent of GDP) and a private sector. The country's economic
performance was sluggish during the 1980s and early 1990s; for instance, annual real
GDP growth averaged 3 percent during 1985/86 through 1992/93, inflation exceeded
20 percent and the budget deficit was about 15 percent of GDP. The country also
suffered from a heavy burden of debt and weak exports. The fall of oil prices during
1980s had a further negative effect on Egypt, including lower remittances and aid
(Handy et al., 1998). During this period, the Egyptian economy suffered from
significant administrative restrictions including administered prices, interest rate
ceilings, multiple official exchange rates and various restrictions on the private and
foreign sectors. The financial sector suffered from segmentation, limits to competition,
subsidised credit allocations and negative real interest rates.
Following the unfavourable economic conditions during the late 1980s and early
1990s, Egypt initiated an extensive structural reform programme in 1991/92. The
programme aimed at privatising a substantial proportion of public entities, liberalising
trade as well as strengthening the financial sector. Handy et al. (1998) indicate that the
reform procedures were enhanced by the substantial capital inflows after the Gulf War
in 1991. National reserves rose to over $11 billion for the three years beginning
1991/92. The reduction in interest rates between 1990 and 1992 helped mobilise
capital to seek profitable investments. The tightening of credit conditions also played a
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role, as high interest rates created strong incentives for capital inflows. In 1991/92, the
interest differential between Egypt and US interest rates rose to 14.2 percent, before
declining to 10.5 percent by 1993/94. During 1994-96, capital inflows slowed, mainly
because of the decline in the interest differential, but accelerated again in 1996.
The Egyptian government reduced tariff and non-tariff restrictions during 1990-96 to
enhance the transparency of the trade regime. In 1991, the government instituted a
general sales tax (GST) and adopted value-added tax. Varieties of non-tariff barriers
that discriminated against foreign firms were eliminated in 1992. In 1997, the Egyptian
government enacted legislation aimed at promoting foreign investment through
packages of incentives to enhance the transparency of government regulations and
strengthening intellectual property rights (Handy et al., 1998). By 1996/ 1997, the
structural reforms had resulted in a decline in inflation to 6.2 percent (from 21 percent
in 1990/91), and the country experienced current and capital account surpluses.
The Egyptian authorities also started to privatise large parts of the public sector which
encompassed a wide variety of economic activities (estimated at about one-third of
economic output and employment). By 1998, the government divested its shares in 42
industrial, agricultural, construction and tourism sectors (accounting for more than
one-quarter of state-owned enterprises). The privatisation involved the sale of interests
in 84 companies with a market value of about LE 17.7 billions (representing about 7
percent of Egypt's GDP) (Subramanian, A. 1997& Handy et al., 1998).
Referring to the report of US Commercial Service/Egypt (2001), the Egyptian reforms
yielded an increase in real GDP growth (at 4-5% in the latter part of the 1990s), low
inflation (3.8% by 1998/99) and enhanced foreign currency reserves. The country's
debt rating in the international markets also enhanced (Moody's upgraded Egypt's
sovereign rating from the speculative grade of Ba-1 to the investment grade of Baa-1,
and Standard and Poor's rate Egypt's investment rating as BBB- but reduced its
economic performance rating from stable to negative in July 2000).
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Egypt's privatisation programme broadened in 1999 when the government opened
maritime, telecommunications and infrastructure sectors to the private sector on a
build-own-operate-transfer basis. In addition to awarding three contracts for power
generation in 1998 and 1999, the Egyptian Electrical Authority named a consortium,
led by Merrill Lynch and the Egyptian Investment Bank, to evaluate the country's
seven state-owned power generation and distribution companies for privatisation. The
estimated assets value of these is around $14 billion (US Commercial Service-Egypt,
2001). Referring to the report of Egypt Economics (2002), over the period 1993
through February 2002, 190 companies and utilities were privatized (for L.E. 16.9
billion), out of an aggregate of 314 companies which were held by the public sector.
Only 181 companies are still in the possession of the public sector.
Overall, privatisation and other economic reforms (i.e., trade liberalisation,
deregulation of the financial system and updating various commercial laws and
regulations) improved Egypt's overall economic performance during the 1990s.
Referring to the report by the Ministry of Planning & CAPMAS of Egypt (1999), the
reforms helped reduce inflation from about 20 percent during 1986-92 to less than 10
percent in 1993/94 and to about 4 percent by 1997-99. Furthermore, unemployment
rates that had ranged between 10 to 22 percent during the 1980s fell to 9.8 percent in
1993 and to less than 8 percent by 1998/99.
2.6.2.3 Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia's history dates back to its establishment in 1932 and it is known as a
country that takes care of Muslim pilgrims who visit the two holy cities of Mecca and
Medina. Referring to the report of US Embassy Riyadh (2001), Saudi Arabia is
considered one of the wealthiest countries in the world as it has 261 billion barrels of
proven oil reserves (more than one-quarter of the world total) and up to 1 trillion
barrels of ultimately recoverable oil. It is the world's largest oil producer (at eight
million barrels per day), and the country has enormous untapped gas potential.
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Saudi Arabia's economy is based primarily on free market principles and consists of a
mix of private ownership and a large state sector. The government maintains price
controls for basic utilities, energy and agricultural products. The oil and government
sectors have played major roles in developing different sectors of the economy. Since
its boom in 1973, oil has helped the government to maintain an annual budget surplus
until 1982 when there was a sharp decline in oil prices. The oil revenue has fallen from
about SR 320 billions in 1980 to SR 76 billions in 1990, having recovered to SR 160
billions by 1997 (Al-Sahlawi, 1997& Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency, 1999).
Parastatal corporations have dominated the economic output of Saudi Arabia since the
early 1970s. These firms include the oil firm of Saudi Arabia (ARMCO), the Saudi
Arabia Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC), the Saudi Arabia Telephone Company,
the Saudi Arabia Electricity Company and the Saline Water Conversion Corporation.
Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency (1999) indicate that prior to the oil boom in the 1970s,
parts or all of these firms, including ARMCO, were in private hands.
The Saudi Arabian Government imposes few taxes, relying on oil revenues, customs
duties, and licensing fees for most government revenue. Saudi people do not pay
income tax but are obliged to pay "zakat"; a voluntary tax set by Islamic law at 2.5
percent of net wealth. Foreign companies and self-employed foreign nationals pay an
income tax but do not pay zakat. Business income tax rates range from 25 percent (on
annual profits of less than $26,667) to a maximum rate of 45 percent (for profits of
more than $266,667). Import tariffs are generally 12 percent ad valorem but certain
specified essential commodities (e.g., defence purchases) are not subject to custom
duties (Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs — Saudi Arabia, 1998).
Oil and its derivative products account for 90-95% of Saudi Arabian export earnings,
and about 35-40% of GDP. The lack of diversity in sources of GDP, some have argued
has delayed Saudi's economic development. Based on the report of US Embassy
Riyadh (2001), Saudi's real GDP grew by only 0.5% in 1999 despite the recovery in
oil prices. Saudi Arabian per capita GDP (current dollars) peaked in 1981 at about US
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$28,600, while it is expected to be below $7,000 in the year 2000. As a result of rising
public debt, declining capital expenditures, and sluggish economic growth, Saudi's
government announced, in 1999, its intention to offer the private sector the opportunity
to take a wider role in economic development (US Embassy Riyadh, 2001). The Saudi
Arabia government has also begun to consider a series of structural reform measures
aimed at boosting capital investment. These reforms include liberalizing trade and
investment regimes, diversifying the economy, privatising parts of the (dominant) state
sector and diversifying tax revenues away from the over-reliance on volatile oil prices.
The Saudi government approved a new foreign investment law in 1999 to enhance
investment. The law permits foreign investment in all sectors and relaxes rules
restricting foreign ownership in local businesses. The law allows foreign investors to
transfer money freely from their enterprises outside of the country, allow joint venture
companies to sponsor their foreign investors as well as their foreign employees; and
permit foreign investors to own real property for company activities. The Saudi
government has also undertaken legal reforms to provide increased transparency
regarding such issues as the resolution of commercial disputes, clearer guarantees for
the protection of intellectual property rights and improved guidance to potential
investors regarding projects in which they cannot participate.
By the year 2001, Saudi had become a member of the WTO (US Embassy Riyadh,
2001). The accession to the WTO required Saudi Arabia to remove protection barriers,
place ceilings on tariffs, open key services sectors to foreign participation, and
improve intellectual property rights protection. These changes resulted in a more open,
transparent and rules-based trade regime. Such procedures are expected to stimulate
improved efficiencies levels, higher economic growth prospects and improve the
investment climate for foreign and domestic investors.
Up to 1999, Saudi privatisation had been largely limited through allowing private
firms to take on certain service functions, such as the management of seaports and
airports, and the provision of some postal collection, health and education services.
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Referring to the report of US Embassy/Riyadh (2001), the Saudi government declared,
in 1999, its intention to sell its stake in the Saudi Arabia Telephone Company to a
foreign strategic partner. Privatising the ownership of Saudi Arabia Basic Industries
Corporation has not progressed beyond 30 percent for many years despite a mandate in
the firm's constitution to become private. Other privatisation possibilities include
Saudi Arabia airlines, hotels, municipal services, and grain mills and silos, as well as
large minority stakes in banks.
Overall, the Saudi Arabian economy is still dependent on oil revenues that account for
about one third of the country's GDP and more than 90 percent of its export earnings.
However, the continued volatility in oil prices and the adverse consequences of the
1990 Gulf War has encouraged the Saudi authorities to diversify its economy by
encouraging the private sector to play a wider role. This process is ongoing.
2.6.2.4 Bahrain
Bahrain history refers to its establishment in 1932. The country is an archipelago of 36
low-lying islands situated midway down the Arab Gulf. The three main islands are
Bahrain (on which the capital Manama is located), Sitra, and Muharraq; these are
joined by causeways and make up about 95% of the 707 square kilometres land area.
Bahrain is a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council and works actively towards
economic integration with the other members.
Prior to the discovery of oil in 1932, the people of Bahrain earned their livelihood from
three main sources; pearl fishing, agriculture and trade. The first two were the
industries largest employers but trade provided the major source of revenue to the
State. Wilkenson and Atti (1997) indicate that there were many other smaller
industries with less potential for employment; the most notable of these were weaving
and embroidery, pottery, copper work and metal-smithing.
Throughout the oil boom years of the 1950s and 1960s, the country developed a solid
modern infrastructure; the electricity and water utilities are well developed,
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telecommunications facilities are of a high standard and the financial sector offers a
broad range of products and services. After independence in 1971, Bahrain has
pursued a liberal trade and investment policy, and has integrated its economy closely
with those of other countries in the region. In addition, Wilkenson and Atti (1997) note
the well-developed and highly competitive trade encouraged expansion of the
merchant sector where duties and tariffs on imports contributed effectively in the
national budget.
Bahrain's oil reserves are limited compared to other Gulf countries but still constitute
the main pillar to the economy. The oil and gas sectors have contributed around 50
percent of government revenues (at about 52 percent of its export and around 14
percent of its GDP) over the last decade (Arab Chamber of Commerce, 2000). The
existence of natural gas in Bahrain has also opened the way to set-up related industries.
As Bahrain's oil reserves are expected to last for a decade or so, efforts are being made
to reduce the size of the public sector which dominates key economic activities and
remains an important source of employment for Bahrain ( public sector activities
comprise petroleum, aluminium and telecommunications, although consolidated data
on the sector is not available).
The need to encourage private investment has led to a liberal economic policy relating
to free trade. US Commercial Service (2001) note that the Bahraini government has
partially or fully privatised a number of state-owned companies, especially in industry
during the 1990s. Private investment became allowed in petroleum refining, and in
petroleum extraction, through production-sharing agreements with the Government of
Bahrain. Liberalisation is proceeding in other service sectors including
telecommunications, maritime and air transport, and tourism. In maritime transport, the
authorities aim to develop Bahrain as a competitive regional distribution centre. In this
regard, a new port is being developed to add to the existing capacity of port facilities at
Mina Salman. Nowadays, Bahrain has one of the most diversified economies in the
Gulf and has the largest collection of manufacturing industries and the biggest
community of international bank branches in the region.
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Monetary competence is apparent in Bahraini fiscal management. The convertible
currency has been fixed at US$ 2.66 to the Bahraini dinar since 1986. The Bahrain
Monetary Authority has held the country inflation rate at less than 3% for many years,
thus encouraging stability and fair spreads in market-based interest rates. There have
been no bank failures. Interest rates were partially decontrolled in 1988 and fully
decontrolled in 1994 (Wilkenson and Atti, 1997).
Finance and banking is among the largest sectors in the Bahraini economy. It consists
of a number of investment, commercial and specialized banks, offshore banking units
and money changing companies (Arab Chamber of Commerce, 2000). The growth of
Bahrain as an international financial centre is partially attributed to the disappearance
of Beirut as a major banking centre during the 1980s as well as its stable
macroeconomic climate. In 1989, the Bahrain Stock Exchange commenced operation
and since then it has sought to extend its services to local and international companies
and helped strengthening the economic ties with other GCC countries (Arab Chamber
of Commerce, 2000).
Bahrain offers several advantages to foreign investors, including no personal or
corporate taxation and no restriction on capital and profit repatriation. The Bahrain
Development Bank was established in 1991, followed by the Bahrain Marketing and
Promotion Office in 1992, both are geared to attract international private-sector
investment. An office of the UN Industrial Development Organisation was opened in
Bahrain in 1996 aimed at attracting foreign investment to realise joint ventures with
local entrepreneurs (Arab Chamber of Commerce, 2000). Regulations now allow 100
percent foreign ownership in new industrial ventures or in service companies if their
regional headquarters are located in Bahrain. The government also allows the
establishment of representative offices or branches of foreign companies without local
sponsors. Joint ventures allow for up to 49 percent foreign ownership.
Since 1999, additional reforms have taken place; foreign equity ownership limits on
firms listed on the Bahrain Stock Exchange have been raised from 24% to 49%. In
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addition, efforts are being made to update the approval of foreign investment projects
(World Trade Organization, 2000). Foreign firms receive the same investment
incentives available to Bahraini companies, including personal corporate tax
exemption, no restriction on capital and profit repatriation, and duty-free access to
GCC member states for products manufactured in Bahrain (Arab Chamber of
Commerce, 2000).
Referring to the report of the Arab Chamber of Commerce (2000), two free trade zones
exist in Bahrain, used for temporary storage of imported goods set for re-export. Mina
Salman, Bahrain's major port, provides a free transit zone to facilitate the duty-free
import of equipment and machinery. The government of Bahrain continues to offer
incentives to international firms to establish light and heavy industries and to deal
freely on the island.
To sum up, the Bahraini authorities have undertaken various reforms aimed at
diversifying further its economy. In particular, the country has taken the initiative to
become a major trade centre in the Gulf region. The transition of the country from its
dependency on oil can be noted by comparing the components of GDP in the 1980s,
where oil accounted for about 35 percent of its GDP, to the current situation where oil
contributed only about 17 percent in the late1990s. In addition, the financial sector has
contributed more than 10 percent towards its GDP (on average) over the last decade.
Bahrain's success is attributed mainly to liberal trade policies being pursued and the
development of appropriate infrastructure services to foreign investors.
2.6.3 Economic performance of Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain during the
1990s
This section examines the impact of the structural reforms that have taken place in the
countries under study on the economic performance of these countries during the
1990s.
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2.6.3.1 Economic Growth
The real GDP of Jordan and Egypt grew at around 8.5 and 14.8 percent annually
between 1990-99. These rates of growth are higher than the average rate of growth for
the non-oil Arab countries (5.1 per annum) over the period 1992-99. The real GDP
growth of both countries was higher at the beginning of the 1990s but has experienced
a slowdown towards the end of the decade. Alternatively, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain
have experienced lower (and volatile) growth at 5.8 and 6.3 percent during 1990-99.
These growth rates are slightly higher than the average rate of growth for Arab-oil
countries at 5.6 percent over the period 1992-99.
Table 2-22: GDP indictors of Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain over the last decade
Indicators Jordan Egypt
Saudi
Arabia
Bahrain
Real GDP growth, annual % change, Average 1990-
99 8.5 14.8 5.8 6.3
GDP per capita (1987 US$), Average 1990-97 1,410 1,020 6,880 9,700
Composition of GDP — Current prices (US$, Avg.
1990-99) 5,990 58,510 126,280 6,620
Commodity Sector (%) 28 47 59 37
Distribution Sector (%) 38 31 18 24
Services Sector (%) 20 17 21 35
Source: Arab Monetary Fund (2002) (www.amf.org.ae).
Concerning the GDP per capita in the four countries, table 2-9 shows that, apart from
Egypt, the real GDP per capita has not shown favourable growth especially over the
last decade. This attests to the imbalance between the growth in the population and the
growth in economic performance in these countries over the last decade.
Concerning the contribution of different economic activities to the GDP of the
countries under study, table 2.22 shows that, apart from Jordan where the distributive
sector (commerce, transport, banking and finance) dominates economic activity,
commodity sectors dominate other economic activities, especially in Saudi Arabia and
Egypt.
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Table 2-23: Distribution of GDP (current prices) to economic sectors for Jordan, Egypt, Saudi
Arabia and Bahrain/ Average 1990-99
SECTOR Jordan Egypt Saudi Arabia Bahrain
Agriculture, Fishing & Forestry 5 16 6 1
Mining, Quarrying & Fuel 4 7 35 17
Manufacturing Industries 12 17 9 13
Electricity, Water and Gas 2 2 0 3
Construction 5 5 9 5
Total Commodity Sector 28 47 59 38
Commerce, Rest. And Hotels 9 1 7 10
Transport, Commercial and Storage 13 9 6 8
Finance, Insurance and Banking 16 20 4 8
Total Distributive Sector 38 31 18 25
Housing 2 2 9
Government Services 17 7 18 18
Other Services 3 8 2 7
Total Service Sector 20 17 21 34
GDP at factor cost 85 94 98 97
Net Indirect taxes 15 6 2 3
GDP at purchaser' values (US$ millions) 5,990 58,508 126,780 5,577
Source: Arab Monetary Fund, 2002 (www.amf.org.ae ).
In Jordan, the government services sector, finance and banking sector and industry
sector are the major sources of GDP, providing about one half of GDP during 1990-99.
Reviewing the major changes that have taken place in the contribution of different
economic activities in Jordan, we noted that the contribution of agriculture has fallen
over time from around 7% in 1990 to 2% percent by 1999. On the other hand, the
contribution of mining has grown substantially. Mineral production in Jordan is
dominated by three industries: phosphate, potash and cement. The contribution of
other economic sectors in Jordan's GDP have not shown noticeable changes since the
early 1990s. Concerning the contribution of banking and finance, this sector has also
not witnessed important changes over the last decade.
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In Egypt, the banking and finance sector, the industrial sector and agriculture are the
main economic activities contributing about 60 percent of GDP over the period 1990-
99. The share of these economic areas has not shown noticeable changes during 1990-
99. The tourism and the Suez Canal revenues dominate Egypt's services sector
(Tourism revenues were $US 2.2 billion through the second quarter of 1999/00). As a
result of the privatisation programme, the private sector's role has steadily expanded in
key sectors such as metals (aluminium, iron, and steel), petrochemicals, cement,
automobiles, textiles, consumer electronics, and pharmaceuticals (US Commercial
Service-Egypt, 2001). Concerning the contribution of banking and finance to Egypt's
GDP, the sector accounts for around 20% of the overall economy a share that appears
to have remained stable during the 1990s.
In Saudi Arabia, the oil sector and government services sector are the major sources of
GDP, accounting for about 55% during the 1990-99 period. Reviewing the changes in
contribution of different economic activities in Saudi's GDP, the share of the oil sector
has fallen from 36% in 1990 to around 31% in 1999. On the other hand, the
contribution of the government sector increased from around 18% of GDP in 1990 to
20% by 1999. The banking and finance sector accounted for around 7% of the Saudi
GDP throughout the 1990s.
In Bahrain, the government sector, oil industry and other industrial activities constitute
around 50% of its GDP over 1990-99 (the contribution of the oil and natural gas
industry has fallen over the past decade and accounted for around 55 percent of the
industrial sector over the 1997-99 period). The manufacturing sector is mainly based
on energy-intensive products, including aluminium, metal industries, and chemicals.
The service sector also accounts for a substantial proportion of the Bahraini economy.
The contribution of the banking and financial sector to GDP increased from around 8%
in 1990 to 9% in 1999.
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2.6.3.2 Exports, Imports and Trade Balance
In addition to various GDP indicators discussed earlier, one can examine another
dimension of economic performance by viewing trade patterns. Trade activity
indicators for the four countries under study are shown in Table 2-24.
Over the last decade, Jordan has suffered from permanent trade deficits. However, the
annual growth in exports, at about 8%, has exceeded the 5% growth in imports. This
has resulted in a fall in Jordan's trade deficits over the last decade. The trade deficit as
a percent of GDP decreased from around 38% in 1990 to around 25% in 1999. It
should be noted that Jordan's exports were dominated by traditional goods (raw
materials such as potash and phosphates). Other important exports are
pharmaceuticals, detergents and fertilizers. As the production base in Jordan's
economy is narrow, the economy is highly dependent on imports.
In Egypt, both exports and imports have increased over the last decade but the annual
increase in imports, at around 8%, has been twice the annual growth in exports. While
the trade balance deficit has grown, it has fallen as a percentage of GDP from 19% in
1990 to around 14% by 1999, an indication that Egypt's GDP has increased over the
last decade.
In Saudi Arabia, the trade surplus averaged around 16 percent of the GDP over the
period 1990-99. However, Saudi exports have increased annually at around 1 percent
over the period 1990-99 while its imports have increased at around 2 percent over the
same period.
Bahrain's export has averaged around $3,960 million annually over 1990-99 while its
imports averaged around $3,890 million. While exports experienced an annual increase
of around 1 percent, imports fell by around 0.5 percent per annum. This resulted in
Bahrain experiencing both trade deficits and surpluses during the 1990s (running a
balanced trade budget for the 1990s period overall).
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The above trade indicators reveal improved trade balance in the four countries under
present study toward the second part of 1990s.
Table 2-24: Trade indictors of Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain over the last decade
Country 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Average
1990-99
Annual
Growth
%(Avg.)
Jordan
Export 1,064 1,132 1,220 1,248 1,425 1,771 1,817 1,836 1,802 1,832 1,515 8.02
Import 2,601 2,513 3,257 3,542 3,381 3,696 4,293 4,102 3,828 3,717 3,493 4.77
Trade Balance -1,537 -1,381 -2,037 -2,293 -1,957 -1,925 -2,476 -2,266 -2,026 -1,885 -1,978 2.52
Trade Bal. % of GDP -38 -33 -40 -41 -32 -30 -37 -32 -28 -25 -33
Egypt
Export 2,569 3,620 3,054 3,121 3,472 3,451 3,539 3,919 3,206 3,546 3,350 4.23
Import 9,169 7,759 8,304 8,216 9,584 11,764 13,036 13,245 16,537 16,009 11,362 8.29
Trade Balance -6,601 -4,139 -5,250 -5,095 -6,113 -8,312 -9,497 -9,326 -13,330 -12,463 -8,013 9.87
Trade Bal. % of GDP
-19 -12 -13 -11 -12 -14 -14 -12 -16 -14 -14
Saudi Arabia
Export 44,416 47,697 50,287 42,395 42,614 50,041 60,728 60,732 38,822 48,482 48,622 1.02
Import 24,069 29,085 33,273 28,202 23,364 28,087 27,765 28,743 30,013 28,032 28,063 1.83
Trade Balance 20,347 18,611 17,014 14,193 19,250 21,954 32,963 31,989 8,809 20,450 20,558 0.06
Trade Bal. % of GDP 19 16 14 12 16 17 23 22 7 15 16
Bahrain
Export 3,760 3,513 3,464 3,723 3,617 4,113 4,700 4,384 3,270 4,088 3,863 0.97
Import 3,712 4,115 4,263 3,858 3,748 3,716 4,273 4,026 3,566 3,588 3,886 -0.37
Trade Balance 49 -602 -799 -135 -131 397 427 358 -296 500 -23 103.04
Trade Bal. % of GDP 1 -13 -17 -3 -2 7 7 6 -5 8 0
Source: Adapted from Arab Monetary Fund, 2002 (www.amf.org.ae ).
2.6.3.3 External Debt and External Reserves
External debt of both Jordan and Egypt has been reduced over the last decade (see
table 2.25). However, Jordan still carries a big external debt at about $7 billion at the
end of April 2000 (about 92% of GDP). The Jordanian government has stated its plan
to use some of the proceeds from privatisation to reduce its debt (US Commercial
Service-Jordan, 2001). On the other hand, while the absolute figure of Egyptian's debt
has not shown significant changes over the last decade (at around $ 29 billion over the
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1990-98 period), this debt as a percent of GDP has fallen from around 80% in 1990 to
33% in 1998.
In contrast to Jordan and Egypt, Saudi Arabia* is considered to be one of the world's
largest international creditors. The Saudi's average aid-to-GDP ratio averaged 4
percent of GDP per annum during the past three decades (US Embassy Riyadh, 2001).
Bahrain is also an oil exporter country and used to have insignificant external debt.
Table 2-25: External debt indicators of Jordan and Egypt over the last decade
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1990-98
Average*
Jordan
External Debt 7,043 7,458 6,922 6,770 6,883 7,023 7,091 6,960 7,388 7,060
External Debt as
% of GDP 175 178 135 122 113 108 107 100 101 126
Egypt
External Debt 28,372 29,317 28,348 28,303 30,189 30,792 28,810 26,804 27,670 28,734
External Debt as
% of GDP 80 86 68 60 58 51 43 35 33 4
Source: Adapted from Arab Monetary Fund, 2002 (www.amf.org.ae ).
The external reserves of the countries under study, especially Jordan and Egypt, have
witnessed favourable growth over the last decade (table 2.26). The external reserves of
Jordan and Egypt have grown at around 15% and 49% over the period 1990-99. On the
other hand, the reserves of both Saudi Arabia and Bahrain have experienced modest
growth. The external reserves of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain's, and perhaps their debts,
were significantly impacted by the consequences of the Gulf War in 1991-1992.
Overall, the external debt and reserves for the countries under study (especially those
of Jordan and Egypt) have shown significant improvement during the last decade.
* There were no official reports showing Saudi Arabia and Bahrain external indebtedness, especially
over the last part of the 1990s (reports by the Arab Monetary Fund, 2002 and World Bank, 2000 do not
provide data on the indebtedness of these countries).
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Table 2-26: International reserves (excluding gold) of Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain
over 1990-99/ US$, millions
Annual
Country 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Average Increase
Jordan 849 825 769 595 431 427 697 1,693 1,170 1,991 945 15
Bahrain 1,235 1,515 1,259 1,149 1,104 1,274 1,265 1,362 1,349 1,371 1,288 1
Saudi Arabia 11,668 11,673 5,935 7,428 7,378 8,622 14,321 14,876 14,220 16,997 11,312 5
Egypt 2,684 5,325 10,936 13,040 13,476 16,192 17,400 18,667 18,114 14,481 13,031 49
Source: Adapted from Arab Monetary Fund, 2002 (www.amf.org.ae ).
2.6.3.4 Investment
Domestic investment in Jordan has grown noticeably during 1995-99, averaging about
29% annually compared to 22% in the Middle East and other Arabian countries (table
2.27). However, domestic investment in Jordan has shown decreasing rates of growth
after 1995; falling from about 34 percent, as a percentage of GDP, in 1995 to about 27
percent in 1999. The domestic investment in both Saudi Arabia and Egypt averaged
slightly less than 20 percent over 1995-99. (There is no available data regarding the
size of domestic investment as a percent of GDP for Bahrain).
Direct foreign investments to both Jordan and Egypt have witnessed significant
increases over the last decade. In Jordan, foreign investment has increased from about
US$ 13 million in 1995 to more than US$ 300 million in 1998, averaging about US$
175 million over the whole period. However, there is no recent available data for Saudi
Arabia and Bahrain.
Table 2-27: Investment activity in Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain over 1995-99
Indicators Jordan Egypt Saudi
Arabia
Bahrain Avg.
Arab-oil
countries
Avg. Arab
non-oil
countries
Gross domestic investment as % of 29 N/A 20 10 19 23
GDP, Average 1995-99
Foreign direct investment, current 175 800 N/A N/A 8 92
US$ millions, Average 1995-98
Source: Adapted from tables 2.19 to 2.20
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2.7 Conclusion
The Arabic region comprises 21 countries whose people speak the Arabic language
and these countries can be classified economically into oil and non-oil exporting
countries. Four Arabian blocs have appeared over the past years and these blocs share
similar objectives; integrating and enforcing the economic and cultural ties between
members' countries. These blocs include the council of Arab community, the Arab
Maghreb union, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the council of Arab
Mashreq countries.
The area and population of individual Arabian countries vary considerably. The living
standards for individual countries also vary widely particularly in terms of per capita
GDP. Various Arabian countries, for instance, suffer in terms of their poverty levels,
high rates of illiteracy and low levels of human development. Despite the variations in
the economic resources of individual countries, Arabia is rich in natural resources,
especially its oil reserves that account for two-thirds of the world's crude oil.
The economic growth of Arabian countries (as measured by real GDP) slowed over
1982-91, averaging 1.6 percent compared to 4 percent for other developing countries
over the same period. This slowness led to low levels of investment and high levels of
unemployment. This was also associated with rising levels of external indebtness and
fiscal deficits, especially for non-oil exporting countries forcing many Arabian
countries to undertake macroeconomic reforms to promote economic growth.
During the 1990s, Arabia's economic performance improved compared to the 1980s
and the gap of economic growth compared to other developing countries reduced
despite the difficult situation faced by some individual economies. The real GDP
growth averaged 3.9 percent between 1992-1999 compared to 5.6 percent for all
developing countries over the same period. The trade balance of Arab oil countries
witnessed surpluses during the 1990s while those of the non-oil Arab countries
witnessed deficits, but these deficits as a percent of GDP have been falling. Inflation
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rates have been reduced in many Arabian countries, especially in comparison with the
1980s levels. While the external debts of some Arabian countries are still high,
external debt as a percentage of GDP appears to be following a declining trend. The
total external reserves of the Arabian countries increased sharply during the 1990s,
especially the reserves of the non-oil exporting countries. Investment levels have also
witnessed improvement, especially foreign investment.
Concerning the economic position of the countries under study, various indicators,
especially those for Jordan and Egypt have improved over the last decade. Specifically,
the real GDP of Jordan and Egypt have grown faster than those for other non-oil Arab
countries. Saudi Arabia and Bahrain have experienced slower growth rates, albeit still
higher than the average for Arab-oil countries. The economic performance of Bahrain
and Saudi Arabia were more affected by the consequences of The Gulf War. Other
economic indicators relating to trade, investment levels, external indebtedness and
levels of reserves suggest improved economic performance (to varying degrees) for the
four countries under study.
The improvement in the general economic position of the countries under study is
expected to be associated with enhanced performance being channelled into the
financial institutions operating in these countries. This will be examined in the
following chapter of this thesis.
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3.1 Introduction
This chapter outlines the main characteristics of the financial systems of the countries
under study; Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. The aim is to investigate factors
that have impacted on the efficiency and competitive features of the financial
institutions operating in these countries. Section 3.2 explains the role of financial
institutions in the process of economic growth by describing briefly the major
functions of the financial system. Section 3.3 outlines the role of financial
liberalisation in enhancing the role of financial intermediaries. The section outlines the
motives for regulating financial systems, the rationale behind financial deregulation,
and exposes the requirements for more successful financial liberalisation.
Section 3.4 presents an overview of the financial systems of the countries under study;
Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. The section examines briefly the financial
reforms that have taken place in these countries. Particular attention is paid to reforms
that have taken place in Jordan and Egypt over the last decade, as these countries have
embarked on more radical financial sector deregulation compared to Saudi Arabia and
Bahrain. Section 3.5 examines the changes in the financial structure of the countries
under study over the last decade by presenting the relative importance of the
commercial banks in the financial systems along with the major changes that have
taken place in the distribution of these assets. It also describes other features of
financial structure by discussing changes in banking sector market concentration. The
section also outlines features of financial sector growth in the countries under study
and notes the main changes in credit distribution to the main economic sectors.
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Section 3.6 presents a preliminary appraisal concerning the impact of economic and
financial reforms on the performance of financial institutions. We use a variety of
financial development indicators, in particular those suggested by Goldsmith (1969), to
examine the impact of economic and financial reforms on the depth of financial
intermediation. Finally, section 3.5 draws some conclusion.
3.2 The role of financial intermediation in economic growth
The main functions of a financial system are to intermediate between saving and
investing economic units. This includes selecting investment projects and the final
users of financial resources according to their creditworthiness and monitoring the use
of these resources. In particular, financial systems transform the maturity, liquidity,
risk and return characteristics of the liabilities issued by borrowing units to meet the
preferences of lenders.
Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) emphasize the role of financial intermediaries in
risk-pooling and monitoring functions. By pooling savings for diversified investment
projects and by monitoring the behaviour of the borrowing firms, banks ensure higher
expected rates of returns which help to promote economic growth.
The financial system ensures that citizens have the incentive to save and that savings
are employed efficiently. Herring and Santomero (2000) argue that a well-functioning
financial system makes a critical contribution to economic performance by facilitating
transactions, mobilising savings and allocating capital across time and space. Financial
institutions provide payment services and a variety of financial products that enable the
corporate sector and households to cope with economic uncertainties by hedging,
pooling, sharing and pricing risks. A stable, efficient financial sector reduces the cost
and risk of investment. Financial markets also provide a crucial source of information
that helps coordinate decentralised decisions throughout the economy. Rates of return
in financial markets guide households in allocating income between consumption and
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savings, and in allocating their stock of wealth. Merton (1995) summarises that the
overall objective of regulating the financial sector should be to ensure that the system
functions efficiently, helping to deploy, transfer and allocate resources across time and
space under conditions of uncertainty.
Seminal work by Schumpeter (1911, 1939) noted that financial intermediaries play an
important role in promoting economic growth by redirecting funds toward innovative
projects. Bencievenga and Smith (1991) and Diamond and Dybvig (1983) have also
stressed the role of financial intermediaries in managing liquidity. Financial
intermediaries reduce low-return investment due to premature liquidation and redirect
funds into longer-term, high-yield projects, leading to faster growth. Therefore,
economic growth is directly affected by the increase in the quality of aggregate
investment through enhancing profitable opportunities, which is accomplished partly
through the informational role of intermediation and according to how well
technological frictions are overcome.
Levine (1991) incorporates both portfolio diversification and liquidity management
aspects to show the role of financial intermediaries in pooling consumers' liquidity
risks via the securities market and concludes that setting up a stock market enhances
economic growth. Chen, Chiang and Wang (1996) also suggest that financial
intermediation increases investment projects and spurs economic growth by utilising
more sophisticated and specialised production processes.
In both developed and developing economies, banks are the principal source of non-
market finance to the economy. Banks gather and assess information about prospective
borrowers and their investment opportunities. The second function performed by banks
is to serve as the principal repository for liquidity in the economy. By pooling the
transaction balances of many different transactors, banks can acquire large, diversified
portfolios of direct claims on borrowers which enable them to meet liquidity demands
while still holding substantial amounts of illiquid assets. Furthermore, banks offer
longer-term deposits that must compete directly with other instruments available in the
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financial markets. The return on deposits must be sufficient to compensate for the risk
and delayed consumption associated with accepting deposit claims on the bank.
Furthermore, banks transform the longer-term, risky, illiquid claims that borrowers
prefer to issue into safer, shorter-term, more liquid demand and the savings deposits
that savers prefer. This asset transformation often involves maturity transformation as
well.
Financial intermediaries enhance economic efficiency by overcoming frictions through
channelling resources toward the most efficient investment, giving households access
to economies of scale in processing information that enables the identification of
investment projects and ensures that businesses act in ways that do not conflict with
saver's interests. Becsi and Wang (1997) note that while there is no single general
model that explains why banks exist, fundamental market frictions are probably the
main rationale for the existence of financial intermediaries. Market frictions can be
classified into either technological or incentive. Technological frictions prevent
individuals from having to access economies of scale in the processing of financial
services relating to potential borrowers.
Gurley and Shaw (1960) introduce the role of financial intermediaries in overcoming
technological frictions. They show that financial intermediaries transform bonds and
stocks issued by firms into demand or savings deposits for households. They transform
savings into investments by repackaging wealth and transferring capital and
information. On the other hand, incentive frictions occur because information is costly
and individuals are differentially informed and act in their self-interest. Moreover,
contracts are incomplete because not all contingencies can be spelled out, not every
action is accountable, and because of specific legal environment concerns.
The role of financial intermediaries in reducing technological frictions can take many
forms (Becsi and Wang, 1997). Intermediaries help individual savers by providing
access to large investment projects via fund-pooling mechanisms. Thus, financial
intermediaries improve the efficiency of the economy by letting savers invest in large
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projects. Furthermore, intermediaries benefit small savers by making riskier
investments available to them through the risk-pooling mechanism. The intermediary
can offer this service at a lower cost than savers can manage individually. Savers
therefore have access to economies of scale. Intermediaries can also help investors by
providing access to long-term projects through liquidity management. The pooling
mechanism provides financial economies of scale by reducing the cost of illiquid
investments. In addition, intermediaries can improve investors' access to worthwhile
investments by means of a screening mechanism. Financial intermediaries can
therefore help capital move to its highest value, thus improving allocative efficiency.
The role of financial intermediaries in reducing incentive frictions arises as a result of
conflicts of interest in the behaviour of savers and firms due to asymmetric
information. Thus, if financial contracts were to apply equally to different types of
firms, adverse selection might occur in that only firms with lower quality assets would
demand contracts. Furthermore, moral hazards might arise as it is not always in a
firms' best interest to behave honestly. Financial intermediaries can help reduce
problems associated with asymmetric information or moral hazard by offering
financial contracts that are not available in markets and by providing economies of
scale in monitoring and control. Therefore, financial intermediaries perform a major
role in mediating conflicting incentives between lenders and borrowers that arise from
imperfect information and incomplete contracts.
Overall, financial intermediaries have major roles to play in the economy; in particular,
they help overcome various sources of market frictions and therefore help transform
financial resources to their most efficient use, thus enhancing economic growth.
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3.3 Financial liberalisation and financial intermediation
This section outlines the grounds for regulating the financial system in general. In
addition, it describes the forms and consequences of financial repression on economic
performance and the financial system in particular. We then consider the rationale for
wider financial liberalisation as a means for boosting economic growth and improving
the competitive advantage of financial systems. Finally, this section outlines the main
requirements suggested for successful financial liberalisation.
3.3.1 Rationale for regulating financial sectors
The financial sector, in general, is one of the most heavily regulated sectors of the
economy. The origins for this relate to the viewpoint that the financial sector can be
subject to systemic* collapse as characterised by the Great (Wall Street) Crash in 1929
and the bank failures that followed thereafter. In banking, the perceived riskiness of
the intermediation process, the importance of banks as suppliers of credit in the
economy and the special role of banks in operating the payments system are other
reasons for the special regulatory attention paid to this business area.
Prudential regulations in banking aim mainly to protect individual investors and to
enhance the stability and soundness of the financial system. Goodhart et al. (1998)
note that the mere possibility that failures of individual financial institutions can
propagate and become general, through contagion risk, combined with uncertainty
about the conditions of the banks, can cause depositors and other creditors to lose
confidence which may lead to a run on the banking system. This can have disastrous
consequences for the real economy, and even large solvent banks can fail. Borrowers
from failed banks also suffer as the informational capital they acquired through
sustained dealings with the bank suddenly loses its value.
* Systemic risk is defined as the risk of a sudden, unanticipated event that would damage the financial
system to such an extent that economic activity in the wider economy would suffer.
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Herring and Santomero (2000) consider the rationale for regulating the financial
system. Financial regulation aims to protect financial markets and institutions from
shocks that might pose a systemic risk. Regulatory measures that might be taken to
reduce systemic risk include asset restrictions, capital adequacy standards, deposit
insurance and disclosure standards. Some measures, such as interest rate ceilings on
deposits, were intended to prevent excessive competition. Other measures, however,
such as geographic restrictions may increase exposure to systemic risk by impeding
diversification. Second, protecting consumers is the second rationale for financial
regulation. Such regulation is put in place to protect consumers from excessive prices
or opportunistic behaviour by participants in financial markets. Competition policy
also aims to protect monopolistic pricing and therefore to enhance the efficiency of the
allocation of financial assets within the financial sector, and between the financial
sector and the rest of the economy. As consumers face the problem of asymmerric
information in their evaluation of financial service providers, they are vulnerable to
adverse selection as well as to moral hazards, where agents put their own interests
above those of the customers. To ease such problems, regulators often establish fit and
proper tests for financial firms. Such enforcement of conduct provides firms with
incentives to adopt procedures that ensure consumers are honestly served. The
provision of insurance is another response to the asymmetric information problem.
Reserve requirements, capital requirements and liquidity requirements are designed to
ensure that a financial services firm will be able to honour its liabilities to its
customers, and are also built into the system so as to safeguard against systemic risk.
A safe and sound banking system is therefore important because it not only minimises
the likelihood of economic downturns resulting from financial panics but also because
the avoidance of such events can limit the exposure of governments that often may
have to bear a significant part of the costs of the bailout. Prudential regulation is meant
to protect the banking system from these problems by inducing banks to invest
prudently. One form of prudential regulation relates to capital requirements, typically
related to international guidelines set by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
(for example the Basle Accord). Capital requirements force banks to have more of
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their own capital at risk so that they internalise the inefficiency of investing in high-
risk assets. Regulatory policies that can be used to generate improvements over using
capital requirements alone include such things as portfolio restrictions, enhanced
supervision of management and systems and the design of incentive-compatible safety
nets. The goal of these policies is to limit the scope of the bank to engage in excessive
risk taking and moral hazard behaviour while creating (franchise value) incentives for
prudential bank behaviour (El-Shazly, 2001).
3.3.2 Regulated versus market-based financial systems
The central role of an economic system (including both the private and public sectors)
is to coordinate economic activity across the various agents in the economy. Analysts
of economic growth have long discussed the proper role of the government in
promoting economic growth. There have been many arguments about whether the
regulated or market based financial system is better in promoting development, and
most economists agree that each system has its own benefits and drawbacks.
The market approach presumes that, in the absence of inefficient government
intervention, the market generally functions efficiently, and so the government should
act to ensure secure property rights and competition. In contrast, the government
approach presumes that market failure is pervasive and thus government intervention
is necessary to mobilize savings, allocate resources efficiently and promote
technological catch-up.
Many developing countries financial systems are characterised by financial repression.
Financial repression characterises excessive government intervention in the financial
sector, resulting in non-market real rates of interest thus suppressing the role of the
market for banking sector deposits and the intermediation process in general.
Government intervention in the regulation of financial and economic sectors can take
many forms. For instance, there may be selective or directed credit policies to
implement planned sectoral investment programmes. Selective credit policies use
interest rate ceilings and subsidies to direct investible funds through a non-price
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rationing system to priority investment projects. Brownbridge and Gayi (2000) argue
that improved credit allocation can be attained by reducing government intervention in
directing credit or setting interest rates so that banks allocate credit according to
commercial criteria. More efficient and higher quality financial services can be
attained through increased competition that comes from liberalised entry and/or the
removal of regulations that restrict competition.
A substantial body of literature presented by McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) has
argued that financial liberalisation (market based system) increases savings, improves
the efficiency with which resources are allocated among alternative investment
projects and therefore raises the rate of economic growth. Financial liberalisation
defines the process of freeing up interest rate controls, exchange rates and capital
controls, the entry of foreign banks, deregulation of financial services and enhancing
the supervisory re-regulation that accompanies deregulation.
McKinnon (1973) postulates that investors must accumulate money before undertaking
investment. The higher the returns on financial assets, the greater the accumulation of
money balances will be and the stronger the incentive for investment. Thus,
liberalising interest rates encourages economic growth through the positive impact of
complementarity of financial assets and physical capital.
Shaw (1973), on the other hand, emphasizes the benefits of an efficient and well-
functioning system to improve a country's per capita income. He proposed that
efficiency gains in the intermediation process would be attained if more individuals
held their assets with banks. The increased institutionalisation of savings could
increase the real return to savers and at the same time reduce the costs of lending to
investors, improving efficiency of investment and hence economic growth. Put another
way, higher real interest rates can improve the intermediation role of financial
institutions (M. Fry, 1995, p 29).
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The neoclassical economists argue that deregulation and liberalization in the financial
sector can lead to more efficient allocation and higher economic growth. According to
Hellmann et al. (1997), this is because a market-based system relies on a stock market
that can generate efficient information about the real performance of firms. Thus, the
stock market can play the role of effective monitoring, because firms' stock prices will
fall with bad performances. However, various failures of financial liberalization, like
those experienced by the Southern countries of Latin America dictate that in practice,
neoclassical economists need to adopt a more balanced view concerning the impact of
financial liberalization. The so-called New-Keynesians recognize the problem of
incomplete information inherent in the financial market and the essential role of
government regulation.
On the other hand, other economists think that a regulated financial system is better
since it can induce longer-term investment in the real sector because market-based
systems are too sensitive to stock market prices in the short-term. Moreover,
government expansion policies can be carried out more easily as the regulated system
provides governments with more measures (such as interest rate regulation and policy
credit) to intervene in the financial sector than in market-based systems (Pollin, 1995).
Moreover, heterodox economists are strongly against financial liberalization. They
point out that financial liberalization induces a vicious cycle of stagflation. They argue
that the availability of loanable funds will decrease with high interest rates after the
liberalization program, and thus economic growth will be retarded.
In conclusion, recent arguments present a balanced view of both regulated and market
based systems. The attractiveness of each approach depends on broader institutional
settings, the stage of economic development and regulation policies. The benefit of the
regulated system is favourable when the economy has severe information problems
and the monitoring by banks is effective. This system has also the advantage of
minimizing the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard with its better
monitoring function, while market based may be better for resource allocation with the
price signals it can provide. Since both approaches have advantages and disadvantages,
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the impact of the development of market-based or more regulated systems on
economic growth by no means straightforward. Recent empirical evidence, by Levine
et al. (2000), indicates that financial deepening itself, regardless of whether in a
regulated or market-based system, can lead to higher growth.
3.3.3 The requirements for successful financial liberalisation
According to Fry (1995 and 1997), there are prerequisites for successful financial
liberalisation. First, adequate prudential regulation is needed to enhance the stability of
the financial system by constraining excessive risk-taking by financial institutions.
Second, there needs to be successful monetary policy resulting in a reasonable degree
of price stability. Third, governments should conduct fiscal policy in a disciplined
manner in order to reduce their borrowing requirements. Fourth, banking institutions
need to be competitive and efficient to increase savings and investment, and this
ultimately should promote economic growth. Finally, the authorities need to reduce or
abolish discriminatory taxes on the financial system, such as excessive reserve
requirement in order to enhance competition within the financial system overall.
Furthermore, the timing and sequencing of liberalisation programmes need to be
considered so as to avoid adverse consequences of macroeconomic instability. There is
a growing agreement that policy should first seek to create macroeconomic and
financial sector stability before financial liberalisation programmes are undertaken
(Galbis, 1994 & Alawode and Ikhide, 1997). Namely, there should be substantial
reductions in the size of fiscal deficits to lessen inflationary pressures and a
strengthening of bank and financial sector supervision to reduce the possibilities of
excessive risk-taking by financial institutions. Finally, liberalisation of the domestic
financial sector should precede the liberalisation of external sectors to ensure that
domestic banks can fast adapt to compete with international financial institutions
According to Miurin and Sommariva (1993), the imprudent privatisation or rapid
expansion of new private sector financial institutions can increase the risk of systemic
failure, which can stall or reverse progress towards financial liberalisation. The main
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issue connected with the privatisation of state-owned banks is the problem of existing
portfolio losses. If banks are privatised before they are cleared of bad loans and
adequately capitalised, perverse incentives will result.
In general, the main rationale for premeditated financial sector deregulation is to
enhance the stability of this sector and to present favourable consequences of
deregulation and market based policies as a means for mobilising economic resources
to their most efficient uses. The brief snapshot of financial sector reform issues
covered in this section provides a general indication for the motives for financial
liberalisation in the four countries under study in this thesis.
3.4 An overview for the financial systems* in the countries involved in this
study
This section outlines the development of the financial systems of the countries under
study; Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain over the last two decades or so.
3.4.1 Financial system of Jordan
The introduction of the banking system into Jordan dates back to the early 1920s when
a British entity, the Ottoman Bank, opened in Amman and acted as a fiscal agent to the
government in the absence of a central bank at that time. In 1936, the Arab Bank,
which had its head office in Jerusalem, opened a branch in Amman and the Bank
moved its head office from Jerusalem to Amman in 1949. The next foreign bank to
open a branch in Amman was the British Bank of the Middle East in 1949. By 1949,
the number of banks' offices operating in Jordan was five; located in the two largest
cities (Amman and Irbid) and in that year steps were taken to create a local national
currency (by establishing a Currency Board) that replaced the Palestinian Pound
{Mohammed 1994 174 /id}. The process developed and led to the establishment of the
* The financial system is defined in this thesis to include various banking institutions (commercial,
investment, Islamic and other specialised financial institutions) as well as other non-profit financial
institutions that were established, by governmental authorities, to support certain economic sectors.
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Central Bank in 1964. The next Jordanian bank to start operating, after the Arab Bank,
was the National Bank in 1955. In 1960, two additional commercial banks were
established, the Cairo Amman Bank and the Bank of Jordan.
Between 1959 and 1968, four specialized credit institutions were established to
enhance economic development and to fill the gap in financing the main economic
activities like agriculture, industry and housing. The government took the initiative of
establishing these institutions to create a channel for collecting funds from a broad
range of sources and to help investors benefit from the specialized services provided.
In 1970, the Jordanian banking system was underdeveloped and comprised eight
commercial banks (four of them were branches of foreign banks). Twenty years later,
the number of banks has increased threefold; the total number of branches has risen
from 41 to more than 300 and are spread all over the country (El-Erian et al., 1996).
The Jordanian banking sector was heavily regulated until the end of the 1980s and
entry into the industry was restricted (Karasneh et al., 1997). Jordan also experienced
various banking crises, associated with one or more of its major banks in the late 1980s
and/or beginning of the 1990s (Petra Bank, Islamic National Bank and Amman Bank).
The deficiency of prudential regulation and supervisory capacities were among the
reasons for these crises. Pre-reform weaknesses included insufficient minimum capital
requirements, and the fact that classification and provisioning criteria of loans were not
in agreement with international standards. Bank supervision that did take place focused
on compliance with allocative controls on interest rates and foreign exchange rather
than on prudential requirements.
To promote competitiveness competence of the banking system and enhance
investment in local economic activities, the Jordanian authorities have undertaken
various financial reforms including the restructuring and addition of new products to
the Amman financial markets. The banking system that dominates the financial sector
has also been the major focus of these reforms. During the 1990s, the supervisory
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framework was strengthened by increasing staff numbers and promoting technical
qualifications (El-Erian et al., 1996). Furthermore, the Central Bank of Jordan (CBJ)
engaged in various reforms concerning the foreign exchange market from 1988
onwards, as shown in Table 3.1.
Table 3-1: Liberalisation of foreign exchange in Jordan during the 1990s
Date The Event
1992 Moneychangers were licensed to deal with foreign currency but the exchange rate for
moneychangers was to be determined by the Central Bank of Jordan (CBJ).
1996 The CBJ liberalised the foreign exchange system. Under the new measures:
The mandatory reserve requirement for foreign currency deposits held by banks was reduced
from 35 percent to 14 percent;
Banks must keep 80 percent of their mandatory reserves at the Central Bank but can use the
remaining 20 percent in the inter-bank market;
Foreign currency holders may engage in asset swap deals with banks on the spot (dinars-for-
dollars) and on a forward (dollars-back-for-dinars) basis, with rollover options.
1997 The CBJ issued new measures to further liberalize the foreign exchange system. Under the new
measures, a licensed bank may:
Open non-resident accounts in dinars and/or in foreign currencies;
Allow resident account holders to maintain up to one million dollars in foreign currency
accounts.
Transfer the value of imports to foreign beneficiaries without CBJ approval;
Allow residents to take Jordanian dinar-denominated banknotes and payment instruments in and
out of the Kingdom without restrictions and take out or transfer cash notes in foreign currencies
up to the equivalent of JD 35,000 (approximately $US 50,000) to cover payments.
1997 All restrictions pertaining to the inflow and outflow of foreign currency (including gold) were
rescinded.
Banks may buy or sell an unlimited amount of foreign currency on a forward basis. Banks are
permitted to engage in reverse operations involving the selling of foreign currency in exchange
for JD on a forward basis for covering the value of imports. Ceilings related to amounts residents
are permitted to transfer abroad have been scrapped.
{Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs 1998 127 /id} & {International Monetary Fund 2000 62
/id} &{Central Bank of Jordan 1997 29 /id}.
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Interest rate ceilings were applied in Jordan on deposit and loan rates during the 1980s.
These ceilings aimed to enhance the stability of the Jordanian dinar and to enhance
international foreign reserves. The ceilings were amended several times and the first
step toward freeing interest rates was taken in 1988 when those on deposit rates was
abolished. The decision to complete the freeing of interest rates on loans was taken in
1990. After that, lending limits to the private and public sectors were eliminated in
1992 and 1993, respectively.
Jordan has also applied required reserve ratios on commercial banks, initially
introduced in 1967 at 7 percent of banks' liabilities. This ratio was raised in
subsequent years as a tool for inflation control and reached 13 percent by 1979. During
the early 1980s, the reserve requirement ratio was reduced in order to encourage bank
lending during a recession period. The ratio was further reduced by the Central Bank
of Jordan and reached 6 percent in 1984. However, because of inflationary pressures in
1988, the ratio increased to 9 percent and had further rises reaching 15 percent by the
end of 1993. In 1996, the Central Bank of Jordan changed the reserve requirement
scheme by offering banks more flexibility to maintain a daily minimum balance of 80
percent of their reserve requirements with the central bank during a one-month
maintenance period (the remaining 20 percent could be held on a period-average basis
during the maintenance period) (El-Erian and Fennel, 1997). Moreover, to eliminate
discrimination against intermediation in the Jordan dinar, reserve requirements on
foreign currency deposits were lowered from 35 percent (remunerated) to 14 percent
(non-remunerated).
In 1991, Treasury bill auctions were introduced in order to bring about a wider role for
market forces to influence treasury bills rates and to facilitate the use of indirect
techniques of monetary control (Central Bank of Jordan, 1997). These procedures were
aimed to encourage new entrants to mobilise deposits from the public and to reassure
depositors that their deposits were safe through the enforcement of a set of prudential
guidelines.
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Furthermore, in 1996 the Central Bank of Jordan abolished the distinction between
resident and non-resident accounts (El-Erian and Fennell, 1997). This resulted in
identical treatment of resident and non-resident foreign currency deposits (FCDs) with
respect to current payments, elimination of the ceiling on residents' FCDs, permission
being granted to the banks to manage investments in foreign currencies for both
residents and non-residents, and the application of similar regulations governing
margin foreign exchange transactions.
Moreover, the Central Bank of Jordan, in November 1996, permitted Swap operations
in foreign exchange to enhance the efficiency of the foreign exchange markets by
allowing bank clients to sell foreign exchange at the spot rate and repurchase it at a
forward rate for any period of time (El-Erian and Fennell, 1997). Further, in June
1996, the central bank liberalized all transactions on foreign exchange. In an effort by
the government to promote competition between banks and reduce lending rates, the
central bank also required banks to publish their prime lending rates and deregulated
commissions, and reserve requirements were reduced from 14 percent to 12 percent.
A new banking law aimed at improving the industry's efficiency and enhancing bank
regulation and supervision was approved by the Jordanian Parliament in June 2000
({US Commercial Service-Jordan 2001 178 /id}. This law is aimed at protecting
depositors' interests while encouraging free market forces in the development of the
financial market. In addition, the central bank has completed the drafting of a deposit
insurance plan, which is currently under review in Parliament and due to be approved
soon.
According to the report of US Commercial Service-Jordan (2001), Jordanian banks
rely heavily on traditional banking activities, namely, the extension of direct credit
facilities, as a main source of income. Credit facilities offered by banks include loans,
discounted bills and overdraft facilities. Investment banks are not permitted to extend
overdraft facilities. The corporate bond market remains under-developed, and
continues to be over-shadowed by traditional direct lending. Some banks, however,
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have started adopting modern banking practices such as automated cheque clearing,
and the use of magnetic check processors, unified reporting forms and electronic data-
transmission networks. The Central Bank of Jordan has adopted policies aimed at
stimulating the local capital market, particularly where long-term project finance is
required. A number of banks have established mutual funds. In addition to long-term
instruments, e-banking, securitization, short-selling, and treasury stocks are being
introduced in some banks.
In 2000, Jordan's banking system comprised 13 commercial banks (of which five
were branches of foreign banks), five investment banks, two Islamic banks, one
industrial development bank, six specialized credit institutions and a number of
financial institutions that do not accept deposits (including the Social Security
Corporations*). There are also 18 insurance companies operating in the country
(Central Bank of Jordan, 2001). Although the Central Bank distinguishes between
"investment banks" and "commercial banks", there are no significant differences in
their operations. The number of operating branches of these banks rose to 457 in 1999
compared with 451 in 1997. Despite the increase in the number of operating branches,
density remained at the same level around ten thousand people per branch. The number
of Jordanian banks' branches operating abroad, including representative offices, rose
to 115 by the end of 1998, of which 49 operated in Palestinian territories.
3.4.2 Jordan's capital Market
The Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) is one of the leading capital markets in the Middle
East. The stock exchange in Jordan commenced its operations in 1978 and deals
mainly with securities, stocks, government and corporate bonds. The ratio of Jordan's
market capitalisation to GDP, which stood at about 74 percent in 1994, exceeds that of
most emerging markets and is similar to that of many industrial countries. Market
* The Social Security Corporation was established in 1978 to secure workers and employees, including
those of the public sector, against most of the risks including providing retirement wages. The
corporation, in its turn, receives the workers insurance instalments and re-invest them in various
investment projects.
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capitalisation remained at around $ 4.7 billion between 1992 and 1994(El-Erian et al.,
1996) but exceeded $ 5 billion by the end of 1999.
The Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) was reorganized as a privately managed
institution in 1999. In 2000, the ASE completed the transition to an electronic trading
system. Listing requirements are being reviewed and updated, while an automated
depository centre will be established as a custodian for all transaction contracts {US
Commercial Service-Jordan 2001 178 /id}. Currently, there are 34 brokerage firms and
158 listed public-shareholding companies on the exchange. Forty-three percent of
ownership is by non-Jordanian investors (37 percent by Arabs and six percent by non-
Arabs).
With respect to ownership and participation in the major economic sectors in Jordan,
there is no noticeable discrimination against foreign participation. In fact, many
Jordanian businesses seek foreign partners, perceived as the key to increased
competitiveness and provide entry into international markets.
To conclude, Jordan's financial system has witnessed major developments and reforms
especially over the last decade. This includes the liberalisation of interest and
exchange rates, the introduction of new financial regulations that are consistent with
international standards and the modernisation of Jordan's capital market. The number
of banks and branches in Jordan has increased over the last two decades leading to a
more competitive environment and potentially more efficient banking system. This
will be investigated in more detail in the empirical part of this thesis.
3.4.3 Financial system of Egypt
Between 1957 and 1973, the Egyptian authorities implemented a comprehensive wave
of the nationalisation of all the country's 27 commercial and specialized banks, closed
its stock market and consolidated the banking system into four non-competing state
banks; each focusing on separate economic sectors. However, since 1970, high
population growth and relatively poor economic performance has led to pressure for
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domestic investment on a larger scale and therefore steps were taken to permit foreign
banks to reestablish themselves (in partnership with Egyptian banks) in the country.
The Egyptian banking sector expanded markedly in the mid-1970s spurred by the
country's outward-looking growth policies and greater emphasis placed on private
sector development (Handy et al., 1998).
To promote economic reform within the country, Egypt's government enacted the
Investment Law of 1974, allowing for the establishment of commercial and investment
banks, with a minimum 51% domestic ownership, to enter the Egyptian market.
Furthermore, a banking law enacted in 1975 defined what constituted banking
businesses. This legislation identified three main types of banks operating in the
Egyptian system: commercial banks that accepted deposits and provided finance for a
wide variety of transactions; business and investment banks that performed medium-
and long-term (lending) business and finance operations (these banks can also accept
deposits and finance foreign-trade operations) and specialized banks which offered
specific types of economic activities and accepted demand deposits.
All specialized banks are state owned and are assigned the task of providing long-term
finance for priority sectors like real estate and agricultural and industrial development.
There are also public sector commercial banks, private & joint venture banks and
foreign banks (operating through branches). Foreign banks were all registered as
business and investment banks, as their role was mainly to raise long-term funds. They
were restricted from dealing in foreign currency business until 1993 when the banking
law was modified to allow existing foreign banks to engage in such operations (US
Commercial Service-Egypt, 2001). Since 1993, foreign banks operating in Egypt have
received equal treatment to domestic banks.
Although the banking system has been opened to private sector banks since 1975, the
four state-owned commercial banks have continued to dominate the market, where
they account for around 50% of total banking sector assets. They have a significant
market share in retail and corporate banking services through large branch networks
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and a close relationship with state-owned companies. They are also major participants
in the equity capital of most joint-venture banks. Furthermore, during the 1970s and
1980s, the securities markets remained underdeveloped and hampered by the absence
of a governing securities law and inadequate regulation. According to Handy et al.
(1998), financial intermediaries such as mutual funds, finance companies, leasing
companies, brokers, moneychangers, and market makers were lacking. In addition, the
insurance sector was underdeveloped and largely state owned{Handy & Staff team
1998 55 /id}.
At the beginning of the economic stabilization programme in 1990/91, Egypt's
financial system suffered heavily from long-standing structural weaknesses resulting
from the unstable economic environment and over-regulated financial system. The
imposed interest rate limits on bank deposits and loans were well below the rate of
inflation. Furthermore, preferential interest rates were mandated for loans to public
enterprises and to industrial and agricultural enterprises. The Central Bank of Egypt
(CBE) also attempted to manage credit expansion to public and private sector
companies using maximum loan-to-deposit ratios and bank-specific ceilings for certain
types of credits. According to Subramanian (1997), these financial repression practices
resulted in heavy losses and substantial non-performing loans for commercial banks in
the early 1990s, when provisioning levels exceeded 18 percent of the total loans
booked at the end of 1992. These losses contributed to a sharp deterioration in the
capital-asset ratio of the banking system from 3.5 percent in 1985 to 2.4 percent in
1990.
In 1991, the Egyptian authorities undertook a series of financial reforms aimed at
enhancing the efficiency of the financial system (see table 3.2 below). In 1991, the
CBE established a capital adequacy ratio equivalent to 8 percent of risk-weighted
assets, in accordance with the Basle guidelines. In 1992, minimum capital
requirements for Egyptian banks were LE 100 million for authorized capital and LE 50
million for paid-up capital; branches of foreign banks were required to show a
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minimum capital base of not less than $15 million {Handy & Staff team 1998 55 /id} &
(US Commercial Service-Egypt, 2001).
According to Handy et al. (1998), the new capital requirements of 1991, indicated
earlier, produced a sharp recovery in the banks capitalisation to 4.3 percent. On a risk-
adjusted basis, the capital adequacy ratio for the banking system reached 10.6 percent
by the end of 1996. Subsequently, a gradual decline in provisioning appears to have
signalled a parallel decline in non-performing loans (or vice versa). The level of non-
performing loans fell from around 14.7 percent of total loans in June 1996 to 13.4
percent in June 1997 and total provisions were equivalent to about 80 percent of non-
performing loans by the end of June 1997.
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Table 3-2: Measures undertaken to enhance bank competition and performance in the Egyptian
banking market since 1991
Measure	 Details
Reserve and	 To reduce the implicit tax on banking activity, the non-interest-bearing reserve held
Liquidity
	
by banks at the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) were reduced (from 25 percent) to 15
Requirements percent of total Egyptian pound deposits. Alternatively, banks continued to hold
with the CBE 15 percent of total foreign currency deposits as a reserve earning
interest equivalent to LIBOR. Meanwhile, the liquidity ratio was reduced to 20
percent (down from 30 percent) and 25 percent for local- and foreign-currency
balances, respectively.
Capital Adequacy The banks' minimum capital requirements were increased in 1991 to 8 percent
Ratio
	
along the lines of the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision. Capital was
defined to consist of two components: Primary capital, which includes paid-up
capital and reserves. Other capital includes provisions for general banking risks.
Foreign-
	
The banks foreign-exchange exposures were limited; the ratio of foreign currency
Exchange
	
liabilities to foreign currency assets became subject to a maximum limit of 105
Exposure
	
percent, and the open position for a single currency, for all currencies combined,
became subject to limits of 10 percent and 20 percent, respectively, of bank capital.
Investment
	
Investment abroad by banks is subject to a limit of 40 percent of the bank capital.
Concentration	 In addition, the bank's deposits held with single foreign correspondents should not
Abroad	 exceed 10 percent of total investments abroad (or US$ 3 million, whichever is
higher).
Credit	 Since 1991, the CBE limit banks' single customer exposure of credit facilities to 30
Concentration percent of bank capital (and the exposure should not exceed 25 percent of a bank's
paid-up capital and reserves). There is also surveillance by the CBE on
geographical and sectoral concentrations of bank lending so as to diversify
portfolio risk. For equity holdings, bank participation in the share capital of joint-
stock companies is limited to 40 percent of the company's capital.
Loan	 Stricter loan classification and provisioning criteria were issued to ensure that
Classification and individual banks act prudently. Non-performing loans are classified as substandard,
Provisioning	 doubtful or bad according to the delay in debt repayment.
Source: Adapted from El-Shazly, 2001; various pages.
To increase reliance on indirect monetary policy instruments, the central bank of Egypt
introduced, from January 1991, weekly auctions of three-month treasury bills which
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helped to maintain the banks' viability (Subramanian, 1997). When the Treasury bill
issues were initiated, the vast bulk of these were held by the commercial banks. Banks'
holdings of securities as a share of their total assets increased from 13 percent at the
end of 1991 to 23 percent by 1993, before easing to 16 percent at end of 1995.
Moreover, the income from this source was tax exempt. Over time, the supply of debt
to the market was increased and longer maturities were introduced.
To strengthen the banking system, new prudential guidelines (as already mentioned)
were introduced in 1991 for foreign currency exposures, capital adequacy levels, asset
classification and provisioning, bank liquidity and auditing rules. This was followed in
1992 by guidelines covering investment abroad, and in 1993 by regulations on credit
concentration. Regulations that discriminated against private banks and inhibited a
level playing field for all participants were removed. Branches of foreign-owned banks
were allowed to operate in local currency and full entry of foreign banks through the
establishment of local subsidiaries was authorized {Handy & Staff team 1998 55 /W}&
(US Commercial Service-Egypt, 2001). Foreign partners were allowed majority
equity-holdings in joint venture banks. Bank fees and charges, creditor and debtor
rates, and transactions on the foreign exchange market were liberalized. Administrative
credit allocations were phased out and Treasury bill auctions were used to manage
liquidity and indirectly provide a reference interest rate to the financial markets.
In 1993, the monetary authority liberalized rates of interest on demand deposits and
subsequently removed ceilings on bank lending to the private sector and bank-specific
ceilings on lending to the public sector in the same year. Following the liberalization
of interest rates that were initiated in 1991, nominal deposit rates reached 16 percent in
1991/92, but declined to 10 percent in 1995/96 and lending rates declined from 19
percent to 14 percent, reflecting improved intermediation (Subramanian, 1997&
{Handy & Staff team 1998 55 /id} .
During the period 1993 to 1994, the authorities mandated public banks to divest their
shares in the joint-venture banks with a maximum ownership of 20 percent to reduce
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market concentration and enhance competition. Furthermore, the government divested
public holdings in two joint-venture insurance companies. By 1997, the state banks
had limited their holdings to three joint-venture banks and reduced their holdings to
below 20 percent in the majority of other institutions ({Handy & Staff team 1998 55
/id }& El-Shazly, 2001). Steps were also taken to reduce the competitive advantages of
the public sector banks by allowing public sector companies to deal with all banks
without prior permission from the central bank. By the end of June 2000, the public
banks' ownership was above 20 percent in eight (out of twenty-three) joint venture
banks, whose privatisation had been planned to be completed by the end of the same
year. The authorities also plan to privatise the four public sector commercial banks and
the necessary legislation was passed by the parliament in 1998, but none have so far
been offered for sale.
On the market transparency front, public disclosure of financial information was
generally poor. Before 1998, banks used to publish their financial statements only at
the end of the fiscal year. Meanwhile, the income statements of some banks, especially
the state owned banks, were brief with a couple of lines on revenues and expenditures
that did not even show the amount of provisions. The public had better financial
information only for banks which were listed on the stock exchange. These banks were
mandated by the capital market law (Law 95/1992) to submit quarterly statements
regarding their financial position to the Capital Market Authority, which made the
information publicly available.
The evolution of the banking system during the past decade has been associated with
changing patterns of credit allocation, both in terms of the economic sector and the
type of borrower {Handy & Staff team 1998 55 /id} & Subramanian, 1997). Prior to
financial liberalization before the 1990s, credit was focused mainly on the industrial
and services sectors. From 1991/92 onwards credit to the agriculture and trade sectors
increased substantially. The share of lending to the private sector has also grown
sharply. As of January 1996, the share of credit to the private sector stood at 43
percent, compared with 29 percent in the early 1990s.
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According to the 1999 report of the National Bank of Egypt, Egypt's banking sector
consists of 7 public sector banks (3 specialized and 4 commercial), 31 investment and
merchant banks (11 joint venture and 20 foreign bank branches) and 24 commercial
banks, as well as 2 offshore registered banks (Table 3.3). Despite the emergence of
new banking institutions, the big four state banks continued to account for over 75% of
commercial bank deposits based on their extensive branch network, with a similar
share of total lending. The new commercial banks focused on lending to the private
sector and multinationals (US Commercial Service-Egypt, 2001).
Table 3-3: Structure of the Egyptian banking system as at 31/12/1999
Number Branches
Commercial Banks Public Sector 4 918
Private & Joint Venture 24 330
Business and Investment Banks Private & Joint Venture 11 105
Foreign Banks (Branches) 20 46
Specialised Banks Industrial 1 14
Real Estate 1 26
Agriculture 1 1,005
Total 62 2,444
Source: El-Shazly, A. (2001); http://www.mafhoum.com/press/49E2b.htm (p. The Appendix).
3.4.4 Egypt's capital market
While banks are the main source of finance for projects in Egypt, Egyptian investors
have begun considering the stock or bond markets to obtain capital. The Cairo and
Alexandria stock exchanges, dormant since 1956, started gaining momentum in late
1992. The authorities made considerable progress in modernizing its capital markets
since the passage of Law 95 in 1992 which aimed at finding alternative sources of
financing to private and public firms (US Commercial Service-Egypt, 2001). In
addition, the privatisation programme, particularly between 1995 and 1997, was a
major spur for development of the capital markets and foreign investor interest.
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As of May 2000, the market capitalization of the Cairo and Alexandria Stock
Exchange was approximately US$ 38 billions with 1051 companies listed. Trading
value for 1999 was $12.4 billion, of which $US 10.5 billion were in listed securities.
This represents a trading volume of about 1.1 billion shares, largely confined to a few
heavily traded companies. The capital markets sector, as of March 2000, consisted of
30 mutual funds (23 managed and traded in Egypt and 7 offshore), 24 portfolio
investment management companies, 20 underwriters, 9 venture capital firms, 140
brokerage firms and one central depository for clearing and settlement (US
Commercial Service-Egypt, 2001). The recent growth of the Egyptian stock market in
terms of providing financing and promoting savings in the domestic economy.
To conclude, the Egyptian financial sector has witnessed many major reforms over the
last decade. These include liberalising interest rates, enhancing bank capital
requirements and prudential regulations in accordance with international standards; the
introduction of new banking laws giving a wider role for foreign banks that boosted
competition and promoted privatisation of the public banks. The new reforms , in
general, have led to a stronger financial position for Egyptian banks.
3.4.5 Saudi Arabia's banking and financial system
The history of financial institutions in Saudi Arabia commenced in the 1900s when a
few foreign based trading houses, including a branch of Algemene Bank Nederland,
and some other money changers, provided most of the finance related services to meet
the needs of the trading community and pilgrims visiting the country. After the
discovery of oil in 1939, and following the Second World War, the Saudi government
expenditures and revenues rose rapidly and foreign banks started entering its market
(Al-Suhaimi, 2001). The French Banque de L'Indochine and Arab Bank opened
branches in Jeddah in 1948; followed in 1950 by the British Bank of the Middle East,
the National Bank of Pakistan and the Bank Misr of Egypt.
However, the modern history of the banking system in Saudi Arabia started in 1952
when the Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency (SAMA) was created to achieve a stable
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monetary mechanism. It opened offices in the main cities, but the government
continued to use the payment services of the moneychanger (Al- Kaki and Bin
Mahfouz Co.) to act as its agent. In 1953, the government permitted this
moneychanger to start as the first commercial bank, under the name of the National
Commercial Bank. More foreign banks followed later when Banque du Caire started
operations in 1954, followed by Banque du Liban et d'Outre Mer and First National
City Bank of New York. Riyad Bank commenced operations in 1957 and Bank Al-
Watany in January 1958 (Bank for International Settlements, 2001).
Al-Sahlawi (1997) notes that before the establishment of SAMA, there was no Saudi
currency until 1952 when the Saudi Riyal was issued. Over 1950-1956, there was a
gradual introduction of paper money (in the form of Pilgrim receipts) which was
covered by precious metals and foreign currencies. The proper issue of paper money
was made at the start of 1960 and a par value for the Riyal was announced to the IMF.
In 1960, the Saudi financial system faced its first banking problem when Riyad Bank
and Al-Watany Bank, which had commenced operations in 1957 and 1959
respectively, faced serious liquidity problems arising from mismanagement and the
existence of a substantial problem loan portfolio. Board members in both banks had
borrowed heavily from the banks and faced defaults on loan repayments. By 1960, Al-
Watany Bank was technically insolvent and unable to settle the claims of local
depositors which led SAMA to liquidate the bank and merge its operations with the
Riyad Bank (Al-Suhaimi, 2001).
The above banking difficulty led to a new Banking Law in 1966, which gave SAMA
wider supervisory powers. Banks were required to meet capital adequacy, liquidity and
lending ratios, and reserve requirements. The Banking Law also peimitted SAMA to
recommend institutions for new licenses, issue rules and regulations, and to take
actions against any violation of the Law. It also supported the concept of a universal
banking model which permitted banks to provide a broad range of financial services
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including banking, investments, securities, etc. Consequently, banks became primary
licensed financial institutions and expanded rapidly, covering the entire country.
The Saudi government had encouraged foreign banks to open in the Kingdom since
early banking activity and consequently ten international banks with 29 branches were
present by the early 1970s. The government policy, however, changed in 1975 when it
promoted a policy to convert foreign banks' branches into publicly traded companies,
with the participation of Saudi nationals. By encouraging foreign banks to take large
shareholdings in the newly incorporated banks, and by offering them management
contracts, the foreign partners' position was strengthened as they could exercise
significant management control while benefiting from national treatment equivalent to
banks fully owned by Saudis (Saudi Monetary Agency, 1998).
The government of Saudi Arabia also took the initiative, during the 1970s, to establish
five major lending institutions; namely Saudi Credit Bank, Saudi Agricultural Bank,
Public Investment Fund, Saudi Industrial Development Fund and the Real Estate Fund
{ Al-Sahlawi 1997 3 /id}. These institutions finance medium and long-term projects to
supplement the short-term funds provided by commercial banks. They provide
development loans at relatively low cost with complete government financing, the
duration of loans extended varies from one sector to another; industrial loans vary
from 5 to 15 years while housing loans last for 25 years. The government of Saudi
Arabia has also established other financial institutions for specific purposes. The most
important of these institutions is the Saudi Fund for development that was established
in 1974 to provide assistance to "friendly" developing countries. The Islamic
Development Bank was also established in 1975 to provide loans to joint ventures in
Islamic countries.
In the early 1980s, the Saudi banking system operated in a macroeconomic
environment characterised by large imbalances. This was mainly because of the steep
rise in government revenues over 1979-1981, followed by a decline in oil revenues
over the following five years. Government oil revenue, which had risen to SR 333
billion by 1981, dropped to just SR 74 billion by 1987. Some banks expanded too
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rapidly, and did not have adequate credit assessment and monitoring procedures.
Consequently, many banks faced difficulties recovering their loans and collateral. The
banking system incurred many non-performing loans, which accounted for over 20 %
of loans by 1986, and banks' profits suffered significantly — loan loss provisions were
substantial. However, by 1988, most banks had made sufficient provisions for doubtful
loans and the average provision for the banking system had risen to over 12 % of total
lending (Bank for International Settlements, 2001).
According to the report of Bank for International Settlements (2001), the slow
economic growth in the first half of the 1980s resulted also in the failure of many
money-changing organisations which led the government to pass the Law for
Moneychangers in 1982, requiring SAMA to license and regulate these institutions.
Moneychangers were prohibited from deposit taking, lending and providing any other
financial services except those specified in the Law. In 1985, SAMA issued rules that
permitted banks to undertake stock brokerage activities.
In 1982, SAMA faced a major supervisory challenge when irregularities appeared in
the operations of Saudi Cairo Bank. The managing director and the treasurer were
involved in unauthorised trading in bullion between 1979 and 1981. The Bank had
concealed accumulated losses that exceeded its share capital. SAMA required the bank
to issue new shares and double its capital in 1986. This increase was taken up entirely
by the Public Investment Fund (PlF). This event was followed by further precautionary
procedures by SAMA to ensure the stability of the financial system and to help the
banks to overcome the prolonged economic downturn (table 3.4 shows the details).
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Table 3-4: Steps undertaken by SAMA during the 1980s and 1990s aimed at strengthening the
stability of the Saudi financial system
Action	 Details and implications
Dividend payments
Tax deductibility of
provisions for doubtful
accounts
Withholding tax on
inter-bank transactions
Creation of banking
disputes committee
Strengthening of the
technological
infrastructure
Corporate governance
Exchange of
information on large
borrowers and on
delinquent loans
Banks were required by SAMA to seek approval prior to announcing their
dividends. The Banking Law required all banks to build their statutory
reserves equal to their share capital.
In 1986, SAMA permitted the tax deduction of loan loss provisions on an
accrual basis. Thus, banks could now receive favourable tax benefits at the
time of making a provision and not just on write-offs of a loan. This
encouraged banks to increase their loan loss provisions for doubtful accounts.
To encourage Saudi banks to increase their inter-bank dealings and to support
the development of a Riyal inter- bank market, a tax ruling was obtained
which exempted foreign banks from withholding taxes when carrying out
inter- bank transactions with Saudi banks.
In 1987, Saudi authorities established a Banking Dispute Committee. The
creation of this Committee aimed to handle disputes between banks and their
customers.
In 1986, an automated Clearing House was established followed in 1989 by
the introduction of an Automated Teller machine system. These systems
encouraged all Saudi banks to invest in technology and to improve their office
operations.
SAMA initiated steps to improve banks risk management and control
procedures. This required banks to develop and strengthen their internal audit
departments and issued minimum internal control guidelines. In addition,
SAMA issued accounting standards for commercial banks that were in line
with International Accounting Standards.
In the early 1980s, SAMA established a credit information service that
provided information to Saudi banks on all large exposures of the banking
system. This better enabled banks to assess their credit position and riskiness
of their big borrowers.
Source: Adapted from (Bank for International Settlements, 2001).
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Despite the turbulent economic conditions during the 1980's, the Saudi banking
system grew rapidly. The Saudi government allowed the establishment of three new
banks (Al- Rajhi Banking and Investment Corporation, Saudi Investment Bank and
United Saudi Investment Bank) to help boost the competitiveness and efficiency of the
banking system. In addition, the United Saudi Commercial Bank emerged as a result of
the takeover of three foreign banks in 1983. In general, the Saudi authorities also
encouraged the banking system to improve its capital position. This is illustrated by
various bank restructurings and moves to increase the capital position of the banking
system (see tables 3.5 and 3.6 for details).
Table 3-5: Restructuring in the Saudi Arabian financial system during the 1980s
Bank Name	 Restructuring procedures
United Saudi	 This bank was established in 1983 by the takeover of the three remaining
Commercial Bank	 branches of foreign banks (United Bank of Pakistan, Bank Melli Iran and
Banque du Liban d'Outre Mer).
Saudi Investment	 This bank was established in 1976 as a special bank. It was given a full
Bank commercial license in 1984 and permitted to offer all banking services. There
were changes in its ownership as some foreign shareholders sold their shares,
reducing foreign ownership to 25 %.
Al- Rajhi Banking and In 1988, the government licensed the Al- Rajhi family (the largest money-
Investment	 changer) as a bank that became the third largest bank in the Kingdom. The
Corporation floatation of Al- Rajhi as a bank raised SR 750 million in new capital and
brought in approximately 100,000 new shareholders. In 1992, Al- Rajhi
doubled its capital to SR 1.5 billion by the issue of bonus shares on a 1: 1
basis.
Source: Adapted from (Bank for International Settlements, 2001; various pages).
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Table 3-6: Capital increases of various Saudi banks during 1980s and 1990s
Bank Name	 Details of increasing capital
Riyad Bank
	 In 1992, Riyad Bank raised its capital from SR 100 million to SR 2,000 million by a
share bonus and then by another SR 800 million by issuing of new shares. It also
raised share premiums of over SR 3 billion on this issue.
Saudi Cairo Bank increased its capital from SR 150 million to SR 300 million in
1987. Moreover, in 1988, the Public Investment Fund (PIP) made a major
investment of SR 300 million in the bank's capital that doubled the total share
capital. In 1992, the bank issued 6 million shares at SR 350 per share and increased
its capital by another SR 600 million. It also raised SR 1,500 million in share
premium.
Saudi American	 Saudi American Bank doubled its capital to SR 600 million in 1988 by issuing
Bank bonus shares to its shareholders. In addition, in 1991, Citibank N. A. sold 1/4 of its
40 % stake in the bank to two public sector agencies. In 1992, the share capital was
also increased to SR 1,200 million through capitalisation of its reserves.
Saudi British	 Saudi British Bank had increased its capital from SR 100 million to SR 300 million
Bank	 in 1979. In 1988, it further increased its capital to SR 400 million.
Saudi French	 Saudi French Bank increased its share capital from SR 100 million in 1977 to SR
Bank 200 million in 1979 and to SR 400 million in 1987. In 1992, the share capital
increased to SR 900 million through bonus shares and an offering of 2 million
shares at SR 100 and a premium of SR 470 million.
The National
	 The National Commercial Bank in 1992 increased its capital from SR 30 million to
Commercial	 SR 6 billion by a cash injection. In 1997, the bank reorganised from being a
Bank	 partnership bank to a limited joint-stock company, which widened its shareholder
base.
Source: Adapted from (Bank for International Settlements, 2001; various pages).
In addition to the improved capitalisation of the system, other significant changes were
made to modernise the banking system (Al-Suhaimi, 2001). These included the
introduction of government bonds to provide investment instruments to banks and
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investors; the introduction of a national Automated Teller Machine System which
permitted customers access to their accounts from any machine; the introduction of
debit, credit and charge cards and the linking of Saudi Arabia with the svirET
payments network.
By the beginning of the 1990s, the Saudi banking system had largely recovered from
the difficulties of the mid-80s. However, the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990
dictated a new situation for the Saudi banking system. The crisis profoundly affected
the monetary situation. Customer withdrawals of domestic deposits during August
1990 were 11 % of total customer deposits; these were largely converted into foreign
currency and transferred abroad. By September 1990, the pressure had eased and
withdrawal slowed down to 1.1 % of customer deposits. SAMA had provided banks
access to additional liquidity through more liberal repo arrangements, placing
additional Saudi riyal and foreign currency deposits with them, and by selling foreign
currency in large volumes. Banks also coped well by liquidating their foreign assets
(Bank for International Settlements, 2001). Following the resolution of the Gulf crisis
there was a mini boom in the economy. During 1991, there was a massive surge of
deposits to banks which accounted for about 20% of total deposits in the system.
Banks' domestic loans and advances grew 90 % during the period 1990— 95 and all
other banking indicators, such as returns on equity and returns on assets, continued to
be positive with many banks making record profits during this period.
The restructuring of the banking system continued in the latter part of the 1990s when
the United Saudi Commercial Bank and the Saudi Cairo Bank merged to form the
United Saudi Bank in 1997. The banking system also took advantage of investments in
new technologies, including the introduction of an electronic funds system in 1997,
and widespread use of point-of-sale systems as well as the introduction of electronic
share trading. Saudi banks are increasingly developed, they were managing about 100
investment funds with investments of over SR 22 billion by 1998, and they offer a
wide range of international stock brokerage facilities. Moreover, by the end of 1998,
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Saudi banks were highly capitalised by international standards with risk asset ratios of
over 21 %, mainly comprising tier 1 capital (Al-Suhaimi, 2001).
By 1999, the Saudi financial system comprised five types of financial institutions: the
Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), 10 commercial banks, 4 investment banks
and various specialised credit institutions (controlled by the Ministry of Finance). The
number of bank branches increased from 1,011 in 1990 to 1,236 in 1998. The growth
in the activities of the banking system in Saudi Arabia can be partly attributed to the
absence of formal capital and money markets and so the commercial banks have taken
the opportunity to mobilize the private capital among different sectors of the economy.
All the commercial and investment banks have majority private ownership, with the
exception of the National Commercial Bank (the largest in Saudi in terms of assets),
which sold 50% of its shares to the government Public Investment Fund in 1999 {US
Embassy Riyadh 2001 175 /id}.
To conclude, despite the downturns in the domestic ecatiamy resciRin from tze
instability in oil prices and the Gulf War, the Saudi banking system has witnessed
rapid progress over the past decade or so. Many Saudi banks have increased their
capital substantially and there has been substantial restructuring. The Saudi authorities
have also demonstrated their ability to effectively manage the soundness of the
banking system by issuing various prudential regulations for the financial system
aimed at providing stability.
3.4.6 Financial system of Bahrain
Banking started in Bahrain when a branch of the Eastern Bank opened in 1921. This
was followed by the British Bank of the Middle East in 1944, the National Bank of
Bahrain in 1957 and the Arab Bank Limited in 1960 (Wilkenson and Atti, 1997).
These banks were sufficient to cater for the needs of the time by providing trade
finance and deposit facilities for customers. These banks witnessed the gradual
transition of the economy from fishing based to an oil-dependent economy and later on
103
Chapter 3: The Financial Systems of Jordan, Eg ypt, Saudi and Bahrain
its transformation into a service centre In 1965, the Bahraini dinar was introduced to
replace the Gulf rupee.
As the pace of economic activity gathered, the number of banks increased when 15
commercial banks opened in Bahrain between 1969 and 1977 focusing their efforts on
• attracting funds from other Gulf countries and reinvesting abroad {SERTCIC 1990 107
/id}. The rapid expansion in Bahrain banking activity in the 1970s and 1980s came
from increasing regional oil revenues that made the Gulf countries recipients of
substantial funds. This progress in banking activity brought to the surface the need for
the direction, supervision and control of banks through a central monetary Currency
Board. Therefore, the Bahrain Monetary Agency was created in 1973 as a legal entity
with extensive central banking powers to replace the Currency Board that had been
constituted in 1965.
A major step forward came in 1975 when the Bahrain Monetary Agency announced its
plan to develop a centre in the Arab World for dealing in international liquidity that
offered an attractive package to prospective participants in terms of regulatory and
fiscal incentives as well as favourable working conditions including free exchange and
trade controls. In particular, offshore banking units were exempted from maintaining
reserves with the Agency and from observing liquidity ratios. No tax was to be paid on
the banks' income, and this exemption continues to be effective up to now {SERTCIC
1990 107 /id}. Furthermore, in 1977 the Bahrain authorities decided to introduce an
exempt company (EC) registration, which enabled companies to incorporate in
Bahrain without a Bahraini shareholding as long as they did not conduct business in
the domestic market.
Referring to the report of {SERTCIC 1990 107 /id}, there was an Arabisation of
Bahrain's offshore banking sector when major Arab banks established their
headquarters on the island during the 1980s. The number of licensed offshore banking
units reached 76 in 1984, but the number had declined to 47 by 1994 in response to the
international consolidation trend. In the same year, the Agency introduced a further
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category of banks to carry out investment business. The number of these investment
banks grew from a small number in the 1970s to reach 23 banks in 1994. These banks
were allowed to participate in traditional investment or merchant banking business,
particularly securities business.
Bahrain's financial sector also includes two specialised banks, namely the Housing
Bank and the Bahrain Development Bank. The Housing Bank was established in 1979
as a government entity to support the construction industry in line with the
government's policy of providing adequate housing for Bahrain's steadily increasing
population. The Bahrain Development Bank, on the other hand, was incorporated in
1991 to enhance business activity and industrialisation in the country {SERTCIC 1990
107 /id}.
According to the report of the {World Trade Organization 2000 176 /id)), Bahrain's
financial services, especially offshore banking, are well developed and the
Government has continued to pursue reforms to further enhance and strengthen the
financial services sector. There are no foreign ownership restrictions for offshore
banks, whereas up to 49% of the total equity of a local bank may be held by foreign
nationals. The insurance sector, which is regulated and supervised by the Ministry of
Commerce, is subject to similar restrictions with regard to foreign investment.
The Bahrain Monetary Agency has successfully introduced and enforced international
standards practices in accounting, auditing, prudential regulation, and banking
supervision and applies a comprehensive and effective off- and on-site monitoring
system of financial institutions, complying in general with the standards set out in the
Basle Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision. The IMF noted that the
Bahrain Monetary Agency had achieved full compliance with 24 of the 30 Core
Principles of Basle and is largely compliant with another five (4 core and 1 sub-core)
Principles. These 29 Principles cover virtually all of the supervisory factors that
broadly encompass the fundamentals of a sound supervisory system {World Trade
Organization 2000 176 /id}.
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The government of Bahrain has identified Islamic banking* as one of the main
economic growth areas. Islamic banking is growing rapidly in the region and is
attracting investors due to its profit potential in addition to religious factors. Referring
to the report of US {US Department of commerce 2001 177 /id}, Bahrain claims to be
the hub of the Islamic banking market in the region, 17 out of 30 Islamic banks in the
Gulf region are located in Bahrain. In November 1999, Bahrain signed a Memorandum
of Understanding with Lubuan, the offshore financial centre in Malaysia and the
Jeddah-based Islamic Development Bank to create an International Islamic Money
Market. In an effort to create a secure market, the BMA has issued regulations
specifically for Islamic banks to prevent and detect institutional weaknesses.
As of the end of 1999, the financial system in Bahrain comprised some 176 financial
institutions. These included 19 full commercial banks, 48 offshore banking units, 33
investment banks including 11 Islamic banks, 2 specialized banks, 19 money changers,
36 representative offices of foreign banks and financial institutions, 6 foreign exchange
and money brokers, and 13 investment advisory and other financial services {US
Department of commerce 2001 177 /id}. The precious metals and commodities market
is also active under the regulatory control of the Bahrain Monetary Agency.
3.4.7 Bahrain's capital market
The government of Bahrain established an organised stock market in Manama in 1989
to regulate the listing and trading of securities and to control the members of the
market. The objectives of the stock exchange market are to enhance the exchange in a
way that serves the country's economic and development policies. Foreign or non-
* Islamic banking has similar principles to conventional banking, with the only exception that they must
conform to Islamic law. Islamic finance prohibits charging interest for the use of money and disallows
dealing in prohibited commodities. Islamic banking falls under four main categories: Murabha is cost-
plus financing--i.e., buying a product from a supplier and selling it to a customer for a profit; Musharaka
is a profit sharing system that is similar to equity participation; Ijara involves leasing and Istisna is the
financing of construction and manufacturing.
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Bahraini companies listed on the BSE must be either joint stock companies or closed
companies that have been incorporated at least three years prior to listing, and must
have a paid-up capital of at least $US 10 million and have been making net profits
from their principal activity three years before listing. Equities, bonds, mutual funds
and currency warrants are currently the main listed securities on the exchange {US
Department of commerce 2001 177 /id}. Efforts are under way to strengthen the role
of the stock exchange in the economy by increasing the number of listed companies,
introducing new investment instruments, cross-listing shares at the regional level, and
developing automated depository, clearing and settlement procedures.
The BSE's operations became fully automated in 1999, a service that enhanced its
regional links and other services. By the end of 1999, there were 41 listed companies,
with a market capitalization amounting to around BD 2.7 billion. The exchange is
heavily dominated by commercial banks, investment firms, and insurance companies.
The top three firms in the market are Investcorp, the Bahrain Telecommunications
Company and the Arab Banking Corporation which accounts for about half of the
exchange's total capitalization {US Department of commerce 2001 177 /id}.
Overall, the Bahraini financial system has been set up to be a financial centre in the
Arab World that plays a major role in attracting oil money and re-investing this in
international markets. The participants in the Bahraini market, especially the offshore
banking units, are offered attractive packages in terms of regulatory and fiscal
incentives. Recently, the Bahraini authorities have introduced various international
prudential regulations in line with the Basle supervisory core-principles. In addition,
Islamic banking activity developments are well-advanced and are supported by the
Bahraini authorities.
To conclude this section, the financial systems of the countries under study have
witnessed major developments and reforms, especially over the last decade. These
developments include the liberalisation of interest rates, the adoption of policies aimed
at strengthening the financial capital of the banking and financial system, the
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introduction of prudential regulations in accordance with international standards and
the modernization of stock markets aimed at providing a wider role in mobilising
financial assets. These reforms have been aimed at improving the competitive
advantage of the respective financial systems and enhancing the efficiency of the
financial institutions operating in these countries.
3.5 Changes in the financial structure of Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and
Bahrain
This section reviews the changes in the financial structure of the countries under study
over the last decade. It outlines the developments in the relative importance of the
banks in the respective financial systems, the level of market concentration, market
shares of top banks, and the growth of the financial assets of the banking systems*
under study.
Table 3-7 shows that the commercial banks in Jordan, Egypt, Saudi and Bahrain
dominate other financial institutions, and their shares in the financial market have not
changed significantly over the last decade. The next important type of financial
institutions in the four countries are the central banks, their share of the countries
financial assets ranged from about 2 percent in Bahrain to around 39 percent in Saudi
Arabia (table 3.17 in the appendix shows the details). On this basis, the commercial
banks are clearly the most important constituents of the financial system in these
countries.
* The financial system includes different types of local financial institutions (commercial, investment,
Islamic and other specialised financial institutions) but excludes the operations of foreign bank
branches.
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Table 3-7 The share of commercial banks of total assets, loans and deposits in Jordan, Egypt,
Saudi Arabia and Bahrain (Average 1992-2000) (%)
Country Total Assets Total Loans
Total Customer
deposits
Jordan 75 88 90
Egypt 62 85 90
Saudi Arabia 58 94 96
Bahrain 85 95 93
Source: Adapted from tables 3-17-3.19 in the appendix.
A commonly used measure of market structure is the n-firm concentration ratio (see
Goddard et al., 2001). Concentration is usually defined as the extent to which the total
assets, sources of funds (mainly customers' deposits) or loans are controlled by the
largest institutions in the financial market, or how these funds are distributed among
various financial institutions. Based on these measures, table 3-8 shows that the
banking systems of the countries under study, especially those of Jordan and Bahrain,
are rather concentrated markets. Market concentration becomes more noticeable if we
look at the 5-firm concentration ratio (see tables 3.20-3.23 in the appendix).
Table 3-8: The 3-firm concentration in the financial sectors of Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and
Bahrain (Average 1992-2000) (%)
Country Total Assets Total Loans Total Customer
Deposits
Jordan 79 82 78
Egypt 52 48 54
Saudi Arabia 49 47 50
Bahrain 78 84 83
Source: Adapted from tables 3-20 to 3-23 in the Appendix. Note, these ratios exclude the financial items
of the respective central banks (and those of foreign banks' branches).
Table 3.9 also shows that financial sector concentration did not fall substantially
between 1992 and 2000.
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Table 3-9: The 3-firm concentration ratio (in terms of total assets; nominal values) in the financial
sectors of Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain over 1992-2000 (%)
Year Jordan Egypt Saudi Arabia Bahrain
1992 82 56 50 80
1993 80 56 49 78
1994 80 54 49 79
1995 79 52 48 80
1996 80 50 47 80
1997 78 50 48 79
1998 78 50 48 79
1999 78 49 54 72
2000 77 50 53 73
Source: Adapted from the detailed tables 3-20 to 3-23 in the appendix.
To illustrate the growth features of the respective countries financial systems, we
evaluate changes in the consolidated balance sheet of the banking systems over the
period 1992-2000. In particular, we analyse: total assets and asset quality, capital
adequacy, profitability and other financial indicators (growth details of these indicators
are shown in the appendix to this chapter). These items help to illustrate the growth of
financial intermediation and provide an overview of the change in the soundness and
performance of the banking systems over the last decade.
Table 3-10 shows that the banking sectors in the four countries under study witnessed
considerable growth in the size of their assets, deposits, equity and loans (in terms of
nominal values) during the 1990s. However, there were significant increases in the size
of problem loans and loan loss reserves in these countries, this perhaps was attributed
mainly to the change in classification of the debts according to international standards.
The favourable growth in the size of equity, especially in Jordan and Egypt, outlines
the move to strengthen the financial position of the banking sector in these countries.
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Table 3-10: Average annual growth (%) of the main banking sector indicators (nominal values)
for Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain over 1992-2000
Country Jordan Egypt
Saudi
Arabia Bahrain
Asset Quality Indicators
Total Assets 18.00 10.00 2.00 9.00
Loans (net) 14.00 20.00 6.00 6.00
Problem loans 15613.00 -13.00 688.00 216.00
Loan loss reserves 90.00 107.00 - -6.00
Capital Adequacy Indicators
Total Equity 25.00 23.00 7.00 10.00
Profitability Indicators
Net Interest Revenue 6.79 65.34 21.30 14.91
Net income 8.87 54.17 10.42 15.29
Average Return on Assets -2.59 13.92 -11.78 6.84
Average Return on Equity -2.53 13.32 -9.07 0.67
Other Indicators
Customer Deposits 15.00 18.00 5.00 7.00
Off-balance sheet items -5.32 17.41 14.94 -4.78
Source: Adapted from table 3.24-3.34 in the appendix.
Concerning the profitability indicators, represented by net interest revenue, net
income, return on average assets and return on average equity, most of these
indicators, especially in Egypt, witnessed favourable progress during the 1990s despite
the differences between the individual countries (see table 3.9).
In general, there has been positive progress in the financial structure indicators of the
countries under study over the last decade, which reflects greater financial
intermediation and a more sound financial position for the financial system. The
profitability indicators also indicate improvements that reflect the ability of banks to
better utilise their assets and improve their competitive advantage.
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Table 3.11 shows the distribution of credit by the banking systems of the four
countries during the 1990s. It can be seen that slightly less than half of the credit
facilities granted by Jordanian banks are granted to the trade sector, and the shares of
the other economic sectors remain relatively stable during the 1990s. In Egypt more
than one third of banking credit facilities were granted to the industrial sector in the
early 1990s although this has declined at the expense of the trade sector throughout the
decade.
In Saudi Arabia, extension of credit is more evenly distributed. The share of the four
major sectors in Saudi Arabia (trade, construction, industry and government) averaged
about 54 percent of the total credit but with some changes in shares in individual
sectors over the last decade. In Bahrain, credit facilities granted by the banking sector
were distributed to the four major sectors of the economy and the shares of these
sectors did not witness significant changes during the 1990s (see table 3.11).
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Table 3-11: Distribution of credit to economic sectors in Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain
Jordan Trade Industry Construction Others Total
% % % (JD, mil.)
1994 45 13 21 21 3250
1995 46 13 20 18 3710
1996 46 13 20 20 3920
1997 47 13 19 21 3980
1998 46 14 18 22 4290
1999 46 15 17 21 4470
Average 46 14 19 21 3,940
Trade Industry Households Services Agriculture AverageEgypt
% % % % (LE, mil.)
1989/90-90/91 15 53 7 23 3 2,340
1992/93-94/95 29 28 23 19 1 8,270
1995/96-96/97 34 27 12 24 3 12,510
Average 26 36 14 22 2 7,710
Govt. & Quasi
Saudi Arabia Trade Industry Construction Gov. Others Total
% % % % % (SR, mil.)
1990 22 8 16 0 54 67,100
1992 19 7 11 0 64 107,900
1995 25 9 10 18 38 137,900
1997 25 10 11 14 41 149,200
1998 26 12 11 13 38 178,800
1999 23 14 12 9 42 166,300
Average 23 10 12 9 46 134,530
Bahrain Trade Industry Construction Personal Others Total
% % % % % (BD, !nil.)
1992 17 17 16 29 21 630
1995 20 20 14 32 15 660
1997 20 14 16 31 19 940
1998 20 15 13 35 17 1,080
Average 22 16 12 35 15 1,170
Source: Central banks and monetary authorities in the respective countries.
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This section shows that commercial banks dominate the financial systems of Jordan,
Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, ranging from 60 percent of total financial sector
assets in Saudi Arabia to 85 percent in Bahrain. Furthermore, market structures are
quite concentrated with the largest three banks accounts for 49 percent of Saudi
Arabian and 79 percent of Jordanian banking sector assets over 1992-2000. The other
main financial indicators, discussed earlier, suggest that all the countries under study
have experienced improvements in financial intermediation and bank performance
reflecting the positive impact of economic and financial reforms undertaken in these
countries.
3.6 Preliminary appraisal of the financial reforms on banks' performance of
the countries under study
This section presents an initial assessment of the impact of economic and financial
reforms on the financial depth of the countries under study; Jordan, Egypt, Saudi
Arabia and Bahrain. Such a preliminary evaluation might suggest the impact on
efficiency levels of the financial systems in these countries.
The relationship between economic growth and the development in financial
intermediation has been subject to substantial academic attention. Studies attempt to
address whether economic growth enhances the process of financial intermediation.
Meltzer (1998) refers to an early study of Bagehot (1873) who argued that financial
intermediation was critical for the rapid industrialisation of England in the early
nineteenth century and stressed the importance of financial intermediation in pooling
funds, that were sufficiently large to fund risky and large-scale projects.
Goldsmith (1969) argued that financial superstructure accelerates economic growth
and improves economic performance as it facilitates the migration of funds to the best
users. Thus, economic and financial reforms might promote the growth of the financial
system, and financial developments can be traced by linking the relationship between
infrastructure and superstructure. Furthermore, changes in a country's financial
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structure can be noted by reviewing the sequence in which different types of financial
institutions have appeared over time, and the relative importance of different financial
instruments in the balance sheets of financial institutions.
Financial infrastructure is usually measured by national wealth and national product
while financial superstructure is described by the presence, nature and relative size of
financial instruments and financial institutions. The quantitative aspects of financial
structure include the distribution of total financial assets and liabilities among financial
institutions and non-financial economic units. In particular, change in the ratio of the
financial assets of the financial sector to the total volume of total financial assets
outstanding may reflect the institutionalisation of the process of savings and
investment. Similarly, changes in the distribution of the total financial assets of
financial institutions reveal the changes in the role of the banking system in the process
of promoting saving (Al-Sahlawi, 1997).
Goldsmith (1969) analyses data from thirty-five countries over the period 1860 to 1963
and finds that financial growth and economic development are positively correlated
over periods for several decades. He measured financial development by the financial
intermediation ratio (the ratio of financial intermediary assets divided by gross national
product). This indicator used also to capture the financial intermediaries' role in
overcoming frictions and enhancing growth through quality enhancement (to the extent
that these assets measure the provision of credit to firms as opposed to households and
government, as the former, are argued to be more efficient in utilising financial assets).
However, Goldsmith wonders whether financial development leads to economic
growth or vice versa.
King and Levine (1992, 1993a,b) consider financial development over various periods
starting in 1960 for a comprehensive cross section of countries. They expand the set of
financial development measures to capture the various services provided by financial
intermediaries. One measure approximates the liquidity-providing role of financial
intermediaries through liquid liabilities (currency plus demand and interest-bearing
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deposits, or M2) as a percentage of a country's GDP. Another measure is the ratio of
credit provision to private firms to GDP (to capture monitoring, screening and control
activities as well as the pooling of funds and diversification of risks). The first measure
approximates the intermediaries' role in overcoming technological frictions, while the
second approximates their role in overcoming incentive frictions. King and Levine
(ibid.) find that these measures are positively correlated with real GDP growth rates,
even after controlling for initial conditions, government spending, inflation, political
stability and some other policy measures. They also show that subsequent growth rates
are positively correlated with initial liquidity ratios. This finding may suggest that
financial development causes growth.
The following presents a similar set of economic and financial indicators to analyse the
impact of financial and economic reforms on the financial systems under study over
the last decade. These indicators were grouped into four categories based on their
similarities in signaiiirig the impact Qf refacms <see ta!3Ze 3 .1 23.
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Table 3-12: Summary of financial deepening ratios utilised in this study *
Currency Ratios	 Include currency outside banks as % of money supply (M1) and as % of broader
money supply (M2).
When the ratios rise at the early stages of development, the real economy is
expected to grow due to monetization (because of the safety of holding currency
instead of tangible assets). However, these ratios are expected to decline as more
financial instruments are created by financial institutions with more attractive
attributes
Monetary Ratios	 Include narrow money supply (M1), broader money supply (M2), demand
deposits, time and saving deposits, and total deposits as a percentage of GDP.
These ratios capture the evolution of the financial system. These ratios are also
used as an indication of the velocities of circulation. The ratios increase gradually
as the financial system and economy develop and progress ahead. Furthermore,
the general increase in these ratios reflects higher confidence in the financial
system.
Financial Ratios Include the ratios of total financial system assets and the commercial banks' total
assets as a percent of GDP; and the ratio of commercial banks' assets as percent
of total financial assets.
The first two ratios are used to measure the importance of the financial
institutions in the financing process, while the last ratio reflects the importance of
the banking system relative to the rest of the financial system.
% of credit to	 Total credit of the private sector as a percent of total credit of the financial
private sector	 system.
The volume of credit to the private sector is used as a proxy to examine whether
reforms have actually led to a more efficient allocation of credit, because it is
assumed that the private sector uses resources more efficiently than the public
sector.
Referring to table 3-13, the currency ratios in the four countries under study showed
some decreases especially in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain over 1990-99. This suggests
that the financial systems in these countries are not in the early stages of financial
* In addition to the studies referred to in this section, some or all of these indicators are utilised in
previous PhD theses that have studied similar areas including those of Al-Sahlawi, 1997; Taher (1999)
and Intarachote (2000).
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development and these financial systems already provided various attractive financial
instruments for savers and investors than merely holding funds at financial institutions.
In the previous chapter, we noted that the central banks in Jordan, Egypt and Saudi
Arabia introduced during 1990s various financial instruments aimed at motivating the
public to invest directly and indirectly in these instruments. Moreover, in Jordan and
Egypt, the central banks have introduced regular Treasury bill (TB) auctions leading to
a steep rise in TB rates, sometimes surpassing time deposit rates, and this is likely to
have led some larger depositors to substitute TBs for time deposits.
Table 3-13: Currency ratios in Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain over 1990-99
% 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Jordan
Currency outside banks/M1 70 62 58 61 61 60 62 60 59 62
Currency outside banks/M2 32 27 24 23 22 20 18 18 16 16
Egypt
Currency outside banks/M1 68 68 68 69 102 68 67 67 69 71
Currency outside banks/M2 15 14 13 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
Saudi Arabia
Currency outside banks/M1 44 37 35 35 36 35 32 32 32 35
Currency outside banks/M2 24 21 20 19 12 11 10 10 16 18
Bahrain
Currency outside banks/M1 41 32 28 28 31 31 31 30 26 27
Currency outside banks/M2 11 9 8 8 8 7 7 6 5 6
Source: Adapted from Arab Monetary Fund, 2002.
On the other hand, monetary ratios, which measure the velocity of currency circulation
(M1 and M2 as percent of GDP), have shown little movement over the last decade
(table 3.14). The other monetary ratios (deposit ratios as a percent of GDP) suggest
some increases in Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, indicating an increase in financial
deepness in these countries.
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Table 3-14: Monetary ratios in Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain over 1990-99
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Jordan
Ml/GDP 54 57 48 44 41 38 33 33 31 34
M2/GDP 117 131 118 114 114 112 110 113 116 127
Demand dep./GDP 16 21 20 17 16 15 12 13 13 13
Time and Saving dep. /GDP 63 75 70 70 73 74 77 80 85 94
Egypt
Ml/GDP 25 17 16 16 11 16 16 16 16 16
M2/GDP 114 85 82 82 83 78 78 79 79 80
Demand dep./GDP 8 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Time and Saving dep. /GDP 88 67 66 66 66 61 62 62 63 64
Saudi Arabia
Ml/GDP 26 27 27 27 28 26 25 26 29 30
M2/GDP 48 49 47 51 87 81 79 83 59 58
Demand dep./GDP 15 17 18 18 18 17 17 17 20 19
Time and Saving dep. /GDP 22 22 20 24 24 24 24 24 29 28
Bahrain
Ml/GDP 15 18 20 19 16 15 15 15 16 17
M2/GDP 55 66 67 65 64 66 65 67 81 79
Demand dep./GDP 9 12 14 13 11 10 10 10 12 13
Time and Saving dep. /GDP 39 49 48 46 48 51 50 53 65 61
Source: Adapted from Arab Monetary Fund, 2002.
Alternatively, commercial banks' assets as a percent of GDP increased in Jordan,
Saudi Arabia and Bahrain during the 1990s (table 3.15 shows the details). The other
financial ratios which measure the assets of commercial banks as a percent of financial
system assets has also indicated noticeable increases in the four countries over the
1990-99 period. Taken together, these indicators suggest a growing role for financial
institutions in the financing process and a wider role for commercial banks relative to
the rest of players in these financial systems.
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Table 3-15: Financial ratios for Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain over 1990-99
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Jordan
Total financial assets/GDP 141 154 135 131 133 134 134 139 148 144
Commercial Banks assets/GDP 153 198 178 172 177 183 188 196 202 218
Commercial Banks assets/T. assets109 129 132 131 133 136 140 141 136 152
Egypt
Total financial assets/GDP 126 102 99 99 101 96 98 97 98 100
Commercial Banks assets/GDP 138 110 104 100 100 95 96 96 94 93
Commercial Banks assets/T. assets 110 108 106 102 100 99 98 98 96 93
Saudi Arabia
Total financial assets/GDP 105 93 86 89 89 83 80 83 9 31
Commercial Banks assets/GDP 59 58 60 72 74 71 68 70 84 80
Commercial Banks assets/T. assets 56 63 70 81 83 86 84 84 924 258
Bahrain
Total financial assets/GDP 65 70 77 75 70 75 71 72 86 81
Commercial Banks assets/GDP 110 116 115 116 125 119 117 131 141 150
Commercial Banks assets/T. assets 168 165 149 155 180 159 165 182 164 186
Source: Adapted from Arab Monetary Fund, 2002.
Concerning the growth of credit to the private sector, table 3.16 shows that lending to
the private sector as a proportion of total credit (and as a percent of GDP) has
increased in the four countries. This suggests that the financial institutions are more
efficient in employing their sources of funds, as the private sector is assumed to be
more efficient than the public sector. Furthermore, such ratios capture the efficiency of
financial intermediaries in monitoring, screening and controlling for credit risks.
Overall, all utilised financial development ratios suggest that the financial systems
under study have deepened during the 1990s. It is also clear that banks operating in
these countries play a major role in mobilising financial assets and directing
investment to supposedly efficient uses.
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Table 3-16: Growth of credit to the private sector in Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain
(US$, millions) over the last decade
Credit to
Private Sector
Total Credit GDP (current
prices)
Credit to private
/T. credit
Credit to
private IT. GDP
Jordan
1990 2.487 4.219 4.021 59 62
1991 2.673 3.939 4.194 68 64
1992 2.933 4.430 5.139 66 57
1993 3.290 4.957 5.570 66 59
1994 3.951 5.633 6.078 70 65
1995 4.514 6.166 6.508 73 69
1996 4.743 6.298 6.645 75 71
1997 4.986 6.474 6.976 77 71
1998 5.462 7.473 7.306 73 75
1999 5.729 6.496 7.465 88 77
Eavnt
1990 14.701 36.302 35.489 40 41
1991 9.080 30.235 34.228 30 27
1992 10.913 31.617 41.755 35 26
1993 12.823 33.245 46.896 39 27
1994 16.575 37.629 51.661 44 32
1995 22.287 43.835 60.457 51 37
1996 28.080 50.432 67.305 56 42
1997 35.204 59.604 75.617 59 47
1998 44.676 70.522 82.710 63 54
1999 53.029 81.812 88.964 65 60
Saudi Arabia
1990 17.437 10.254 104.671 170 17
1991 19.653 11.535 118.034 170 17
1992 22.991 28.491 123.204 81 19
1993 27.210 33.511 118.516 81 23
1994 30.227 41.282 120.167 73 25
1995 32.363 43.605 127.811 74 25
1996 33.004 42.724 141.322 77 23
1997 35.701 50.547 146.494 71 24
1998 42.911 60.053 128.377 71 33
1999 43.311 43.000 139.206 101 31
Bahrain
1990 1.283 -23 4.529 28
1991 1.628 511 4.616 319 35
1992 1.799 1.147 4.751 157 38
1993 2.177 1.316 5.201 165 42
1994 2.434 1.374 5.566 177 44
1995 2.521 1.620 5.849 156 43
1996 2.539 1.499 6.102 169 42
1997 2.857 1.811 6.349 158 45
1998 3.096 2.234 6.184 139 50
1999 3.464 2.848 6.621 172 52
Sources: Adapted from Arab Monetary Fund, 2002.
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Other factors that may have contributed to promoting financial deepness in the
countries under study include the globalisation of financial services that one would
expect to increase competition and lead to improvements in the quality of financial
services provision. A number of innovations have occurred, new products have been
introduced, such as credit and debit cards, automated teller machines, interest bearing
current accounts and cheque clearing has been speeded up. Competition for deposits
has been broadened in urban areas with anecdated evidence of increases in both price
and non-price competition. Other feature that can explain the improvement in financial
sector developments in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain (in particular) is the greater
macroeconomic stability in these two countries.
3.7 Conclusion
This chapter reviews the main features of the financial systems under study; Jordan,
Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. In general, these countries have experienced various
financial reforms aimed at liberalising their financial systems. Jordan and Egypt, in
particular, have witnessed major financial reforms over the last decade, aimed at
replacing financial repression and excessive regulation with a more competitive
environment. The reforms procedures in the four countries have included improving
bank capitalisation in accordance with Basle standards and introducing new prudential
guidelines. Apart from Saudi Arabia, stock markets have been upgraded and they have
begun to play a wider role in financing various economic sectors within their
respective countries.
Despite the appearance of new financial institutions in the four countries, commercial
banks still dominate the financial systems, where their share of the financial assets
ranged from about 58 percent in Saudi to about 85 percent in Bahrain during 1992-
2000. However, the market share of commercial banks has not grown during the
1990s. In addition, the banking systems of Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain
are quite concentrated where the share of the largest three institutions of the financial
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systems total assets ranged from about 49 percent in Saudi to about 79 percent in
Jordan over 1992-2000.
The banks in the countries under study also showed favourable growth in terms of their
asset quality, capital adequacy and profitability during the 1990s. Such indicators
reflect an enhanced role for financial intermediaries in the process of economic growth
and exhibit the positive impact of economic and financial reforms undertaken in these
countries. Furthermore, financial systems have deepened in these countries and the
proportion of credit allocated to the private sector as a percent of GDP has increased in
the four countries, suggesting that the financial institutions are more efficient in
allocating the financial resources to the most efficient users.
Taken together, this suggests that the efficiency of the financial and banking systems
under study is likely to have improved during the 1990s. Although it is difficult to say
specifically whether this improvement is a result of reforms in the general
macroeconomic environment, perhaps one can at least suggest that the reform process
has had some positive influence. The aim of the remaining chapters is to empirically
investigate the efficiency of the respective banking systems in order to see if we can
corroborate the above general observations.
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Appendix to Chapter 3
Table 3-17: Distribution of financial assets to financial institutions in Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia
and Bahrain (%) over 1992-2000
Specialisation 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000Average
Jordan
Central Bank 0 20 20 19 18 18 16 17 17 16
Commercial Bank 89 70 71 73 74 74 76 75 75 75
Investment/Securities Bank 6 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Islamic Bank 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 4
Others 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Total (US $, millions) 14,850 19,780 21,820 24,240 26,330 28,490 30,120 32,930 36,710 26,140
Egypt
Central Bank 35 40 39 0 36 33 32 31 31 31
Commercial Bank 60 55 55 88 57 59 60 60 60 62
Investment/Securities Bank 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 1 1
Islamic Bank 3 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2
Others 2 2 3 6 4 4 4 6 6 4
Total (US $, millions) 75,560 88,610 93,260 64,300 107,420 117,840 123,610 131,300 137,460 104,370
Saudi Arabia
Central Bank 45 41 39 38 39 39 35 40 29 39
Commercial Bank 53 56 58 59 57 57 60 56 67 58
Investment/Securities Bank 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
Others 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Total (US $, millions) 147,690 148,270 148,150 153,740 162,400 172,980 174,130 191,280 174,880 163,720
Bahrain
Central Bank 0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2
Commercial Bank 88 83 85 85 86 85 85 82 84 85
Investment/Securities Bank 10 11 10 9 9 10 10 11 10 10
Islamic Bank 1 2 3 2 2 2 2 3 3 2
Others 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Total (US $, millions) 34,540 36,550 38,560 41,520 43,970 46,480 50,110 55,550 58,810 45,120
Source: Bankscope (2002), the figure based on the consolidated balance sheets (nominal values) of the
local financial intuitions.
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Table 3-18: Distribution of customer deposits to financial institutions in Jordan, Egypt, Saudi
Arabia and Bahrain (%) over 1992-2000
Specialisation (General) 1992	 1993	 1994	 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Average
Jordan
Commercial Bank 90	 89	 90	 90 91 91 91 91 90 90
Investment/Securities Bank 6	 6	 5	 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Islamic Bank 4	 5	 5	 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Others 1	 1	 1	 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total (US $, millions) 13,627 16,340 17,466 19,493 21,438 23,015 24,173 26,362 29,446 21,260
Egypt
Commercial Bank 92	 92	 91	 89 91 91 90 88 88 90
Investment/Securities Bank 1	 2	 2	 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Islamic Bank 4	 3	 3	 3 3 2 3 3 3 3
Others 3	 3	 4	 6 4 4 4 7 7 5
Total (US $, millions) 40,371 60,745 63,487 53,795 74,458 84,122 88,555 93,514 99,501 73,170
Saudi Arabia
Commercial Bank 97	 96	 96	 96 95 95 95 95 95 96
Investment/Securities Bank 2	 2	 2	 2 3 3 3 3 3 2
Others 1	 1	 2	 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Total (US $, millions) 84,569 91,176 92,605 97,074 100,305 107,590 114,889 112,245 120,741 102,360
Bahrain
Commercial Bank 94	 92	 92	 94 94 93 94 91 92 93
Investment/Securities Bank 6	 6	 6	 4 5 5 5 6 5 5
Islamic Bank 0	 2	 2	 2 2 2 2 3 4 2
Others 0	 0	 0	 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total (US $, millions) 28,169 28,340 30,346 32,141 33,528 35,274 38,858 42,270 43,997 34,770
Source: Bankscope (2002), the figure based on the consolidated balance sheets (nominal values) of the
local financial intuitions.
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Table 3-19: Distribution of customer loans to financial institutions in Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia
and Bahrain (%) over 1992-2000
Specialisation (General) 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Average
Jordan
Commercial Bank 88 85 87 88 88 89 90 90 90 88
Investment/Securities Bank 5 6 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 4
Islamic Bank 6 7 7 7 7 6 5 5 5 6
Others 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2
Total (US $, millions) 5,649 6,541 7,606 8,837 9,715 10,702 11,442 11,676 12,149 9,370
Egypt
Commercial Bank 85 88 86 84 85 85 85 83 83 85
Investment/Securities Bank 1 1 2 3 3 3 3 3 2 2
Islamic Bank 8 6 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 5
Others 6 5 7 8 8 8 8 11 11 8
Total (US $, millions) 25,578 27,000 29,314 28,652 38,549 43,188 48,150 59,319 66,359 40,680
Saudi Arabia
Commercial Bank 95 95 96 95 94 93 93 93 92 94
Investment/Securities Bank 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 4 4 3
Others 3 2 2 2 3 4 3 3 4 3
Total (US $, millions) 32,318 36,280 39,738 41,162 39,515 44,517 49,918 47,529 48,287 42,140
Bahrain
Commercial Bank 94 93 95 95 96 96 96 95 95 95
Investment/Securities Bank 5 4 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 2
Islamic Bank 1 3 3 3 .	 3 3 3 4 4 3
Others 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total (US $, millions) 16,625 16,028 16,908 17,159 17,980 19,124 21,109 23,128 24,379 19,160
Source: Bankscope (2002), the figure based on the consolidated balance sheets (nominal values) of the
local financial intuitions.
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Table 3-20: Concentration ratios in Jordanian's banking sector over 1992-2000 (Totals in US$,
million)
Year Bank Name Total Assets Total Loans (net) Customer Deposits
1992 Total 14,845 5,649 13,627
Largest 1 68 67 72
Largest 3 82 83 83
Largest 5 88 89 89
1993 Total 15,836 6,206 14,034
Largest 1 67 61 75
Largest 3 80 84 78
Largest 5 86 89 85
1994 Total 17,376 7,266 14,842
Largest 1 67 62 61
Largest 3 80 76 79
Largest 5 87 84 86
1995 Total 19,606 8,491 16,716
Largest 1 67 62 62
Largest 3 79 74 79
Largest 5 87 87 86
1996 Total 21,513 9,383 18,335
Largest 1 68 76 63
Largest 3 80 87 76
Largest 5 87 92 86
1997 Total 23,276 10,370 19,470
Largest 1 65 71 64
Largest 3 78 84 76
Largest 5 87 88 87
1998 Total 25,351 11,116 21,015
Largest 1 65 71 63
Largest 3 78 84 75
Largest 5 86 88 86
1999 Total 27,393 11,303 22,612
Largest 1 65 71 63
Largest 3 78 82 76
Largest 5 86 89 85
2000 Total 30,475 11,496 25,212
Largest 1 64 70 62
Largest 3 77 81 75
Largest 5 85 88 84
Source: Ban1cscope (2002), the figure based on the consolidated balance sheets (nominal values) of the
local financial intuitions and excludes the share of the central banks.
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Table 3-21: Concentration ratios in Egyptian's banking sector over 1992-2000 (Totals in US$,
million)
Year Bank Name Total Assets Total Loans (net) Customer Deposits
1992 Total 49,184 16,846 40,371
Largest 1 27 20 28
Largest 3 56 43 58
Largest 5 71 63 71
1993 Total 53,085 20,408 44,757
Largest 1 25 25 24
Largest 3 56 54 57
Largest 5 68 64 69
1994 Total 56,652 23,533 47,617
Largest 1 22 23 22
Largest 3 54 53 55
Largest 5 67 64 67
1995 Total 64,304 28,652 53,795
Largest 1 22 23 21
Largest 3 52 50 53
Largest 5 65 61 66
1996 Total 69,167 33,185 59,486
Largest 1 21 20 21
Largest 3 50 48 52
Largest 5 63 61 65
1997 Total 78,687 38,437 66,712
Largest 1 20 20 21
Largest 3 50 46 52
Largest 5 62 59 65
1998 Total 83,972 42,315 71,255
Largest 1 21 20 21
Largest 3 50 44 52
Largest 5 62 57 64
1999 Total 91,044 50,633 76,730
Largest 1 21 20 21
Largest 3 49 44 51
Largest 5 60 57 62
2000 Total 95,092 53,446 81,016
Largest 1 23 23 23
Largest 3 50 48 52
Largest 5 61 60 63
Source: Bankscope (2002), the figure based on the consolidated balance sheets (nominal values) of the
local financial intuitions and excludes the share of the central banks.
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Table 3-22: Concentration ratios in Saudi's banking sector over 1992-2000 (Totals in US$, million)
Year Bank Name Total Assets Total Loans (net) Customer Deposits
1992 Total 81,063 32,318 69,883
Largest 1 21 21 21
Largest 3 50 43 50
Largest 5 68 69 68
1993 Total 86,747 36,280 74,487
Largest 1 20 20 21
Largest 3 49 42 49
Largest 5 67 68 68
1994 Total 90,210 39,738 77,091
Largest 1 20 •	 22 21
Largest 3 49 46 50
Largest 5 67 70 67
1995 Total 94,595 41,162 80,278
Largest 1 21 26 22
Largest 3 48 48 49
Largest 5 66 71 66
1996 Total 9MO 39,515 83,269
Largest 1 21 26 22
Largest 3 47 46 48
Largest 5 65 70 65
1997 Total 105,823 44,517 89,593
Largest 1 22 28 23
Largest 3 48 47 48
Largest 5 65 71 66
1998 Total 112,315 49,918 95,156
Largest 1 22 28 23
Largest 3 48 49 49
Largest 5 66 65 67
1999 Total 114,534 47,529 97,372
Largest 1 21 21 22
Largest 3 54 50 55
Largest 5 73 71 73
2000 Total 124,308 48,287 105,067
Largest 1 21 21 23
Largest 3 53 50 54
Largest 5 72 69 73
Source: Bankscope (2002), the figure based on the consolidated balance sheets (nominal values) of the
local financial intuitions and excludes the share of the central banks.
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Table 3-23: Concentration ratios in Bahrain's banking sector over 1992-2000 (Totals in US$,
million)
Year	 Bank Name	 Total Assets	 Total Loans (net)	 Customer Deposits
	
1992	 Total	 34,536	 16,625	 28,169
Largest 1	 56	 63	 59
Largest 3
	
80	 85	 85
Largest 5	 88	 91	 91
	
1993	 Total
	 35,480	 16,028	 28,168
Largest 1
	 52	 61	 55
Largest 3
	 78	 83	 84
Largest 5
	 86	 88	 90
	
1994	 Total	 37,518	 16,908	 30,194
Largest 1
	 52	 62	 54
Largest 3
	 79	 85	 84
Largest 5	 87	 90	 90
	
1995	 Total	 40,255
	 17,159
	 31,827
Largest 1
	 53	 62	 56
Largest 3
	 80	 84	 85
Largest 5
	 89	 90	 92
	
1996	 Total	 42,760	 17,980
	 33,290
Largest 1
	 54	 63	 57
Largest 3
	 80	 85	 86
Largest 5
	 89	 91	 92
	
1997	 Total	 45,144	 19,124
	 34,975
Largest 1
	 52	 63	 56
Largest 3
	 79	 85	 85
Largest 5
	 88	 91	 92
	
1998	 Total	 48,856	 21,109
	 38,673
Largest 1
	 53	 62	 58
Largest 3
	 79	 87	 85
Largest 5	 89	 91	 91
	
1999	 Total	 54,057	 23,128
	 41,986
Largest 1
	 45	 56	 49
Largest 3
	 72	 80	 76
Largest 5	 82	 86	 84
	
2000	 Total	 57,278	 24,379	 43,702
Largest 1
	
47	 58	 50
Largest 3
	
73	 81	 78
Largest 5
	
83	 86	 84
Source: Banlcscope (2002), the figure based on the consolidated balance sheets (nominal values) of the
local financial intuitions and excludes the share of the central banks.
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Table 3-24: Financial assets of the banking sectors of Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain
(US$ million, 1992-2000)
Year Bahrain Egypt Jordan Saudi Arabia Total
1992 34,540 75,560 14,850 147,690 272,630
1993 36,550 88,610 19,780 148,270 293,210
1994 38,560 93,260 21,820 148,150 301,800
1995 41,520 64,300 24,240 153,740 283,810
1996 43,970 107,420 26,330 162,400 340,130
1997 46,480 117,840 28,490 172,980 365,790
1998 50,110 123,610 30,120 174,130 377,980
1999 55,550 131,300 32,930 191,280 411,050
2000 58,810 137,460 36,710 174,880 407,860
Avg. Annual growth % 9 10 18 2 6
Total 406,090 939,370 235,270 1,473,520 3,054,260
No. of banks 27 45 tg LE. ‘06
Source: Bankscope (2002), the figure based on the consolidated balance sheets (nominal values) of the
local financial intuitions and excludes the share of the central banks.
Table 3-25: Customer loans of the banking sectors of Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain
(US$ million, 1992-2000)
Year Bahrain Egypt Jordan Saudi Arabia Total
1992 16,630 25,580 5,650 32,320 80,170
1993 16,030 27,000 6,540 36,280 85,850
1994 16,910 29,310 7,610 39,740 93,570
1995 17,160 28,650 8,840 41,160 95,810
1996 17,980 38,550 9,720 39,520 105,760
1997 19,120 43,190 10,700 44,520 117,530
1998 21,110 48,150 11,440 49,920 130,620
1999 23,130 59,320 11,680 47,530 141,650
2000 24,380 66,360 12,150 48,290 151,170
Avg. Annual growth % 6 20 14 6 11
Total 172,440 366,110 84,320 379,260 1,002,130
No. of banks 27 45 18 16 106
Source: Banlcscope (2002), the figure based on the consolidated balance sheets (nominal values) of the
local financial intuitions and excludes the share of the central banks.
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Table 3-26: Problem loans of the banking sectors of Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain
(US$ million, 1992-2000)
Year Bahrain Egypt Jordan Saudi Arabia Total
1992 40 30 1 80 150
1993 50 30 20 70 170
1994 1,220 0 420 3,730 5,380
1995 1,410 0 510 4,300 6,220
1996 2,010 0 630 4,940 7,570
1997 1,680 0 750 4,970 7,400
1998 2,070 0 830 2,170 5,070
1999 1,470 0 1,120 4,760 7,350
2000 730 0 1,250 4,480 6,450
Avg. Annual growth % 216 -13 15,613 688 525
Total 10,680 60 5,520 29,500 45,770
No. of banks 27 45 18 16 106
Source: Bankscope (2002), the figure based on the consolidated balance sheets (nominal values) of the
local financial intuitions and excludes the share of the central banks.
Table 3-27: Loan-loss reserves of the banking sectors of Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain
(US$ million, 1992-2000)
Year Bahrain Egypt Jordan Saudi Arabia Total
1992 2,150 580 100 2,830
1993 2,430 970 250 3,640
1994 2,120 990 520 3,620
1995 2,100 1,150 520 3,770
1996 2,000 3,000 540 5,540
1997 1,910 4,160 590 6,660
1998 2,140 4,610 700 7,440
1999 1,430 5,020 820 7,260
2000 1,050 5,560 820 7,430
Avg. Annual growth % -6 107 90 20
Total 17,320 26,020 4,860 48,200
No. of banks 27 45 18	 16 106
Source: Bankscope (2002), the figure based on the consolidated balance sheets (nominal values) of the
local financial intuitions and excludes the share of the central banks.
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Table 3-28: Net income of the banking sectors of Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain (US$
million, 1992-2000)
Year Bahrain Egypt Jordan Saudi Arabia Total
1992 310 150 120 1,120 1,700
1993 540 220 160 1,270 2,200
1994 410 310 160 1,310 2,190
1995 530 380 190 1,530 2,640
1996 600 470 180 1,660 2,910
1997 730 610 200 1,880 3,410
1998 520 730 240 1,970 3,460
1999 640 840 190 1,080 2,750
2000 530 800 220 2,490 4,040
Avg. Annual growth % 9 54 10 17
Total 4,800 4,510 1,660 14,320 25,290
No. of banks 27 45 18 16 106
Source: Bankscope (2002), the figure based on the consolidated balance sheets (nominal values) of the
local financial intuitions and excludes the share of the central banks.
Table 3-29: Return on average assets of the banking sectors of Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and
Bahrain (%, 1992-2000
Year Bahrain Egypt Jordan Saudi Arabia Total
1992 1.35 0.63 0.96 1.29 0.98
1993 2.49 0.99 0.48 0.85 1.26
1994 1.78 1.27 0.70 1.31 1.31
1995 2.29 1.48 0.86 1.61 1.60
1996 2.61 1.45 0.54 1.92 1.65
1997 2.89 1.62 0.50 2.15 1.81
1998 2.10 1.67 0.64 1.81 1.62
1999 2.02 1.63 0.47 1.45 1.50
2000 1.07 1.33 0.06 2.00 1.14
Avg. Annual growth % -2.59 13.92 -11.78 6.84 1.95
Total 2.09 1.37 0.57 1.60 1.44
No. of banks 27 45 18 16 106
Source: Banlcscope (2002), the figure based on the consolidated balance sheets (nominal values) of the
local financial intuitions and excludes the share of the central banks.
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Table 3-30: Return on average equity of the banking sectors of Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and
Bahrain (%, 1992-2000)
Year Bahrain Egypt Jordan Saudi Arabia Total
1992 6.12 6.52 15.33 16.16 9.67
1993 10.63 12.25 24.54 5.82 12.95
1994 8.17 14.08 15.87 10.91 12.35
1995 9.24 17.07 14.92 13.65 14.27
1996 10.02 17.29 6.46 13.50 13.32
1997 11.76 16.36 4.82 14.73 13.24
1998 9.08 15.72 6.68 14.23 12.54
1999 9.69 14.67 3.87 10.87 11.25
2000 4.88 13.47 4.21 17.03 10.42
Avg. Annual growth % -2.53 13.32 -9.07 0.67 0.96
Total 8.94 14.43 10.71 12.96 12.28
No. of banks 27 45 18 16 106
Source: Bankscope (2002), the figure based on the consolidated balance sheets (nominal values) of the
local financial intuitions and excludes the share of the central banks.
Table 3-31: Net interest revenue of the banking sectors of Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and
Bahrain (US$ million, 1992-2000)
Year Bahrain Egypt Jordan Saudi Arabia Total
1992 700 220 270 1,450 2,640
1993 760 180 350 1,560 2,850
1994 760 770 390 1,500 3,420
1995 730 760 460 1,390 3,330
1996 840 950 460 2,400 4,650
1997 930 1,050 510 2,780 5,260
1998 860 1,160 610 3,030 5,670
1999 1,020 1,340 580 2,930 5,860
2000 1,080 1,370 730 3,180 6,360
Avg. Annual growth % 7 65 21 15 18
Total 7,670 7,800 4,350 20,220 40,040
No. of banks 27 45 18 16 106
Source: Bankscope (2002), the figure based on the consolidated balance sheets (nominal values) of the
local financial intuitions and excludes the share of the central banks.
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Table 3-32: Banks' equity in the banking sectors of Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain
(US$ million, 1992-2000)
Year Bahrain Egypt Jordan Saudi Arabia Total
1992 4,070 2,570 810 8,660 16,110
1993 5,090 3,510 940 9,650 19,190
1994 4,910 3,740 1,050 10,100 19,810
1995 5,310 3,470 1,250 10,650 20,670
1996 5,660 4,940 1,410 11,600 23,610
1997 6,020 6,020 1,820 12,050 25,910
1998 6,200 6,690 2,050 12,540 27,490
1999 7,340 7,340 2,190 12,190 29,060
2000 7,380 7,220 2,420 13,220 30,250
Avg. Annual growth % 10 23 25 7 11
Total 51,980 45,510 13,940 100,660 212,090
No. of banks 27 45 18 16 106
Source: Banlcscope (2002), the figure based on the consolidated balance sheets (nominal values) of the
local financial intuitions and excludes the share of the central banks.
Table 3-33: Customers in the banking sectors of Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain (US$
million, 1992-2000)
Year Bahrain Egypt Jordan Saudi Arabia Total
1992 28,170 40,370 13,630 84,570 166,740
1993 28,340 60,750 16,340 91,180 196,600
1994 30,350 63,490 17,470 92,610 203,900
1995 32,140 53,790 19,490 97,070 202,500
1996 33,530 74,460 21,440 100,300 229,730
1997 35,270 84,120 23,010 107,590 250,000
1998 38,860 88,550 24,170 114,890 266,470
1999 42,270 93,510 26,360 112,240 274,390
2000 44,000 99,500 29,450 120,740 293,680
Avg. Annual growth % 7 18 15 5 10
Total 312,920 658,550 191,360 921,190 2,084,030
No. of banks 27 45 18 16 106
Source: Bankscope (2002), the figure based on the consolidated balance sheets (nominal values) of the
local financial intuitions and excludes the share of the central banks.
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Table 3-34: Off-balance sheet items in the banking sectors of Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and
Bahrain (US$ million, 1992-2000)
Year Bahrain Egypt Jordan Saudi Arabia Total
1992 24,030 11,280 3,940 71,980 111,240
1993 30,880 12,420 4,330 91,140 138,760
1994 35,720 15,400 5,270 91,530 147,910
1995 14,590 18,120 6,100 100,920 139,720
1996 15,820 20,670 5,490 51,010 92,990
1997 16,990 23,260 6,470 30,430 77,150
1998 15,770 27,050 6,790 34,890 84,500
1999 14,860 27,480 7,210 41,100 90,660
2000 13,810 26,990 8,650 44,450 93,900
Avg. Annual growth % -5 17 15 -5 -2
Total 182,460 182,670 54,250 557,450 976,840
No. of banks 27 45 18 16 106
Source: Bankscope (2002), the figure based on the consolidated balance sheets (nominal values) of the
local financial intuitions and excludes the share of the central banks.
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4.1 : Introduction
This chapter presents a theoretical overview of the banking efficiency literature. Section 4.2
presents a basic description of the concept of efficiency and draws attention to the
significance of empirical efficiency studies. It shows that the desire to investigate the
efficiency characteristics of financial services institutions has received attention by various
groups including academics and policymakers as well as bankers. In particular, the seminal
studies of Aigner and Chu (1968), Afriat (1972) and Richmond (1974) emphasise the
importance of efficiency measurement using parametric frontier production functions.
Section 4.3 describes the concepts of economies of scale and X-efficiency as these will be
used in the present study to estimate efficiency levels in the banking sectors of Jordan,
Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. Section 4.4 reviews the area of productive efficiency
which dominates efficiency studies. Productive efficiency (or X-efficiency) defines the
relationship between the production levels and some desirable objective function such as
the cost, revenue or profit function given a certain level of production technology. It also
describes how overall efficiency can be decomposed into technical and allocative
efficiency. In its turn, technical efficiency can be investigated further and decomposed into
pure technical efficiency and scale efficiency. Furthermore, this section outlines the
technical change that deal with the consequences of shifts in the production function due to
such factors as experience, increased knowledge, innovations and improved production
techniques.
Section 4.5 presents the three main economic functional forms from which efficiency and
productivity estimates can be derived; cost, standard and alternative profit function. These
will be utilised in the present study to estimate the efficiency levels in several Arabian
banking sectors. Finally, section 4.6 draws the conclusion.
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4.2 Importance of studying banks' efficiency
The desire to investigate efficiency characteristics of financial services firms has received
concern by different groups including academics and policymakers as well as bankers.
These groups attempt to link efficiency levels to the characteristics of financial institutions
as this is expected to provide an insight into the profitability of financial firms and should
result in lower prices and improve service quality for consumers and should also result in
greater safety and soundness if efficiency savings are directed toward improving capital
buffers that absorb risks. These are the main reasons why the study of banking sector
efficiency is regarded important.
In general, banking industry structure is greatly influenced by the nature of production
economies. If an industry's technology allows for both economies of scale and scope, the
industry tends to be made up of large diversified firms (see Clark, 1988). These firms will
be able to produce at lower per-unit costs than smaller specialized firms and can potentially
use this cost advantage to gain market share. On the other hand, if technology neither
allows economies of scale nor scope, small-specialized firms will tend to dominate the
industry. A mixture of larger diversified firms and smaller specialized firms will develop in
the absence of significant economies of scale and scope.
In particular, bank efficiency represents a social optimal target since it reduces the costs of
financial intermediation which drives down the drainage of real resources through
transferring funds efficiently from savers to producers (see Resti, 1996). For this reason,
regulatory authorities are interested in fostering more efficient operating practices that
results in a market equilibrium that promote the maximum productive efficiency. On the
other hand, the economic theory of the firm assumes that production should take place in an
environment where the managers aim to maximize profits by operating in the most efficient
manner. The competitive model suggests that firms which fail to do so will be driven from
the market by ones that are more efficient. However, when natural entry barriers or
regulations weaken competitive forces, inefficient firms may continue to prosper.
Rhoades (1998) distinguishes between cost reductions and efficiency improvements.
Reductions in expenses may result from cutting the number of employees, closing branches
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and so on. Such reductions in expenses do not automatically translate into improvements in
efficiency which can be measured by some expense ratios, such as expenses to assets or
revenues. Reductions in expenses that are accompanied by corresponding reductions in
assets and revenues represent shrinkage of the firm rather than efficiency improvements.
An improvement in efficiency occurs when the reduction in costs are more than the decline
in revenues.
The seminal studies of Aigner and Chu (1968), Afriat (1972) and Richmond (1974) turn the
focus to the importance of efficiency measurement. These studies are concerned with
estimating parametric frontier production functions by assuming a function that gives
maximum possible output given a certain amount of inputs. For a given firm:
Yi = f( x ,;I 3 1,
where y, is the maximum output attainable from x. 	 vector of non-stochastic inputs) and
13 (an unknown parameter vector to be estimated). Therefore, to determine the degree of
efficiency, the technology of the firm should be modelled through the production function,
or equivalently through a cost function. A simple expression of a cost function is
C = f (Y, W, t),
where C is total cost, Y is output, W is input price, and t is time. The producer's objective is
to produce its output Y at minimum cost. The cost function (frontier) then can then be
defined as the minimum attainable cost for each level of output.
To summarise, the efficiency of the banking system is of interest to many parties as
improvements in efficiency are expected to improve profitability, lower prices, improve
services quality that ultimately result in greater safety and soundness.
4.3 Types of efficiency
This section describes the main types of efficiency that are investigated extensively in the
banking literature. In particular, this section focuses on the economies of scale and X-
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efficiency, as these concepts will be utilised to estimate efficiency levels in the banking
sectors of Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, later in this thesis.
4.3.1 Economies of scale
Economies of scale refer to the rate at which output changes as all factor quantities are
varied. It measures whether firms with similar production and managerial technologies are
operating at optimal economies of scale. Clark (1988) describes that firms can realize
economies of scale, for a single product firm, if technology allows production costs to rise
proportionately less than output when output increases. That is, economies of scale exist if
average production costs per unit decline as output rises. This is measured by the ratio of
the percentage change in costs relative to the percentage change in output. If the economies
of scale ratio is smaller than one, economies of scale arise because average long-run cost is
declining. If the ratio is equal to one, no economies of scale are present since average cost
is constant and when the ratio exceeds one, diseconomies of scale exist as average cost is
increasing.
Sinkey (1992) notes that a bank is said to be producing at constant returns to scale if, for a
given mix of products, a proportionate increase in all its outputs would increase its costs in
the same proportion. A bank is experiencing economies of scale if a proportionate increase
in its outputs would lead to a less than proportionate increase in cost. On the other hand,
scale diseconomies arise when a proportionate increase in bank outputs would lead to a
more than proportionate increase in costs. These alternative relationships between costs and
output are shown in figure 4-1 below.
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Figure 4-1: Economies of scale and the shape of average cost curves
Average Cost
	 Rising costs (diseconomies of scale)
U-shaped cost curve
Constant Costs
Declining costs
(Economies of scale)
Output
Source: Sinkey (1992, p 306)
Therefore, scale economies are measured by the elasticity of cost with respect to output.
Given the total cost function defined by TC = f(Q), where Q is an output then average cost
can be derived as ATC = f(Q)/Q and marginal cost is dT C / dQ . The average cost will
decline as long as the marginal cost lies under average cost, so economies of scale (SE) is
ATC/MC (see Altunbas et al., 1996, p. 139) which is the elasticity of cost with respect to
output. Therefore, when SE  1,SE = 1 and SE _. 1, we are experiencing increasing,
constant or decreasing returns to scale respectively.
Scale efficiencies can increase profits as the unit cost of production falls with increased
size. More specifically, it can improve cost efficiency by reducing costs per unit of output
for a given set of output quantities and input prices. Second, it may increase profits through
improvements in profit efficiency that involves superior combinations of inputs and outputs
resulting from larger size. Third, it may improve profits through the exercise of additional
market power in setting prices (see Akhavein et al., 1997a for details).
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4.3.1.1 Economies of scale for multiproduct firms
While the concept of economies of scale for a single product firm applies to the behaviour
of total costs as output increases, the concept of average cost for multiproduct firms is more
complicated. The problem lies in how to measure output for multiproduct firms. Baumol et
al. (1982) show that the multiproduct cost function possesses no natural scalar quantity over
which costs may be averaged. That is, we cannot construct a measure of the magnitude of
multiproduct output without adding non-homogeneous outputs. One alternative when
facing this problem is to refer to the single-product case by fixing output proportions and
considering the behaviour of costs as the size of the resulting output is varied.
Baumol et al. (1982) proposes the concept of the Ray Average Cost (RAC) to measure
economies of scale for multiproduct firms. RAC requires that firms expand all outputs at
the same rate while mixing inputs optimally. RAC is a generalisation of single product
average cost and defined as
TC(Q)/IQ,=TC(tq° )/ t
where q° is the unit bundle for a particular mixture of outputs and tq° = Q . This gives the
average cost of the composite commodity whose unit is vector q° and whose scale output is
given by the scalar t. Ray average cost is said to be increasing (decreasing) at Q if RAC(Q)
is an increasing (decreasing) function of the scalar T. At T = 1. RAC is said to be
minimized at q if RAC(q)<RAC(Tq), for all positive T # 1. With this definition, RAC can
be represented in the cross-section hyperplane that defines the composite commodity
(figure 4.2). Figure 4.2 shows the behaviour of total cost along the ray, OR. The lower part
is the outputs space which is produced in proportion given by the ray OR. The point of
minimum RAC, the output bundle q°, corresponds to the most efficient scale for the firm
producing (for instance, loans and securities) in the proportion specified by the ray QR.
Thus, the degree of economies of scale at q° is defined as the elasticity output with respect
to cost which is equal to 1/(1-e), where e is the elasticity of the relevant average cost curve.
This degree of economies of scale is greater than, less than or equal to one as returns to
scale are locally increasing, decreasing or constant and as the RAC curve's slope is
negative, positive, or zero, respectively (see Molyneux et al., 1996 for the details).
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Figure 4-2: Economies of scale for multiproduct firm: the concept of RAC
Total cost \
Source: Molyneux et al. (1996), p141
4.3.1.2 Overall versus product-specific economies of scale
The concept of multi-product economies of scale explains the behaviour of costs as output
increases or decreases along a given ray, but it may not explain the full behaviour of costs
as output bundles change. Panzar and Willig (1977) show how total costs change as output
of one-commodity changes, which is called product-specific economies. Product-specific
economies of scale are the average incremental cost (AK) and defined as the extra cost of
adding the production of a given product at a specific level of output as compared with not
holding it at all, divided by the output of that product.
The product-specific economies arise from increases in the production of individual
products while the overall economies of scale arise from increases in all of a firm's output.
For multi-product firms, overall economies of scale occur if total costs increase
proportionately less than output when there is a simultaneous and equal percentage increase
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in each of the firm's products (see Clark, 1988). With overall economies of scale, average
costs decline as the firm expands production while maintaining a constant product mix.
Product-specific economies of scale are present if a decline in the per-unit cost of
producing a specific product occurs as the output of that product increases.
Alternatively, overall economies of scale are measured by computing the sum of the output
cost elasticises of individual products. The output cost elasticity for a product is the
percentage change in production costs that occurs for a given percentage change in the
output of the product. In addition, the sum of the individual output cost elasticities is
equivalent to the percentage change in costs that results from an equal percentage change in
the output of all products. When this measure of overall economies of scale is equal to one
at a given level of overall output, there are constant returns to scale. If this measure of
overall economies of scale is significantly less than one, then there are increasing returns to
scale and production efficiencies will be realized in this range of production. Conversely, if
this measure is significantly greater than one, there are decreasing returns to scale and
production inefficiencies will be realized.
4.3.2 Economies of scope
Economies of scope arise if two or more products can be jointly produced at a lower cost
than that is incurred in their independent production; TC(Q1, Q2) < TC(Q 1 )+TC( Q 2 ) . If the
inequality is reversed, then diseconomies of scope are said to exist. A measure of
economies of scope is: SCOPE = [TC(Q i) + TC(Q2) - TC(Q1,Q2)1/ TC(Q1,Q2).
Economies of scope generate cost savings from delivering multiple goods and services
jointly through the same organisation rather than through specialised providers. Molyneux
et al. (1996) sum up that there are two groups of potential economies of scope. Firms can
realise internal scope economies through joint production and marketing, while consumers
can realise external scope economies through joint consumption. On the production side,
scope economies appear available where facilities devoted to one objective or to serving a
single market are not fully utilised and are capable of being deployed simultaneously to
serve other targets and other markets. On the consumption side, scope economies exist
where multiple productions at a single location or through a single firm saves consumers
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the time and expense of searching for and purchasing these items through specialised
providers. Sinkey (1992) attributes the existence of economies of scope to interproduct or
cost complementarities. For a multiproduct-banking firm, cost complementarities refer to
the extent to which the costs of producing a particular financial service or product may vary
with the output levels of other products or services.
Clark (1988) clarifies the disparity between global economies and the product-specific
economies of scope. Global economies are identified by comparing the costs of both joint
production and separate production while assuming a given scale for each product. For a
given product mix, if the total costs from joint production of all products in the product mix
are less than the sum of the costs of producing each product independently, global
economies of scope are present. On the other hand, product-specific economies of scope
refers to economies that arise from the joint production of a particular product with other
products; i.e. enhancing production efficiency by adding a particular product to a given
product mix. So, if the cost of producing a product independently from the other products
in the product mix exceeds the cost of producing it jointly, product-specific economies of
scope can be realized from joint production. Global economies of scope are measured by
computing the cost differential that would arise between the independent and joint
production of specific output levels of all products. This cost differential is then scaled by
dividing by total costs of joint production. This measure is greater than one when there are
global economies of scope. Product-specific economies of scope are measured in several
ways. One common measure is to compute the cost increase or decrease that arises from
producing a specific product both independently from, and jointly with, the remaining
product mix and expressing it as a percentage of the costs of joint production. If this ratio is
greater than one, product specific economies of scope are said to exist.
On the other hand, Berger et al (1987) developed alternative scale and product mix
measures: Expansion Path Scale Economies (EPSCE) and the Expansion Path Subadditivity
(EPSUB) measures which compare the costs of firms that differ in both scale and product
mix simultaneously. Berger et al. (ibid) identified the following potential sources of scope
and product mix economies: spreading fixed costs; information economies; risk reduction;
consumer cost economies.
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Berger et al (1993) point out that there are three major problems related to estimating scope
economies. First, the translog functional form, on which many studies have been based, is
not sufficiently flexible to describe an industry with increasing returns to scale up to some
point and constant returns thereafter. It also has difficulties when firms tend to change
product mix significantly as they change scale. The translog and the Box-Cox
approximation perform poorly in estimating scope economies because they have trouble
with estimations at or near zero. Second, there is often little or no data on firms'
specialisation. Third, it is difficult to evaluate scope economies using data that are not on
the frontier. In order to address these limitations, Berger et al. proposed the concept of
'optimal scope economies', based on the profit function instead of the cost function. This
incorporates the revenue effects of output choices as well as the cost effects of input
choices, providing at a least partial solution to the above limitations.
4.3.3 Sources of scale and scope economies
Firms attain economies in scale or scope from various sources. First, they may have excess
capacity of some inputs so that an increase in output cannot require a proportionate increase
in all inputs over the entire production period. Specifically, the existence of indivisibility in
some inputs may help reduce costs per unit of output as the output level is increased.
Furthermore, spreading fixed costs over large levels of output are usually the predominant
source of economies of scale. Clark (1988) concludes that most economies of scope arise
from the joint usage of a fixed resource.
In addition, the greater size allows for a more efficient organisation of resources (see
Molyneux, 1996). Large banks may divide tasks so that employees and machines can be
used in more than one facet of their operation. Besides, the law of large numbers accounts
for certain economies. Moreover, larger banks are seemingly better able to diversify their
assets and reduce risk. Likewise, some types of technological innovations may be
economically more feasible for large banks. Thus, according to asset size, banks could
employ different compositions of inputs with varying efficiencies.
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Furthermore, when financial intermediaries grow in size and intensify their diversification,
they can lower delegation costs by mitigating the asymmetric distribution of information
between borrowers and lenders. In addition, the increase in size may improve
organisational and strategic flexibility that lead to greater cost minimization, better
management and more efficiency for fixed costs, and the diversification of assets and
liabilities can reduce income variability. Alternatively, on the demand side, consumers may
benefit through "package-acquisition behaviour" that favour output diversification via cost
savings or in terms of the perception of a quality advantage.
Finally, information technology may raise efficiency when an increase in firm's size results
in imperfect divisibility of investments. Alternatively, size may help through the
availability of more advanced professional skills necessary to integrate complex
technologies. Furthermore, size provides more flexibility in production process that helps
reduce scale barriers (Girardone, 2000).
4.4 X-efficiency as a measure of productive efficiency
Productive efficiency defines the relationship between production and some desirable
objective function such as cost minimisation or revenue and profit maximisation given
certain levels of technology. The firm normally faces a degree of competitiveness in input
and output markets, and its rational economic behaviour aims to maximise the production
by choosing either optimal input mix under cost minimisation or optimal outputs under the
revenue maximisation objective.
The production frontier (signifies the overall efficiency) shows the minimum inputs
required to produce a given level of output where the firm or firms on this frontier are
operating with full efficiency. Forsund et al. (1980) expresses the transformation of inputs
into outputs by the production function f(x), which shows the maximum output obtainable
from various input vectors. Under certain regularity conditions, an equivalent
representation of efficient production technology is provided by the cost function:
c(y,w)=min(wx/ f(x) ..y,x  0)
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which shows the minimum expenditure required to produce output y at input prices w. A
similar equivalent representation of efficient production technology is provided by the
profit function which shows the maximum profit available at output price p and input prices
w.
While the concept of productive efficiency is rather straightforward, various difficulties
arise when attempting to measure it. Essentially, it is necessary to derive the best practice
on production frontier which depicts the maximum attainable level of performance. Ideally,
actual firm performance would be compared with their 'true' frontier (Casu and Molyneux,
2001). The latter is unobservable, however, and the best that can be achieved is an
empirical or 'best practice' frontier generated from the researcher's data set.
X-efficiency is usually utilised to measure productive efficiency and depicts how
effectively firms are in using inputs to produce a given level of output. Specifically, X-
efficiency envelops each firm's technical and allocative efficiencies as distinguished from
scale and scope efficiencies (see Berger and Humphrey, 1992). It measures the deviation of
a bank's costs from the efficiency or "best practice" frontier. However, there is no
consensus as to the best method of estimating X-efficiency.
4.4.1 Technical and Allocative efficiency
Overall efficiency can be decomposed into technical and allocative efficiency. Koopmans
(1951) formally defined technical efficiency as an event when an increase in any output
requires a reduction in at least one other output or an increase in at least one input, and if a
reduction in any input requires an increase in at least one other input or a reduction in at
least one output. Coelli et al. (1998) refer to Nunamaker (1985) who defines technical
efficiency as a measure of the ability of a decision-making unit (DMU) to avoid waste by
producing as much output as long as input usage will allow, or using as little input as output
level will allow.
Allocative efficiency, on the other hand, measures the ability of a DMU to avoid waste by
producing a level of output at the minimal possible cost (the ability to combine inputs and
outputs in optimal proportions in the light of prevailing prices).
148
Chapter 4: Efficiency in Banking: A theoretical Overview
The measures of overall economic efficiency can be graphically represented. Figure 4.3
shows the isoquant for a firm with one output and two inputs, x 1 and x 2 . The firm's
production function y = f (x 1 , x 2 ) is characterised by constant returns to scale. Given the
technology and the input prices represented by the slope of ww, cost minimisation occurs at
point D. The isoquant Q Q' represents the various combinations of the two inputs required
to produce a fixed amount of the single output using the best available technology. The
firms operating on the isoquant are considered technically efficient. The firm can improve
its efficiency by moving to a place on the frontier (i.e., by adopting a new technology).
Figure 4-3: Farell Technical and Allocative Efficiency
x 2
0
	 D	 w
(Source: Coelli et al., 1998, p 135)
With reference to figure 4.3, Cun-unins and Weiss (1998) show that the measure of Farrell
technical efficiency as the ratio of OB to OA (the proportion by which the firm could
radially reduce its input usage by adopting the best technology). The inefficiency can also
result from the firm's not using the cost minimising combination of inputs (allocative
inefficiency). The firm is also allocatively inefficient if it is not using its inputs in the
correct proportions. The measure of allocative efficiency is the ratio OC/OB. The optimal
operating point is represented by the tangency (point D) between the isoquant Q Q' and the
isocost line w w ' . A firm operating at this point is considered fully cost efficient. The firm
operating at point A = (x IA , X 2A ) exhibits both technical and allocative inefficiency.
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4.4.2 Pure technical and scale efficiency
Technical efficiency can be investigated further and decomposed into pure technical
efficiency and scale efficiency. Webster et al. (1998) define scale efficiency as the case
where the firm can produce its current level of output with fewer inputs assuming constant
return to scale (the measure of the ability to avoid waste by operating on the most
productive scale). Pure technical efficiency measures the proportional reduction in inputs
that could be achieved if the firm operated on the variable returns to scale frontier. If the
firm is able to achieve this, then further input reductions could be achieved by operating on
the constant returns to scale frontier.
The decomposition of overall efficiency can be depicted graphically. Figures 4.4 shows
frontier V C that represents a constant return to scale (CRS), which measures the optimal
level of output which can be produced for given input levels. To measure scale efficiency,
the constant returns to scale assumption is dropped and a variable returns to scale frontier is
developed V V . When a firm is operating at point (x i
 , y 1 ), pure technical efficiency is
measured relative to the VRS frontier and is equal to Ob/Oc. This measures the proportional
reduction in input usage that is achieved if the firm is operating at constant returns to scale.
However, a firm operating on the VRS frontier at same output level is also scale inefficient
because it is not operating on the CRS frontier. Its scale efficiency is measured by the ratio
Oa/Ob (This measure of scale efficiency can be derived from measures of technical and pure
technical efficiency). For multiple output and inputs, the estimation of efficiency measures
requires a non-parametric linear programming solution.
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Figure 4-4: Pure technical and scale efficiency
4.4.3 Technological change and productivity growth
Both production and cost functions are estimated under the assumption of constant
technology. Hunter and Timme (1986) show that technical change deals with the processes
and consequences of shifts in the production function. This is brought about by the
adoption of new outputs that can be produced from any given set of inputs increases over
time due to factors such as experience, increased knowledge, innovation and improved
production techniques. Revell (1983) suggests that technological advances could also bring
about greater scope economies.
Productivity growth can be measured as the proportional change in cost or profit due to
changes in a given set of business conditions (the business conditions are the exogenous
variables specified in the cost or profit function). Productivity growth may be decomposed
into movement of the best-practice frontier and the change in the average degree of
efficiency or the dispersion of firms away from this frontier. The movements of the frontier
may be driven by technological change, such as improvements in information-processing
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technologies or improvements in applied finance that allow banks to make better
investments at lower cost. The frontier may also shift due to regulatory changes that affect
costs or profits, such as the deregulation of interest rates or relaxation of geographic entry
barriers. The location of the best-practice frontier also depends on competitive conditions,
since even the managers of the best-practice banks may reduce effort, pursue goals other
than cost minimization or profit maximization if competition is lax. It is possible for the
efficient frontier to either improve or worsen over time, and prior literature has found
movements in both directions (see Berger and Mester, 1997).
Molyneux et al. (1996) note that the effects of greater technological advances on bank
average costs can be visible. They show how the U-shaped average curve could become
flatter because of technological effects reducing average costs. Humphrey (1985) indicates
that technological change is appeared at two levels of operation, the plant-level and firm-
level. Economies of scale may be gained at either the plant or multi-plant level or both.
To derive accurate efficiency estimates, it is therefore necessary to net 'overall efficiency'
measure from the shift in technological changes using Farrell's (1957) definition of micro
level efficiency and the Malmquist index approach to efficiency measurement of Fare et al.
(1994). The two production situations (x', y') and (x ), 1+1 ) can be compared by taking
into account the changes observations as well as changes in the technologies. Figure 4.5
below shows graphically production frontiers for periods t and t+1 for a single-input single-
output firm. The frontier for period t+1 lies to the left of the frontier for period t which
implies productivity gains between the two periods. The firm operating at point (x, yl) in
period t becomes more productive and more efficient at point (x f- F1 , y 1 +1 ) in period t+1.
In period t+1, the firm is utilising all available technology (technical efficiency), while
those to the right are not using this technology. In reference to the distance function
introduced by Shepherd (1970), the distance function for the firm's operation at point
, yl) is given by D	 , )f )= 0a/Ob, where D indicate the period of the frontier from
which the distance is computed. The distance function is used to compare firm's
efficiencies in periods t and t+1 (DE' (x1+ , ,	 <DE ()( yl)) or (0e/Of < 0a/0b).
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Figure 4-5: Productivity and efficiency change
The Malmquist input productivity index compares periods t and t+1 and can be defined
using distance functions that represent the four combinations of adjacent time periods,
\id! ( x t+1 v 1+1) dt+I( x 1+1 vt+1\
mi ( y 1+1 ,x t+1 73,t ,x /)_ 	 s k	 )1.	 I	 i	 k	 )1	 I 
di' (x i ,y I )	 c 1 ;1+1 (x t ,y1)
following Fare et al. (1994), an equivalent way of writing the above equation is
d it+1 (x ` + , y (+1)
	 di (x t ± , y t ')	 d,t (x t ,y ` ) H-i
d (x ,y‘)	 d:+1 (x 1+1 , y (+1 ) d 1 (x l , y1)
where the ratio outside the brackets measures the change in relative efficiency between
period t and t+1 and the geometric mean of the ratios in the brackets measures the shift in
technology between the two periods.
To summarise, this section reviewed the theory on productive efficiency, which underpins
the empirical efficiency literature. Productive efficiency defines the relationship between
production levels and some desirable objective function such as cost minimisation or
revenue and profit maximisation given certain levels of technology. The section also
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describes how overall productive efficiency can be decomposed into technical and
allocative efficiency. Technical efficiency can be investigated further and decomposed into
pure technical efficiency and scale efficiency. We also outline the concept of technological
change and show how this relates to shifts in the production.
4.5 Economic functions utilised to estimate efficiency
Efficiency estimates can be derived using two main types of methodological approaches —
parametric and non-parametric. The non-parametric approach involves linear-programming
techniques, such as Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) whereas the parametric approach
stipulates an underlying functional form from which estimates are attained. In terms of the
parametric approach, there are three main economic functional forms from which efficiency
and productivity estimates can be derived; cost, standard and alternative profit function.
This section reviews these concepts following Berger and Mester (1997), as these will be
utilised later to estimate efficiency levels in the Arabian banking systems under study.
4.5.1 The Cost function approach
The cost function shows how close a bank's cost is to a best-practice bank's cost that
produces the same output bundle under the same condition. The cost function relates
variable costs to the prices of variable inputs and the quantities of variable outputs and any
fixed netputs (inputs or outputs), environmental factors, and random error, as well as
efficiency:
in C = fc (w,y,z,v) + In ti c + in Ec
where C measures the variable costs, f c is some functional form, w is the vector of prices
of variable inputs, y is the vector of quantities of variable outputs, z indicates the quantities
of any fixed netputs, v is a set of environmental variables that may affect performance,
ti c denotes the inefficiency factor that may raise costs above the best-practice level, and
ec denotes random error.
The term in ti c + In Ec is treated as a composite error term, and the various efficiency
measurement techniques differ in how they distinguish the inefficiency term ( In ti c ) from
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the random error term (in Ec ). The inefficiency factor u c incorporates both allocative
inefficiencies (from failing to react optimally to relative prices of inputs (w)) and technical
inefficiencies (from employing too many inputs to produce output).
The cost efficiency of bank b is the estimated cost needed to produce bank b's output vector
if the bank were as efficient as the best-practice bank in the sample facing the same
exogenous variables (w,y,z,v), divided by the actual cost of bank b, adjusted for random
error, i.e.,
cm in	 exp[rc(w b,yb,zb,vbdX exp[in tec°1 tecnin
 =	 b b b b
	
, =rub
	exdr (w d ,z , _vc	 dxexpktt.bc]	 4
where tecnin is the minimum awbc across all banks in the sample. Cost efficiency ranges over
[0,1], and equals one for a best-practice firm.
4.5.2 The Standard profit function
The standard profit function measures how close a bank is to producing the maximum
possible profit given a particular level of input prices and output prices (and other
variables). It is based on a comparison with the best-practice point of profit maximization
within the data set, whereas the cost (efficiency) function evaluates performance while
holding output constant at its current level. A firm that is relatively cost efficient at its
current output, may or may not be cost efficient at its optimal output, which typically
involves a different scale and mix of outputs.
The standard profit function specifies variable profits in place of variable costs and takes
variable output prices as given but allows output quantities to vary, so that it accounts for
revenues that can be earned by varying outputs as well as inputs:
ln(Tc,0) = fa (w,y,p,z,v) +In u it +In e„,
TC is the variable profits of the firm, which includes all the interest and fee income earned on
the variable outputs minus variable costs, 0 is a constant added to every firm's profit so that
the natural log is taken of a positive number; p is the vector of prices of the variable
outputs; in sn represents random error; and in un.represents inefficiency that reduces profits.
Cost EFF b =
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Standard profit efficiency is the ratio of the predicted actual profits to the predicted
maximum profits of a best-practice bank facing the same business conditions, net of
random error:
EFF" —
	
exp [f: (w b d b ,z b ,v b )}X expknil']— 0
rcS td 
irmax
	 exp[tn„(w ,I) yb,zb,vb)lx expkn te,n,"1— 0
where tennax isi the maximum value of 11,b in the sample. Profit efficiency ranges over [- cc ,
1], and equals one for a best-practice firm within the observed data.
4.5.3 The Alternative profit function
The alternative profit function employs the same dependent variable as the standard profit
function and the same exogenous variables as the cost function but it measures how close a
bank comes to earning maximum profits given its output levels rather than output prices.
The alternative profit function in log form can be written as:
In (n+0)= f (w,y,z,v)+ ln u a ,, + InEvt,
which is identical to the standard profit function except that y replaces p in the function, f,
yielding different values for the inefficiency (In u,„ ) and random error term (in Evr ). The
alternative profit efficiency function is the ratio of predicted actual profits to the predicted
maximum profits for a best-practice bank.
The alternative profit function accounts for the additional revenue earned by high-quality
banks, allowing it to offset their additional costs of providing the higher service levels. The
alternative profit efficiency measure may be helpful when firms exercise some market
power in setting output prices because it takes output prices as given and embodies the
assumption that the bank can sell as much output as it wishes without having to lower its
prices. On the other hand, a scale bias may occur in the standard profit function unless the
(w,p,z,v) variables give a strong prediction about the size of the bank.
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4.6 Conclusion
This chapter presents a theoretical overview on efficiency measurement in banking, as this
will support the empirical framework for studying efficiency levels in various Arabian
banking sectors outlined in the following chapters. The chapter focuses on economies of
scale and productive efficiency — the most important areas concerning efficiency in
banking. Economies of scale refer to the rate at which output changes as all factor
quantities are varied. Productive efficiency defines the relationship between output levels
and some desirable objective function such as cost minimisation or revenue and profit
maximisation given certain levels of technology. We show how the overall productive
efficiency can be decomposed into technical and allocative efficiency. Allocative efficiency
measures the ability of a firm (DMU) to avoid waste by producing a level of output at the
minimal possible cost (the ability to combine inputs and outputs in optimal proportions in
the light of prevailing prices). Technical efficiency can be investigated further and
decomposed into pure technical efficiency and scale efficiency. Pure technical efficiency
measures the proportional reduction in inputs that could be achieved if the firm operated on
the variable returns to scale frontier. Alternatively, technical changes deals with the
processes and consequences of shifts in the production function because of the adoption of
new efficient outputs that can be produced from any given set of input increases over time
due to such factors as experience, increased knowledge, innovations, and better production
techniques. The final part of the chapter discusses various types of functional form — cost,
profit and alternative profit, that can be estimated to derive efficiency measures as these
will be used later in this thesis. The following chapters will explain in more detail both the
parametric and non-parametric approaches utilised in the recent banking literature.
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5.1 Introduction
This chapter reviews both the parametric and non-parametric approaches utilised in the
banking literature to measure efficiency. The focus is mainly on the parametric approach
as this methodology will be used, later on, to estimate efficiency levels in the four Arabic
banking markets (Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain) that are the focus of this
thesis. Section 5.2 presents the different approaches utilised in the banking literature for
measuring efficiency. Generally, these can be classified according to the way in which
the frontier is specified and estimated; parametric or non-parametric and whether the
specified frontier is deterministic or stochastic. Section 5.3 briefly outlines the
advantages of frontier efficiency approaches for the evaluation of the performance of
financial institutions.
The main differences between parametric and non-parametric approaches are discussed
in section 5.4. Section 5.5 presents the stochastic frontier approach (SFA) that will be
utilised in this thesis. The SFA is obtained by estimating a cost (or a profit) function with
a composite error term, the sum of a two-sided error term representing random
fluctuations in cost (profit) and a one-sided positive error term representing inefficiency.
Section 5.6 briefly reviews the other major parametric approaches utilised to measure
efficiency in banking markets and section 5.7 covers the linear programming Data
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) method; the main non-parametric approach. The DEA can
estimate efficiency scores for decision-making units (firms) based on the assumption of
constant return to scale or variable return to scale. However, the nonparametric nature of
DEA estimates considers any deviations from the efficient frontier as inefficiencies given
the absence of random error. Section 5.8 discusses the bank production process and notes
that the banking literature is still divided concerning how one defines bank inputs and
outputs. In general, researchers adopt one of two approaches labelled either the
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'intermediation' or 'production' approach. Afterwards, section 5.9 presents the empirical
studies that investigate banking sector efficiency in the US, Europe and other developing
countries. Finally, section 5.10 draws the conclusion.
5.2 An overview of the approaches utilised to measure efficiency
Several approaches have been developed in the banking literature for measuring bank
(firm) level efficiency, ranging from simple financial ratios to complex econometric
models. Forsund et al. (1980) sums up that efficiency studies can be classified according
to the way in which the frontier is specified and estimated. First, the frontier may be
specified as a parametric function of inputs, or it may not. Second, an explicit statistical
model of the relationship between the observed output and the frontier may be specified,
or it may not. Finally, the frontier itself may be specified as deterministic or random.
Several permutations of these possibilities have been considered.
In general, there have been two major types of frontier approaches utilized in most prior
efficiency studies; deterministic and stochastic. The deterministic approach assumes that
all firms share a common technology and therefore face common production and cost
frontiers and all variation in firm performance is attributed to variation in firm
efficiencies relative to these common frontiers. However, the notion of a deterministic
frontier shared by all firms ignores the possibility that a firm's performance may be
affected by factors outside its control as well as by factors under its control
(inefficiency). The stochastic approach, on the other hand, assumes that firms may
deviate from the minimum attainable cost levels for purely exogenous reasons as well as
through inefficiency effects (see for instance, Forsund et al., 1980 and Cummins and
Weiss, 1998).
Berger and Humphrey (1997) note that efficiency estimation techniques can be broadly
categorized into parametric and non-parametric methods. However, no consensus exists
as to the preferred method for determining the best-practice frontier against which
relative efficiencies are measured. The most commonly used non-parametric methods are
known as Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and the Free Disposable Hull (FDH). On
the other hand, the most commonly used parametric methods are the Stochastic Frontier
Approach (SFA), the Thick Frontier Approach (TFA) and the Distribution Free
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Approach (DFA). These approaches differ primarily in the assumptions imposed on the
data in terms of the functional form of the best-practice frontier.
5.3 Why use frontier methodology to estimate efficiency in banking?
According to Berger and Humphrey (1997), frontier approaches are superior, for most
regulatory purposes, to standard financial ratio analysis because they use programming or
statistical techniques that remove the effects of differences in input prices and other
exogenous market factors affecting the standard performance of firms. This, they argue,
provides more accurate estimates of the underlying performance of firms and their
managers. Therefore, frontier efficiency has been used extensively in regulatory analysis
to measure the effects of mergers and acquisitions, capital regulation, deregulation of
deposit rates, removal of geographic restrictions on branching and holding company
acquisitions, and on financial institution performance in general (Bauer et al., 1997).
In addition, frontier efficiency models are preferred by researchers over other
performance indicators primarily because these models result in an objectively
determined quantified measure of relative performance that removes many exogenous
factors (Barr et al., 1999). This permits the researcher to focus on quantified measures of
costs, inputs, outputs, revenues, profits, etc. to impute efficiency relative to the best
practice institutions in the population. Previous studies have examined efficiency and
associated effects on financial institution performance from several different
perspectives. These include the effects of mergers and acquisitions, institutional failure,
and deregulation on banking sector efficiency.
Siems and Barr (1998) state that the use of frontier efficiency techniques yields useful
comparative and benchmarking information that can provide impetus for significant
improvements and can alert institutions to new practices and new paradigms. Simple
ratio-based analysis that is used for benchmarking can provide important insights but,
they argue, are limited in scope because they take a one-dimensional view of a service,
product, or process and ignore any interactions, substitutions, or trade-offs between key
variables. Thus, a more inclusive multiple-input, multiple-output framework for
evaluating productive efficiency, that provides benchmarking information on how to
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become a well-managed bank, seems essential to improve decision making processes
(especially at poorly managed banks).
In addition, frontier methodologies can also provide helpful guidance to regulators and
policy makers in various areas. For instance, frontier analysis may help regulators to
understand more about efficiency effects of financial deregulation and disruption;
efficiency issues relating to institutional failure, risk-taking, problem lending and
management quality; efficiency issues associated with market structure and
concentration; and the efficiency effects of mergers and acquisitions (Cummins and
Weiss, 1998; Berger and Humphrey, 1997). Frontier methodologies can also be applied
to help inform management about the effects of policies, procedures, strategies, and
technologies adopted by the firm. Furthermore, frontier analysis can be used to track the
evolution of a firm's productivity and efficiency over time and to compare the
performance of different sections within the firm.
From an academic perspective, frontier efficiency methods are useful for testing various
economic hypotheses. For example, both agency theory and transactions cost economies
generate predictions about the likely success of firms with different characteristics in
attaining objectives such as cost minimisation or profit maximisation under various
economic conditions. In general, greater knowledge of productive efficiency also allows
one to address various important research areas ({Intarachote 2000 173 /id}. For
example, current methodological areas of research focus on how efficiency varies with
different frontier approaches, output definitions and overtime in order to demonstrate the
consistency of different types of efficiency estimates. Furthermore, measuring bank
efficiency may be useful to evaluate whether bank management maximize shareholder
value (SWM). Greater bank-level efficiency, in turn, is expected to improve financial
products and services, increase the volume of intermediated funds and should lead to a
more responsive financial system with improved risk taking capabilities (if efficiency
gains are channelled to enhance capital adequacy positions).
5.4 Parametric versus non-parametric approaches to measuring efficiency
The main advantage of the parametric approach to the non-parametric approach for
measuring bank efficiency relates to the ability of the latter to characterize the frontier
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technology in a simple mathematical form, and the ability to accommodate non-constant
returns to scale. However, the non-parametric frontier method truly envelops a data set
but makes no accommodation for noise (Fried et al., 1993). In addition, non-parametric
models are subject to certain assumptions about the structure of production technology
and can be categorized according to the type of data available (cross-sectional or panel),
and according to the type of variables used (quantities only, or quantities and prices).
With quantities only, technical efficiency can be calculated while with both quantities
and prices, economic efficiency can be calculated and decomposed into its technical and
allocative components.
Alternatively, the parametric approach requires the specification of a production, cost,
revenue, or profit function as well as assumptions about the error term(s). Cummins and
Zi (1997) mention that the advocates of the parametric approach disagree about
distributional assumptions imposed on the error term and note that debate still exists as to
the most appropriate choice. Moreover, this methodology can lead to different results as a
consequence of the choice of functional form or type of error term(s). In addition, the
parametric method has also been criticized for confounding estimation of efficiency with
specification errors. Nonetheless, an argument in favour of the parametric approach is
that it allows for random error, so these methods are less likely to misidentify
measurement error, or transitory differences in cost, or specification error as inefficiency.
The primary challenge in implementing the parametric approach is determining how best
to separate random error from inefficiency, since neither is observed. Furthermore, the
main parametric methods; the stochastic frontier approach (SFA), thick frontier approach
(TFA) and distribution free approach (DFA); differ in the distributional assumptions
imposed to accomplish this disentanglement.
The choice of estimation method has been an issue of debate with some researchers
preferring the parametric approach (e.g. Berger, 1993) and others the non-parametric
method (e.g., Seiford and Thrall, 1990). Despite dispute over the preferred
methodological approach, the emerging viewpoint suggests that it is not necessary to
have a consensus as to one single (best) frontier approach for measuring firm-level
efficiency. Instead, there should be a set of consistency conditions for the efficiency
measures derived from various approaches to meet. If efficiency estimates are consistent
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across different methodologies then these measures will be convincing and therefore
valid (or believable) estimates for regulators and other decision-makers (Bauer et al.
,1997).
Efficiency estimates derived from different approaches should be consistent by
generating analogous efficiency levels and rankings concerning the identification of best
and worst firms. These should also be consistent over time and in line with the
competitive conditions of the market, and also with standard non-frontier measures of
performance. These consistency conditions measure the degree to which different
approaches are mutually consistent and the degree to which the efficiencies generated by
the different approaches are consistent with reality.
To conclude this section, we refer back to Eisenbeis et al. (1999) who sums up that each
main efficiency approach has its advantages and disadvantages. While, the parametric
approach has the virtue of allowing for noise in the measurement of inefficiency, this
approach requires assumptions about the particular form of the economic function being
estimated and the distribution of efficiency. The programming approach requires no
specification for functional form or distributional forms. However, the non-parametric
approach suffers from the drawback that all deviations from the frontier are attributed to
inefficiency with no allowance made for noise in the standard models.
5.5 The Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA)
This section presents a theoretical framework of the SFA as this approach will be utilised
later in this thesis to examine the efficiency levels in the banking systems of Jordan,
Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. The stochastic frontier production function was
independently proposed by Aigner et al. (1977), and Meeusen and Van den Broeck
(1977), and it has been widely used in the banking efficiency literature. The SFA
postulates that firms face various technical inefficiencies in producing a particular level
of output. For a given combination of input levels, it is assumed that the realized
production of a firm is bounded by the sum of a parametric function of known inputs,
involving unknown parameters, and a random error, associated with measurement error
of the level of production or other factors. The greater the amount the realized production
falls below the production frontier, the greater the level of technical inefficiency.
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The frontier approach labels a bank as inefficient if its costs (profits) are higher (lower)
than those predicted for an efficient bank producing the same input/output combination
and the difference cannot be explained by statistical noise. The cost frontier is obtained
by estimating a cost function with a composite error term, the sum of a two-sided error
term representing random fluctuations in cost and a one-sided positive error term
representing inefficiency. The single-equation stochastic cost function model can be
given as:
TC =TC(y1,w1)+6;
where TC is observed total cost, y i is a vector of output, and w is an input-price vector.
Following Aigner et al. (1977), the error of the cost function is:
E=U+V
where u and v are independently distributed; u is assumed to be distributed as half-
normal; u = N(0,cru2 ), that is, a positive disturbance capturing the effects of inefficiency,
and v is assumed to be distributed as two-sided normal with zero mean and variance, av2,
capturing the effects of the statistical noise.
Observation-specific estimates of the inefficiencies, u, can be estimated by using the
conditional mean of the inefficiency term, given the composed error term, as proposed by
Jondrow et al. (1982). The mean of this conditional distribution for the half-normal
model is shown as:
E(u,/ aX   [ f (EiAl
	 1-(1.61+.1,2 1—F(0J o-)	 a
where A. au / a„ and total variance, ol = 0;2, +a,2 ; F(.) and f(.) are the standard normal
distribution and the standard normal density function, respectively. (ti i / c 1 ) isan
unbiased but inconsistent estimator of u i since regardless of the number of observations,
N, and the variance of the estimator remains nonzero (see Greene, 1991,p. 80-82).
Jondrow et al. (1982) have shown that the ratio of the variability (standard deviation, a)
for u and v can be used to measure a bank's relative inefficiency, where A= cru / 0, is a
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measure of the amount of variation stemming from inefficiency relative to noise for the
sample. Estimates of this model can be computed utilising the maximum likelihood
procedure directly (see Olson et al., 1980).
Bauer et al. (1997) refers to Greene's (1990) argument that alternative distributions for
inefficiency may be more appropriate than the half-normal, and the application of
different distributions sometimes 'do matter' to the average efficiencies for financial
institutions. If panel data are available, however, some distributional assumptions can be
relaxed, and the distribution-free approach (DFA) may be used. The distribution-free
method assumes that there is a core efficiency or average efficiency for each firm over
time. The core inefficiency is distinguished from random error (and any temporary
fluctuations in efficiency) by assuming core inefficiency as persistent over time, while
random errors tend to average out over time. In particular, a cost or profit function is
estimated for each period of a panel data set. The residual in each separate regression is
composed of both inefficiency (In u) and random error an v) but the random component
is assumed to average out over time. Furthermore, an adjustment (called truncation) is
assigned to the average of a bank's residuals from all of the regressions (ln et). This is
done so as to assign less extreme values of in am to these banks, since extreme values may
indicate that random error has not been completely purged by averaging. The resulting in
irfor each bank is used to compute its core efficiency.
The distributional assumptions of the stochastic frontier approach are rather arbitrary.
Two prior studies (Bauer and Hancock, 1993; Berger, 1993) found that when the
inefficiencies were unconstrained, they behave much more like symmetric normal
distributions than half-normal, which would invalidate the identification of the
inefficiencies. Carbo et al. (2000) summarize the specification of previous studies that
modelled bank inefficiencies. Allen and Rai (1996) and Kaparakis et al. (1994), and
Mester (1996) all use the half-normal specification to test for inefficiency differences
between financial institutions. Cebenoyan et al. (1993) uses the truncated normal model.
Mester (1993) in common with many studies uses the half-normal distribution. Stevenson
(1980) and Greene (1990) have used the normal and gamma model, respectively.
Altunbas and Molyneux (1994b) note that efficiency estimates are relatively insensitive
to different distributional assumptions when testing the half normal, truncated normal,
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exponential and gamma efficiency distributions, as all distributions yield similar
inefficiency levels for the German banking market. Vennet (1998) uses both the half-
normal and exponential distributions to derive efficiencies in European banking, but
notes that there was little difference between the two and so reports only the half-normal
estimates.
5.6 The other main parametric approaches utilised to measure efficiency
This section briefly reviews the other main parametric approaches used to measure
efficiency in banking markets.
5.6.1 The thick frontier approach (TFA)
The TFA divides banks in a sample into four quartiles based on the total cost per unit of
assets. The estimated cost function for banks in the least average cost quartile is used to
construct the cost frontier (the banks in this quartile are assumed to be the most efficient)
while the estimated cost function for banks in the highest average cost quartile are
assumed to have less than average efficiency. The differences between the cost functions
estimated for banks in the least average cost quartile and banks in the highest average
cost are assumed to reflect differences in efficiency alone.
Bauer et al. (1997) note that TFA assumes that deviations from predicted performance
values within the highest and lowest performance quartiles of firms represent only
random error, while deviations in predicted performance between the highest and lowest
average-cost quartiles represent inefficiencies plus exogenous differences in the
regressors. Thus, the measured inefficiencies are embedded in the difference in predicted
costs between the lowest and highest cost quartiles. This difference may occur either in
the intercepts or in the slope parameters.
A benefit of the thick-frontier approach is that it requires less specificity in the
maintained statistical assumptions (Berger and Humphrey, 1992). First, the assumption
that the inefficiencies are uncorrelated with the regressors, maintained in the econometric
approach, is not needed. Second, the assumption that the error terms for the quartiles
satisfy standard regression properties, seems no worse than (a) the econometric approach
assumption that inefficiencies are from an arbitrary (half-normal) distribution, or (b) the
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DEA assumption that random error is zero. Third, even if the error terms within quartiles
represent inefficiencies, rather than only random error as maintained, the thick-frontier
approach remains a valid comparison of the average inefficiencies of high and low cost
firms. Finally, the cost quartiles are quite stable over time and are inversely related to
long-term profits, both of which are consistent with the cost differences between quartiles
reflecting long-term inefficiencies.
However, the TFA provides estimate of efficiency differences between the best and worst
quartile but does not indicate the general level of overall efficiency and does not provide
point estimates of efficiency for all individual firms. Furthermore, Berger and Humphrey
(1991) point out that assumptions about the error term do not hold exactly and are
sensitive to whether banks are divided into quartiles, quintiles, or any alternative number
of groups. Further, there is a potential for parametric problems, since banks are pre-
sorted using average cost, which is essentially a dependent variable.
5.6.2 The distribution free approach (DFA)
The DFA specifies a functional form for the cost function but it does not impose a
specific shape on the distribution of efficiencies but assumes that there is a core
efficiency or average efficiency for each firm that is constant over time, while random
error tends to average out overtime (Bauer et al., 1997). Unlike the other approaches, a
panel data set is required, and therefore only panel estimates of efficiency over the entire
time interval are available (DFA-P). The panel efficiency estimates may be derived using
three different techniques.
The first DFA technique, known as DFA-P WITHIN, is a fixed-effects model which
estimates inefficiency from the value of a firm-specific dummy variable (derived by
measuring the firm cost function variables relative to deviations from firm-specific
means). Efficiency is estimated using the deviation from the most efficient firm's
intercept term and single sets of parameters are to be obtained so inefficiency is fixed
over time. However, since inefficiency is no longer a separately specified element in a
composed error term, we do not need an assumption that inefficiency is uncorrelated with
the regressors (as in SFA) and we adjust for possible first-order serial correlation.
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The second DFA technique, known as DFA-P GLS, applies generalized least squares to
panel data, obtains a single set of parameters, assumes that bank inefficiencies are fixed
over time and that inefficiency is uncorrelated with the regressors. In the cost function,
which is also corrected for first-order serial correlation, a separate intercept for each is
recovered from the panel estimates as the average residual for that firm over time. The
firm with the smallest average residual is presumed to be the most efficient firm and the
inefficiency of all the other firms is measured relative to this benchmark.
The third DFA technique, known as DFA-P TRUNCATED, estimates the cost function
separately for each year. The efficiency estimates are based on the average residuals for
each bank, since some noise might also be persistent over time. Berger (1993) truncates
the residuals at both the upper and lower 1% of the distribution, thus limiting the effects
of extreme average residuals at both ends.
The DFA implicitly assumes that inefficiency is the only time-invariant fixed effect. The
levels of the DFA efficiency estimates may be influenced by somewhat arbitrary
assumptions; mainly the measurement of the core efficiency means that efficiency
variations over time for an individual firm tend to be averaged out with the random error.
5.7 The Data Envelopment Analysis Approach to measuring efficiency
5.7.1 Background Information about DEA
The DEA nonparametric or mathematical programming approach is an alternative
method to estimate productive efficiency in the financial sector. This approach was
originally proposed by Fare11 (1957) and received wider attention after Charnes et al.
(1978) developed an estimable model that had an input orientation assuming constant
returns to scale (CRS). Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978) reformulated Farrell's
original idea into a mathematical programming problem that construct a non-parametric
piece-wise frontier that envelops the input and output data relative to which costs are
minimised allowing for the calculation of efficiency' scores for each observation in the
sample. The calculated score is defined as the percentage reduction in the use of all
inputs that can be achieved to make an observation comparable with the best
observation(s) in the sample with no reduction in output.
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DEA is non-parametric in the sense that it simply constructs the frontier of the observed
input-output ratios by linear programming techniques (Fare, Grosskopf, and Lovell,
1985). This procedure is not based on any explicit model of the frontier or the
relationship of the observations to the frontier other than the fact that observations cannot
lie below the frontier. This approach shows how a particular decision making unit
(DMU) operates relative to other DMUs in the sample and so it provides a benchmark for
best practice technology based on the experience of those banks in the sample.
DEA can estimate efficiency under the assumption of constant return to scale and
variable returns to scale. The CRS assumption is only appropriate when all DMUs are
operating at optimal scale. However, factors like imperfect competition and constraints in
finance may cause a DMU not to operate at optimal scale. As a result, the use of the CRS
specification, when some DMUs are not operating at optimal scale, confuses measures of
technical and scale efficiency. Banker et al.'s (1984) seminal work proposed a variable
returns to scale and an output-oriented model.
Bauer et al.(1997) note that the usual radial form of DEA are based on technological
efficiency where efficient firms are those for which no other firm or linear combination
of firms produces as much or more of every output (given inputs) or uses as little or less
of every input (given outputs). The efficient frontier is composed of these undominated
firms and the piecewise linear segments that connect the set of input/output combinations
of these firms, yielding a convex production possibility set.
To match firms in so many dimensions, other constraints are often imposed on DEA
linear programming problems. Other constraints that may be specified in the financial
institutions research can include such factors like quality controls (such as the number of
branches or average bank account size) or environmental variables (such as bank
ownership or state regulatory controls). However, matching firms in so many dimensions
can result in firms being measured as highly efficient solely because no other firms or
few other firms have comparable values of inputs, outputs or other constrained variables.
That is, some firms may be self-identified as 100% efficient not because they dominate
other firms, but because there are only a few other observations, with which they are
comparable. The problem of self-identifiers or near self-identifiers most often arises
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when there are a small number of observations relative to the number of inputs, outputs,
and other constraints, so that a large proportion of the observations are difficult to match
in all dimensions.
5.7.2 The favourable features of DEA
DEA uses sample data to derive the efficiency frontier against which each firm (in the
sample) are evaluated. No explicit functional form for the production needs to be
specified. Instead, the production frontier comprises piecewise linear segments that
assign relative efficiency scores for each firm. Another important feature of DEA scores
is independency of units of measurement (of both inputs and outputs) as long as these
units are the same for all observations. These characteristics make the DEA methodology
relatively flexible.
Siems and Barr (1998) point that the DEA methodology is a valuable tool for strategic,
policy, and operational decision problems, particularly in the service and non-profit
sectors. They argue that this approach provides an analytical, quantitative benchmarking
tool for measuring relative efficiency. In contrast to statistical procedures that are based
on central tendencies, DEA reveals best-practice frontiers by analysing each decision-
making unit DMU separately and then measures relative productive efficiency with
respect to the entire population being evaluated.
In addition, even though DEA focuses on technological or productive efficiency rather
than economic efficiency, it can be adapted to examine economic efficiency by observing
the costs to produce a set of outputs given the best-practice technology and input prices.
The productive efficiency focuses on levels of inputs relative to levels of output. To be
productively efficient, a firm must either maximize its outputs given inputs or minimize
its inputs given outputs. Economic efficiency, on the other hand, is broader and requires
both productive and allocative efficiency. It involves optimally choosing the levels and
mixes of inputs and/or outputs based on reactions to market prices.
Cummins and Zi (1997) and Cummins and Weiss (1998) show that DEA focuses on the
technological aspects of production and is used therefore to estimate production, cost and
revenue frontiers. It provides a convenient way for decomposing cost efficiency into pure
technical, scale and allocative efficiency without requiring estimates of input and output
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prices. If estimates of input prices are available, cost efficiency can also be measured
(e.g., Aly, et al., 1990, and Ferrier and Lovell, 1990).
5.7.3 The unfavourable features of DEA
In DEA, the objective function constructs the frontier that minimizes total cost. However,
as Drake and Simper (1999) make clear, the nonparametric nature of DEA considers any
deviations from the efficient frontier as inefficiencies given the absence of random error.
Furthermore, DEA does not allow for random error due to measurement problems
(associated with using accounting data), luck (that temporarily raises or lowers inputs or
outputs) and specification error (such as excluded inputs and outputs). These typically
result in lower average efficiency, because there is more dispersion in the data, unless
there is some unusual statistical association between random error and true efficiency.
This effect may be quite large, since the random error in a single observation affects the
measured efficiency of all of the firms that are compared to any linear combination cm
the frontier involving this firm. Hence, there is possibility that DEA actually overstates
inefficiency levels by failing to allow for bad luck, measurement error and so on.
In addition Colwell and Davis (1992) stress that the efficiency frontier of DEA is
sensitive and defined by the outliers rather than the whole sample and may therelort
particularly susceptible to extreme observations and measurement error. This possibility
arises because the efficient frontier is derived from actual input/output configurations of
the sample units. Hence, the level of efficiency may be largely determined in the case of
outliers as there may be no similar units in the relevant input/output region from which to
form the efficient production frontier. Besides, inadequacies in data or sample size may
invalidate DEA results.
Finally, although the basic DEA models (CRS and VRS) have been improved in a
number of ways in recent years, the non parametric methods suffer from the difficulty of
drawing statistical inference and the lack of a definite functional form encapsulating the
production technology (Casu and Molyneux, 1999).
5.7.4 The other non-parametric approaches utilised to estimate efficiency
The Free Disposal Hull approach (PDH), developed by Deprins et al (1984), is a special
case of DEA. Here the hypothesis of convexity of the production possibility set (PPS) is
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abandoned, and the PPS is composed only of the DEA vertices and the free disposal hull
points interior to these vertices. Because FDH frontier is either congruent or interior to
the DEA frontier, FDH will typically generate larger efficiency estimates than DEA.
DEA is a more efficient estimator than FDH, but only if the assumption of convexity is
correct (Tulkens, 1993).
Like DEA, FDH permits efficiency to vary over time, requires no prior assumptions
regarding the form of the distribution of inefficiencies across observations, except that
the undominated observations are 100% efficient (Berger and Humphrey, 1997).
In addition to FDH, Casu and Molyneux (1999) indicate that there have been a number of
attempts to generalise and extend the standard DEA non-parametric approach. These
include the polyhedral cone-ratio DEA model (Charnes et al, 1990; Brockett et al, 1997;
Resti, 1996); the assurance region DEA model (Thompson et al, 1997; Taylor et al,
1997); the non-parametric Malmquist Index method of productivity measurement
(Griffell-Tatjê and Lovell, 1994); and tests of the sensitivity of DEA and FDH efficiency
models to different radial and non-radial measurement techniques (Ferrier et al, 1994;
Pastor, 1995; DeBorger et al, 1995).
To summarise, this section briefly reviewed the main features of the DEA methodology
for estimating efficiency. DEA is the main non-parametric approach that can be used to
estimate efficiency, utilising assumptions about constant returns to scale and variable
returns to scale. A major drawback of the nonparametric approach is that it considers any
deviations from the efficient frontier as inefficiencies given the absence of random error.
In addition, this approach also suffers from the difficulty of drawing statistical inference
and the lack of a definite functional form encapsulating the production technology.
5.8 Specification of bank's inputs, outputs and costs
Following the discussion on the main parametric and non-parametric approaches that
have been utilised to estimate efficiency levels in banking, this section outlines the
choice of bank inputs and outputs that have been used in the bank efficiency literature.
A financial firm is an entity engaged in the intermediation of services between borrowers
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and lenders. These services are related directly or indirectly to the financial assets and
liabilities held by this firm such as loans and deposits. In addition, financial institutions
such as banks are naturally multi-product firms, many of their services are jointly
produced and so certain kinds of costs are jointly related to production of a variety of
services. Furthermore, financial firms provide services rather than readily identifiable
physical products, and there is no consensus as to the precise definition of what banks
produce and how service output can be measured.
Intermediation theories do not provide a clear cut view regarding bank's output and input
and therefore do not present precise indication as to how to define bank's costs. Allen
and Santomero (1998) argue that many current theories of intermediation are too narrow
and focus on functions of institutions that are no longer crucial in many developed
financial systems. Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993) provides a review of the relevant
literature where such theories are often unable to account for those activities that have
become more central to many institutions such as risk management and cost-reduction
oriented activities (see Casu and Molyneux, 2001).
Casu and Molyneux (2001) note that the earliest cost studies in banking applied a variety
of different banking output indicators. Some early studies proxied bank services by a
single index that combined all services into a uni-dimensional measure; others measured
each bank service separately. In addition, some researchers chose to measure output in
terms of bank assets and liabilities by focussing either on only one side of the balance
sheet, or on both sides at the same time. Others have used bank revenues to measure bank
output. Greenbaum (1967), for example, used the dollar market value of services
rendered to measure output in an attempt to estimate the real social value of banking
services.
While the multi-product nature of the banking firm is recognised, there is still no
agreement as to the definition and measurement of bank inputs and outputs. The banking
literature is divided concerning the issue of bank cost and there is no agreement
concerning the variables that provide good proxy for bank costs. Benston, Hanweck, and
Humphrey (1982) have summarized the issue into three viewpoints: economists tend to
view bank's output as dollars of deposits or loans, monetary economists see banks as
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producers of money-demand deposits, while others see banks as producing loans, with
demand and time deposits being analogous to raw materials. In general, researchers take
one of two approaches labelled the 'intermediation approach' and the 'production
approach'.
5.8.1 The Intermediation approach
The intermediation approach views bank as an intermediator of financial services. This
approach was suggested by Sealey and Lindley (1977) and assumes that bank collect
sources of funds (deposits and purchased funds with the assistance of labour and capital)
and transform these into loans and other assets. The deposits are treated as inputs along
with capital and labour and the volumes of earning assets are defined as measures of
output. Consistent with this approach, costs are defined to include both interest expense
and total costs of production. Some authors support the exclusion of interest expense
from total costs, reasoning that interest costs are purely financial and not pertinent in
measuring efficiency. Others have argued that excluding interest costs disregards the
process of financial technology by which deposits are transformed into loans (for these
viewpoints, see for instance, Miller and Noulas, 1996, Aly. et a)., 1990 and Clark, 1988.
{Intarachote 2000 173 /id} summarises the advantages of the intermediation over other
approaches. This approach treats deposits as inputs which are more convincing since
banks use deposits as well as other funds to make loans and investment. This view is in
accord with Mehdian and Elyasiani (1990) who support the idea that banks buy rather
than sell deposits. Furthermore, the unit of bank inputs and outputs, under the
intermediation approach, are measured in terms of monetary values that can determine
the market share of individual banks. In addition, some services cannot be measured in
terms of number of accounts such as investment in securities. Moreover, the
intermediation approach includes interest expenses on deposits and other purchased
funds which comprise the bulk of bank costs. Finally, the intermediation approach has
been the most widely used in the empirical bank efficiency literature.
Berger, Leusner and Mingo (1997b) indicate that the intermediation approach has the
advantages of being more inclusive and captures the role of banking institution. It
emphasizes the overall costs of banking and is appropriate for addressing questions
related to the cost minimization of banks (Ferrier and Lovell, 1990). Studies using this
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approach include Elyasiani and Mehdian (1990 a&b), Miller and Noulas (1996), Mester
(1996), Altunbas and Molyneux (1997) and DeYoung (1998).
5.8.2 The Production approach
The production approach views banks as producers of loan and deposit services using
capital and labour. The number of accounts of each type is the appropriate definition of
outputs. The total costs under this approach are exclusive of interest expense and outputs
are measured by the number of accounts serviced as opposed to dollar values, thus
considering only operating but not interest costs (Clark, 1988, Miller and Noulas, 1996,
Aly. et al., 1990). Studies that have used this approach include Sherman and Gold
(1985), Ferrier and Lovell (1990) and Berger and DeYoung (1997).
5.8.3 The other approaches used to define bank's inputs and outputs
There are three other forms of the intermediation approach suggested by Berger and
Humphrey (1992). These forms define bank inputs and outputs according to bank
activities.
The first is the asset approach which considers banks as financial intermediaries between
liability holders and those who receive funds. The outputs are therefore defined by assets
and loans while the inputs are defined as deposits and other liabilities. The main
shortcoming of this approach is that it does not take into account the other services
provided by banks. Studies utilising this approach include English et al. (1993) and
Favero and Papi (1995).
The second is known as the value-added approach where both assets and liabilities are
considered to have some output characteristics and bank inputs and outputs are defined
based on their share of value added. Outputs are classified from activities that create high
value-added such as loans, demand deposits and time and saving deposits. Others outputs
are considered unimportant, intermediate products or inputs. The studies that use this
approach include those of Berg et al. (1992), Clark (1996), Grifell-Tatje and Lovell
(1996) and Bhattacharyya et al. (1997).
The third approach is known as the user-cost approach which determines whether the
final product is an input or an output based on its contribution to bank revenue. On this
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basis, the transaction is defined as an output if the financial return (e.g. return on asset or
equity) exceeds the opportunity cost of the funds, or defined as a cost (liability) if
financial cost is less than the opportunity cost of those funds. The drawback of this
approach is that it is often difficult to obtain accurate data on prices and revenues (Favero
and Papi, 1995). Studies that use this approach include Aly et al. (1990), Fixler and
Ziechang (1993) and Resti (1997).
Finally, some researchers model bank inputs and outputs according to assumed bank
objectives (see Intarachote 2001 for details). For example, Leightner and Lovell (1998)
specified outputs such as net interest income and non-interest income assuming that
banks' main objective is to maximise revenue. Bergendahl (1998) assumes that banks
have two input-saving objectives of risk management and service provision. For the risk
management objective, output is measured by gross revenues while bank input is
measured by credit losses. For a service provision objective, output can be captured by
the volume of lending or deposits, and inputs can be measured by personnel and other
capital costs.
To conclude this section, both the intermediation and production approach have received
most attention in the banking efficiency literature but there is no consensus as to the
'best' approach. Berger and Humphrey (1997) indicate that both approaches are
imperfect because neither fully captures the dual role of financial institutions, which
includes both the provision of transaction and document processing services, and the
transfer of funds from savers to borrowers. The 'production approach' may be somewhat
better for evaluating the efficiencies of branches of financial institutions, because
branches process primarily customers documents for the institution as a whole, and
branch managers typically have little influence over bank funding and investment
decisions. On the other hand, the 'intermediation approach' may be more appropriate for
evaluating entire financial institutions because this approach is inclusive of interest
expenses, which often account for between one-half and two-thirds of total costs.
Moreover, the 'intermediation approach' may be superior for evaluating the importance
of frontier efficiency to the profitability of financial institutions, since the minimisation
of total costs (and not just production costs) is needed to maximise profits.
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This thesis will utilise the intermediation approach as suggested by Sealey and Lindley
(1977), where inputs include labour, physical capital and deposits and these are used to
produce earning assets and interest costs are included in the definition of total costs. The
total costs are proxied by the sum of labour, capital, and loanable funds expenditures
incurred by the banks in the production of outputs and services. Consistent with the
intermediation approach, all outputs are measured in dollars. As indicated earlier, this
approach is followed by many other studies like those of Mester (1996), and Berger and
Mester (1997).
5.9 Efficiency in banking: empirical evidence*
This section reviews the previous literature that has investigated the efficiency
characteristics of banking systems in various countries. Nowadays, a substantial literature
addressing efficiency in banking has emerged on both developing and developed
countries. These studies investigate such things as the impact of mergers and acquisitions
and the consequences of economic reforms and financial deregulation on banking sector
efficiency.
5.9.1 Studies on scale and scope efficiency
The first methodical study of scale economies in banking was carried out by Alhadeff
(1954) who utilised earning assets (loans and investment) as the measure of bank output.
He focused on cost differences between branch and unit banks of different sizes in
California State over the years 1938-50. He found that there were economies of scale in
banking; increasing returns for small banks, constant returns for the middle range and
increasing returns for the largest banks.
However, the use of earning assets as a measure of output was criticised since it did not
include all assets, this omission tended to exaggerate the average unit cost of large banks.
Later on, Schweiger and McGee (1961), and Gramley (1962) used total assets as a
measure of bank output. Schweiger and McGee (1961) found that large banks had a cost
advantage over small and medium-sized banks. Gramley (1962) found that average cost
* This section reviews selective efficiency studies that have significantly contributed to the bank efficiency
literature while the tables included in this chapter provide more detailed summary of the broad literature.
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decreased as bank size increased and, therefore, larger banks had a cost advantage over
small banks.
Benston (1965a,b) utilised the Cobb-Douglas cost function to study scale economies in
banking. His studies initiated a new stage in utilising more advanced techniques to study
costs structure in banking. Benston found that economies of scale were present, but were
small for all banking services. Greenbaum (1967) reviewed the early literature on bank
costs, and concluded that economies of scale were generally exhausted after banks' asset
size exceeded $10 million. Banks with more than $10 million in assets were therefore
inefficient, because of high overhead unit costs, high transaction costs, and the lack of
sufficient specialisation and limited diversification.
Casu and Molyneux (2001) have noted that studies during the 1970s sought to take into
account technological change and other developments affecting the banking industry
(Schweitzer, 1972; Murphy, 1972; Daniel et al, 1973; Kalish and Gilbert, 1973;
Longbrake and Haslem, 1975; Mullineaux, 1975, 1978). From these studies, it emerged
that if there were economies of scale in banking, they were not sufficient to preclude
small and medium-sized banks from viable competition. On the other hand, many of
these studies which used the Cobb-Douglas functional form, to estimate economies of
scale, used modest samples in which large banks were under represented. Furthermore,
the Cobb-Douglas functional form allows neither for a U-shaped average cost curve, nor
for the computation of economies of scope.
To overcome the disadvantages of the Cobb-Douglas functional form, Benston (1982b)
introduced the translog functional form to estimate scale economies. The translog offered
at least two important advantages over the Cobb-Douglas approach. First, it allows for a
U-shaped average cost curve, or more generally for a cost curve that is not uniform for all
sizes. Second, it allows one to test the hypothesis that input elasticities are not equal to
one, an implicit assumption in the Cobb-Douglas functional form. It also imposes fewer
constraints on the structure of costs than the CES production function (Forestieri, 1993).
In general, the translog functional form was accepted in the literature, as it appeared to be
a more suitable in representing the 'true' nature of the activity of financial institutions.
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Casu and Molyneux (2001) note that the increasing use of the translog functional form
led to a reappraisal of earlier bank efficiency results. The majority of studies from the
1980s, using either the production or the intermediation approach, reported the existence
of scale economies up to a very low level of output (typically around $100 million). The
estimated average cost function was often U-shaped, but optimal bank size was typically
small (Benston et al, 1982b; Benston et al, 1983; Gilligan et al, 1984; Berger et al, 1987;
Humphrey, 1987; Mester, 1987). With the exception of Gilligan et al (1984), these
studies found little evidence of substantial scope economies.
A new trend in the study of banking sector efficiency was commenced by Humphrey
(1987), who examined scale economies through investigating cost dispersion among
banks of similar size. He noted that variations in costs among banks had two sources;
scale economies across different sized banks and cost differences across similar sized
banks. Utilising cost data on 13,959 banks in the USA over 1980, 1982 and 1984,
Humphrey found that cost economies were dominated by differences in average cost
levels. Specifically, the difference in average costs between banks with the highest cost
and banks with the lowest was two to four times greater than the observed variation in
average cost across bank size classes. Therefore, the existence of scale economies
provided little competitive advantage for large banks over smaller institutions.
Gilligan et al. (1984) examined economies of scale and scope using data for 714 banks
from the Federal Reserve's Functional Cost Analysis (FCA) programme for the year
1978. They found that economies for small banks with less than US $ 25 million in
deposits but diseconomies beyond US$ 100 million deposits. Moreover, they also found
that bank output was characterised by scope economies. Gilligan and Smirlock (1984)
examined economies of scale and scope by using data from the Federal Reserve Bank of
Kansas City for more than 2700 unit banks for years 1973-78. They found that there were
slight economies of scale for banks with less than US$ 10 million deposits and
diseconomies above US$ 50 million deposits. Kolari and Zardkoohi (1987) examine the
scale and scope economies for a sample of banks using data drawn from the FCA
programme of the Federal Reserve over 1979-83. Their main findings were that cost
curves were U-shaped and that unit banks benefited from greater scope economies than
branch banks.
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Berger et al. (1987) formulated two new multi-product measures of cost economies,
expansion-path scale economies and expansion-path subadditivity. They used the
translog functional form and obtained 1983 FCA data from the Federal Reserve Banks'
system for 413 branching state banks and for 214 unit state banks. Their results indicate
that there was evidence of scale economies in general where branch banks showed slight
scale economies at the branch level and slight diseconomies of scale at the level of the
banking firm, whereas unit state banks showed large diseconomies of scale for large
banks. Furthermore, the study concludes that there are diseconomies of scope in banking.
(For more evidence on studies in US banking, see Table 5.1 below). In addition to the US
studies on economies of scale in banking, there have also been a number of European
studies; these are covered below.
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Fanjul and Maravall (1985), and Rodriguez et al (1993) found evidence of both scale and
scope economies for medium-sized saving banks and diseconomies of scale and scope
for larger institutions in Spain. Gathon and Grosjean (1991) found decreasing returns to
scale for the four largest Belgian banks, with assets above 50 million BF, and increasing
returns to scale in all other banks. Pallage (1991) found evidence of scale economies for
small Belgian institutions, and diseconomies of scale as size increases, confirming the
results of Pacolet (1986). In addition, evidence of scope economies was found for the
five largest Belgian banks.
UK studies in their turn have focused mainly on the building society sector. Gough
(1979), and Barnes and Dodds (1983) both estimated linear average cost functions, and
found no evidence of scale economies for UK building societies, using data covering the
periods 1972-79 and 1970-78 respectively. Cooper (1980) found evidence of scale
economies for building societies with assets size of less than £100 million, and
diseconomies of scale for larger societies. Hardwick (1989, 1990) found evidence of
scale economies for relatively smaller building societies and no evidence of scope
economies.
Drake (1992) uses the translog form for a sample of 76 building societies of UK in 1988.
His results suggest mild economies of scale for societies in the £120-500 million asset
size but find no evidence of economies of scope. Drake (1995) extends his previous study
by re-specifying the translog to include more parameters to control for expense-
preference behaviour. He again finds no evidence of either economies of scale or scope.
Sheldon and Haelger (1993) and Sheldon (1994) find that Swiss bank with diversified
product mixes are more inefficient than specialised banks. Lang and Welzel (1994) use
the standard translog to estimate cost economies for the German cooperative bank sector
using a sample of over 700 banks. They find evidence of scope economies especially for
the largest cooperative banks.
McKillop and Glass (1994) employed a hybrid translog cost function to obtain measures
of overall economies of scale, product-specific scale economies and economies of scope.
The data were obtained from the 1991 annual returns for a sample of 89 national,
186
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regional and local building societies. There was evidence of significant augmented
economies of scale for both national and local societies, but only constant returns to scale
for those societies that are regionally based. There was no evidence of economies of
scope or cost complementarities.
Molyneux et al. (1996) used the hybrid translog cost function to examine economies of
scale and scope in France, Germany, Italy and Spain. They found differences in cost
characteristics between countries (scope and scale economies appeared to be evident in
each country, however, over a wide range of bank output levels). (More evidence on
studies on European banking is presented in Table 5.2 below).
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Taking the US and European literature on scale economies together, the overall finding is
that average cost curves have a relatively flat U-shape, with medium-sized banks being
slightly more scale efficient than either very large or very small firms (Humphrey, 1991
and Berger, 1995). The translog studies suggest that average cost curves in US banking
are U-shaped where economies of scale exist only up to relatively low levels of output
(between $25 and $200 million in deposit size). Studies that used samples including large
US banks generally found evidence of scale economies at higher output levels, well
beyond $100-200 million in the deposit size range (Hunter and Timme, 1986; Shaffer
and David, 1986; Kim, 1986; Hunter et al, 1990; Noulas et al, 1990). None of these
studies, however, find much evidence on scope economies in banking.
5.9.2 Studies on productive efficiency in banking
This section presents empirical evidence on X-efficiency in banking. The following
section 5.9.3 reviews literature that focuses on the consequences of economic and
financial reforms on bank efficiency levels, as this thesis will examine the impact of
economic and financial reforms, undertaken in various Arabian countries, on the
performance of operating banks in these countries.
5.9.2.1 Banking studies that use the parametric approach to study X-efficiency
As indicated earlier, Leibenstein (1966) was the first to identify X-efficiency. He stated
that while microeconomic theory focused on the possibilities of optimal allocative
efficiency, it must also focus on the identification of X-efficiencies that reveal the
differences in costs and revenues between firms. Efficiencies that are not related to size
(scale) and product-mix (scope) are X-efficiencies. These are related to such things as
superior management and the use of better technology. We already have shown in the
previous chapter how X-inefficiency can be measured by estimating the deviation from
best (cost or profit) practice.
Utilising the distribution-free approach for measuring banking efficiency derived from
profit function estimates, Berger et al. (1993) find that larger US banks are more X-
efficient, in general, than smaller banks (efficiency estimates ranged from 0.52 to 0.66)
over the period 1984-89. Kaparalcis et al. (1994) used the stochastic cost frontier
methodology to measure efficiency for a sample of 5,548 US banks. They find that the
overall efficiency is around 90% and banks become less efficient with greater size.
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Altunbas et al. (1994a) evaluate inefficiencies for the German banking market by
utilising the stochastic frontier analysis for a sample of 196 banks for the year 1988. The
study finds that inefficiency levels are around 24%. Altunbas et al. (1994b) estimate
levels of technical inefficiency in the Italian credit cooperative sector between 1990 and
1992 where they find that inefficiency ranged from 13.1% in 1990 to 17.6% in 1992.
Moreover, they find insignificant inefficiency differences across Italian banks operating
in different geographical regions.
Altunbas et al. (1995a) use the stochastic frontier approach to examine efficiency for the
UK banks in 1993. They find that inefficiency is around 6% and the banks are more
efficient than their building society competitors. Altunbas et al. (1995b) use the
stochastic frontier to examine the relative efficiency of banks operating in Turkey over
1991-93. The study finds that inefficiency is relatively high; 46%, 32%, and 49% for the
years 1991, 1992 and 1993 respectively. Furthermore, no significant efficiency
differences were found between public and private banks.
Allen and Rai (1996) used both the SFA and DFA on a sample of 194 banks from 14
OECD countries (including 9 in the EU) for the period 1988-92. Large banks operating in
countries that prohibited the functional integration of commercial and investment
banking, had the largest inefficiency measures, amounting to 27.5 per cent of total costs.
Using banks' balance sheet and income statement data for the period 1987-94, EC (1997)
estimated a pooled time-series cost frontier for all the main EU banking sectors. In
general, the study found average inefficiencies of around 20%. Results for individual
countries, calculated from the pooled EU estimates, showed that Luxembourg banks
appeared to be relatively more efficient (0.88) than their counterparts in other banking
systems.
Dietsch and Weill (1998) use unconsolidated accounting data of 661 commercial, mutual
and savings banks from 11 EU countries covering the period 1992-96, to estimate
changes in efficiency and productivity. The results suggest an increase in efficiency using
both a cost and a profit frontier. This trend, however, was not observed in all countries;
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France, Italy, Luxembourg and UK experienced decreasing efficiency measured in terms
of costs. Productivity results showed an increase in total productivity, mainly due to
technological change.
In a study of the cost characteristics of banking in European countries over 1988-95
using the Fourier-flexible functional form, Altunbas et al. (1999) find that economies of
scale are widespread across banking markets and across different size classes of banks.
The estimated cost functions are relatively flat with scale economies typically in the
region of 5 per cent. In contrast, the X-inefficiency measures vary largely and, on
average, are around 25 per cent. The authors also do not find that large banks are
significantly more X-efficient than their smaller counterparts, although some banking
markets do appear to be systematically more efficient than others.
Maudos et al. (1999) examined efficiency for a sample of banks from 11 EU countries
with data covering the period 1993-96, using both cost and profit frontiers and taking
into account firms' specialisations in the measurement of efficiency. Using the cost
frontier, the average efficiency score for the whole sample was 0.44, compared with 0.74
when estimation of separate frontiers was carried out. Differences in product mix
therefore seem to be important in explaining variation in banking sector efficiency.
(Further empirical evidence on productive efficiency, in various banking sectors, is
exposed in tables 5.3-5.5, at the end of this section).
5.9.2.2 Studies that utilise the non-parametric approaches to estimate X-efficiency in banking
Aly et al. (1990) explore various measures of efficiency for 322 randomly chosen
independent US banks in 1986. Employing three inputs (i.e., labour, capital, and loanable
funds) and five outputs (i.e., commercial and industrial, consumer, real estate, and other
loans; and demand deposits), they discover that scale inefficiency is a minor problem
when compared to pure technical inefficiency. In the second stage regression analysis,
bank size and efficiency are positively related while product diversity and efficiency are
negatively related.
Elyasiani and Mehdian (1990) investigate bank efficiency, as well as technological
change, for a sample of 191 US banks with assets in excess of $300 million in both 1980
and 1985. Employing a four input (i.e., labour, capital, demand deposits, and savings and
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time deposits) and four output (i.e., commercial and industrial, real estate, and other
loans; and investments) approach, they find that because of technological progress
between 1980 and 1985, the same level of output can be produced with 10.45 to 22.29
percent fewer inputs.
Ferrier and Lovell (1990) use both econometric and programming techniques to evaluate
bank efficiency for a sample of 575 US banks in 1984. Employing three inputs (i.e., total
number of employees, occupancy costs and expenditure on furniture and equipment, and
expenditure on materials) and five outputs (i.e., the number of demand deposits and time
deposit accounts, and the number of real estate, instalment, and industrial loans), they
report an overall technical inefficiency of 16.04 percent using the non-stochastic
production frontier. They find, unlike the other studies, that small banks under $25
million in assets are the most efficient.
Yue (1992) evaluates the efficiency of the 60 largest Missouri banks for the period 1984
through 1990. Employing four inputs (i.e., interest and non-interest expense, and
transactions and non-transactions deposits) and three outputs (i.e., interest and non-
interest income, and total loans), he reports that pure technical inefficiency provides the
major source of technical inefficiency.
Berg et al's (1993) utilise DEA to study bank efficiency in Finland, Norway and Sweden
in 1990. Within countries, efficiency differences between banks were most important in
Finland and Norway and least important in Sweden. The largest Swedish banks were
among the most efficient units in the pooled sample, whereas only one large Finnish
bank and no large Norwegian bank had efficiency scores above 0.90. More recently,
Berg et al (1995) used DEA to investigate efficiency in the banking sectors of Denmark,
Finland, Norway and Sweden. The study found that the largest Danish and Swedish
banks were among the most efficient units in the pooled sample. Danish and Swedish
banks appeared to be in the best position to expand in a common Nordic banking market.
Grabowski et al. (1994) consider the efficiency for a group of 670 US banks in 1979,
1983 and 1987. Employing three inputs (i.e., labour, capital, and loanable funds) and five
outputs (i.e., commercial and industrial, consumer, and real estate loans; securities; and
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demand deposits), they conclude that pure technical inefficiency provides the main
source of technical inefficiency. In addition, efficiency was the highest in 1983 for the
various measures considered, except for scale efficiency that remained constant over the
three years of observation. Finally, banks with deposits in excess of $1 billion had the
highest technical efficiency.
Pastor et al (1995) analysed efficiency and differences in technology using non-
parametric methods for eight European countries in 1992. France, Spain and Belgium
appeared to have the most efficient banking sectors (with average efficiency scores of
0.950, 0.822 and 0.806 respectively), while the UK (0.537), Austria (0.608) and
Germany (0.650) were the least efficient. Elyasiani et al. (1995) employed a flexible non-
parametric approach to measure the productive efficiency of a sample of small and large
banks to examine the relationship between size and productive performance in banking
industry and to check whether the progress in relative efficiency over 80s. Their findings
suggest that in the pre-deregulation period, small banks were more efficient while in the
deregulated, small and large banks are equally efficiency. Moreover, the dispersion in the
efficiency measures of the small banks was found to have increased substantially while
that of large banks changed little over the sample period.
Wheelock and Wilson (1995) undertook DEA estimation of two specifications; the
intermediation and production approach. They use the production approach but replace
the number of deposits and loans accounts with their dollar amounts to check if this
affects the estimated efficiency scores. They find that efficiency scores are the same
applying both input/output specifications. (Further empirical evidence on banking
productive efficiency is exposed in tables 5.3-5.5).
To summarise the findings of previous two subsections, while there are differences in
productive efficiency estimates at the level of individual markets, it safe to say that the
results of the above studies concur with Evanoff and Israilevich (1991) who survey the
productive efficiency literature in the US and find that mean inefficiency levels typically
range between 13-51%. This is also in agreement with Berger et al. (1993) survey who
show that X-inefficiencies account for about 20% or more of the costs of banking, while
scale and product mix inefficiencies are usually found to account for less than 5% of the
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costs. This general finding also concurs with later reviews, such as the extensive Berger
and Humphrey (1997) survey of 130 efficiency studies that finds that average bank
efficiency of studies that use DEA and other non-parametric methods are typically
around 0.70 while those studies that employ parametric methods report overall mean
efficiencies of 0.84 in US banking. On the other hand, the European efficiency studies, in
particular, disagree somehow about the levels of X-inefficiency depending on the study
period and the countries concerned but most studies suggest that cost X-inefficiency are
around 20%.
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5.9.3 Financial liberalisation and productive efficiency
As indicated earlier, the financial systems in developing countries have typically been
characterised by excessive control by their regulatory authorities. Gruben and McComb
(1997), for instance, state that developing countries have historically been more
aggressive than industrialised countries in their detailed bank control where the
governments have imposed far higher requirements to regulate the resources of the
banking sector.
Financial liberalisation involves breaking down these barriers. This includes nullifying
regulations that limit entry and exit of firms into the banking industry and offering the
firms pricing and other flexibility. Such reforms are aimed at enhancing competition,
improving efficiency, upgrading service quality and extending the range of available
financial instruments at lower costs to customers.
Bhattacharya et al. (1997) examines the impact of liberalisation on the productive
efficiency of Indian commercial banks, utilising DEA, over the period 1986-91.
Beginning in 1985, the Indian Reserve bank relaxed restrictions by adopting a system of
flexible exchange rates, freeing lending and deposit rates and allowing certain mergers
between various banks. Furthermore, the regulatory authorities adopted a liberalisation
program that allowed industrial and businesses to enter the banking sector. Furthermore,
the authorities stipulated that Indian banks had to attain 8% capital adequacy
requirements in line with Basle Committee norms. The study concluded that publicly
owned banks were the most efficient and privately owned banks the least efficient. The
differences in the efficiency levels were linked to differences between regulations
controlling the workings of each category of banks. Foreign banks were the least efficient
at the beginning of the sample period but they were nearly as efficient as the publicly
owned banks by the end of the period.
Zaim (1995) examine the effect of post-1980 financial liberalisation on the efficiency of
Turkish commercial banks utilising a non-parametric methodology. He indicates that
before the stabilisation programme in Turkey, the banking sector was characterised by
restricted entry and regulated deposit and loan rates. The lack of interest rate competition
in the sector forced banks to compete for deposits by establishing branch networks. This
214
Chapter 5: Parametric and non-parametric approaches to Efficiency Measurement in Banking
led to over-branching and overstaffing in the commercial banking industry. The main
target of government reforms of the 1980s was to create a more competitive environment
and thereby enhance the efficiency in the sector. Liberalisation policies allowed new
entry of both domestic and foreign banks into the sector and deregulated interest rates,
commissions and fees. As a result, unprofitable branches were closed and the number of
staff reduced. The author concludes that financial reforms succeeded in stimulating
commercial banks to take measures that would enhance both technical and allocative
efficiency. Furthermore, state banks were found to be more efficient than their private
sector counterparts. In addition, banks experienced considerable scale adjustment and
were successful in achieving optimal scale.
Hao et al. (1999) studied the productive efficiency of private Korean banks over 1985-95
following the programme of deregulation initiated by the government in the early 1980s
and augmented in the early 1990s. The authors refer to the period 1960-80 where the
Korean government had extensive involvement in the banking and financial markets
which led to imbalances in these markets and in the industrial structure of the economy.
The financial repression that was associated with excessive regulation affected adversely
the efficiency of the financial system and resource allocation. Restrictions on bank
lending which favoured loans to family controlled industrial conglomerates caused small
and medium sized firms to turn to the informal sector for lending. Furthermore, excessive
government involvement in the banking system led to the erosion of effective credit
evaluation and risk assessment policies. Following the privatisation period of the 1980s
and the mid-1990s, banks dramatically changed their mix of inputs and outputs. These
changes combined with technological developments led to significant improvement in
the productivity of the banking sector. The results, in general, show that banks with
higher rates of asset growth, fewer employees, larger amounts of core deposits, and lower
expense ratios were more efficient. In addition, banks which branched nationwide were
found to be more efficient. The major financial deregulation of 1991, however, was
found to have had little or no significant effect on the level of bank efficiency.
In a seminal study on the impact of deregulation on banking sector efficiency in the US,
Humphrey and Pulley (1997) outline banks' responses to deregulation of interest rates in
the early 1980s. They use a profit function approach to separate the internal, bank
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initiated adjustments to deregulation from the external, contemporaneous changes in
banks' business environment. They find that the consequences of deregulation were
broad and included the raising of fees for deposit services, reduced operating costs at the
branch level, changing asset mix towards floating-rate loans, and banks were seen to take
on greater asset risk in search of higher revenue. Bank-initiated adjustments to
deregulation took three main forms: cost offset and reduction, cost shifting, and revenue
augmentation. Profits were stabilised, but at a lower rate than had existed previously, and
annual rates of return did not attain their pre-deregulation levels until 1992. While the
cost offset, cost reduction, and cost shifting responses to deregulation were quite
successful, attempts to augment loan revenues were more than completely reversed by
unexpectedly large loan losses. Furthermore, the results indicated that large banks (those
with assets over $ 500 million) bore the brunt of adjustment to deregulation. Between
1977-80 and 1981-84, these banks adjusted deposit and loan output prices and their use
of labour and capital inputs to minimize the negative impact on profits from the
deregulation-induced rise in funding costs. The effects of changes in the business
environment during this period included changes in the level of deposit and loan outputs
and prices of inputs. Between 1981-84 and 1985-88, the situation was reversed for large
banks and an improved business environment was the major reason for profit
improvements that occurred.
The above studies present some empirical evidence that suggests that financial
liberalisation can enhance competition in the financial industry (that in turn may improve
efficiency levels). On this basis, we expect to find improved levels of efficiency in the
Arabian banking markets under study in the following chapter, as these countries have
initiated major economic and financial reforms aimed at improving the performance of
their banking sectors. It should be noted, however, that the impact of financial
deregulation on the banking efficiency can be mixed, as pointed by Berger and
Humphrey (1997). Some studies point out that financial deregulation brings about higher
levels of bank efficiency (Berg et al., 1992; Zaim, 1995; Bhattacharya et al., 1997;
L,eightner and Lovell, 1998). Other studies, however, argue that there was no noticeable
impact of deregulation on bank efficiency (Bauer et al., 1993; Elyasiani and Mehdian,
1997; Griffell-Tatjó and Lovell, 1997; Humphrey and Pulley, 1997).
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5.10 Conclusion
This chapter outlines the main methodological approaches used to estimate efficiency in
banking sectors and provides extensive empirical evidence on the banking efficiency
literature. It shows that frontier methodology has been extensively used to estimate
banking efficiency as it removes the effects of differences in input prices and other
exogenous market factors affecting the standard performance measures of firms. Frontier
methodology can be broadly classified into parametric and nonparametric approaches.
The parametric approach has the virtue of allowing for noise in the measurement of
inefficiency but this approach requires assumptions about the particular form of the
economic function being estimated and the distribution of efficiency. The programming
approach, on other hand, requires no specification for functional form or its distributional
forms. However, the non-parametric approach suffers from the drawback that all
deviations from the frontier are attributed to inefficiency with no allowance made for
noise in the standard models.
The chapter also shows that there is still no agreement as to the definition and
measurement of bank inputs and outputs. In addition, the banking literature is divided
concerning the issue of bank cost and there is no agreement concerning the variables that
provide precise proxy for the production process. In general, researchers take one of two
approaches labelled the 'intermediation approach' and the 'production approach'.
However, both approaches are imperfect because neither fully captures the dual role of
financial institutions, which includes both the provision of transaction and document
processing services, and the transfer of funds from savers to borrowers.
Concerning the empirical findings of the bank efficiency literature, the chapter shows
that X-efficiency dominates scale economies in banking and scope economies are
illusive. The chapter covers evidence from both parametric and non-parametric studies
and reviews briefly the empirical evidence of the impact of economic and financial
reforms on banking efficiency. While evidence on the impact of deregulation on banking
sector efficiency is mixed, the general view is that liberalisation reforms should
ultimately bring about more competitive and efficient banking markets. Taken together,
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these main areas — banking sector efficiency and the influence of financial sector reforms
— will be examined in the context of Arabian banking in the following chapter 6.
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6.1 Introduction
This chapter is the main empirical part of this thesis which investigates the efficiency
levels in the banking sectors of various Arabian countries; Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia
and Bahrain over the 1992-2000 period. The empirical evidence on bank efficiency
aims to highlight the features associated with the role of economic development and
financial reforms that have taken place in these countries over the past decade. It is
expected that the macroeconomic reforms, financial liberalisation and the market-
oriented policies implemented in these countries over the last decade or so should have
increased competition in the financial sector and therefore generated higher levels of
banking sector efficiency.
Section 6.2 describes the sample which comprises data for 82 banks operating in the
financial systems of Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain over 1992-2000. This
sample constitutes about 78%, 88%, 63% and 55% respectively, of the total assets of the
financial systems (excluding the assets of foreign branches and central banks) of Jordan,
Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, respectively. Section 6.3 outlines the main
characteristics of the Fourier-flexible functional form which is utilised to estimate the
efficiency measures in the countries under study. Section 6.4 outlines the DEA
methodology that is also utilised to estimate the efficiency measures in the countries
under study in order to test for 'consistency' of the former stochastic frontier results.
Section 6.5 explains the structural tests employed to obtain the most accurate model that
describes efficiency levels for the banks in the countries under study. Based on chosen
preferred models for cost, standard profit and alternative profit functions specifications,
we report different efficiency measures for the banks in the countries under study. We
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then present the results of efficiency measures obtained utilising the DEA procedure
comparing the result with those obtained utilising the stochastic frontier approach.
Finally, section 6.7 is the conclusion.
6.2 Data and sample characteristics
Our data comprises a representative sample of the banks operating in Jordan, Egypt,
Saudi Arabia and Bahrain and consists of 82 banks over the 1992-2000 period. This
sample represents around 78%, 88%, 63% and 55% of the financial systems of these
countries (excluding the assets of foreign branches and central banks) (Table 6.1 below
shows the details).
Table 6-1: Size of the study sample relative to the banking sectors of Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia
and Bahrain over 1992-2000 (US$ million, figures rounded to nearest 2 digits)
Bahrain Egypt Jordan Saudi Arabia
Total.
Country Sample
Banking
/ Year	 Assets
Assets
%
Total
Sample
Banking %
Assets
Assets
Total
Sample
Banking
Assets
Assets
%
Total
Sample
Banking
Assets
Assets
%
1992 34,200 77,500 44 52,200 62,500 84 6,900 9,100 75 77,600 129,600 60
1993 34,300 68,400 50 54,300 60,900 89 7,100 9,600 74 82,700 142,800 58
1994 37,000 73,700 50 57,200 62,300 92 8,000 10,700 75 85,400 146,300 58
1995 40,000 73,700 54 63,900 69,800 92 9,100 11,900 77 89,600 150,100 60
1996 42,500 76,600 55 67,600 77,100 88 9,800 12,500 79 93,900 156,400 60
1997 44,900 83,500 54 77,200 89,100 87 11,100 13,700 81 105,000 163,900 64
1998 48,700 99,400 49 82,600 97,300 85 12,000 14,800 81 111,500 171,400 65
1999 55,200 102,100 54 88,700 103,300 86 13,000 16,300 80 121,700 172,200 71
2000 57,400 106,400 54 93,800 103,600 90 14,500 18,900 77 131,900 181,300 73
Average 43,800 84,600 52 70,800 80,600 88 10,200 13,100 78 99,900 157,100 63
Source: The total assets were extracted from the annual financial reports of the monetary agencies in the
countries under study (the consolidated financial statements of the banks) while the sample was drawn
from the London Bankscope database (January, 2000 & 2002).
Our sample represents the major financial institutions that have consistently published
their financial statements over the last ten years in the countries under study. The
relative size of Bahrain's banks sample looks small and the reason is that the financial
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system in this country has been dominated by offshore banking units which are
excluded from the sample as these belong to large international financial institutions
and their data are unavailable. In Saudi Arabia, the specialised government institutions,
while important, do not publish detailed financial statements and so these are not
included in the sample.
Table 6.2 shows the specialisation of the banks included in the sample. The number of
commercial banks comprises around 66% of the total sample. The percent of
commercial banks operating in each country varies; ranging from 42% in Bahrain to
77% in Saudi Arabia.
Table 6-2: Specialisation of banks under study, 1992-2000
% of total Bahrain Egypt Jordan Saudi Arabia All
Commercial 44 76 57 77 66
Investment 28 8 29 8 16
Islamic 17 5 7 0 7
Other 11 11 7 15 11
Total Number 18 37 14 13 82
Source: Bankscope (Jan. 2000 & 2002)
Table 6.3 shows that the size of total assets of all the banks included in the present study
increased from about US$ 180 billion in 1992 to about US$ 310 billion in 2000 and
averaged about US$ 235 billion over the whole period. Dividing these financial
institutions into nine size categories, the share of the largest banks (with assets size
greater than US$ 5 billion) constituted around 70 percent of the total assets of all the
banks over the period 1992-2000.
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Table 6-3: Distribution of banks' assets in Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, 1992-2000
1992
%
1993
%
1994
%
1995
%
1996
%
1997
%
1998
%
1999
%
2000
%
Avg.
US$,
mu.
1-99.9 0.11 0.08 0.14 0.16 0.14 0.10 0.06 0.02 0.02 202
100-199.9 1.16 1.05 0.78 0.35 0.31 0.18 0.21 0.29 0.27 1,073
200-299.9 1.76 1.35 1.10 1.78 1.04 0.80 0.67 0.36 0.32 2,173
300-499.9 3.78 4.08 3.47 2.79 2.92 2.75 2.49 2.04 1.58 6,422
500-999.9 2.56 2.73 4.64 4.57 4.51 3.53 3.67 3.47 3.29 8,569
1,000-2,499.9 11.87 11.50 9.89 13.09 10.02 11.31 11.84 10.51 10.15 25,911
2,500-4,999.9 8.29 8.56 4.68 4.94 7.12 6.65 6.50 7.66 8.26 16,470
5,000-9,999 18.22 19.28 24.51 26.23 24.40 26.82 14.88 19.13 9.28 46,196
10,000+ 52.26 51.37 50.78 54.22 49.54 47.85 59.67 56.53 66.83 129,190
T. Assets ((1S$,
mil., nominal	 179,033	 186,975	 197,046	 213,044	 225,426	 250,325	 267,943	 292,855	 313,209
values)
Source: Bankscope (Jan. 2000 & 2002)
This study employs the intermediation approach, as indicated earlier, for defining bank
inputs and outputs. Following Aly et al. (1990), the inputs used in the calculation of the
various efficiency measures are deposits ( w 1 ), labour ( w 2) and physical capital (w3).
The deposits include time and savings deposits, notes and debentures, and other
borrowed funds. The price of loanable funds was derived by taking the sum of interest
expenses of the time deposits and other loanable funds divided by loanable funds.
Labour is measured by personnel expenses as a percent of total assets*. Bank physical
capital is measured by the book value of premises and fixed assets (including capitalised
leases). The price of capital was derived by taking total expenditures on premises and
fixed assets divided by total assets. The three outputs used in the study includes total
customer loans (y 1 ), all other earning assets (y 2 ), and off-balance sheet items (y3),
measured in millions of US dollars.
* As staff numbers were not available for the banks in the sample, we used this measure instead. This
measure for staff costs has been used in various previous studies including Altunbas et al. (1996) and
(1999).
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The off-balance sheet items (measured in nominal terms) were included as a third
output. Although the latter are technically not earning assets, these constitute an
increasing source of income for banks and therefore should be included when modelling
the banks' cost characteristics; otherwise, total banks' output would tend to be
understated (Jagtiani and Khanthavit, 1996). Furthermore, these items are included in
the model because they are often effective substitutes for directly issued loans, requiring
similar information-gathering costs of origination and ongoing monitoring and control
of the counterparts, and presumably similar revenues as these items are competitive
substitutes for direct loans.
The definitions, means, standards of deviation of the input and output variables used in
the stochastic frontier estimations are reported in table 6.4. The table shows that the
average bank had US$ 1.26 billion in loans, US$ 1.39 billion other earning assets and
US$ 1.32 billion of balance sheet items over 1992-2000. The cost of input variables
averaged about 7.0 percent for purchased funds, 2.0 percent for labour and 1.0 percent
for physical capital over the period 1992-2000. On the other hand, the prices of banks
output averaged about 15.0 percent for loans*; 5.0 percent for other earning assets and
1.0 percent for off-balance sheet items over the same period.
* This may be an over statement as interest earned on bonds is also included in this figure.
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Table 6-4: Descriptive statistics of the banks' inputs and outputs for Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia
and Bahrain over 1992-2000
Variables
	 Description
TC	 Total cost (includes Interest expense, Personnel
expense, Commission expense, Fee expense,
Trading expense, other operating expense) (US$
millions).
W1	 Price of funds (%) (total interest expense/ total
customer deposits (demand, saving and time
deposits)).
W2	 Price of labour (%) (total personnel expense/total
assets).
W3	 Price of physical capital (Non-interest expense/
Total assets).
Y1	 The US $ value of total aggregate loans (all types
of loans) (US$ millions).
Y2	 The US $ value of total aggregate other earning
assets (short-term investment, equity and other
investment and public sector securities (US$
millions)).
Y3	 The US $ value of the off-balance sheet activities
(nominal values, US$ millions).
pl	 Price of loans (%) (total earned interest/ Total
loans).
p2 Price of other earning assets (%) (Trading income
and other operating income excluding commission
and fees income/Other earning assets).
P3	 Price of off-balance sheet items (%) (Commission
and fees income/ off-balance sheet items).
Mean St. Dev Min. Max.
170 300 0 1,720
0.07 0.09 0.00 1.98
0.02 0.01 0.00 0.21
0.01 0.01 0.00 0.21
1,260 2,280 1 15,060
1,390 2,470 1 13,600
1,320 3,510 1 26,740
0.15 0.07 0.01 0.87
0.05 0.04 0.01 0.33
0.01 0.02 0.00 0.20
Source: Bankscope (Jan. 2000 & 2002)
In addition to the above input and output variables, the present study employs a variety
of control and environmental variables* to rule out the effect of other factors that might
t The control variables enter into the stochastic frontier model in the same way as the input variables (as
betas) and these variables are fully interactive with other parameters of the model; On the other hand, the
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explain differences among efficiency estimates for the banks under study. The three
control variables included in our model include the size of loan loss reserves as a
percent of bank's credit portfolio, the capital adequacy ratio, and a time trend (see table
6.5 below for details). The loan loss reserves as a proportion of gross loans ranged
between 0.01 and 19.68 percent, the latter figure suggests that some banks faced
substantial credit quality problems. The total banks' capital as a percentage of total
assets averaged around 14.0 percent with a standard deviation of 12.0 percent, this
reflects sizeable differences in the capital adequacy of the banks under study.
The size of loan loss reserves as a proportion of gross loans is added to the model to
control for the bank's risk structure. It is also used as a measure of bank's asset quality
and as a measure of the bank's management efficiency in monitoring the credit
portfolio. A lack of diversity in a bank's asset portfolio may be associated with
increases in problem loans without sufficient provisioning, exposing bank's capital to
risk and potential bankruptcy that might be closely related to the quality of bank
management. Banks facing financial distress have been found to carry large proportions
of nonperforming loans (Whalen, 1991). Furthermore, studies on bank failures suggest a
positive relationship between operating inefficiency and failure rates (see for example,
Cebenoyan, Cooperman, and Register, 1993; Hermalin and Wallace, 1994; Wheelock
and Wilson, 1995). Barr, Seiford and Siems (1994) found that this positive relationship
between inefficiency and failure is evident a number of years ahead of eventual failure.
Kwan and Eisenbeis (1994) report that problem loans are negatively related to
efficiency even in non-failing banks. Berger and DeYoung (1997) found a link between
management quality and problem loans by reporting that an increase in management
quality reduces the bank's problem loans.
Hughes et al. (1996a, b) and Mester (1996) included the volume of nonperforming loans
as a control for loan quality in studies of US banks, and Berg et al. (1992) included loan
environmental variables are not interactive with other model parameters and added to the model as delta
(as will be shown later).
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losses as an indicator of loan quality evaluations in a DEA study of Norwegian bank
productivity. Whether it is appropriate to include nonperforming loans and loan losses
in bank's cost, standard and alternative profit functions depends on the extent to which
these variables are exogenous. Such variables would be exogenous if caused by
negative economic shocks "bad luck", but they could be endogenous, either because
management is inefficient in managing its portfolio "bad management" or because it has
made a conscious decision to reduce short-run expenses by cutting back on loan
origination and monitoring resources "skimping". Berger and DeYoung (1997) tested
the bad luck, bad management, and skimping hypotheses and found mixed evidence on
the exogeneity of nonperforming loans.
Another important aspect of efficiency measurement is the treatment of financial
capital. A bank's insolvency risk depends on the financial capital available to absorb
portfolio losses, as well as on the portfolio risk themselves. Even apart from risk, a
bank's capital level directly affects costs by providing an alternative to deposits as a
funding source for loans. On the other hand, raising equity typically involves higher
costs than raising deposits. If the first effect dominates, measured costs will be higher
for banks using a higher proportion of debt financing; if the second effect dominates,
measured costs will be lower for these banks. Large banks depend more on debt
financing to finance their portfolios than small banks do, so failure to control for equity
could yield a scale bias. The specification of capital in the cost and profit functions also
goes part of the way toward accounting for different risk preferences on the parts of
banks. Therefore, if some banks are more risk averse than others, they may hold a
higher level of financial capital than maximising profits or minimising costs. If financial
capital is ignored, the efficiency of these banks would be mismeasured, even though
they behave optimally given their risk preferences. Hughes et al. (1996a, b, 1997) and
Hughes and Moon (1995) tested and rejected the assumption of risk neutrality for
banks. Clark (1996) included capital in a model of economic cost and found that it
eliminated measured scale diseconomies in production costs alone. The cost studies of
Hughes and Mester (1993) and the Hughes et al. (1996a, 1997) profit studies
incorporated financial capital and found increasing returns to scale at large-asset-size
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banks. A possible reason is that large size confers diversification benefits that allow
large banks to have lower capital ratios than smaller banks. Akhavein et al. (1997a)
controlled for equity capital and found that profit efficiency increases as a result of
mergers of large banks. Bank's capital is also included in the model of Berger and
Mester (1997) who find that well-capitalised firms are more efficient. This positive
relationship between capital and efficiency may indicate that inefficient banks with
lower capital have less to lose in taking more risky projects than an efficient bank. This
is consistent with moral hazard and agency conflict between mangers and shareholders
where less monitored mangers with lower equity have incentives to expense preference.
The environmental variables (or efficiency correlates) were also added to the model to
investigate the reason for the differences in efficiency scores across banks under study.
These include variables that control for market structure and organisational
characteristics, geographical segmentation and bank liquidity. We identify variables to
account for bank specialisation, bank size and concentration in the respective banking
industries. Financial institutions in each country are divided into four categories;
commercial, investment, Islamic and other financial institutions (that perform various
bank functions). Furthermore, we employ the 3-firm asset concentration ratio which is
widely used to test for monopoly characteristics. Furthermore, we include a dummy
variable to control for bank geographical (countries) location (Table 6.5 shows
descriptive statistics of the control and environmental variables).
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Table 6-5: Descriptive statistics of the banks' control and environmental variables for Jordan,
Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain over 1992-2000
Variables
	 Description Mean St. Dev Min Max
The control Variables
K Capital Adequacy (%) (Total equity/ Total 0.14 0.12 0.01 0.72
Assets)
S Asset quality (Loan Loss Reserve! Gross 0.22 0.81 0.01 19.68
Loans)
T Time Trend 5.00 2.58 1.00 9.00
The Environmental Variables
TA Total Assets (US$ millions) 2,881 4,966 35 26,700
B Dummy variable for Bahrain 0.22 0.41 0.00 1.00
J Dummy variable for Jordan 0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00
E Dummy variable for Egypt 0.45 0.50 0.00 1.00
Corn. Dummy variable for commercial banks 0.66 0.47 0.00 1.00
Inv. Dummy variable for investment/ securities
banks
0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00
Isl. Dummy variable for Islamic banks 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00
L Liquidity ratio (%) (Total liquid assets/ 0.14 0.16 0.00 0.71
Total Assets)
3-FCR Three firm concentration ratio (%) (the
largest 3 banks total assets of /Total assets
of all banks in the bank country for the
respective years)
0.62 0.14 0.48 0.81
MS Bank assets market share (%) for each year 0.05 0.10 0.00 0.68
Source: Bankscope (Jan., 2000, 2002)
The total assets variable is used to control for bank size where bank size should be
strongly associated with efficiency as size may be required to utilise scale and (maybe)
scope economies (if large banks are more diversified). Furthermore, larger banks may
have more professional management teams and/or might be more cost conscious due to
greater pressure from owners concerning the bottom line profits (Evanoff and
Israilevich, 1991). Berger et al. (1993) found that most of the efficiency differences
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among large banks was on the output side as larger banks might be better able to reach
their optimal mix and scale of outputs. On the other hand, Hermalin and Wallace
(1994), Kaparakis et al. (1994), DeYoung and Nolle (1996) found significant negative
relationships. Other studies, however, report no significant relationship between bank
size and efficiency, such as Aly et al. (1992), Cebenoyan et al. (1993), Mester (1993), Pi
and Timme (1993), Mester (1996), Berger and Hannan (1995), Berger and Mester
(1997), and Chang et al. (1998).
The 3-firm concentration ratio and market share variables were included to control for
oligopoly behaviour along the lines of the traditional structure-conduct-performance
paradigm (see Molyneux et al., 1996) and as an indicator of the characteristics of the
respective banking industry structures. The Cournot model of oligopolistic behaviour
suggests that there is a positive relationship between concentration and profitability.
Consistent with this model, some studies have found a positive relationship between
market concentration and profitability (Berger and Hannan, 1997; Berger and Mester,
1997). The market power that prevails in the less competitive markets enable some
banks to charge higher prices for their services and make supernormal profits. Banks
may exert their own market power through size as noted by Berger (1995) and so we
include a market share variable to control for what Berger refers to as 'relative market
power'.
Dummy variables for bank specialisation are also included in the model so as to control
for the product diversity as efficiency might associated with firm's strength in carefully
targeting its market niches. The cost of producing various products might be lower
when specialised banks produce them rather than when a single bank produces all the
products due to diseconomies of scope. There are number of studies that have examined
the impact of product diversity on efficiency. Aly et al. (1990) found a negative
relationship between product diversity and cost efficiency. Ferrier, Grosskopf, Hayes
and Yaisawarng (1993) found that banks with greater product diversity tend to have
lower cost efficiency. Chaffai and Dietsch (1995) compared the efficiency of universal
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versus non-universal (more specialised) banks in Europe and found the former to be less
cost efficient.
Finally, the liquidity ratio is included to account for bank's liquidity risk. Banks that
hold more liquidity may be expected to have lower liquidity risk but may be less profit
efficient as liquid assets tend to yield lower returns. In contrast, as liquid assets are
controlled in outputs, one would expect banks with higher liquid assets (all other things
being equal) to be more cost efficient.
6.3 The Fourier -flexible functional form
The stochastic frontier, with the Fourier-flexible functional form, is the main
methodology to be employed to derive efficiency measures in the countries under study.
While the translog functional form has been probably the most widely utilised to derive
efficiency estimates, the Fourier-flexible has received more focus in the recent
efficiency literature. This section presents the main features of the Fourier-functional
form and shows how to derive scale economies and scale inefficiencies estimates using
this functional form.
6.3.1 The advantage of the Fourier-flexible (FF) versus the translog functional form
The most widely used functional form in the bank efficiency literature is the translog;
however, it is subject to certain limitations, namely it does not necessarily fit well the
data that are far from the mean in terms of output size or mix. In addition, McAllister
and McManus (1993), and Mitchell and Onvural (1996) show that some of the
differences in results of scale economies across studies may be due to the ill fit of the
translog function across a wide range of bank sizes, some of which may be
underrepresented in the data. The translog functional form for a cost function represents
a second-order Taylor series approximation of any arbitrary, twice-differentiable cost
function at a given (local) point. This restrictive property of the translog form is part of
White's (1980) appraisal, which led Gallant (1981) to propose the Fourier flexible
functional form (FF) as a preferred alternative.
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This methodology was first proposed by Gallant (1981, 1982), discussed later by
Elbadawi, Gallant and Souza (1983), Chalfant and Gallant (1985), Eastwood and
Gallant (1991), Gallant and Souza (1991) and applied to the analysis of bank cost
efficiency by Spong et al. (1995), Mitchell and Onvural (1996) and Berger et al. (1997).
It has been shown (Tolstov, 1962), that a linear combination of the sine and cosine
function, namely the Fourier series, can fit exactly any well-behaved multivariate
function.
The Fourier-flexible functional form is preferred over the translog because its better
approximates the underlying cost function across broad range of outputs as suggested
by Spong et al. (1995), Mitchell and Onvural (1996). The semi-nonparametric Fourier
functional form has desirable mathematical and statistical properties because an infinite
Fourier series is capable of representing any function exactly and even truncated Fourier
series can approximate a function reasonably well throughout its entire range. When
using the Fourier functional form, one avoids holding any maintained hypothesis by
allowing the data to reveal the true cost function through a large value of fitted
parameters.
Besides, Berger and Mester (1997) note that the local approximations of the translog
may distort scale economy measurements since it imposes a symmetric U-shaped
average cost curve. This aspect of the transiog might not fit very weli data that are far
from the mean in terms of output size or mix. The FF alleviates this problem since it can
approximate any continuous function and any of its derivatives (up to a fixed order).
Any inferences that are drawn from estimates of the FF are unaffected by specification
errors (Ivaldi et al., 1996). Carbo et al. (2000) indicate that since the FF is a
combination of polynomial and trigonometric expansions, the order of approximation
can increase with the size of the sample size. This is due to the mathematical behaviour
of the sine and cosine functions which are mutually orthogonal over the [0, Irt] interval
and function space-spanning.
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Finally, the FF has several appealing properties in terms of modelling bank cost
structures as pointed out by Williams and Gardener (2000). Unlike other commonly
used functional forms such as the translog, the FF form is unaffected by specification
errors. Furthermore, it has been widely accepted that the global property is important in
banking where scale, product mix and other inefficiencies are often heterogeneous,
therefore, local approximations (such as those generated by the translog function) may
be relatively poor approximation to the underlying true cost (or profit) function.
Specifically, the Fourier-flexible functional form augments the translog by including
Fourier trigonometric terms.
6.3.2 The Fourier-flexible functional form
The stochastic cost model for a sample of N firms can be written as:
InTC ; =1nTC(y 1 ,w 1 ,z 1 ;B)+u i +v 1, ,	 i=1,...,N,
where TC, is observed cost of bank i, y, is the vector of output levels and w, is the
vector of input prices for bank i. z 1 represents a vector of control variables which in the
case of our estimates includes the quality of bank's output (q ), the level of its financial
capital ( k ) and the time trend (T 1 ). B is a vector of parameters, v is a two-sided error
term representing the statistical noise (assumed to be independently and identically
distributed and have a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance cr 2,, ).
U. 	 non-negative random variables that account for technical inefficiency. In case of
Battese and Coelli (1995) model, u, are assumed to be independently distributed as
truncations at zero of the N (m 1 , o) distribution; where m i =S i d, w here  6, is a set of
environmental variables (defined in the previous section) which are employed to control
for firm's specific factors that may contribute to explain the differences in the efficiency
estimates, and d is a vector of parameters to be estimated. In case of Battese and Coelli
(1992) model, Il i
 are assumed to be iid as truncations at zero of the N Oa, cr2u
distribution.
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The translog functional form for the cost frontier is specified as*:
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By augmenting the previous translog form by Fourier trigonometric terms, we get the
Fourier-flexible functional form written as:
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where 1nC is the natural logarithm of total costs (operating and financial); ln
Inymi
y i is the
natural logarithm of bank outputs (i.e. loans, securities, off-balance sheet items); in w
is the natural logarithm of ith input prices (i.e. wage rate, interest rate and physical
* As indicated in the previous chapter, for the case of the standard profit function, we specify variable
profits in place of variable costs and take variable output prices as given but allow output quantities to
vary. On the other hand, the alternative profit function employs the same dependent variable as the
standard profit function and the same exogenous variables as the cost function but it measures how close
a bank comes to earning maximum profits given its output levels rather than its output prices.
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capital price); the x 11 terms, n=1,...,8 are rescaled values of the ln( w / w 3 ), i=1,2,
ln( y k)' k=1,2,3, and ln( z r ), r=1,2,3, such that each of the x 11 span the interval [0, 27t],
and it refers to the number of radians here (not profits), and a, 13, y, w,p,	 d ,	 and t
are coefficients to be estimated.
Since the duality theorem requires that the cost function be linearly homogeneous in
input prices and continuity requires that the second order parameters are symmetric, the
following restrictions apply to the parameters of the cost function in the equation
3	 3	 3
above: 13 . = 1 .	B i =0 ; E	 = 0;	 p1.J. = 0 for all j. Moreover, the second orderj	 j
i=1	 1=1	 i=1	 1=1
parameters of the cost function must be symmetric, that is, B = B 
and ilk = , for
all i, k. The scaled log-output quantities; X 1 are calculated as in Berger and Mester
(1997) by cutting 10% off each end of the to, 271 interval so that the c, span [0./ x 2zz.,
.9x 2rt] to reduce approximation problems near endpoints. The formula for z 1 is [0.27t -
gxa+gx variable], where [a, b] is the range of the variable being transformed, and ix
(0.9 x 27t — 0.1 x 27c/ (9b-a)). This study applies Fourier terms only for the outputs,
leaving the input price effects to be defined entirely by the translog terms, following
Berger and Mester (1997). The primary aim is to maintain the limited number of Fourier
terms for describing the scale and inefficiency measures associated with differences in
bank size. Moreover, the usual input price homogeneity restrictions can be imposed on
logarithmic price terms, whereas they cannot be easily imposed on the trigonometric
terms.
The maximum-likelihood estimates for the parameters in the Fourier-flexible stochastic
frontier for Cost, Standard and Alternative profit efficiency functions; that includes
efficiency correlates, are estimated using the computer program FRONTIER Version
4.0 (see Coelli 1996). This computer program uses three steps to obtain the maximum
likelihood estimates. The first step involves obtaining ordinary least squares (OLS)
estimates of the equation. These estimates are unbiased because of the non-zero
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expectation of u it . The second step involves evaluating the log-likelihood function for a
number of values of y between zero and one. During this procedure, d, are set to zero
and the values of B 0 and 62
 are adjusted according to the corrected ordinary least
squares formulae for the half-normal model. The estimates corresponding to the largest
log-likelihood value in this second step are used as starting values in the iterative
maximisation procedure in the third and final part of the estimation procedure.
6.3.3 Calculation of within-sample scale elasticities
This thesis also estimates scale elasticities for the banks under study. As indicated
earlier, scale elasticity for the cost function (i.e., scale economies) refer to the
proportional increase in cost resulting from a small proportional increase in the level of
output (the elasticity of total cost with respect to output). Within the sample scale
elasticities are calculated as in Mester (1996) and Altunbas et al. (1998) and are
evaluated at the mean output, input price, asset quality and financial capital levels for
the respective size quartiles. The degree of scale elasticities is given by the sum of
individual cost elasticities. For the case of FF cost function, the measure of overall
economies of scale (SE) is given by the following cost elasticity by differentiating the
cost function in the above equation with respect to output;
a In TC
This gives us: SE = L
a in
3
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If the calculated SE is less than 1 then increasing returns to scale, implying economies
of scale. On the other hand, if SE = 1 then constant returns to scale and if SE < 1 then
decreasing returns to scale, implying diseconomies of scale.
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6.3.4 Calculation of Scale inefficiency
Recently Evanoff and Israilevich (1995) have noted that comparing scale economies
(scale elasticities) with x-inefficiencies are mis-leading as the former is an elasticity and
the latter is a relative efficiency measure. While many authors compare scale economies
and x-inefficiencies, Evanoff and Israilevich suggest one should calculate scale
inefficiencies for accurate comparisons.
The scale elasticity measure, 6 = a ln c/a in Y, is an elasticity associated with a
particular output level and indicates the relative change in cost associated with an
increment change from this output level. Scale inefficiency (I), on other hand, can be
measured as the aggregate cost of N inefficient firms (c # 1.0) relative to the cost of a
single efficient firm (c = 1.0); that is I = [N * C / IC E 1-1.0, where C 1 and C E are the
cost of production at the inefficient and efficient firms, respectively.
Therefore, the two concepts differ because elasticity is related to incremental changes in
output, and inefficiency related to the change in output required to produce at the
minimum efficient scale. The inefficiency measure is typically associated with
significantly larger output changes as it measures the difference in total or average cost
at distinct output levels. Furthermore, the cost savings realised by an incremental
increase in output by a scale inefficient firm is irrelevant for measuring inefficiency
since this is not the savings realised by producing at the efficient scale.
Given the following simple representation for the cost function:
ln C = a + b an Y) + .5 c (ln Y ) 2,
then the scale elasticity for inefficient firms = El = amn C I / aln Y 1 = b, on the other
hand the scale elasticity for the efficient firms = 1.0; by definition.
The scale inefficiency (see Evanoff and Israilevich, 1995) then can be written as:
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(.5 / C)(1 -	 ) 2
I = e	 I	 -1.0,
that is scale inefficiency is a function of the first and second derivatives of the function
(cost function as well as other functional forms) with respect to output (the second
derivation aims to reach c which is the key for inefficiency calculation).
Furthermore, if the estimated scale elasticity value is insignificantly different from
unity, this does not imply scale inefficiency is insignificantly different from zero
because the statistical difference of the elasticity measure from a value of unity depends
entirely on the standard error of the estimated coefficient b.
For completeness, this thesis estimates x-inefficiencies, scale inefficiencies and scale
economies for our sample of Arabic banks.
6.4 Utilising DEA to measure efficiency
In order to test for the consistency of the aforementioned parametric x-efficiency
estimates, we also use the non-parametric DEA approach to estimate efficiency so the
results derived by different methodologies can be compared. This section describes the
steps utilised to derive cost efficiency in the countries under study using the linear
programming DEA approach. This methodology, unlike the stochastic frontier, does not
allow us to include the control and environmental variables directly into the model.
Therefore, we confine our analysis to the CRS and VRS DEA approaches using the
same inputs and outputs specification to calculate efficiency measures but without
utilising the control and environmental variables.
6.4.1 Constant returns to scale DEA model
Efficiency measures derived using DEA are simply based on maximising the ratio of all
output over all the inputs. Assuming a data set that includes K inputs (k = 1,...,K), M
outputs (m = 1,...,M) for N firms (j =1,...,N). Then for the ith observation, the set of
input and output can be represented by the column of input vector x and the column of
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output vector y, and the sets of inputs and outputs for the ith observation are x ik , and
,. The input matrix X = [KxN], and the output matrix Y = [MxN] represent the data
for all N firms. The optimal weights are obtained by solving the mathematical
programming problem:
max u,v (u'y i v'xi)
s.t. u 'Yj	 v/x j _ 1, j =1,2,...,N,	 (1)
u, v	 0.
The aim is to obtain a measure of efficiency (the ratio of all outputs over all inputs) such
as eYi INA; is maximised, where u is a vector of output weights [Mx11 and v is a
vector of input weights [Kxl]. The inequality equation requires that the weights are
positive. DEA selects the weights that maximise each firm's productive efficiency score
as long as no weight is negative and the weights are universal.
To avoid the problem of the infinite number of solutions in the problem, the constraint
v 'x =1 is imposed to provide the multiplier form of the DEA linear programming
problem:
maxxv(ilyi),
s.t.	 v'xi =1
J t 'Yj	 v	 0 , j	 1,2,...,N,	 (2)
/A y 0
where the change of notation from u and v to kt and v is used to reflect the
transformation.
The dual envelopment form of the input-oriented CRS DEA linear program of equation
(2) can be written as:
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mm
 0.x
s.t.	
—y. +17 X  O,	 (3)
ex; -X/1,  0,
A  0,
where 0 is a scalar and A is an Nxl vector of constants. The objective function seeks to
minimise the efficiency score, 0, which represents the amount of radial reduction in the
use of each input. The first constraint (the output constraint) implies that the production
of the rth output by observation i cannot exceed any linear combination of output r by
all firms in the sample. The second constraint involves the use of input s by observation
i, and implies that the radially reduced use of input s by firm i cannot be less than the
same linear combination of the use of input s by all firms in the sample. The value of 0
obtained will be the efficiency score for the i-th firm that satisfy: 0 1. When 19 value
is 1 (the point is on the frontier), the firm is technically efficient according to the Farrell
(1957) definition. Equation (3) must be solved N times, once for each firm in the sample
and then a value of 0 is obtained for each firm (see Coelli et al., 1998).
Equation (3) above assumes that constant returns to scale are imposed on every
observation in the sample. It does not take into account factors which make firms
unique beyond the simple input-output mix (such as inefficiencies which result from
operating in areas of increasing or decreasing returns to scale due to size constraints).
6.4.2 VRS model and decomposition of technical efficiency
Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984) suggested an extension to the CRS model to
account for variable returns to scale (VRS) when not all firms are operating at an
optimal scale. If calculated technical efficiency (CRS) is different from the technical
efficiency (VRS), then this indicates that the firm has scale inefficiency. Therefore, the
use of the VRS specification permits the calculation of technical efficiency devoid of
the scale efficiency effect (decomposing technical efficiency into pure technical and
scale efficiency; that is OCRS= °VRSS °Scale)• The CRS linear programming problem can be
modified to account for VRS by adding the convexity constraint to provide:
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St	 - y i -1-Y11,  0,
OA; —X.1,  0,
NVA=1	 (4)
A,  0,
where Ni is an Nxl vector of ones. This approach forms a convex hull of interesecting
planes which envelope the data points more tightly than the CRS . The convexity
constraint N = 1 ensures that an inefficient firm is only benchmarked against firms of
similar size.
6.4.3 Non-increasing returns to scale
Coelli et al. (1998) show that the measure of scale efficiency using the VRS modelling
approach does not indicate whether the firm is operating in the area of increasing or
decreasing returns to scale. To determine whether the firm is operating in the area of
increasing or decreasing returns to scale, an additional DEA problem with non-
increasing returns to scale formulation (NIRS) is required. This is executed by
modifying the VRS constraint from equality that governs the sum of linear combination
parameters to a constraint of less than or equal to one (by substituting the N VX = 1
resrtiction with N1/X  1 ) to provide:
mine,A0,
St	 - y l +YA  0,
Oxi
NVA,  1	 (5)
A.  0,
The nature of the scale inefficiencies due to increasing or decreasing returns to scale for
a particular firm can be determined by considering whether the N1RS TB score is equal
to the VRS TB score. If they are unequal, then increasing returns to scale exist for that
firm but if they are equal then decreasing returns to scale apply.
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6.4.4 Technical and Allocative efficiency
If information about prices are available and we want to consider a behavioural
objective such as cost minimisation or revenue maximsation, then we can estimate
measures of both technical and allocative efficiency. For the case of VRS cost
minimisation, we run the input-oriented DEA model (defined by (4)) to obtain technical
efficiencies (TE), and then we need to solve the following cost minimisation DEA:
minA.,qW(X.*„	 (6)
St
	 -
where w is a vector of input prices for the i-th firm and x: is the cost minimisation
vector of input quantities for the i-th firm, given the input prices w and the output
levels y 1 . The total cost (economic) efficiency of the i-th firm is calculated
as: EE = w	 / w
	 (the ratio of minimum cost to observed cost , for the i-th firm),
then the allocative efficiency is calculated as AE = CE / TE.
To summarise, the above section describes how DEA will be utilised to derive the
efficiency measures under the assumption of constant return to scale, variable return to
scale and shows how to identify whether firms are operating at increasing or decreasing
return to scale. Finally, the section shows how to split cost efficiency into technical and
allocative efficiency measures. The following section report both parametric and non-
parametric estimates (as outlined earlier) of efficiency for the Arabic banking systems
under study.
6.5 Stochastic frontier: Preferred models specifications and efficiency levels
This section presents the steps undertaken to get the preferred cost, standard and
alternative profit models. This includes employing different models utilised in the
banking efficiency literature based on different assumptions concerning the distribution
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of efficiency terms. In addition, various hypotheses are tested, given different
combination of control and environmental variables, to arrive at the preferred models
based on maximum likelihood estimation*. Based on the preferred model, subsection
6.5.2 through 6.5.3 present technical efficiency, scale elasticity and scale efficiency
measures for the banks under study.
6.5.1 The preferred stochastic model based on the specification of the cost function
There are three stages undertaken to arrive at the preferred model for our cost function
estimates. The first stage involves utilising Battese and Coelli's (1995) approach that
allows us to include the efficiency correlates directly in the model estimation. The
second stage involves utilising Battese and Coelli's (1992) time-varying efficiency
approach that gives flexibility to examine different assumptions concerning the
distribution of efficiency terms, comparing time-variant versus time-invariant models
but it does not allow for the inclusion of efficiency correlates in the model. Finally,
stage 3 compares the best specified models in stage 1 and stage 2 to arrive at a single
preferred model from the two stages and provides the basis for the model choice.
* The Maximum Likelihood (ML) and Log-likelihood (LL) functions are the basis for deriving parameters
estimates, given certain data. While the shapes of these two functions are different, they have their
maximum point at the same value. Both seek to estimate the value of p (the unknown parameter in the
model) that maximises the ML or LL function given the data z. The MILE have many statistical appealing
features especially when the sample size is large. First, consistency: as the sample size increases, the
MLEs converge to the true parameters values. Second, asymptotic normality and efficiency (i.e., as the
sample size increases, the sampling distribution of the MLE converges to normality with least possible
variance (Hence, estimates obtained typically have the smallest confidence intervals)). The MILE of
unknown parameter, pi is the value of p that corresponds to the maximum of L(p/z) that is most likely to
have produced from data z. Since it is easier to deal with addition rather than multiplication, the problem
is generally tackled in the log form. This is called the log likelihood function that truly maximises the sum
of the log likelihoods by choosing the parameters that give identical results to maximising the
untransformed likelihood. The log likelihood takes the following form:
log(L) = —(n / 2) log(27/-) — (n / 2) log(o- ) — (1/ 2)17,2, y (1'; —a — bX i)2
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Stage 1: Estimating the cost frontier models that include efficiency correlates
This stage estimates the stochastic frontier for the cost function, given the Fourier-
flexible functional form that includes efficiency correlates. This stage follows Dietsch
and Lozano-Vivas (2000) who emphasise the importance of including country and other
specific information in common frontier estimations of bank efficiency. This stage is
conducted using the approach suggested by Battese and Coelli's (1995) technical
inefficiency effects model that allows us to include firm-specific (and country-specific
variables) directly into the model as these might explain some of the efficiency
differences between banks as well as the variation in bank inefficiency overtime.
Battese and Coelli's (1995) model defines the inefficiency term 11 4 as non-negative
variables that account for technical inefficiency and are assumed to be independently
and identically distributed (iid) as truncations at zero of the N (S it cl , cy2un ) distribution.
This methodology follows Kumbhakar, Ghosh and McGukin (1991) and Reifschneider
and Stevenson (1991) and Battese and Coelli (1991) who propose a stochastic model in
which II ; are stated as an explicit function of a vector of firm-specific variables and
random error. According to Coelli (1996), this specification proves to be better than that
of Pitt and Lee (1981) who have estimated stochastic frontiers and predicted firm-level
efficiencies using these estimated functions, and then regressed the predicted
efficiencies upon firm-specific variables (such as managerial experience, ownership
characteristics, etc.) in an attempt to identify some of the reasons for differences in
predicted efficiencies between firms. Furthermore, the two-stage procedure utilised by
Pitt and Lee (1981) has been recognised as one which is inconsistent in its assumptions
regarding the independence of the inefficiency effects in the two estimation stages.
In order to derive the bank efficiency model that includes firm-specific variables, we
employ the control and environmental variables detailed earlier. The control variables
include the loan loss reserves as a percent of loans, capital strength and a time trend.
The loan loss reserve as a percent of gross loans is included to control for asset quality.
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Capital strength is measured by the ratio of equity to total asset ratio. A time trend
variable is included in the model (table 6.5 show descriptive statistics of these
variables). Environmental variables are employed, as a set of explanatory variables, to
control for organisational characteristics, geographical location. Organisational
characteristics refer to the structure of the financial systems in the countries under study.
We identify three ratios to test these characteristics; dummy variables for bank
specialisation, bank market share and concentration in the pertinent banking systems.
The banks in each country are divided into four categories; commercial, investment,
Islamic and other financial institutions. Furthermore, we employ the 3-firm
concentration ratio which is widely used to test for monopoly characteristics in the
pertinent market. Furthermore, we include dummy variables to control for bank
geographical (country) location.
To reach the best-specified model in this stage, we have examined many hypotheses
which can be summarised in the following steps:
Step 1: Estimating the Fourier-truncated with different combination of control
variables (see table 6.6 below for details):
/./. The unrestricted Fourier-flexible model is estimated assuming inefficiency to be
truncated. This model includes all the control variables (bank's capital, bank's asset
quality and the time trend) and all the efficiency correlates (the environmental
variables). This general model will be compared later with some other models to decide
upon (based on maximum-likelihood ratio tests) preferred model specifications utilising
different combinations of control variables.
1.2. The Fourier-truncated model that includes the efficiency correlates is estimated but
without the time parameters. This is done to examine whether there has been any
technical change over the sample period. This involves restricting all the coefficients
associated with the time trend equal to zero. Next, we estimate the model but without
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the capital parameters. Then, we estimated the model without the risk (bank's asset
quality) parameters.
At this point, there are three null hypotheses to be examined. The first null hypothesis is
that the specification of the truncated model without time parameters is better than that
of the unrestricted model in (/./). The second null hypothesis states that the
specification of the truncated model without the risk parameters is better than that of the
unrestricted model. The third null hypothesis states that specification of the truncated
model without capital parameters is better than that of the unrestricted model. The
alternative hypothesis (Ha) against these hypotheses is that the full model (/./) is better
specified than these restricted models.
As table 6.6 below shows, based on the log-likelihood one-sided ratio s , the null
hypothesis that the model without time-parameters is better specified model is rejected
at the critical value of 5% while the other two null hypotheses are not rejected. In other
words, the value of the generalised likelihood-ratio statistics compared with those of the
* The Maximum likelihood (ML) provides a convenient way to tests the hypotheses in the form of the
Log-likelihood ratio (LR) that examine whether a reduced model provides the same fit as a full model.
This ratio allows us to test whether the likelihood estimates for parameters are significantly different from
other fixed values. It permits to compare the likelihood of the data under one hypothesis against the
likelihood of the data under another (more restricted) hypothesis. The LR shows whether the data are
significantly less likely to have arisen if the null hypothesis is true than if the alternate hypothesis is true?.
The difference between the likelihoods is multiplied by a factor of 2 for technical reasons, so that this
quantity will be distributed as the familiar x 2 statistic.	 The LR test statistic is given by
LR = —2[ L	 I z) — L	 I z)] where L	 I z) is the likelihood function evaluated at the MLE
where L (Cir I z) is the maximum if the likelihood function, subject to the restriction that r
unconstrained parameters in the full likelihood analysis are assigned fixed values. For sufficiently large
sample size, the LR test statistic is 4.2 -distributed, a X 2 with r degrees of freedom (Wald, 1943). The
degrees of freedom equal the difference in the number of parameters being estimated under the alternate
and null models.
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upper five per cent point for %-square (for the appropriate degree of freedom) were not
in favour of accepting these null hypotheses. This means that the model without risk and
the model specified without the capital parameters are better specified than the
unrestricted model (1.1 above).
1.3. The Fourier-truncated model that includes the efficiency correlates is estimated
without time and capital parameters simultaneously. Next, the model is estimated
without time and risk parameters. Then, the model is estimated without risk and capital
parameters.
Again here, we have three null hypotheses that need to be examined. The first null
hypothesis states that the Fourier-truncated that includes the efficiency correlates but
without time and capital parameters is specified better than the models in 1.1 and 1.2
above. The second null hypothesis states that the truncated model without time and risk
parameters is better specified than those in 1.1 and 1.2. Finally, the third null hypothesis
states that the truncated model without risk and capital parameters is better specified
than those in 1.1 and 1.2 . Based on the log-likelihood ratio, only the null hypothesis
that specifies the Fourier-flexible without time and capital is a better specified model is
not rejected (table 6.6 shows the details).
1.4. The Fourier-truncated that includes the efficiency correlates is estimated but
without any of the control variables (capital, risk and time) in the model. In this case,
the null hypothesis states that Fourier-truncated model excluding the control variables is
specified better than the models specified in 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 above. Based on the
maximum likelihood ratio, this model is not rejected at critical level of 5%. Therefore,
the best specified model up to this step is the Fourier-truncated that excludes all the
control variables.
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Step 2: Comparing Fourier specification with translog specification
In this step, we will compare the best Fourier specifications concluded from step 1 with
identical translog specifications. The null hypothesis in this step states that translog
specifications are more appropriate than the Fourier specifications for estimating
efficiency. The alternative hypothesis states that translog specification is not better than
that of the Fourier. Based on the log-likelihood ratio, the null hypothesis is rejected at
the 5% significance level. This means that the data is better specified utilising the
Fourier than the translog form.
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Chapter 6 :Methodology and empirical results
Step 3: Examining the impact of efficiency correlates (the environmental variables)
on the model specification
The best specified model up to step 1 and 2 above is the Fourier-truncated that includes
the efficiency correlates (environmental variables) but does not include any of the
control variables. In the following, we estimate the Fourier-truncated without including
the efficiency correlates. In this case, the null hypothesis states that the specified
truncated model without efficiency correlates is better than the model that includes
them. The alternative hypothesis, on the other hand, states that the model that excludes
the efficiency correlates is not specified better than the model that includes them. Based
on the log-likelihood ratio, the null hypothesis is rejected in favour of the alternative
hypothesis that necessitates the existence of such variables in the model (see table 6.6
for details).
Step 4: Examining the impact of inefficiency-terms on the model specification
In this step, the best specified model selected until step 3 will be compared with the
model that excludes the inefficiency term from the model. The null hypothesis here
states that the inefficiency effects in the cost function are not present, and so the banks
are fully technically efficient. If this is the case, the technical inefficiency error term,
U , would be removed from equation, and the resulting model would be appropriately
estimated using OLS. This hypothesis is rejected and so, the model which accounts for
technical inefficiency is warranted in these instances (see table 6.6 for details).
Based on the results of the steps above, the best specified model from stage 1 is the
Fourier-truncated model that excludes the control variables (time trend, capital
adequacy and asset quality) but includes the efficiency correlates (table 6.6 shows the
details).
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Stage 2: Estimating the cost frontier models that excludes efficiency correlates
This stage estimates the stochastic frontier, given the Fourier-flexible functional form
that excludes efficiency correlates. The models in this stage are estimated utilising
Battese and Coelli's (1992) time-varying approach. This approach gives some flexibility
concerning the distribution of inefficiency term in the stochastic frontier; truncated or
half normal. Furthermore, it allows us to examine the time-varying efficiency model
against the time-invariant model. Therefore, one of the advantages of the time-varying
inefficiency model is that the technical inefficiency changes overtime can be
distinguished from technical change, provided the latter is specified in the model
parameters, in the frontier function. This discrimination is only possible given that the
technical inefficiency effects are stochastic and have the specified distributions.
However, this approach does not allow us to add the efficiency correlates directly into
the model.
The inefficiency term u u s in this model is assumed to be an exponential function of
time, involving only one unknown parameter. The technical inefficiency effects are
assumed to be defined by
u 	 expl	 —T Wu, , i = 1,2,...,N; t = 1,2,...,T;
where ti t , s are assumed to be independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) as the
generalised truncated-normal random variable and i is an unknown scalar parameter to
be estimated. The major disadvantages of this time-varying model is that the technical
inefficiency effects of different firms at any given time period, t, are equal to the
identical exponential function (exp —77( t — T)] E exp [ n( T — t )] ) of the corresponding
firm-specific inefficiency effects at the last period of the panel (the Il i , s). This implies
that the ordering of the firms according to the magnitude of the technical inefficiency
effects is the same at all time periods. Thus, the time-varying model of the equation
does not account for situations in which some firms may be relatively inefficient
initially but become relatively more efficient in subsequent periods.
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In our search for the best model specification utilising this model, we follow studies that
assume no restriction to be imposed on the distributional features of the inefficiency
term. These studies include Cebenoyan et al. (1993) who use the truncated normal
model, Stevenson (1980) and Greene (1990) who use the normal and gamma
distribution respectively. Then, we restricted Mu (a) to be zero to obtain Pitt and Lee's
(1981) half-normal model. The studies that use the half-normal specification to model
inefficiency in banking include Allen and Rai (1996), Kaparalcis et al. (1994) and
Mester (1996). Next, we restrict both Mu (.1) and Eta (Ti) to be zero to get the time-
invariant model as outlined in Battese, Coelli and Colby (1989). All the above models
assume that the inefficiency term to be independently and identically as truncations at
zero of the N(1, c3.2„ ) distribution. This definition of the inefficiency term conforms to
the original definition of the stochastic frontier, which was proposed by Aigner, Lovell
and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and Van de Broeck (1977).
The following steps summarise the procedures followed to arrive at the most
appropriate model specifications in this stage using Battese and Coelli's (1992)
approach:
Step 1: Comparing the Fourier-truncated time-variant with time-invariant model: The
specification of the estimated truncated time-variant model is compared with the
truncated time-invariant model and the better specified model is chosen based on the
log-likelihood ratio test. The null hypothesis in this step states that the specification of
Fourier-truncated time-invariant model is better than the time-variant model. The null
hypothesis in this step is rejected, as the time-invariant model cannot be specified using
the stochastic frontier methodology (see table 6.7 for details).
Step 2: Fourier truncated time-variant versus Fourier half-normal time variant
model:
The specification of the truncated time-variant model chosen from step 1 is compared
with the half-normal time-variant model. Here, the null hypothesis states that the half-
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normal time-variant model specification is better than the specification of the truncated
time-variant model. Utilising the log-likelihood ratio, the null hypothesis is rejected
given the appropriate degree of freedom.
Step 3: Fourier-truncated with different combinations of control variables: The
Fourier-truncated time-variant model is estimated with different combinations of control
variables to see if we can accept simpler model specification for our data. In this step,
there are seven hypotheses examined. The first one states that the specification of the
Fourier-truncated time-variant model without time parameters is better than the model
specified in step 1 and 2 above. The second hypothesis examines the model without risk
parameters and the third examines the model without the capital parameters. The fourth
hypothesis examines the model without time and risk parameters at the same time. The
fifth hypothesis examines the model without time and capital parameters. The sixth
hypothesis examines the model without capital and risk parameters. Finally, the seventh
hypothesis examines the model specification without any of the control variables
(capital, risk and time trend). Comparing the estimated models in this step and based on
the log-likelihood ratio, the most appropriate model is the Fourier-truncated time-
variant model without the control variables (see table 6.7 for details).
Step 4: Comparing the Fourier-specification with translog specification: In this step,
we compare the Fourier-truncated model specifications selected in step 3 above with the
translog form given an identical specification. At this point, the null hypothesis states
that the translog specification is more appropriate than the Fourier specification. The
null hypothesis is not rejected and so, the best specified model in this stage is the
translog-truncated without the control variables.
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Chapter 6 :Methodology and empirical results
Stage 3: Comparing the models from stage 1 and stage 2
It should be noted that we cannot formally compare directly the results of stage I and
stage 2 above because we utilise Battese and Coelli's (1995) approach in the first stage
and Battese and Coelli's (1992) approach in the second stage. The first approach does
not have the second approach as a special case, and neither does the converse apply.
Thus, these two model specifications are non-nested and hence no set of restrictions can
be defined to permit a test of one specification versus the other.
However, the second approach suffers from a main weakness as indicated earlier; that is
the technical inefficiency effects of different firms at any given time period, t, are equal
to the same exponential function (exp[ —77( t — T)] E exp[ 77 ( T — t )] ) of the
corresponding firm-specific inefficiency effects at the last period of the panel (the u u s).
This implies that the ordering of the firms according to the magnitude of the technical
inefficiency effects is the same at all time periods. Thus, the time-varying model of
equation does not account for situations in which some firms may be relatively
inefficient initially but become relatively more efficient in subsequent periods.
(Furthermore, as Battese and Coelli (1995) indicated, a small error was detected in the
first partial derivative with respect to r in the 1992 model of the program. This error
would have only affected results when q was assumed to be non-zero).
Therefore, if the above two stages lead more or less to the same model specifications,
we will take the efficiency estimates of the first stage which utilises the 1995 approach.
However, if the two stages lead to different preferred model specifications, we will
report the results of two stages and then compare the efficiency estimates result from
each stage.
In the case of the cost function, the first stage leads us to select the Fourier-truncated
without control variables but with efficiency correlates. The second stage leads us to
select the translog-truncated without control variables as well. As such, it is plausible to
assume that the inclusion of efficiency correlates in the first stage is the reason for the
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selection of the Fourier over translog in the first stage. Furthermore, as the second stage
is estimated utilising Battese and Coelli's (1992) approach which does not allow us to
include directly the efficiency correlates in the model and since there is no major
differences between the specifications of the two stages, we will choose the result of
stage 1 as the cost preferred model; the Fourier-truncated model excluding control
variables (capital, risk and time trend) but including all the efficiency correlates(the
parameter estimates of the preferred model are shown in Table 6-8).
Table 6-8: Maximum likelihood estimates of the preferred cost function model
The variables (all are logged) coefficient	 standard-error t-ratio
a 115.71 0.97 118.76
yl lnyl 0.54 0.54 1.00
y2 lny2 0.78 0.90 0.87
y3 lny3 0.17 0.38 0.44
131 Lnwl/w3
-14.15 0.65 -21.92
lnw2/w3 28.76 0.45 63.58
yl 1 lnyllnyl 0.08 0.08 1.05
y12 lnyllny2
-0.15 0.08 -1.77
y13 lnyllny3 -0.05 0.08 -0.65
1111 lnyllnwl/w3 0.07 0.19 0.38
r112 Inyllnw2/w3 0.18 0.27 0.65
y22 Iny2lny2 0.01 0.13 0.09
Y23 Iny2lny3 0.07 0.07 0.97
121 Iny2lnwl/w3 0.02 0.24 0.08
122 lny2lnw2/w3 0.03 0.05 0.57
y33 lny3lny3
-0.02 0.03 -0.59
lny31nwl/w3 -0.01 0.14 -0.09
1132 lny3Inw2/w3
-0.08 0.30 -0.27
011 Inw1/31nwl/w3 3.16 0.40 7.97
012 lnwl/w3lnw2/w3
-1.69 0.36 -4.65
022 lnw2/w3Inw2/w3
-16.62 0.38 -43.26
(I)1 Cos(y1)
-0.19 0.27 -0.70
(01 Sin(y1) 0.03 0.38 0.08
(1)2 Cos(y2) 0.02 0.28 0.08
a)2 Sin(y2) 0.03 0.22 0.13
Cos(y3) 0.03 0.30 0.10
(03 Sin(y3) 0.00 0.17 0.00
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The variables (all are logged) coefficient	 standard-error t-ratio
04 Cos(w 1 /w3) -4.00 0.56 -7.10
0)4 Sin(w 1/w3) 3.87 0.51 7.56
4)5 Cos(w2/w3) -15.04 0.78 -19.18
(05 Sin(w2/w3) -14.05 0.76 -18.46
4)11 Cos(y 1 +y1) 0.00 0.02 -0.13
c011 Sin(yl+y1) -0.03 0.04 -0.68
4)12 Cos(y 1 +y2) 0.04 0.08 0.55
c012 Sin(y 1 +y2) -0.05 0.09 -0.54
4)13 Cos(y 1 +y3) 0.00 0.06 0.02
0013 Sin(yl+y3) 0.00 0.04 0.11
014 Cos(y 1 +w 1/w3) -0.03 0.26 0.12
c014 Sin(y 1 +w 1/w3) 0.08 0.12 0.63
4)15 Cos(y 1 +w2/w3) 0.05 0.21 0.24
0)15 Sin(y 1 +w2/w3) -0.03 0.27 -0.10
4)22 Co s (y2+y2) -0.01 0.07 -0.13
0022 S in (y2+y2) 0.04 0.01 5.96
4)23 Cos (y2+y3) 0.00 0.03 0.03
(023 Sin(y2+y3) 0.00 0.04 -0.07
4)24 Cos(y2+w 1/w3) -0.01 0.20 -0.03
0024 Sin(y2+w 1 /w3) -0.10 0.16 -0.61
4)25 Cos(y2+w2/w3) 0.03 0.09 0.36
c025 Sin(y2+w2/w3) 0.03 0.34 0.10
033 Cos(y3+y3) 0.01 0.00 1.67
0)33 Sin(y3+y3) 0.00 0.04 -0.02
4)34 Cos(y3+wl/w3) -0.01 0.10 -0.13
c034 Sin(y3+wl/w3) 0.01 0.33 0.03
035 Cos(y3+w21w3) -0.02 0.20 -0.08
0035 Sin(y3+w2/w3) -0.02 0.14 -0.17
4144 Cos(w 1 /w3+w 1/w3) 0.09 0.33 0.29
c044 Sin(wl/w3+wl/w3) 1.14 0.42 2.70
045 Cos (wl/w3+w2/w3) 0.96 0.51 1.89
c045 Sin(wl/w3+w2/w3) 0.14 0.24 0.57
4)55 Cos (w2/w3+w2/w3) 0.24 0.50 0.49
0055 S in (w2/w3+w2/w3) 3.81 0.42 9.05
0111 Cos(yl+yl+y1) -0.01 0.05 -0.25
corn Sin(y 1+y 1 +y1) 0.02 0.02 0.65
4)222 Cos(y2+y2+y2) 0.00 0.02 -0.21
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The variables (all are logged) coefficient	 standard-error t-ratio
6)222	 Sin(y2+y2+y2) 0.00 0.03 -0.10
4)333	 Cos(y3+y3+y3) 0.01 0.02 0.36
co333	 Sin(y3+y3+y3) 0.00 0.03 -0.06
4)444	 Cos(w 1/w3+w 1/w3+w 1/w3) 0.33 0.17 1.90
c0444
	 Sin(w 1/w3+w 1/w3+w 1/w3) 0.23 0.22 1.01
4)555	 Cos(w2/w3+w2/w3+w2/w3) 0.32 0.28 1.11
0555
	 Sin(w2/w3+w2/w3+w2/w3)
-0.58 0.19 -2.99
80
-0.05 0.57 -0.08
81	 L 0.13 0.56 0.23
82	 TA 0.00 0.00 0.34
83	 B
-0.09 0.23 -0.40
84	 J 0.13 0.69 0.18
85	 E 0.11 0.25 0.43
86	 Corn 0.01 0.61 0.01
87	 Inv. 0.05 0.47 0.10
58	 Isl. -0.06 0.39 -0.16
89	 3-FCR -0.02 0.16 -0.12
810	 MS -0.17 1.26 -0.14
sigma-squared (S) 0.08 0.01 9.42
gamma 0.008 0.006 1.263
Sigma-squared 0.001
Sigma-squared (v) 0.082
Lambda 0.089
The relative contribution of the inefficiency effect to the total variance
term 0.003
Log likelihood function -113.444
LR test of the one-sided error 16.219
[note that this statistic has a mixed chi-squared distribution]
Source: Author's own estimation
6.5.2 The preferred models based on the specification of the standard and alternative
profit functions
Following similar procedures to those of the cost function discussed above, the
preferred model for both the standard and alternative profit functions is the Fourier-
truncated model that includes both the control variables (capital, risk and time trend) as
well as the efficiency correlates (Tables 6.19-6.22 in the appendix details the steps
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undertaken to arrive at the preferred models for the standard and alternative profit
functions, and tables 6.23-6.24 in the appendix shows the details of these preferred
models).
6.5.3 Coefficients of efficiency correlates in the preferred models
The maximum likelihood estimates of the Fourier-flexible preferred model of cost,
standard and alternative profit efficiency defined earlier are presented in table 6.8 earlier
and in tables 6.23 & 6.24 (in the appendix). Asymptotic standard errors are presented
beside each estimate.
The t-ratios which define the ratio of the estimated coefficients to their corresponding
standard errors, indicates the significance of the coefficients and therefore some of the t-
ratios of important coefficients of the cost, standard and alternative profit functions will
be discussed based on the chosen preferred models. However, it should be noted that the
consideration of these individual t-tests separately may lead to the omission of some
important coefficients, this is because multicollinearity resulting from the inclusion of
the squared and interaction terms may contribute to the high standard errors observed.
As this is the case, the consideration of these individual t-tests may lead to the omission
of some important coefficients, resulting in misspecification of the model (see Coelli,
1996 for details).
Therefore, the more appropriate testing procedure would be to test simultaneously the
significance of groups of coefficients. In this study, this likelihood ratio testing
procedure is used in the previous section in the course of examining different
hypotheses (see Greene, 1993 for details). This involves the calculation of
X = —2[LLF(H 0 ) —LLF(H A )1,
where LLF( H o ) and LLF( H A) are the values of the log-likelihood function under the
null and alternative hypotheses, respectively. This X statistic has an asymptotic chi-
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square distribution, with degrees of freedom equal to the number of restrictions imposed
under the null hypothesis.
Looking at the coefficients associated with the firm-specific variables given the cost
function specification, we can notice that most of the B coefficients for these variables
have t-ratios less than one in absolute value. However, the B coefficients for the total
assets variable, the countries' dummy variables and liquidity have relatively high t-
ratios. This implies that those variables are relatively more important than the other
variables in the model specification. Alternatively, given the standard profit function,
we can notice that the B coefficients associated with the specialisation's dummy
variables, the concentration and market share variables are important; some have t-ratios
close to one in absolute value. Concerning the alternative profit function, we can notice
that most of the B coefficients for these variables have significant t-ratios in absolute
value and there is a very high correlation between the sign and magnitude of these
variables. This suggests that the environmental variables are important and should be
included in our models. Therefore, we can say the set of efficiency correlates variables
utilised in this study improved our models specification overall.
To summarise, after checking the different assumption about the distribution of
efficiency terms and employing various model specifications, preferred models are
selected based on maximum likelihood results. For cost efficiency, the preferred model
is the Fourier-truncated that exclude control variables but includes the efficiency
correlates (environmental) variables. Concerning the standard and alternative profit
efficiency, the preferred model is the Fourier-truncated that includes both the control as
well as the efficiency correlate variables.
6.5.4 Estimated levels of technical efficiency
Technical inefficiency estimates for the cost, standard and alternative profit efficiency,
derived from the preferred models, are summarised in tables 6.9, 6.10 and 6.11 below.
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Given the preferred cost function, technical efficiency estimates for banks in the
countries under study averaged 95% and these estimates have slightly varied over time
from 95% in 1992 to 94% in 2000. This suggests that the same level of output could be
produced with approximately 95% of current inputs if banks under study were operating
on the most efficient frontier. This level of technical inefficiency is somewhat less than
the range of 10-15% for the 130 studies surveyed by Berger and Humphrey (1997)* and
Berger and DeYoung (1997). These results are also less than the level of inefficiency
found in European studies including Carbo et al.'s (2000) whose findings for a sample
of banks, from twelve countries, show mean cost inefficiency of around 22 % for the
period 1989 to 1996.
Referring to table 6.9, the average technical efficiency based on bank specialisation
ranged from 93% for investment banks to 98% for Islamic banks. The efficiency scores
based on geographical location, ranged from 89% in Jordan to 99% in Bahrain. Finally,
based on asset size, the differences among technical efficiency scores are not significant
where optimal bank size is between US$ 2.5-5.0 billion and the largest banks seems to
be somehow more efficient. These results are noticeably different from Carbo et al.'s
(2000) findings on European savings banks who find that the least X-efficient banks
were the largest in asset size.
* Of these, 60 parametric studies found that the mean technical inefficiency is smaller than 15%.
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Table 6-9: Cost efficiency in Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain banking over 1992-2000
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 All
Bahrain 100 100 100 100 100 99 99 99 99 99
Egypt 94 94 94 94 94 93 93 93 93 94
Jordan 90 89 89 89 89 89 89 88 88 89
Saudi Arabia 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 96 97
Commercial 95 95 95 95 94 94 94 94 94 94
Investment 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93
Islamic 98 98 98 98 99 99 98 98 98 98
Other 97 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96
All 95 95 95 95 95 94 94 94 94 95
Asset Size (US$ million)
1-199 200-299 300-499 500-9991,000-2,4992,500-4,9995,000-9,900 10000+ All
Bahrain 100 99 100 99 99 99 99 99 99
Egypt 95 94 94 94 94 93 92 90 94
Jordan 88 87 88 91 90 91 89
Saudi Arabia 98 98 98 98 95 97
All 95 93 94 95 95 96 96 94 95
Asset Size (US$ million)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 All
1-199.9 94 94 95 95 96 96 95 96 95 95
200-299 93 94 92 93 92 92 95 95 95 93
300-499 95 95 95 95 94 94 92 92 91 94
500-999 96 94 94 94 94 95 96 95 96 95
1,000-2,499 96 96 95 96 96 94 94 94 94 95
2,500-4,999 95 96 99 96 96 96 96 96 96 96
5,000-9,999 98 98 97 96 96 96 95 96 95 96
10000+ 95 95 94 94 94 93 94 93 94 94
All 95 95 95 95 95 94 94 94 94 95
Source: Author's own estimation
As indicated in the previous chapters, the bank efficiency literature considers the
estimation of both cost and profit efficiencies to reveal more accurate information about
firm-level performance (see Berger and Mester, 1999). Referring to tables 6.10 and
6.11, the standard and alternative profit functions results show average technical
efficiency estimates are around 66% and 58% respectively over the period 1992-2000. It
should be noted that this level of technical inefficiency is somehow similar to the
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typical range of profit efficiency found in US studies which is about half of the
industry's potential profits, according to Berger and Humphrey (1997). Profit
inefficiencies in Arabic banking are less than those found in European banking. For
instance, William's and Gardener (2000) estimate profit efficiency to be 79.7% in
European banking during the 1990s. The mean profit efficiency given the standard
profit function suggests that banks under study lose around 34% of profits that could be
earned by a best practice institution. The profit efficiency given both the standard profit
and alternative profit function has witnessed volatility over the period 1992-2000.
While over the period 1993-99, the efficiency estimates derived from both profit
function specifications fluctuate slightly around their average, the year 2000 exhibits
fall in profit efficiency across banks under study. This might reflect the response of
economic and financial activities to the instability in the oil prices and the political
instability aroused from recent conflict aggravation in Palestine and the Gulf.
Given the standard profit function, profit efficiency ranged from around 61% in Jordan
to 68% in Bahrain. Based on specialisation, the results show that the efficiency scores
ranged from 56% for investment banks to 75% for the Islamic banks (see table 6.10 for
details). This result might explain the increase in Islamic banking activities especially in
Bahrain over the past few years; as the cost of funds for Islamic banks is relatively
cheaper than the cost of funds for other financial institutions. The Islamic banks, in
general, do not pay interest but rather a mark-up which is a profit margin based on the
way in which the funds are utilised; as indicated in chapter 3. Given the geographical
location, Jordan is a relatively much poorer country compared to Saudi and Bahrain
(oil-producing countries) and banks may be able to sell higher profit generating
products in these markets. This might explain why the Jordanian banks are relatively
less profit efficient than the banks in other countries under study.
Based on the size of assets, apart from the smallest banks (US $ 1-199 millions) which
are the most profit efficient, larger banks seems to be more profit efficient, in general.
This result supports the theory that large banks enjoy several advantages compared to
small banks. These advantages include the ability of large banks to utilise more efficient
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technology with less cost, the ability of these banks to prepare more specialised staff for
the most profitable activities and their ability to provide higher quality output resulting
in higher prices.
Similar results are obtained from the alternative profit function estimates where profit
efficiency ranges from 49% in Jordan to 61% in Bahrain. Based on specialisation,
Islamic banking is again the most profit efficient while investment banking is the least
efficient. Based on asset size, the largest banks also seem to be the most efficient.
Overall, the results of both the standard and alternative profit function, while varying in
absolute efficiency levels, are exactly identical in terms of profit efficiency ranking in
terms of country, specialisation and bank asset size.
To summarise the main findings, cost efficiency levels averaged around 95 percent over
the period 1992-2000 without noticeable change over the 1992-99 period but have
experienced a fall in 2000. On the other hand, both standard (and alternative) profit
efficiency averaged around 66% (and 56%) over the sample period. Standard profit and
alternative profit efficiency of Arabic banking systems have not witnessed significant
changes over the 1993-99 but have also experienced a fall in 2000. That is profit
efficiency has recently fallen.
Profit efficiency estimates for the Arabic banks under study are not noticeably different
from those observed from previous studies on the US and European banking industries.
Islamic banks are found to be the most cost and profit efficient while investment banks
are the least efficient. This result may partially explain the motives behind the increase
in Islamic banking activities over the past few years; as the cost of funds for Islamic
banks is relatively cheaper than the cost of funds for other financial institutions. On the
other hand, intense competition between investment and commercial banks might
explain the competitive disadvantages of the investment banks in terms of their market
share and expose the motives for increased mergers and consolidation activity between
such banks.
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Based on assets size, large banks seems to be relatively more cost and profit efficient, in
general. This result suggests that large banks enjoy several advantages compared to
small banks. These include the ability of large banks to utilise more efficient technology
with less cost, the ability of these banks to set up more specialised staff for the most
profitable activities and the ability of these banks to provide better quality output and
therefore charge higher prices. Geographically, Bahrain is the most cost and profit
efficient banking systems while Jordan is the least cost and profit efficient.
Finally, while the countries under study have implemented many economic and
financial reforms over the last twenty years or so as indicated earlier, these reforms do
not appear to have had much impact on banking sector efficiency. Given our findings, it
seems that more reform may be needed to improve (especially) their profit efficiency.
Perhaps the move to create a single GCC market may help to facilitate these
developments as the creation of a similar European Single market appears to have had a
positive impact on European bank efficiency (see European Commission (1997)).
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Table 6-10: Standard profit efficiency in Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain banking over
1992-2000
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 All
Bahrain	 69 78 67 71 66 72 67 68 57 68
Egypt
	 66 64 66 70 66 64 65 73 63 66
Jordan	 84 60 61 61 63 56 56 59 50 61
Saudi Arabia	 67 68 66 69 69 65 59 63 63 65
Commercial	 70 67 68 72 69 65 62 68 62 67
Investment	 65 69 55 55 48 51 57 60 43 56
Islamic	 83 73 78 79 75 80 67 67 76 75
Other	 64 58 57 61 64 73 74 78 55 65
All	 70 67 65 68 66 65 63 68 59 66
Asset Size (US$ million)
1,000- 2,500- 5,000-
1-199 200-299 300-499 500-999 2,499 4,999 9,900 10000+ All
Bahrain	 75 67 71 62 66 66 78 56 68
Egypt	 74 59 60 70 69 70 58 72 66
Jordan	 53 66 56 73 53 68 61
Saudi Arabia 43 62 65 68 68 65
All	 70 63 62 68 65 67 67 67 66
Asset Size (US$ million)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 All
1-199.9	 72 68 75 70 65 70 76 70 56 70
200-299	 65 75 60 65 62 60 57 63 44 63
300-499	 71 65 60 60 58 63 59 64 55 62
500-999	 61 66 62 76 71 64 63 75 66 68
1,000-2,499	 78 62 64 66 65 67 66 67 56 65
2,500-4,999	 59 49 79 79 78 63 64 77 62 67
5,000-9,999	 65 73 71 72 64 60 61 70 64 67
10000+	 70 73 64 73 76 71 60 61 63 67
All	 70 67 65 68 66 65 63 68 59 66
Source: Author's own estimation
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Table 6-11: Alternative profit in Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain Banking over 1992-2000
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 All
Bahrain 58 72 60 66 58 64 51 61 58 61
Egypt 65 58 60 62 59 60 56 68 55 60
Jordan 59 51 54 53 49 39 42 52 46 49
Saudi Arabia 56 56 54 51 61 59 51 61 61 57
Commercial 60 59 61 63 63 58 53 62 56 60
Investment 55 61 52 50 43 46 46 62 44 51
Islamic 76 57 60 64 54 63 51 55 78 62
Other 69 62 47 53 48 63 56 67 47 57
All 61 60 58 60 58 57 52 62 55 58
Asset Size (US$ million)
1,000- 2,500- 5,000-
1-199 200-299 300-499 500-999 2,499 4,999 9,900 10000+ All
Bahrain 63 66 59 54 55 59 86 68 61
Egypt 59 55 54 63 64 61 64 78 60
Jordan 42 46 46 59 43 74 49
Saudi Arabia 23 50 65 56 63 57
All 56 55 54 59 57 62 61 69 58
Asset Size (US$ million)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 All
1-199.9 61 47 57 68 49 62 63 55 48 56
200-299 56 72 47 58 57 45 46 59 46 55
300-499 58 64 56 52 50 57 44 53 44 54
500-999 62 53 55 61 63 55 51 70 56 59
1,000-2,499 70 57 63 54 49 57 50 64 53 57
2,500-4,999 58 50 66 66 64 52 55 73 66 62
5,000-9,999 58 55 67 64 64 58 63 65 56 61
10000+ 62 80 62 74 84 77 60 62 68 69
All 61 60 58 60 58 57 52 62 55 58
Source: Author's own estimation
6.5.5 Estimated levels of scale elasticities
Productive efficiency requires optimising behaviour with respect to outputs as well as
inputs as indicated earlier. Regarding outputs, optimal behaviour relates to producing
the level of outputs that correspond to the lowest cost per unit. For the cost function, the
optimal output level is possible if economies and diseconomies exist at different output
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levels; that is at some point, there will be constant returns defining the optimal level of
production. Economies of scale exist if, over a given range of output, per unit costs
decline as output increases. Increases in per unit cost correspond to decreasing returns to
scale. A scale efficient firm will produce where there are constant returns to scale; that
is, changes in output result in proportional changes in costs (Evanoff and Israilevich,
1991).
Given the cost function specification, the scale economy measure is a cost elasticity; the
percent change in cost with respect to a percent change in output. On this basis, the
results suggest existence of scale diseconomies across the banks under study and the
scale diseconomies for these banks ranged from around 3% in 1992 to 6% in 2000 and
averaged 5% over the 1992-2000 period (table 6.12 shows the details*). Thus, a 100
percent increase in the level of outputs would lead to about 105% percent increase in
total costs. The magnitude of these scale diseconomies estimates is not different from
other banking literature that finds evidence of diseconomies in the US banking market.
For example, see Berger et al. (1993), Hughes et al. (1995) and McAllister and
McManus (1993).
Based on the size of banks' assets, the optimal bank size are those in the ranges of US$
5-10 billion where banks in this category experience increasing returns to scale. In
addition, scale economies increase with size, and optimal bank size is inexhaustible
which supports an argument for further consolidation. Based on geographical location,
Saudi Arabian and (to a lesser extent) Egyptian banks seem to have the largest
unrealised scale economies (see table 6.12 for details).
.
see table 6.12's footnote to observe if these values are statistically significant from unity.
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Table 6-12: Scale elasticities in the banking sectors of Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain
over 1992-2000
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 All
Bahrain 1.23 1.25 1.22 1.24 1.27 1.22 1.22 1.21 1.26 1.23
Egypt 0.92 0.97 0.92 0.90 0.96 1.00 1.02 1.03 1.00 0.97
Jordan 1.14 1.09 1.16 1.23 1.21 1.20 1.17 1.15 1.07 1.16
Saudi Arabia 0.94 0.90 0.88 0.92 0.89 0.92 0.90 0.93 0.97 0.92
Commercial 0.94 0.95 0.92 0.92 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.94
Investment 1.15 1.15 1.16 1.24 1.22 1.27 1.31 1.28 1.30 1.23
Islamic 1.19 1.30 1.34 1.40 1.49 1.42 1.39 1.31 1.29 1.35
Other 1.26 1.29 1.25 1.17 1.25 1.27 1.24 1.32 1.29 1.26
All 1.03 1.04 1.02 1.03 1.06 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.06 1.05
Asset Size (US$ million)
1,000- 2,500- 5,000-
1-199 200-299 300-499 500-999 10000+ All
2,499 4,999 9,900
Bahrain 1.33 1.15 1.25 1.38 1.42 1.23 1.15 0.46 1.23
Egypt 0.79 0.88 0.92 0.97 1.17 1.15 0.97 0.67 0.97
Jordan 1.06 1.15 1.15 1.25 1.29 0.90 1.16
Saudi Arabia 0.83 1.03 1.15 0.95 0.69 0.92
All 1.05 1.01 1.06 1.13 1.19 1.16 0.98 0.67 1.05
Asset Size (US$ million)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 All
1-199.9 1.01 1.11 1.10 1.03 1.09 0.98 0.94 1.06 1.03 1.05
200-299 1.01 1.08 0.92 1.05 1.02 1.07 1.07 0.93 0.81 1.01
300-499 1.07 1.04 1.06 1.09 1.08 1.10 1.01 1.02 1.02 1.06
500-999 1.09 1.02 1.00 1.09 1.16 1.07 1.24 1.19 1.18 1.13
1,000-2,499 1.05 1.10 1.19 1.14 1.19 1.29 1.26 1.23 1.23 1.19
2,500-4,999 1.13 1.05 0.94 1.10 1.05 1.06 1.20 1.33 1.33 1.16
5,000-9,999 0.99 0.96 0.99 0.84 0.97 0.99 1.06 1.01 1.04 0.98
10000+ 0.90 0.81 0.73 0.69 0.66 0.57 0.62 0.55 0.62 0.67
All 1.03 1.04 1.02 1.03 1.06 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.06 1.05
Note: The scores that fall within the ranges [0.983-1.016] and [0.966-1.033] are not statistically different
from one at 5 percent and 1 percent level respectively for two-tailed test.
Source: Author's own estimation.
In order to examine the responsiveness of bank profits to size, we also estimate standard
profit and alternative profit 'scale' elasticities. This is done by using the same approach
as for the cost elasticity but this time profits and alternative profits functions are used.
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Given the standard profit function, the profits scale elasticity is around 87%. This
implies increasing the scale of operation for the banks under study by 87% will result in
an increase in their profits by 100%. On the other hand, the scale elasticity given the
alternative profit function is about 95% which is clearly not far away from unity*. Given
both the standard and alternative profit function, the Egyptian banks scale appear the
most profit efficient. On the other hand, profit elasticities for the investment banks are
the lowest. Furthermore, the scale of operation for large banks especially given the
standard profit functions seems to be larger than for smaller banks (table 6.13 and 6.14
show the details).
To summarise, (cost) scale elasticity estimates for the banking systems under study is
around 105% and this did not noticeably change over 1992-2000. This implies that
increasing the size of operations by 100 percent results in an increase in cost by 105
percent. In other words, scale diseconomies predominate. Nevertheless, we do not find
evidence of significant scale economies for the largest banks in the sample. On the other
hand, profit (scale elasticities) averaged around 90%. This result suggests that
increasing the size of banks through mergers and consolidation would tend to increase
the profitability of the banks under study. Overall, it appears that scale elasticities are
most prevalent for commercial banks and for the largest banks in general.
see tables 6.13 and 6.14 to observe if these value are statistically significant from unity.
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Table 6-13: Standard profit scale elasticity estimates for the banking sectors of Jordan, Egypt,
Saudi Arabia and Bahrain over 1992-2000
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 All
Bahrain	 0.67 0.77 0.77 1.19 0.69 0.79 0.97 0.58 0.59 0.78
Egypt	 0.95 1.09 0.87 1.00 1.04 1.22 0.34 0.69 1.24 0.94
Jordan	 0.56 0.97 0.93 0.88 0.89 0.96 0.36 0.86 1.04 0.83
Saudi Arabia	 0.69 0.72 1.23 0.60 0.97 1.01 0.21 0.85 1.12 0.82
Commercial	 0.82 0.97 0.93 0.94 0.90 1.06 0.44 0.79 1.10 0.88
Investment	 0.70 0.78 0.82 1.04 0.88 1.03 0.45 0.61 0.87 0.80
Islamic
	 0.72 0.89 0.73 1.16 0.91 1.10 0.67 0.54 0.97 0.85
Other	 0.71 1.04 1.07 0.83 1.15 0.99 0.47 0.61 0.98 0.87
All	 0.78 0.94 0.91 0.96 0.93 1.05 0.46 0.72 1.04 0.87
Asset Size (US$ million)
1,000- 2,500- 5,000-
1-199 200-299 300-499 500-999 10000+ All
2,499 4,999 9,900
Bahrain	 0.76 0.83 0.83 0.77 0.73 0.67 0.71 0.81 0.78
Egypt	 0.98 0.91 0.97 0.91 0.96 0.81 0.86 0.96 0.94
Jordan	 0.72 0.85 0.79 0.88 0.90 0.89 0.83
Saudi Arabia 1.07 0.78 0.71 0.75 0.96 0.82
All	 0.84 0.88 0.89 0.88 0.88 0.75 0.77 0.93 0.87
Asset Size (US$ million)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 All
1-199.9	 0.80 1.00 0.80 0.81 0.87 0.80 0.89 0.69 0.76 0.84
200-299	 0.69 0.85 0.88 1.05 0.98 0.97 0.50 0.79 1.18 0.88
300-499
	 0.79 1.04 0.87 1.06 0.91 1.08 0.51 0.69 1.13 0.89
500-999	 0.83 1.02 0.95 0.98 0.97 1.12 0.52 0.54 1.01 0.88
1,000-2,499
	 0.96 0.81 0.97 1.03 0.99 1.05 0.31 0.78 1.13 0.88
2,500-4,999	 0.39 0.77 0.79 0.57 0.59 1.36 0.54 0.64 0.89 0.75
5,000-9,999	 0.65 0.78 0.90 0.71 0.96 1.00 0.10 0.62 1.12 0.77
10000+	 0.81 1.01 1.20 0.97 0.92 0.95 0.46 1.07 1.05 0.93
All	 0.78 0.94 0.91 0.96 0.93 1.05 0.46 0.72 1.04 0.87
Note: The scores that fall within the ranges [0.979-1.020] and [0.959-1.041] are not statistically different
from one at 5 percent and 1 percent level respectively for two-tailed test.
Source: Author's own estimation.
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Table 6-14: Alternative profit scale elasticity for the banking sectors of Jordan, Egypt, Saudi
Arabia and Bahrain over 1992-2000
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 All
Bahrain 0.53 1.11 0.19 0.94 0.49 0.37 1.70 0.45 1.16 0.77
Egypt 1.33 1.42 0.90 0.67 0.45 0.92 0.71 1.09 2.29 1.09
Jordan 0.77 1.12 0.80 0.32 0.19 1.08 1.04 0.78 1.39 0.83
Saudi Arabia 0.41 0.67 1.37 0.31 0.85 0.31 0.67 1.77 1.98 0.93
Commercial 1.01 1.23 0.85 0.56 0.48 0.65 0.94 1.15 1.86 0.97
Investment 0.65 0.96 0.47 0.61 0.42 0.65 0.93 0.86 1.74 0.81
Islamic 0.60 1.29 0.84 1.01 0.49 1.14 1.10 0.63 1.59 0.97
Other 0.91 1.15 0.95 0.64 0.56 1.01 1.18 0.61 2.01 1.00
All 0.91 1.18 0.80 0.61 0.48 0.73 0.98 1.01 1.84 0.95
Asset Size (US$ million)
1,000- 2,500- 5,000-
1-199 200-299 300-499 500-999 10000-i- All
2,499 4,999 9,900
Bahrain 0.71 0.87 0.77 0.82 0.71 1.06 0.66 0.67 0.77
Egypt 1.23 0.88 1.08 0.98 1.17 1.26 0.88 1.19 1.09
Jordan 0.71 0.67 1.00 0.78 0.86 0.97 0.83
Saudi Arabia 1.01 0.71 0.72 0.96 1.17 0.93
All 0.92 0.82 0.98 0.90 0.97 1.02 0.91 1.07 0.95
Asset Size (US$ million)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 All
1-199.9 1.03 1.40 0.48 0.43 0.26 0.49 1.23 0.95 1.79 0.92
200-299 0.67 0.88 0.82 0.67 0.46 0.66 1.10 0.68 2.46 0.82
300-499 1.14 1.41 0.80 0.67 0.44 0.70 1.14 0.91 1.77 0.98
500-999 0.90 1.21 0.87 0.49 0.44 1.10 1.13 0.56 1.53 0.90
1,000-2,499 0.88 0.95 0.75 0.80 0.62 0.93 0.70 1.02 1.82 0.97
2,500-4,999 0.85 0.96 0.84 0.05 0.35 0.76 1.13 0.95 2.15 1.02
5,000-9,999 0.47 0.95 0.87 0.94 0.55 0.43 0.89 1.45 2.03 0.91
10000+ 0.88 1.22 1.24 0.31 0.69 0.24 0.77 1.73 1.87 1.07
All 0.91 1.18 0.80 0.61 0.48 0.73 0.98 1.01 1.84 0.95
Note: The scores that fall within the ranges [0.961-1.038] and [0.923-1.076] are not statistically different
from one at 5 percent and 1 percent level respectively for two-tailed test.
Source: Author's own estimation.
6.5.6 Estimated levels of scale efficiency
The scale elasticity measure, as indicated earlier, is an elasticity associated with a
particular output level and indicates the relative change in cost associated with an
increment change from this output level. Scale inefficiency (I), on other hand, can be
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measured as the aggregate cost of F inefficient firms (6 # 1.0) relative to the cost of a
single efficient firm (6:.--- 1.0).
Given the following representation for the cost function: ln C = a + b (ln Y) + .5 c (ln
Y) 2 , then the scale elasticity for inefficient firms = El = a ln C 1
 / am n II I = b. On this
basis, scale inefficiency can be written as: I = e )(1 e1) 2
 -1.0, that is scale
inefficiency is a function of the first and second derivatives of the function with respect
to output (the second derivation helps to reach c which is the key for calculation of
inefficiency). Note, if the estimated scale elasticity is insignificantly different from
unity, this does not imply scale inefficiency is insignificantly different from zero
because the statistical difference of the elasticity measure from a value of unity depends
entirely on the standard error of the estimated coefficient b.
Given the cost function specification of the stochastic frontier, scale efficiency averaged
around 65% for banks under study over 1992 to 2000. Furthermore, there is a
significant drop in scale efficiency over time when it decreased from around 72% in
1992 to reach 60% percent in 2000. According to geographical location, the efficiency
scores ranged from 72% for Jordan and Saudi Arabian banks to 51% for Bahrain banks.
Furthermore, commercial banks are the most efficient with cost efficiencies around 70%
while the least efficient are the Islamic banks (table 6.15). Furthermore, the results
generally show that some categories of small and large banks are scale efficient while
other ranges do have similar efficiency levels.
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Table 6-15: Cost Scale inefficiency for the banking sectors of Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and
Bahrain over 1992-2000
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 All
Bahrain	 47 49 44 51 53 53 49 46 52 49
Egypt	 24 24 31 33 32 35 36 41 40 33
Jordan
	 21 26 25 34 31 34 30 27 25 28
Saudi Arabia	 20 21 27 27 23 29 30 36 40 28
Commercial	 24 25 30 34 29 31 30 33 33 30
Investment	 32 30 30 42 39 44 45 40 42 38
Islamic	 34 47 50 59 74 77 71 65 55 59
Other	 38 43 31 25 38 46 46 57 70 44
All	 28 29 32 36 35 38 37 39 40 35
Asset Size (US$ million)
1,000- 2,500- 5,000-
1-199 200-299 300-499 500-999 10000+ All
2,499 4,999 9,900
Bahrain	 44 27 41 54 75 54 17 79 49
Egypt	 44 26 17 28 51 23 28 50 33
Jordan	 21 20 21 39 47 20 28
Saudi Arabia 25 26 27 16 43 28
All	 38 24 24 37 49 31 19 48 35
Asset Size (US$ million)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 All
1-199.9
	
30 32 39 37 40 46 46 46 51 38
200-299	 20 33 19 28 25 24 24 16 26 24
300-499
	
25 19 19 29 33 35 21 20 14 24
500-999
	
30 35 33 40 37 35 44 35 37 37
1,000-2,499	 42 47 49 47 53 55 50 51 47 49
2,500-4,999	 25 16 54 24 3 13 28 48 49 31
5,000-9,999	 10 10 19 37 20 22 12 14 23 19
10000+	 30 29 40 43 46 52 50 69 56 48
All	 28 29 32 36 35 38 37 39 40 35
Source: Author's own estimation
275
Chapter 6 :Methodology and empirical results
As in the case of scale elasticities reported in the previous section, we also calculated
scale efficiency using both standard and alternative profit functions. Scale efficiency
given the standard and alternative profit functions were 56% and 61% respectively but
with rather dissimilar movements for efficiency scores for both sets of measures
overtime. The scale efficiency estimates, given both profit functions, show high
fluctuation overtime with some years exhibiting relatively high scale efficiency scores
and others relatively low efficiency scores. Based on geographical location, Saudi
Arabia banks appear to be the most scale efficient while the Jordan's banks are the least
profit scale efficient. Based on specialisation, the profit efficiency scores for Islamic and
commercial banks seem to be better than those of other banks. Furthermore, the scale
profit efficiency scores for large banks, given alternative profit function in particular,
are higher than the smaller banks (see table 6.16 & 6.17 for details).
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Table 6-16: Standard profit scale inefficiency of the banking sectors of Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia
and Bahrain over 1992-2000
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 All
Bahrain	 40 37 53 27 42 67 29 42 40 42
Egypt	 35 45 59 54 66 51 9 40 62 47
Jordan	 25 74 14 57 60 81 9 37 82 49
Saudi Arabia	 43 54 29 18 21 27 4 43 68 34
Commercial	 34 50 42 46 54 54 12 44 64 44
Investment	 43 38 45 47 41 79 12 37 64 45
Islamic	 42 58 52 34 50 48 14 29 46 41
Other	 33 61 60 25 63 37 15 33 54 42
All	 36 50 45 43 52 56 13 40 61 44
Asset Size (US$ million)
1,000- 2,500- 5,000-
1-199 200-299 300-499 500-999 2,499 4,999 9,900 10000+ All
Bahrain	 46 40 46 42 29 34 30 55 42
Egypt	 47 53 47 43 44 41 57 48 47
Jordan	 49 43 56 46 46 48 49
Saudi Arabia 29 30 32 32 42 34
All	 48 48 48 43 40 36 38 46 44
Asset Size (US$ million)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 All
1-199.9	 29 62 32 56 70 55 26 63 54 48
200-299	 38 35 59 50 53 81 12 34 69 48
300-499	 23 53 58 48 58 65 18 47 70 48
500-999	 42 69 41 47 57 58 12 28 45 43
1,000-2,499	 62 39 47 29 46 48 8 23 63 40
2,500-4,999	 10 27 55 23 32 30 13 48 63 36
5,000-9,999	 38 52 31 24 40 48 0 45 67 38
10000+	 39 49 30 50 50 47 12 62 70 46
All	 36 50 45 43 52 56 13 40 61 44
Source: Author's own estimation
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Table 6-17: Alternative profit scale inefficiency of the banking sectors of Jordan, Egypt, Saudi
Arabia and Bahrain over 1992-2000
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 All
Bahrain	 53 51 17 31 42 32 30 44 40 38
Egypt	 39 25 39 46 45 30 64 46 10 38
Jordan	 76 57 30 30 18 67 55 37 33 45
Saudi Arabia	 41 51 22 29 48 28 49 42 16 36
Commercial	 47 39 32 37 40 34 56 42 21 39
Investment	 64 45 37 33 37 54 39 39 24 41
Islamic	 57 52 19 56 41 23 48 52 22 41
Other	 34 34 12 33 45 37 57 51 21 36
All	 49 40 30 37 40 37 53 44 22 39
Asset Size (US$ million)
1,000- 2,500- 5,000-
1-199 200-299 300-499 500-999 2,499 4,999 9,900 10000+ All
Bahrain
	
35 31 37 43 43 36 43 36 38
Egypt	 31 48 35 37 37 40 60 37 38
Jordan	 50 54 46 34 47 32 45
Saudi Arabia 15 49 28 41 27 36
All	 37 46 38 37 42 35 46 31 39
Asset Size (US$ million)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 All
1-199.9	 41 45 20 43 27 50 42 40 26 37
200-299
	
67 36 45 36 46 55 45 65 5 46
300-499	 44 33 31 39 38 38 51 40 23 38
500-999	 38 28 26 37 41 30 57 52 21 37
1,000-2,499	 45 47 33 39 51 34 63 40 24 42
2,500-4,999	 84 23 31 7 29 31 51 48 12 35
5,000-9,999	 47 72 37 52 40 40 57 46 24 46
10000+	 47 42 19 23 38 20 40 30 24 31
All	 49 40 30 37 40 37 53 44 22 39
Source: Author's own estimation
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6.6 Efficiency estimates using DEA
In order to test the consistency of the efficiency estimates derived in section 6.5, this
section reports the efficiency measures obtained utilising DEA.
As indicated earlier, DEA can be used to estimate efficiency under the assumptions of
constant and variable return to scale. The CRS assumption is only appropriate when all
DMUs are operating at an optimal scale. However, factors like imperfect competition
and constraints on finance may cause a DMU not to operate at optimal scale. As a
result, the use of the CRS specification when some DMUs are not operating at the
optimal scale confuses measures of technical and scale efficiency. Therefore, Banker et
al. (1984) proposed a variable returns to scale approach.
The cost efficiency results using DEA, assuming constant and variable returns to scale
averaged around 0.51 and 0.68 respectively for the financial institutions under study
over 1992-2000. When we split the cost efficiency further, assuming CRS, we find that
technical efficiency estimates averaged around 0.84 while the allocative efficiency
averaged around 0.61 over the sample period. On the other hand, splitting the cost
efficiency into technical and allocative, assuming VRS, we get 0.91 and 0.75 for the
technical and allocative efficiency measures respectively (tables 6.23 in the appendix
shows the details)
The difference between cost efficiency estimates under CRS and VRS is attributed to
scale efficiency; as indicated earlier. The scale efficiency averaged around 0.93 for the
financial institutions in the countries under study over (1992-2000) the sample period.
Comparing the estimates of DEA with those of SFA, the results from both
methodologies are somewhat different. Utilising both Pearson and Spearman rank
correlations, both of these two measures report a correlation of around 40% between the
scores from both methodologies. Referring to table 6.18, both methodologies are
consistent in ranking Egypt and Jordan in the third and fourth position, in terms of cost
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efficiency, but there is a difference between the two methodologies concerning the
ranking of Bahrain and Saudi Arabia in the first and second place where the SF rank
Bahraini banks as the most efficient and DEA ranks Saudi Arabian banks as the most
efficient.
Furthermore, both methodologies were consistent in ranking commercial and
investment banks as the least efficient, in terms of cost efficiency, but they rank the
Islamic banks and other financial institutions differently (see table 6.18 for details).
Finally, both approaches ranked the smallest banks the same as the least cost efficient,
but the two methodologies vary concerning the ranking of large and very large
institutions.
Table 6-18: Comparing the cost efficiency results of the SF with those of DEA
Technical Efficiency
Country DEA SF Rank
Bahrain 76 99
Egypt 62 94 3
Jordan 55 89 4
Saudi 88 97
Specialisation
Commercial 67 94 3
Investment 60 93 4
Islamic 77 98
Other 81 96
Asset size
1-999 58 94 4
1,000-4,999 74 94 3
5,000-9,999 90 96
10,000 97 94
Source: Author's own estimation
While the correlation between the results of both methodologies is relatively modest,
the differences between scores of both methodology results are attributed mainly to the
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differences in the assumptions, detailed earlier, necessary by each methodology to
obtain the efficiency estimates. Technical efficiency using the SFA approach averaged
around 0.95 for the financial institutions under study while the results from DEA
assuming VRS, estimates cost efficiency to be around 0.68. This result is not strange
because DEA assumes all the deviation from the efficient frontier as inefficiency and
therefore the DEA method known to give higher inefficiency scores compared to the
SFA approach.
6.7 Conclusion
This chapter investigates the levels of cost and profit efficiency in Jordan, Egypt, Saudi
Arabia and Bahrain over the 1992-2000 period and utilises a sample that consists of 82
banks from these countries.
At the beginning, we present the theoretical justification for utilising the Fourier flexible
functional form (FF) over other approaches to estimate efficiency measures. The
Fourier-flexible functional form is preferred because it better approximates the
underlying cost function across a broad range of outputs and the FF form is unaffected
by specification errors. In addition, we utilise the non-parametric data envelopment
analysis (DEA) approach to cross-check the robustness of the efficiency results obtained
from the parametric approach.
The process of obtaining a preferred stochastic model follows recent banking efficiency
methodologies and proceeds in a step-wise fashion aimed at obtaining the most
appropriate model specification. Model choice is determined by using the maximum
likelihood estimates, on various models specifications, that suggests the most
appropriate model fit. The various stochastic models are assessed employing different
combination of control and environmental variables and the preferred models are
selected based on maximum likelihood estimates.
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Based on the preferred models for cost, standard profit and alternative profit, different
efficiency measures are reported for the banks in the countries under study. Given cost
efficiency estimates, the preferred model is the Fourier-truncated that excludes control
variables (capital adequacy, asset quality and the time trend) but includes the
environmental variables. Given the standard and alternative profit function, the
preferred model is the Fourier-flexible that includes the control as well as the
environmental variables.
Based on the results of the preferred models, technical cost efficiency averaged around
95% over the 1992-2000 period with insignificant changes over this period. Given the
standard and alternative profit function, the technical efficiency averaged 66% and 58%
respectively over the same period. The technical efficiency estimates utilising the
standard and alternative profit functions have shown insignificant volatility in the
efficiency scores over 1993-99 but both have reported significant falls in efficiency for
the year 2000. The Islamic banks are found to be the most cost and profit efficient while
the investment banks are the least (cost and profit efficient). This result perhaps explains
the motives behind the increase in Islamic banking activities over the past few years. It
also indication of the fact that the cost of funds for Islamic banks is relatively cheaper
than the cost of funds for other financial institutions.
Large banks seem to be relatively more cost and profit efficient. This result suggests
that large banks enjoy several advantages compared to small banks. This includes the
ability of large banks to utilise more efficient technology with less cost, the ability of
these banks to set up more specialised staff for the most profitable activities and the
ability of these banks to provide (presumably) better quality outputs for which they can
charge higher prices. Geographically, Bahrain banks are the most cost and profit
efficient while Jordanian banks are the least (cost and profit efficient).
Based on the estimated preferred models, we also report scale elasticity and scale
efficiency measures for the banks under study. The cost scale elasticity estimates
reveals diseconomies of around five percent and the cost scale inefficiency estimates
282
Chapter 6 :Methodology and empirical results
also suggest that banks are 65% scale efficient (Given profit and alternative profit
functions, scale elasticities ranged, on average, between 5% to 13% while scale
inefficiencies tend to be, on average, around 35 percent to 44 percent). Islamic and
commercial banks are again found to be the most cost and profit scale efficient. Large
banks are also generally found to be more efficient than smaller institutions. In addition,
geographically, Saudi Arabian and Egyptian banks seem to be the most cost and profit
scale efficient.
Finally, while the countries under study have implemented many economic and
financial reforms over the last decade or so, these do not appear to have noticeable
positive impact on the efficiency of the respective banking systems under study.
Diseconomies of scale are prevalent and profit inefficiencies, in general, are substantial.
Both Islamic and commercial (in particular the largest in terms of assets' value) banks
appear to be the most efficient forms of banks operating in the Arabic countries under
study. It seems that future reforms should be geared to facilitating further consolidation
in the sector to realise greater efficiency. In addition, the growth of Islamic banking
practices may also help improve the performance of the banking systems under study.
Finally, the operation of a single banking market in the GCC (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain,
Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, UAE) may also force greater merger and acquisition activity in
the financial sector that could result in the realisation of larger economies and greater
efficiency for their banking and financial systems.
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Chapter 6: Methodology and empirical results
Table 6-23: Maximum Likelihood estimates of the preferred Standard Profit Function model: the Fourier
truncated with capital, risk and time parameters
The variable (all are logged) coefficient	 standard-error	 t-ratio
a -79383.60 1.00 -79506.77
yl lnyl 0.72 0.98	 0.74
y2 Iny2 0.26 0.97	 0.26
Y3 Iny3 0.25 0.79	 0.32
131 Lnp 1 /p3 -0.26 0.99	 -0.27
132 Lnp2/p3 3.50 0.97	 3.61
NA Ink -206.91 0.99	 -209.28
w2 InS 0.13 0.96	 0.13
x1/ 3 1nT -41047.01 0.99 -41658.40
yl 1 lny 1 lnyl 0.00 0.30	 0.00
y12 lny 1 Iny2 -0.12 0.45	 -0.26
y13 Inyllny3 0.04 0.38	 0.11
rill Iny 1 lnp 1/p3 0.05 0.61	 0.08
Ti12 Inyllnp2/p3 -0.10 0.60	 -0.17
T11 lny link -0.07 0.69	 -0.11
T12 InylIns 0.05 0.37	 0.13
T13 lny 1 InT 0.09 0.70	 0.13
y22 Iny2lny2 0.05 0.38	 0.14
Y23 Iny2lny3 -0.06 0.39	 -0.14
121 Iny2Inp 1 /p3 0.05 0.55	 0.08
ri 22 Iny2Inp2/p3 -0.06 0.59	 -0.10
T21 Iny2Ink -0.01 0.71	 -0.01
T22 Iny2Ins -0.05 0.38	 -0.13
T23 lny2InT 0.10 0.72	 0.15
y33 Iny3lny3 0.02 0.11	 0.15
T131 Iny3Inp 1/p3 -0.03 0.50	 -0.06
132 Iny3Inp2/p3 -0.01 0.51	 -0.03
T31 Iny3Ink 0.01 0.63	 0.02
T32 lny3Ins 0.01 0.25	 0.03
T33 Iny3InT -0.06 0.61	 -0.10
1311 lnp 1 /p3lnp 1/p3 -0.10 0.60	 -0.17
1312 Inpl/p3Inp2/p3 -0.05 0.75	 -0.07
p11 lnp 1 /p2Ink -0.01 0.77	 -0.02
p12 lnp 1 /p2Ins -0.04 0.45	 -0.09
p13 lnp 1/p2InT 0.01 0.64	 0.02
1322 Inp2/p3Inp2/p3 -1.07 0.76	 -1.42
p21 lnp2/p2lnk -0.07 0.69	 -0.10
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The variable (all are logged) coefficient	 standard-error t-ratio
p22 lnp2/p2Ins 0.05 0.60 0.08
p23 lnp2/p2InT -0.06 0.83 -0.07
W 11 InkInk -44.76 0.69 -64.53
11112 lnklns 0.06 0.62 0.10
tic13 InkInT -0.19 0.90 -0.21
w22 lnsIns 0.00 0.53 -0.01
tic23 1nSInT 0.05 0.70 0.07
xv33 1nTInT 15804.95 0.91 17419.03
01 Cos(lny 1) 0.02 0.67 0.03
col Sin(lny 1 ) 0.05 0.68 0.07
4)2 Cos(lny2) -0.04 0.71 -0.06
co2 Sin(lny2) -0.02 0.69 -0.03
4)3 Cos(lny3) 0.06 0.66 0.09
(03 Sin(lny3)
-0.03 0.59 -0.05
0 Cos(lnpl/p2) -0.02 0.81 -0.03
(04 Sin(lnpl/p2) -0.49 0.81 -0.60
05 Co s(lnp2/p2) -0.67 0.84 -0.80
(05 Sin(lnp2/p2) -0.94 0.85 -1.11
(I)6 Cos(lnk) 35.26 0.92 38.34
0)6 Sin(lnk) 38.15 0.94 40.65
07 Cos(InS) -0.14 0.65 -0.21
0 Sin(InS)
-0.08 0.80 -0.10
$8 Cos(InT) 4688.58 0.92 5074.55
(08 Sin(InT) 15748.63 0.92 17029.03
011 Cos(y 1 +y1) 0.01 0.40 0.02
(01 1 Sin(y 1 +y1) 0.04 0.33 0.13
(I)12 Cos(y1 +y2)
-0.04 0.44 -0.10
w12 Sin(y 1 +y2)
-0.02 0.50 -0.04
413 Cos(y 1 +y3)
-0.03 0.41 -0.08
(013 Sin(y 1 +y3) 0.02 0.41 0.04
014 Cos(y 1 +p 1 /p3)
-0.06 0.54 -0.12
(014 Sin(y 1 +p 1 /p3)
-0.10 0.53 -0.19
015 Cos(yl+p2/p3)
-0.03 0.47 -0.07
(015 S in(y 1 +p2/p3) 0.03 0.52 0.05
016 Cos(y l+k) -0.03 0.54 -0.05
(016 Sin(y 1 +k) 0.15 0.64 0.23
(I)17 Cos(yl+S) 0.02 0.43 0.04
(017 Sin(y 1 +S) 0.10 0.39 0.26
4018 Cos(y1+T) 0.05 0.44 0.12
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The variable (all are logged) coefficient	 standard-error t-ratio
col 8 Sin(y1+T) 0.04 0.56 0.07
(022 Cos(y2+y2) 0.01 0.40 0.02
0o22 Sin(y2+y2) -0.02 0.43 -0.04
4023 Cos(y2+y3) 0.02 0.42 0.06
(023 Sin(y2+y3) -0.01 0.41 -0.04
024 Cos(y2+p 1/p3) 0.00 0.60 0.00
co24 Sin(y2+pl/p3) 0.06 0.56 0.11
025 Cos (y2+p2/p3) 0.00 0.56 0.01
co25 Sin(y2+p2/p3) -0.04 0.54 -0.07
4026 Cos(y2+k) 0.06 0.59 0.10
w26 S in (y2+k) -0.04 0.64 -0.06
(1)27 Cos(y2+S) -0.02 0.47 -0.04
co27 Sin(y2+S) -0.03 0.48 -0.07
028 Cos(y2+T) -0.02 0.49 -0.03
c028 Sin(y2+T) 0.03 0.62 0.04
033 Cos(y3+y3) -0.02 0.35 -0.05
0)33 Sin(y3+y3) 0.00 0.23 0.00
034 Cos(y3+p 1 /p3) 0.01 0.52 0.02
0)34 Sin(y3+p 1 /p3) -0.03 0.51 -0.06
035 Cos (y3+p2/p3) -0.02 0.47 -0.04
0)35 Sin(y3+p2/p3) -0.05 0.53 -0.10
036 Cos(y3+k) 0.01 0.57 0.02
0o36 Sin(y3+k) -0.02 0.54 -0.04
037 Cos(y3+S) -0.03 0.40 -0.08
0o37 Sin(y3+S) -0.03 0.32 -0.10
038 Cos(y3+T) -0.01 0.52 -0.01
c038 Sin(y3+T) -0.01 0.54 -0.02
044 Cos(p 1/p3+p 1 /p3) -0.07 0.66 -0.10
c044 Sin(pl/p3+pl/p3) -0.03 0.72 -0.05
05 Cos(pl/p3+p2/p3) -0.03 0.60 -0.05
0o45 S in (pl/p3+p2/p3) 0.03 0.58 0.05
046 Cos(p 1/p3+k) 0.10 0.65 0.15
0o46 Sin(pl/p3+k) 0.06 0.73 0.08
07 Cos(p 1/p3+S) -0.05 0.51 -0.09
c047 Sin(p 1 /p3+S) 0.00 0.43 0.00
048 Cos (pl/p3+T) -0.04 0.53 -0.08
(048 Sin(pl/p3+T) 0.00 0.69 0.00
055 Cos(p2/p3+p2/p3) -0.10 0.58 -0.17
co55 Sin(p2/p3+p2/p3) 0.23 0.45 0.51
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The variable (all are logged) coefficient	 standard-error t-ratio
056 Cos(p2/p3+k) 0.05 0.59 0.09
co56 Sin(p2/p3+k) 0.13 0.55 0.24
4)57 Cos(p2/p3+S) 0.00 0.56 0.00
co57 Sin(p2/p3+S) -0.04 0.57 -0.06
058 Cos (p2/p3+T) 0.09 0.55 0.16
co58 Sin(p2/p3+T) -0.02 0.64 -0.03
4)66 Cos (k+k) -1.05 0.72 -1.45
(066 Sin(k+k) 8.06 0.80 10.10
4)67 Cos(k+S) 0.06 0.53 0.12
co67 Sin(k+S) -0.02 0.45 -0.05
4)68 Co s (k+T) -0.07 0.76 -0.10
(1)68 S in (k+T) 0.11 0.67 0.17
4)77 Cos(S+S) -0.04 0.46 -0.09
co77 Sin(S+S) -0.06 0.61 -0.10
4)78 Cos(S+T) -0.01 0.41 -0.04
co78 Sin(S+T) -0.02 0.53 -0.03
4)88 Cos(T+T) 1554.48 0.78 1983.37
co88 Sin(T+T) -913.30 0.80 -1144.71
0111 Cos(yl+yl +y1) 0.03 0.16 0.17
will Sin(yl+yl+y1) 0.01 0.19 0.03
4)222 Cos (y2+y2+y2) -0.01 0.22 -0.06
(0222 Sin(y2+y2+y2) 0.02 0.20 0.10
0333 Cos(y3+y3+y3) 0.00 0.17 0.02
(1)333 Sin(y3+y3+y3) -0.02 0.13 -0.17
4)444 Cos(p 1/p3+p 1/p3+p 1 /p3) 0.04 0.45 0.08
co444 Sin(pl/p3+pl/p3+pl/p3) 0.05 0.43 0.11
0555 Cos (p2/p3+p2/p3+p2/p3) 0.07 0.23 0.32
(1)555 S in (p2/p3+p2/p3+p2/p3) -0.01 0.29 -0.03
4)666 Cos (k+k+k) -1.02 0.53 -1.93
co666 S in (k+k+k) 0.59 0.40 1.46
4)777 Cos(S+S+S) 0.01 0.37 0.04
co777 Sin(S+S+S) -0.05 0.29 -0.18
4)888 Cos (T+T+T) -109.24 0.60 -182.66
co888 Sin(T+T+T) -111.71 0.44 -256.71
80 -0.47 0.79 -0.59
81 L 0.30 0.99 0.31
82 TA 0.00 0.00 -0.24
83 B -0.20 0.97 -0.20
84 J 0.48 0.97 0.50
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The variable (all are logged) coefficient	 standard-error t-ratio
85	 E -0.62 0.86 -0.71
86	 Corn -0.08 0.91 -0.09
57	 Inv. 0.98 0.97 1.02
58	 Isl. -0.22 0.99 -0.22
59	 3-FCR -0.44 0.92 -0.48
510	 MS -0.68 1.00 -0.67
sigma-squared (S) 1.53 0.48 3.21
gamma 0.99 0.05 20.05
Sigma-squared 1.52
Sigma-squared (v) 0.02
Lambda 9.93
The relative contribution of the inefficiency effect to the total variance
term 0.97
Log likelihood function -797.05
LR test of the one-sided error 576.05
[note that this statistic has a mixed chi-squared distribution]
Source: Author's own estimation
296
ayl
y2
y3
131
32
Nil
w2
1113
yl 1
y12
y13
i 1 1
i 1 2
T11
T12
T13
y22
y23
i 21
i 22
T21
T22
T23
y33
i31
i32
T31
T32
T33
1311
312
p 1 1
p12
p13
1322
p21
Chapter 6: Methodology and empirical results
Table 6-24: Maximum Likelihood estimates of the Alternative Profit Function model: the Fourier truncated
with capital, risk and time parameters
The variable (all are logged) coefficient	 standard-error	 t-ratio
-121836.72 1.00-122016.40
lnyl 0.81 0.97	 0.84
Iny2 1.30 0.96	 1.35
Iny3 0.13 0.73	 0.17
Lnwl/w3 38.55 0.99	 39.03
Lnw2/w3 -73.80 0.98	 -74.92
Ink -256.84 0.99	 -260.01
InS -0.15 0.93	 -0.16
InT -62698.63 0.98 -63780.28
lny 1 lnyl -0.05 0.25	 -0.21
lny 1 lny2 -0.23 0.43	 -0.54
Iny 1 lny3 0.08 0.31	 0.27
lny 1 Inwl/w3 -0.18 0.59	 -0.31
Inyllnw2/w3 0.33 0.69	 0.48
lny link -0.50 0.66	 -0.75
lnyllns 0.08 0.23	 0.37
lny 1 1nT 0.19 0.59	 0.32
Iny2lny2 0.09 0.34	 0.27
Iny2lny3 -0.07 0.35	 -0.20
lny2lnwl/w3 0.13 0.59	 0.22
lny2Inw2/w3 -0.53 0.67	 -0.80
lny2Ink 0.08 0.66	 0.12
Iny2Ins -0.01 0.30	 -0.03
lny2InT 0.03 0.64	 0.04
Iny3lny3 0.02 0.12	 0.13
Iny3Inw 1/w3 -0.14 0.58	 -0.24
Iny3Inw2/w3 0.06 0.61	 0.10
Iny3Ink 0.03 0.59	 0.05
lny3Ins -0.02 0.21	 -0.08
Iny31nT -0.06 0.41	 -0.14
lnw 1 /w3lnw 1/w3 -11.06 0.66	 -16.83
Inwl/w3Inw2/w3 1.39 0.80	 1.75
lnw 1/w2Ink -0.24 0.82	 -0.29
lnw 1/w2Ins 0.11 0.57	 0.20
lnw 1 /w21nT -0.10 0.85	 -0.12
Inw2/w3Inw2/w3 50.95 0.88	 57.65
Inw2/w2Ink -0.70 0.86	 -0.82
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The variable (all are logged) coefficient	 standard-error	 t-ratio
p22 lnw2/w2lns -0.07 0.68	 -0.11
p23 lnw2/w21nT -1.08 0.88	 -1.23
1ji11 lnklnk -56.42 0.74	 -76.35
V12 lnklns 0.03 0.53	 0.06
w13 lnklnT -0.10 0.85	 -0.11
w22 lnslns -0.02 0.35	 -0.06
w23 1nS 1nT 0.01 0.51	 0.03
11133 1nTInT 24161.34 0.90	 26830.91
(1)1 Cos(lny 1 ) -0.10 0.74	 -0.14
col. Sin(lnyl) 0.00 0.74	 0.00
4)2 Cos(lny2) 0.20 0.70	 0.28
c02 Sin(lny2) 0.00 0.67	 -0.01
(1)3 Cos(lny3) 0.03 0.64	 0.04
c03 Sin(lny3) 0.03 0.66	 0.05
04 Cos(lnwl/w2) 2.94 0.89	 3.31
o)4 Sin(lnwl/w2) -13.50 0.85	 -15.88
05 Cos(lnw2/w2) 46.85 0.90	 52.32
c05 Sin(lnw2/w2) 39.38 0.92	 42.93
06 Cos (lnk) 43.38 0.88	 49.12
c06 Sin(Ink) 48.32 0.95	 51.10
07 Cos(lnS) -0.28 0.67	 -0.42
c07 Sin(lnS) 0.04 0.74	 0.06
08 Cos(1nT) 7205.73 0.92	 7808.18
co8 Sin(lnT) 24096.48 0.91	 26419.79
4)11 Cos(y 1 +y1) 0.02 0.24	 0.07
coi l Sin(yl+y1) 0.08 0.26	 0.30
012 Cos(yl+y2) -0.03 0.40	 -0.07
(012 S in (yl+y2) -0.05 0.39	 -0.13
4113 Cos(yl+y3) -0.08 0.41	 -0.20
c013 Sin(y 1 +y3) 0.00 0.33	 -0.01
4)14 Cos(y 1 +w 1/w3) -0.25 0.58	 -0.44
c014 Sin(y 1 +w 1/w3) 0.08 0.55	 0.14
4)15 Cos(yl+w2/w3) 0.15 0.67	 0.23
(015 Sin(yl+w2/w3) -0.15 0.66	 -0.23
4)16 Cos(yl+k) 0.15 0.58	 0.27
c016 Sin(y 1 +k) 0.14 0.62	 0.22
4)17 Cos(y 1 +S) 0.00 0.34	 -0.01
c017 Sin(y 1 +S) 0.07 0.26	 0.28
4)18 Cos(y1+T) 0.06 0.42	 0.14
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The variable (all are logged) coefficient	 standard-error t-ratio
o.)18 Sin(y1+T) 0.07 0.48 0.13
4)22 Cos(y2+y2) -0.02 0.38 -0.06
co22 S in (y2+y2) 0.06 0.44 0.14
4)23 Cos(y2+y3) 0.06 0.33 0.18
co23 Sin(y2+y3) -0.04 0.44 -0.08
4)24 Cos(y2+wl/w3) 0.09 0.60 0.15
co24 Sin(y2+w 1 /w3) -0.08 0.46 -0.17
4)25 Cos(y2+w2/w3) -0.21 0.68 -0.31
co25 S in (y2+w2/w3) -0.10 0.61 -0.16
4)26 Cos (y2+k) 0.05 0.53 0.09
6)26 Sin(y2+k) 0.01 0.47 0.02
4)27 Cos(y2+S) -0.05 0.33 -0.16
0)27 Sin(y2+S) 0.00 0.36 -0.01
4)28 Cos (y2+T) -0.06 0.41 -0.15
co28 Sin(y2+T) 0.05 0.45 0.11
4)33 Cos(y3+y3) -0.02 0.25 -0.09
co33 Sin(y3+y3) 0.00 0.23 -0.01
4)34 Cos(y3+w 1/w3) -0.06 0.44 -0.13
co34 Sin(y3+w 1/w3) 0.00 0.51 0.01
4)35 Cos(y3+w2/w3) 0.05 0.54 0.09
co35 Sin(y3+w2/w3) -0.06 0.54 -0.11
4)36 Cos(y3+k) 0.06 0.30 0.19
o.)36 Sin(y3+k) -0.01 0.52 -0.01
4)37 Cos(y3+S) -0.06 0.29 -0.21
0)37 Sin(y3+S) -0.06 0.19 -0.34
4)38 Cos(y3+T) 0.03 0.27 0.11
co38 Sin(y3+T) -0.05 0.43 -0.12
4344 Cos(w 1/w3+wl/w3) -2.18 0.67 -3.27
co44 Sin(w 1/w3+w 1 /w3) -1.08 0.68 -1.58
045 Cos(wl/w3+w2/w3) -0.81 0.72 -1.13
o.)45 Sin(w 1/w3+w2/w3) 0.15 0.76 0.20
046 Cos(wl/w3+k) 0.01 0.67 0.01
o)46 Sin(w 1/w3+k) -0.05 0.66 -0.08
07 Cos(w 1/w3+S) -0.18 0.49 -0.37
co47 Sin(w 1 /w3+S) -0.02 0.57 -0.04
448 Cos(w 1 /w3+T) 0.04 0.64 0.07
(1)48 Sin(w 1/w3+T) -0.11 0.61 -0.18
4)55 Cos(w21w3+w21w3) -2.29 0.79 -2.92
co55 Sin(w2/w3+w2/w3) -10.40 0.77 -13.54
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4)56 Cos(w2/w3+k) -0.13 0.73 -0.17
(056 Sin(w2/w3+k) 0.17 0.75 0.23
4)57 Cos(w2/w3+S) 0.12 0.46 0.27
(057 Sin(w2/w3+S) -0.06 0.64 -0.09
4)58 Cos (w2/w3+T) 0.08 0.79 0.11
(058 Sin(w2/w3+T) -0.32 0.58 -0.55
4)66 Cos (k+k) -1.64 0.69 -2.38
(066 Sin(k+k) 9.93 0.77 12.81
4)67 Cos(k+S) 0.03 0.53 0.06
(067 Sin(k+S) -0.08 0.47 -0.17
4)68 Cos (k+T) -0.05 0.68 -0.08
(068 Sin(k+T) 0.08 0.57 0.15
4)77 Cos(S+S) -0.13 0.40 -0.33
(077 Sin(S+S) 0.00 0.43 -0.01
4)78 Cos (S +T) 0.00 0.33 0.01
0)78 Sin(S+T) 0.00 0.38 -0.01
4)88 Cos(T+T) 2384.44 0.81 2960.94
(088 Sin(T+T) -1410.35 0.81 -1746.00
4)111 Cos(yl+yl+y1) 0.03 0.16 0.18
will Sin(yl+yl+y1) 0.00 0.10 0.02
4)222 Cos (y2+y2+y2) -0.02 0.15 -0.10
(0222 Sin(y2+y2+y2) 0.01 0.18 0.07
4)333 Cos(y3+y3+y3) 0.00 0.12 0.00
00333 Sin(y3+y3+y3) -0.03 0.15 -0.23
4)444 Cos(wl/w3+wl/w3+w 1/w3) -0.41 0.37 -1.11
(0444 Sin(wl/w3+w 1/w3+w 1 /w3) 0.28 0.45 0.62
4)555 Cos(w2/w3+w2/w3+w2/w3) -0.65 0.54 -1.19
(0555 Sin(w2/w3+w2/w3+w2/w3) 1.64 0.44 3.69
4)666 Cos(k+k+k) -1.29 0.45 -2.85
(0666 Sin(k+k+k) 0.64 0.40 1.63
4)777 Cos(S+S+S) 0.00 0.27 0.01
w777 Sin(S+S+S) -0.08 0.23 -0.35
4)888 Co s (T+T+T) -170.22 0.56 -304.33
(0888 Sin(T+T+T) -172.00 0.40 -428.84
80 0.28 0.79 0.35
81 L 0.40 0.99 0.40
82 TA 0.00 0.00 -0.84
83 B
-1.16 0.98 -1.19
84 J 0.03 0.98 0.03
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The variable (all are logged) coefficient	 standard-error t-ratio
55	 E -1.42 0.88 -1.61
86	 Corn 0.10 0.91 0.11
57	 Inv. 0.95 0.98 0.97
58	 Isl. -0.24 1.00 -0.24
89	 3-FCR -0.53 0.92 -0.58
810	 MS -1.50 1.00 -1.49
sigma-squared (S) 1.72 0.42 4.10
gamma 0.99 0.03 35.16
Sigma-squared 1.71
Sigma-squared (v) 0.01
Lambda 13.00
The relative contribution of the inefficiency effect to the total variance
term 0.98
Log likelihood function -792.45
LR test of the one-sided error 671.70
[note that this statistic has a mixed chi-squared distribution]
Source: Author's own estimation
301
Chapter 6: Methodology and empirical results
Table 6-25: Cost Efficiency levels for Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain Banks over 1992-
2000 — Individual Bank Estimates
Firm\Year 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 Avg.
Al Baraka IS BSC 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Al-Ahli United Bank (Bahrain) B.S.C. 99 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Alubaf Arab International Bank 100 99 99 100 99 99 99 99 99 99
Arab Banking Corporation BSC 100 100 100 99 99 99 99 99 99 99
Arab Financial Services Company - AFS 100 99 100 100 100 99 99 99 99 99
Bahrain Development Bank B.S.C. 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Bahrain International Bank E.C. 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99
Bahrain IS B.S.C. - 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Bahraini Saudi Bank (The) BSC 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Bank of Bahrain and Kuwait B.S.C. 100 99 100 100 100 100 100 99 99 100
BMB Investment Bank - BMEB 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99
Commercial Bank of Bahrain B.S.C. 100 100 100 100 100 99 99 99 99 100
Gulf International Bank BSC 100 100 100 99 99 99 99 99 99 99
Investcorp Bank EC 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99
National Bank of Bahrain 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 99 100
Shamil Bank of Bahrain EC
- 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
TAIB Bank E.C. 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99
United Gulf Bank (BSC) EC 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99
Al Watany Bank of Egypt 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94
Alexandria Commercial and Maritime Bank SAE 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94
Arab African International Bank 93 93 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94
Arab Banking Corporation - Egypt 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 91
Arab International Bank 94 93 94 94 94 93 93 93 93
Arab Investment Bank - FABFDI 91 91 91 91 91
90 90 90 90 91
Bank of Alexandria 94 93 93 93 93
92 92 92 92 93
Bank of Conurierce & Development 94 94 94
94 94 94
92
94
91
94
91
94
91
94
92
Banque du Caire 95 93 93
92 92
94 94 94 94 94
Banque du Caire et de Paris SAE 94 95
95 94 94
89 89 89 88 90
Banque Misr 92 92
91 91 90 94 94 94 94 94
Cairo Barclays Bank SAE 96 94
93
94
94
94
94
93
94
91
94
91
94
91
94
90
94
92
Cairo Far East Bank 94 94
94 94
93
94 94 94 94 94
Commercial International Bank (Egypt) S.A.E. 94 94
9 4 94
94
94 94 94 94 94
Credit Agricole Indosuez Egypte 94 94 94 94
94
94 94 94 94 94
Delta International Bank 94 94
94
94 94 94 94 94 94 94
Egyptian American Bank 94 94
95 95
94
94 94 94 94 94
Egyptian Arab Land Bank 95 95 94
94 94 98 98 98 98
98
Egyptian Gulf Bank 94 94 98
98 98 95 95 94 94 95
95
Egyptian Saudi Finance Bank 98 9S 95
95 98 98 97 97 97
Export Development Bank of Egypt 95
,
97 97
98
94 94 94 95 94
Faisal IS of Egypt 97 97 A
9....
94
94
Housing and Development Bank 95 95
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Firm\Year 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00	 Avg.
HSBC Bank Egypt S A E 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94	 94
Misr America International Bank 94 95 94 94 90 90 90 90 91	 92
Misr Exterior Bank 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94	 94
MISR International Bank 94 94 94 94 94 93 93 93 93	 94
MISR Iran Development Bank 95 95 95 95 95 94 95 95 95	 95
Misr Romanian Bank 94 95 94 94 94 94 94 94 94	 94
Mohandes Bank 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94	 94
National Bank for Development 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 93	 94
National Bank of Egypt 91 91 91 90 90 89 88 87 86	 89
National Societe Generale Bank SAE 91 91 91 91 90 90 90 90 90	 90
Nile Bank (The) 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94	 94
Port Said National Bank for Development 94 94 94 94 95 94 94 94	 94
Societ6 Arabe Internationale de Banque 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94	 94
Suez Canal Bank 94 94 94 94 94 92 92 92 92	 93
Arab Bank PLC 96 96 91 90 90 90 89 88 87	 91
Arab Banking Corporation (Jordan) 87 88 88 88 88 88 87 87 87	 88
Arab Jordan Investment Bank 87 87 87 87 87 87 86 87 87	 87
Bank of Jordan Plc 88 88 88 88 87 87 87 88 87	 88
Cairo Amman Bank 89 90 90 90 90 89 87 89 87	 89
Housing Bank for Trade & Finance (The) 93 90 91 91 91 89 89 87 87	 90
Industrial Development Bank 94 90 91 91 92 93 93 93 91	 92
Jordan Gulf Bank 88 89 90 90 89 89 89 89	 89
Jordan Investment & Finance Bank 81 82 83 83 84 83 84 84 84	 83
Jordan IS for Finance and Investment 95 95 96 96 96 96 96 96 96	 96
Jordan Kuwait Bank 93 93 88 88 88 89 90 89 90	 90
Jordan National Bank Plc 93 89 88 89 89 89 90 89 88	 89
Philadelphia Investment Bank 85 84 85 85 86 85 85 85 85	 85
Union Bank for Savings & Investment 86 86 87 87 87 87 87 87 86	 87
Al Bank Al Saudi Al Fransi 97 98 98 97 97 97 97 98 97	 97
Al-Rapti Banking & Investment Corporation 98 98 98 98 98 98 94 94 92	 96
Arab Investment Company SAA (The) 99 99 98 98 99 99 99 99 98	 99
Arab National Bank 97 97 97 96 96 97 97 97 97	 97
Arab Petroleum Invest. Corp. 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99	 99
Bank Al-Jazira 97 98 98 98 98 98 97 98 98	 98
National Commercial Bank (The) 95 95 95 94 94 93 93 92 91	 94
Riyad Bank 95 95 95 94 94 95 95 95 95	 95
Saudi American Bank 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 95 93	 97
Saudi British Bank (The) 98 98 98 98 98 98 97 97 97	 98
Saudi Hollandi Bank 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98	 98
Saudi Investment Bank (The) 97 96 96 96 96 97 96 97 97	 96
United Saudi Bank 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98	 98
Avg. 95 95 95 95 95 94 94 94 94	 95
Source: Author's own estimation
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Table 6-26: Standard Profit Efficiency levels for Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain Banks
over 1992-2000 — Individual Bank Estimates
Firm\Year 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 Avg.
Al Baraka IS BSC 72 58 82 91 88 90 89 30 70 74
Al-Ahli United Bank (Bahrain) B.S.C. 79 88 74 91 67 62 58 65 54 71
Alubaf Arab International Bank 66 89 56 41 56 54 91 81 84 69
Arab Banking Corporation BSC 57 70 39 86 83 82 30 52 48 61
Arab Financial Services Company - AFS 80 66 87 91 57 91 80 84 42 75
Bahrain Development Bank B.S.C. 64 49 59 79 82 73 86 74 80 72
Bahrain International Bank E.C. 52 88 50 61 30 58 57 37 4 49
Bahrain IS B.S.C. 80 83 73 71 82 89 86 85 82
Bahraini Saudi Bank (The) BSC 85 84 80 64 62 80 85 90 49 75
Bank of Bahrain and Kuwait B.S.C. 81 94 83 79 79 97 61 78 65 80
BMB Investment Bank - BMEB 0 88 71 73 79 87 79 93 0 63
Commercial Bank of Bahrain B.S.C. 86 81 78 67 85 74 81 93 87 82
Gulf International Bank BSC 90 94 80 75 71 55 47 35 45 66
Investcorp Bank EC 66 66 54 35 37 45 80 60 25 52
National Bank of Bahrain 90 95 77 63 74 64 66 84 79 77
Shamil Bank of Bahrain EC 76 75 72 65 93 0 31 57 61
TA1B Bank E.C. 73 43 39 49 51 23 37 62 88 52
United Gulf Bank (BSC) EC 36 85 31 83 51 91 87 92 60 68
Al Watany Bank of Egypt 41 93 92 89 82 49 72 94 80 77
Alexandria Commercial and Maritime Bank SAE 46 48 47 91 96 90 88 92 23 69
Arab African International Bank 19 32 87 81 28 55 55 94 70 58
Arab Banking Corporation - Egypt 90 74 69 84 82 70 82 79
Arab International Bank 67 70 50 79 79 82 72 81 74
Arab Investment Bank - FABFDI 64 29 38 33 28 29 38 46 36 38
Bank of Alexandria 56 34 56 60 33 45 48 44 63 49
Bank of Commerce & Development 42 62 33 34 32 25 25 16 22 32
Banque du Caire 91 45 47 72 52 63 80 91 59 67
Banque du Caire et de Paris SAE 94 84 71 61 29 52 32 48 36 56
Banque Misr 54 65 67 81 80 85 68 89 95 76
Cairo Barclays Bank SAE 87 75 71 83 73 67 42 86 70 73
Cairo Far East Bank 78 92 84 56 49 57 56 77 58 67
Commercial International Bank (Egypt) S.A.E. 89 62 85 92 64 52 61 75 72 73
Credit Agricole Indosuez Egypte 63 92 94 87 78 79 65 54 39 73
Delta International Bank 0 38 71 30 23 88 95 95 92 59
Egyptian American Bank 90 85 86 91 84 79 63 78 55 79
Egyptian Arab Land Bank 38 27 27 43 43 57 92 93 69 54
Egyptian Gulf Bank 50 34 54 60 66 62 41 42 43 50
Egyptian Saudi Finance Bank 93 86 74 93 72 90 66 91 89 84
Export Development Bank of EgYP t 66 77 78 72 78 40 70 80 58 69
Faisal IS of Egypt 75 60 68 56 70 60 85 94 95 74
Housing and Development Bank 50 53 58 72 88 76 85 82 57 69
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Firm\Year 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 Avg.
HSBC Bank Egypt S A E 76 65 79 59 71 68 51 60 66 66
Misr America International Bank 69 74 96 93 85 91 89 89 43 81
Misr Exterior Bank 89 88 70 87 83 82 81 0 16 66
MISR International Bank 91 67 42 81 93 94 92 97 88 83
MISR Iran Development Bank 59 29 63 43 53 75 75 86 66 61
Misr Romanian Bank 52 85 34 72 82 78 69 82 55 68
Mohandes Bank 22 44 29 97 97 18 22 31 30 43
National Bank for Development 84 88 92 95 59 59 64 92 81 79
National Bank of Egypt 95 70 53 69 71 52 56 84 61 68
National Societe Generale Bank SAE 88 89 90 77 77 89 73 93 77 83
Nile Bank (The) 64 58 36 45 53 30 36 54 88 51
Port Said National Bank for Development 92 90 85 83 67 86 92 84 83
Societe Arabe Internationale de Banque 75 62 74 50 50 45 50 68 55 59
Suez Canal Bank 50 23 54 70 73 57 62 73 58 58
Arab Bank PLC 68 61 77 64 71 68 68 80 55 68
Arab Banking Corporation (Jordan) 85 76 91 86 65 55 77 80 67 76
Arab Jordan Investment Bank 94 63 31 28 34 24 21 39 30 41
Bank of Jordan Plc 90 68 28 59 93 61 50 55 95 66
Cairo Amman Bank 89 62 57 71 94 89 78 81 54 75
Housing Bank for Trade & Finance (The) 83 33 26 47 40 39 48 78 41 48
Industrial Development Bank 91 46 49 32 87 86 90 88 0 63
Jordan Gulf Bank 0 93 91 77 94 1 23 73 60
Jordan Investment & Finance Bank 61 75 76 73 61 41 33 45 38 56
Jordan IS for Finance and Investment 96 80 84 87 85 63 72 73 59 78
Jordan Kuwait Bank 87 64 91 77 76 57 94 95 83 81
Jordan National Bank Plc 95 82 74 82 65 67 46 0 24 59
Philadelphia Investment Bank 92 78 35 42 20 44 58 51 43 51
Union Bank for Savings & Investment 51 44 34 16 11 0 48 42 33 31
Al Bank Al Saudi Al Fransi 31 53 65 64 58 61 56 70 52 57
Al-Rajhi Banking & Investment Corporation 83 90 74 83 78 57 75 88 88 79
Arab Investment Company SAA (The) 43 90 40 42 48 82 72 61 68 61
Arab National Bank 73 79 82 76 88 58 37 53 43 65
Arab Petroleum Invest. Corp. 86 83 54 73 38 78 19 59 51 60
Bank Al-Jazira 79 0 0 47 58 57 63 92 67 52
National Commercial Bank (The) 72 87 68 69 85 79 48 0 93 67
Riyad Bank 56 78 46 59 67 64 59 78 56 63
Saudi American Bank 85 80 94 86 73 65 74 39 66 73
Saudi British Bank (The) 49 48 93 73 67 56 73 77 57 66
Saudi Hollandi Bank 72 69 72 76 67 61 52 61 51 65
Saudi Investment Bank (The) 85 75 79 72 76 46 53 51 39 64
United Saudi Bank 53 48 88 80 88 87 86 94 84 79
Avg. 70 67 65 68 66 65 63 68 59 66
Source: Author's own estimation
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Table 6-27: Alternative Profit Efficiency levels for Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain
Banks over 1992-2000 — Individual Bank Estimates
Firm\Year 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 Avg.
Al Baraka IS BSC 66 54 88 93 92 88 86 25 86 76
Al-Ahli United Bank (Bahrain) B.S.C. 41 94 72 94 79 40 45 56 36 62
Alubaf Arab International Bank 34 32 48 31 60 60 69 76 83 55
Arab Banking Corporation BSC 90 90 46 93 94 90 46 75 51 75
Arab Financial Services Company - AFS 75 88 71 65 26 85 53 14 16 55
Bahrain Development Bank B.S.C. 88 76 52 83 44 38 68 87 79 68
Bahrain International Bank E.C. 40 94 49 58 38 59 21 14 3 42
Bahrain IS B.S.C. 44 33 49 52 49 45 53 89 51
Bahraini Saudi Bank (The) BSC 71 68 66 56 58 75 69 83 44 65
Bank of Bahrain and Kuwait B.S.C. 91 88 69 50 62 97 44 60 59 69
BMB Investment Bank - BMEB 0 76 65 88 49 55 69 96 0 55
Commercial Bank of Bahrain B.S.C. 39 57 55 73 71 82 78 93 83 70
Gulf International Bank BSC 90 88 89 88 90 74 63 28 46 73
Investcorp Bank EC 31 35 53 46 26 38 31 62 81 45
National Bank of Bahrain 73 94 56 45 45 36 47 55 81 59
Shamil Bank of Bahrain EC 88 79 65 71 93 0 46 90 68
TAIB Bank E.C. 53 40 47 33 21 14 27 87 71 44
United Gulf Bank (BSC) EC 41 88 38 84 73 85 61 85 47 67
Al Watany Bank of Egypt 86 84 92 73 83 51 60 92 62 76
Alexandria Commercial and Maritime Bank SAE 25 50 46 83 97 96 82 86 19 65
Arab African International Bank 23 27 49 46 18 34 29 89 45 40
Arab Banking Corporation - Egypt 86 60 72 69 52 47 63 69
Arab International Bank 70 79 51 45 42 48 68 88 64
Arab Investment Bank - FABFDI 48 20 31 24 33 29 25 32 26 30
Bank of Alexandria 75 30 81 68 28 63 58 63 37 56
Bank of Commerce & Development 84 26 20 27 38 29 28 48 27 36
Banque du Caire 55 43 61 79 58 64 84 91 58 66
Banque du Caire et de Paris SAE 85 88 70 85 24 44 23 27 20 52
Banque Misr 83 92 86 86 89 70 64 90 93 84
Cairo Barclays Bank SAE 92 67 66 81 92 85 43 91 63 75
Cairo Far East Bank 44 44 46 49 24 49 39 39 34 41
Commercial International Bank (Egypt) S.A.E. 95 53 88 66 48 43 40 57 66 62
Credit Agricole Indosuez Egypte 62 82 95 69 69 73 56 50 30 65
Delta International Bank 0 36 61 20 19 90 89 97 91 56
Egyptian American Bank 94 84 94 89 83 79 59 87 47 80
Egyptian Arab Land Bank 45 36 32 26 53 75 88 93 52 56
Egyptian Gulf Bank 47 50 81 50 56 56 37 30 33 49
Egyptian Saudi Finance Bank 95 28 37 89 37 86 82 68 76 66
Export Development Bank of Egypt 92 85 62 44 52 31 52 62 59 60
Faisal IS of Egypt 81 51 44 38 26 34 56 95 89 57
Housing and Development Bank 65 63 63 76 88 63 91 88 65 74
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Firm\Year 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 Avg.
HSBC Bank Egypt S A E 48 83 51 70 91 81 49 55 50 64
Misr America International Bank 85 68 93 68 68 85 78 92 40 75
Misr Exterior Bank 74 68 68 74 55 83 75 0 10 56
MISR International Bank 82 48 53 57 90 87 78 97 73 74
MISR Iran Development Bank 62 32 35 41 51 77 80 78 55 57
Misr Romanian Bank 27 77 30 46 63 56 49 56 45 50
Mohandes Bank 23 78 30 95 97 16 18 28 33 47
National Bank for Development 77 80 91 94 42 45 51 81 71 70
National Bank of Egypt 91 88 36 86 80 51 50 91 82 73
National Societe Generale Bank SAE 89 92 88 75 72 90 70 95 65 82
Nile Bank (The) 85 61 27 27 37 24 22 32 88 45
Port Said National Bank for Development 26 14 82 94 83 94 86 81 66
Societe Arabe Internationale de Banque 35 42 51 28 44 30 32 49 42 39
Suez Canal Bank 41 19 87 87 73 55 60 69 53 60
Arab Bank PLC 32 52 71 92 91 82 78 84 85 74
Arab Banking Corporation (Jordan) 34 31 48 79 45 38 35 45 38 44
Arab Jordan Investment Bank 39 48 42 38 32 34 36 50 41 40
Bank of Jordan Plc 47 62 22 46 53 47 43 64 96 53
Cairo Amman Bank 70 55 29 32 87 74 72 85 85 66
Housing Bank for Trade & Finance (The) 62 37 33 27 32 23 37 46 32 37
Industrial Development Bank 79 71 44 86 37 50 40 44 0 50
Jordan Gulf Bank 0 94 44 94 15 2 29 24 38
Jordan Investment & Finance Bank 82 76 64 70 58 45 34 51 48 59
Jordan IS for Finance and Investment 95 80 79 52 45 27 34 44 41 55
Jordan Kuwait Bank 30 88 94 74 29 39 67 85 69 64
Jordan National Bank Plc 80 54 84 75 64 42 21 0 20 49
Philadelphia Investment Bank 91 23 23 13 11 28 36 62 43 37
Union Bank for Savings & Investment 40 36 28 11 10 0 55 42 21 27
Al Bank Al Saudi Al Fransi 14 28 39 41 45 46 41 58 58 41
Al-Rajhi Banking & Investment Corporation 59 23 53 68 91 11 44 51 70 52
Arab Investment Company SAA (The) 40 25 28 18 30 81 18 56 45 38
Arab National Bank 88 90 66 59 83 75 42 52 43 66
Arab Petroleum Invest. Corp. 73 79 33 40 51 63 15 80 53 54
Bank Al-Jazira 84 0 0 34 23 26 47 88 51 39
National Commercial Bank (The) 50 86 57 33 88 90 57 0 96 62
Riyad Bank 40 73 46 51 66 64 59 81 56 60
Saudi American Bank 48 77 93 78 77 89 88 53 86 77
Saudi British Bank (The) 41 45 78 45 53 49 52 52 43 51
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Firm\Year 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 Avg.
Saudi Hollandi Bank 79 92 50 53 63 50 37 43 43 57
Saudi Investment Bank (The) 64 75 67 55 58 45 77 89 66 66
United Saudi Bank 46 37 93 87 60 80 92 93 85 75
Avg. 61 60 58 60 58 57 52 62 55 58
Source: Author's own estimation
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Table 6-28: Cost Efficiency scale elasticities estimates for Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and
Bahrain Banks over 1992-2000 - Individual Bank Estimates
Firm\Year 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 Avg.
Al Baraka IS BSC 0.92 1.03 1.04 1.10 1.14 0.69 0.73 0.76 0.80 0.91
Al-Ahli United Bank (Bahrain) B.S.C. 0.94 0.93 1.01 1.16 1.01 0.96 0.94 1.03 1.12 1.01
Alubaf Arab International Bank 1.26 1.44 1.17 0.93 1.19 1.14 1.15 1.14 1.12 1.17
Arab Banking Corporation BSC 0.40 0.45 0.32 0.30 0.22 0.16 0.12 0.13 -0.09 0.22
Arab Financial Services Company - AFS 1.58 1.48 1.29 1.05 1.19 1.06 0.86 1.26 1.30 1.23
Bahrain Development Bank B.S.C. 2.32 2.71 2.37 1.88 2.01 1.69 1.56 1.69 1.63 1.98
Bahrain International Bank E.C. 1.31 1.35 1.35 1.56 1.53 1.35 1.66 1.73 1.85 1.52
Bahrain IS B.S.C. - 1.17 1.22 1.32 1.33 1.33 1.28 1.34 1.55 1.30
Bahraini Saudi Bank (The) BSC 1.01 0.99 1.05 1.05 1.03 1.15 1.14 1.15 1.12 1.08
Bank of Bahrain and Kuwait B.S.C. 1.53 1.48 1.53 1.45 1.39 1.38 1.29 1.30 1.36 1.41
BMB Investment Bank - BMEB 1.21 1.10 1.27 1.36 1.49 1.63 1.96 1.98 2.06 1.56
Commercial Bank of Bahrain B.S.C. 1.07 1.02 1.05 1.12 1.12 1.14 1.11 1.07 1.12 1.09
Gulf International Bank BSC 1.14 1.10 1.11 1.19 1.18 1.18 1.14 1.15 1.23 1.16
Investcorp Bank EC 2.07 1.91 2.01 1.93 2.06 2.02 1.93 1.77 1.81 1.94
National Bank of Bahrain 0.68 0.56 0.52 0.65 0.71 0.83 1.06 1.04 1.13 0.80
Shamil Bank of Bahrain EC - 1.28 1.02 1.11 1.45 1.35 1.31 0.81 0.89 1.17
TAIB Bank E.C. 0.90 0.88 1.01 1.45 1.25 1.39 1.29 1.16 1.34 1.19
United Gulf Bank (BSC) EC 1.45 1.63 1.59 1.62 1.51 1.49 1.38 1.27 1.29 1.47
Al Watany Bank of Egypt 0.83 0.84 0.83 0.88 0.95 1.03 1.18 1.24 1.24 1.00
Alexandria Commercial and Maritime Bank SAE 0.75 0.87 0.90 0.89 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.96 0.96 0.89
Arab African International Bank 1.34 0.66 0.57 0.58 0.71 0.66 0.74 0.67 0.69 0.74
Arab Banking Corporation - Egypt - 0.87 0.86 0.84 0.87 0.86 0.85 0.87 0.85
Arab International Bank - 0.26 0.19 0.23 0.44 0.50 0.47 0.36 0.44 0.35
Arab Investment Bank - FABFDI 0.88 0.96 0.93 0.89 0.83 0.82 0.88 0.89 0.89 0.89
Bank of Alexandria 0.96 1.06 1.23 1.24 1.08 1.21 1.22 1.24 1.21 1.16
Bank of Commerce & Development 0.71 1.05 0.76 0.82 0.75 0.75 0.77 0.77 0.81 0.80
Banque du Caire 0.97 0.98 1.02 -0.19 1.01 0.95 0.88 0.76 0.74 0.79
Banque du Caire et de Paris SAE 0.57 0.73 0.62 0.56 0.80 0.82 0.82 0.79 0.86 0.73
Banque Misr 1.14 0.93 0.88 0.81 0.74 0.73 0.84 0.66 0.47 0.80
Cairo Barclays Bank SAE 0.60 0.78 0.68 0.71 0.82 0.86 0.83 0.80 0.82 0.77
Cairo Far East Bank 0.93 0.89 0.77 0.64 0.52 0.67 0.69 0.68 0.68 0.72
Commercial International Bank (Egypt) S.A.E. 0.92 0.97 1.03 1.08 1.07 1.12 1.19 1.15 1.14 1.07
Credit Agricole Indosuez Egypte 0.77 0.82 0.78 0.78 0.88 0.86 0.84 0.83 0.79 0.82
Delta International Bank 0.93 0.95 0.92 0.90 0.84 0.85 0.87 0.89 0.93 0.90
Egyptian American Bank 0.75 0.85 0.84 1.05 1.10 1.16 1.20 1.19 1.18 1.03
Egyptian Arab Land Bank 1.18 1.40 1.23 1.22 1.50 1.74 1.73 1.55 1.46 1.44
Egyptian Gulf Bank 1.00 1.10 1.13 1.02 0.85 0.97 1.09 1.00 0.89 1.01
Egyptian Saudi Finance Bank 0.95 1.34 1.72 1.74 1.77 1.88 1.88 1.88 1.89 1.67
Export Development Bank of Egypt 0.88 0.91 0.96 0.95 1.01 1.11 1.17 1.34 1.37 1.08
Faisal IS of Egypt 1.63 1.62 1.62 1.68 1.69 1.74 1.68 1.71 1.30 1.63
Housing and Development Bank 1.40 1.45 1.44 1.35 1.54 1.58 1.57 1.60 1.57 1.50
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Firm\Year 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 Avg.
HSBC Bank Egypt S A E 0.68 0.75 0.69 0.75 0.77 0.75 0.98 1.03 0.92 0.81
Misr America International Bank 0.83 0.89 1.00 0.95 0.87 0.84 0.83 0.81 0.84 0.87
Misr Exterior Bank 1.03 1.00 0.82 0.82 0.91 1.20 1.29 1.35 1.31 1.08
MISR International Bank 1.01 0.99 0.85 0.99 1.02 1.08 1.15 1.21 1.16 1.05
MISR Iran Development Bank 0.84 0.88 0.91 0.90 0.82 0.76 0.78 0.81 0.82 0.84
Misr Romanian Bank 0.89 1.74 0.85 0.85 0.81 0.81 0.86 1.00 0.99 0.98
Mohandes Bank 0.87 0.82 0.97 1.00 1.15 1.28 1.34 1.42 1.42 1.14
National Bank for Development 1.01 1.06 1.16 1.19 1.21 1.29 1.32 1.40 1.41 1.23
National Bank of Egypt 1.05 0.88 0.74 0.60 0.57 0.44 0.36 0.15 -0.02 0.53
National Societe Generale Bank SAE 0.98 0.92 0.85 0.88 0.94 1.00 1.02 1.06 1.03 0.96
Nile Bank (The) 0.99 1.00 0.97 0.99 0.97 0.85 0.90 1.15 1.15 1.00
Port Said National Bank for Development - 0.97 0.63 0.60 0.65 0.69 0.67 0.72 0.70 0.74
Soci6te Arabe Internationale de Banque 0.90 0.90 0.82 0.88 0.88 0.94 0.87 0.83 0.85 0.87
Suez Canal Bank 0.88 1.05 0.94 1.10 1.20 1.15 1.18 1.26 1.30 1.12
Arab Bank PLC 1.00 0.97 1.13 1.05 0.96 0.83 0.76 0.71 0.69 0.90
Arab Banking Corporation (Jordan) 1.04 0.49 1.05 1.09 1.09 1.06 1.03 1.03 0.97 0.98
Arab Jordan Investment Bank 1.17 1.13 1.25 1.30 1.25 1.31 1.26 1.24 1.24 1.24
Bank of Jordan Plc 1.20 1.23 1.19 1.25 1.10 1.19 1.17 1.17 1.16 1.19
Cairo Amman Bank 1.18 1.12 1.17 1.24 1.09 1.12 1.10 1.15 1.03 1.13
Housing Bank for Trade & Finance (The) 1.08 1.36 1.49 1.44 1.58 1.46 1.28 1.26 1.15 1.34
Industrial Development Bank 1.16 1.01 1.08 1.12 1.08 1.05 1.04 1.07 0.61 1.02
Jordan Gulf Bank 1.04 1.20 1.90 1.66 1.37 1.17 1.21 1.24 1.32
Jordan Investment & Finance Bank 0.88 0.92 0.95 1.06 1.06 1.09 1.11 1.12 1.08 1.03
Jordan IS for Finance and Investment 1.23 1.33 1.41 1.48 1.55 1.50 1.45 1.37 1.29 1.40
Jordan Kuwait Bank 1.05 1.06 1.07 0.89 1.12 1.13 1.18 1.10 1.03 1.07
Jordan National Bank Plc 1.35 1.20 1.23 1.32 1.32 1.38 1.44 1.31 1.22 1.31
Philadelphia Investment Bank 1.38 1.33 0.95 1.05 0.92 1.09 1.13 1.20 1.16 1.13
Union Bank for Savings & Investment 1.06 1.02 1.10 1.02 1.10 1.21 1.24 1.12 1.05 1.10
Al Bank Al Saudi Al Fransi 1.05 1.01 1.06 1.08 1.06 1.06 0.99 0.96 0.96 1.03
Al-Rajhi Banking & Investment Corporation 0.81 0.75 0.50 0.51 0.30 0.24 0.57 0.45 0.55 0.52
Arab Investment Company SAA (The) 0.93 0.79 0.93 0.99 1.10 1.17 1.10 1.25 1.31 1.06
Arab National Bank 1.04 0.96 1.00 1.02 1.09 1.10 1.09 0.99 0.98 1.03
Arab Petroleum Invest. Corp. 1.09 1.02 1.02 1.05 1.05 1.30 1.31 1.33 1.56 1.19
Bank Al-Jazira 0.77 0.72 0.66 0.68 0.66 0.75 0.78 0.94 1.10 0.78
National Commercial Bank (The) 0.51 0.41 0.25 0.13 0.13 -0.08 -0.21 0.56 0.52 0.25
Riyad Bank 1.09 0.96 0.89 1.01 0.94 0.91 0.76 0.79 0.78 0.90
Saudi American Bank 1.11 1.04 0.92 0.93 1.04 1.03 0.83 0.37 0.39 0.85
Saudi British Bank (The) 0.91 0.97 1.00 1.06 1.08 1.12 1.00 0.93 0.95 1.00
Saudi Hollandi Bank 1.24 1.28 1.39 1.38 1.08 1.05 1.11 1.12 1.11 1.19
Saudi Investment Bank (The) 0.90 0.94 0.97 1.16 1.09 1.21 1.25 1.27 1.29 1.12
United Saudi Bank 0.78 0.86 0.90 0.94 0.99 1.05 1.12 1.09 1.10 0.98
Avg. 1.03 1.04 1.02 1.03 1.06 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.06 1.05
Source: Author's own estimation
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Table 6-29: Standard Profit Efficiency scale elasticities for Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and
Bahrain Banks over 1992-2000 - Individual Bank Estimates
Firm\Year 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 Avg.
Al Baraka IS BSC 0.42 0.93 0.64 0.69 0.68 0.52 1.53 0.16 0.92 0.72
Al-Ahli United Bank (Bahrain) B.S.C. 0.42 0.99 0.81 0.70 0.92 0.51 1.41 0.08 0.67 0.72
Alubaf Arab International Bank 0.41 1.09 0.91 0.66 0.94 0.63 1.31 0.88 0.52 0.82
Arab Banking Corporation BSC 0.42 1.23 0.94 0.77 0.89 0.64 1.39 0.81 0.70 0.87
Arab Financial Services Company - AFS 0.45 1.28 1.09 0.63 0.80 1.00 1.28 0.86 0.26 0.85
Bahrain Development Bank B.S.C. 0.31 1.34 1.13 0.52 1.08 0.20 1.24 0.79 0.32 0.77
Bahrain International Bank E.C. 0.33 1.36 1.13 1.34 1.65 0.96 1.25 0.76 0.91 1.07
Bahrain IS B.S.C. 1.29 0.80 1.61 0.59 0.85 1.25 0.77 0.70 0.91
Bahraini Saudi Bank (The) BSC 0.28 0.58 0.69 1.74 0.53 0.77 1.29 0.80 0.71 0.82
Bank of Bahrain and Kuwait B.S.C. 0.66 0.50 0.63 1.74 0.51 0.77 1.32 0.74 0.72 0.84
BMB Investment Bank - BMEB 0.78 0.29 0.58 1.72 0.50 0.88 1.30 0.72 0.83 0.84
Commercial Bank of Bahrain B.S.C. 0.81 0.42 0.39 1.71 0.45 0.88 1.36 0.33 0.92 0.81
Gulf International Bank BSC 0.82 0.55 0.38 1.63 0.03 0.81 0.31 0.83 0.76 0.68
Investcorp Bank EC 1.03 0.54 0.42 1.71 0.02 0.83 0.24 0.60 0.57 0.66
National Bank of Bahrain 1.04 0.26 0.50 1.94 0.69 0.85 0.18 0.38 0.32 0.69
Shamil Bank of Bahrain EC 0.19 0.45 0.62 0.56 1.00 0.24 0.45 0.25 0.55
TAIB Bank E.C. 1.16 0.21 1.22 0.78 0.70 1.08 0.26 0.24 0.33 0.67
United Gulf Bank (BSC) EC 1.17 0.75 1.05 0.86 0.81 1.06 0.31 0.16 0.29 0.72
Al Watany Bank of Egypt 0.73 0.63 0.88 0.95 0.54 1.10 0.22 0.28 0.78 0.68
Alexandria Commercial and Maritime Bank SAE 0.01 0.59 1.05 1.27 0.85 1.21 0.28 0.47 1.71 0.83
Arab African International Bank 0.39 0.58 0.84 1.31 0.78 1.24 0.28 0.98 1.72 0.90
Arab Banking Corporation - Egypt - 1.13 1.18 1.15 1.14 0.21 0.52 1.27 0.84
Arab International Bank 0.57 1.02 1.25 1.23 0.97 0.19 0.48 1.58 0.85
Arab Investment Bank - FABFDI 0.31 0.61 1.07 1.20 1.30 0.97 0.29 0.45 1.47 0.85
Bank of Alexandria 0.28 0.59 0.90 1.23 1.05 1.09 0.22 0.40 1.41 0.80
Bank of Commerce & Development 0.16 0.57 0.85 1.11 1.05 1.06 0.01 0.51 1.56 0.76
Banque du Caire 0.24 1.38 0.78 0.88 1.07 1.12 0.06 0.53 1.26 0.81
Banque du Caire et de Paris SAE 1.77 1.32 0.60 0.82 1.23 1.23 0.16 0.66 1.33 1.01
Banque Misr 1.66 1.28 0.81 0.99 1.28 1.20 0.10 0.92 1.40 1.07
Cairo Barclays Bank SAE 1.60 1.27 0.79 0.87 1.28 1.13 0.11 0.15 1.39 0.96
Cairo Far East Bank 1.82 1.26 0.63 0.88 1.20 1.06 0.36 1.05 1.23 1.05
Commercial International Bank (Egypt) S.A.E. 1.81 1.24 0.65 1.00 1.09 1.58 0.21 1.01 1.21 1.09
Credit Agricole Indosuez Egypte 1.83 1.27 0.59 0.93 1.30 1.75 0.21 0.93 1.09 1.10
Delta International Bank 1.87 1.34 0.14 1.36 1.31 1.73 0.28 0.93 1.11 1.12
Egyptian American Bank 1.77 1.37 1.09 1.42 1.35 1.69 0.24 0.82 1.18 1.22
Egyptian Arab Land Bank 1.83 0.95 1.09 1.48 1.39 1.58 0.21 0.73 1.12 1.15
Egyptian Gulf Bank 0.90 1.00 0.79 1.47 1.23 1.61 0.24 0.62 1.11 1.00
Egyptian Saudi Finance Bank 0.68 0.93 0.85 1.50 1.22 1.61 0.25 0.65 1.36 1.01
Export Development Bank of Egypt 1.03 1.00 1.15 1.46 1.23 1.69 0.26 0.74 1.28 1.09
Faisal IS of Egypt 1.08 0.71 1.09 1.36 1.27 1.77 0.42 0.49 1.20 1.04
Housing and Development Bank 0.96 0.74 1.16 1.36 1.18 0.75 0.35 0.30 1.01 0.87
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Firm\Year 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 Avg.
HSBC Bank Egypt S A E 1.23 0.79 0.92 1.35 0.92 0.77 0.47 0.36 0.94 0.86
Misr America International Bank 1.16 0.98 0.86 0.87 0.73 1.13 0.61 0.23 1.16 0.86
Misr Exterior Bank 1.30 1.02 0.98 0.82 0.84 1.24 0.61 0.00 1.31 0.90
MISR International Bank 1.18 1.64 0.63 0.60 0.70 1.35 0.52 0.13 1.19 0.88
MISR Iran Development Bank 0.25 1.52 0.62 0.62 0.81 1.37 0.44 0.17 1.24 0.78
Misr Romanian Bank 0.55 1.51 0.71 0.65 1.09 1.48 0.36 0.21 1.51 0.90
Mohandes Bank 0.57 1.48 0.67 0.68 1.09 1.50 0.31 1.63 1.18 1.01
National Bank for Development 0.72 1.48 0.70 0.69 1.18 1.49 0.66 1.55 1.10 1.06
National Bank of Egypt 0.61 1.44 0.41 0.48 1.06 0.78 0.48 1.30 1.11 0.85
National Societe Generale Bank SAE 0.63 1.45 0.41 0.26 0.89 0.79 0.45 1.23 1.02 0.79
Nile Bank (The) 0.85 1.44 0.40 0.74 0.92 0.80 0.59 1.11 0.96 0.87
Port Said National Bank for Development - 1.43 1.65 0.71 0.52 0.76 0.57 1.03 1.05 0.96
Societe Arabe Internationale de Banque 0.76 1.26 1.78 0.64 0.54 0.62 0.72 1.08 1.07 0.94
Suez Canal Bank 0.96 1.15 1.58 0.71 0.54 0.69 0.71 1.03 1.06 0.94
Arab Bank PLC 0.67 1.22 1.55 0.63 0.54 0.64 0.62 1.05 1.04 0.89
Arab Banking Corporation (Jordan) 0.45 0.92 1.72 0.61 0.55 0.81 0.64 1.08 0.99 0.86
Arab Jordan Investment Bank 0.61 1.19 1.53 0.66 0.44 0.86 0.60 1.17 0.80 0.87
Bank of Jordan Plc 0.34 0.94 1.52 0.70 0.35 1.03 0.33 1.53 0.84 0.84
Cairo Amman Bank 0.53 0.84 1.38 0.66 0.84 1.03 0.43 1.46 0.96 0.90
Housing Bank for Trade & Finance (The) 0.80 0.66 1.67 0.66 0.88 1.14 0.30 1.52 1.05 0.96
Industrial Development Bank 0.71 0.59 0.51 0.81 1.00 1.13 0.33 1.41 1.02 0.83
Jordan Gulf Bank - 1.11 0.03 0.78 0.98 0.94 0.33 0.73 1.01 0.70
Jordan Investment & Finance Bank 0.68 1.22 0.52 0.80 1.14 0.82 0.26 0.81 0.99 0.81
Jordan IS for Finance and Investment 0.64 1.28 0.53 1.18 1.13 0.85 0.35 0.70 1.42 0.90
Jordan Kuwait Bank 0.50 0.77 0.72 1.13 1.15 0.89 0.32 0.19 1.42 0.79
Jordan National Bank Plc 0.50 0.94 0.50 1.22 0.96 0.86 0.20 0.07 1.23 0.72
Philadelphia Investment Bank 0.51 0.84 0.48 1.30 0.78 1.28 0.34 0.05 0.92 0.72
Union Bank for Savings & Investment 0.50 1.01 0.36 1.14 1.70 1.15 0.05 0.30 0.90 0.79
Al Bank Al Saudi Al Fransi 0.61 1.20 0.58 0.32 1.53 0.80 0.05 0.23 0.91 0.69
Al-Rajhi Banking & Investment Corporation 0.57 0.77 0.52 0.34 1.35 0.57 0.06 0.68 0.90 0.64
Arab Investment Company SAA (The) 0.14 1.09 1.57 0.14 1.46 0.59 0.09 0.16 0.85 0.68
Arab National Bank 0.65 1.03 1.51 0.38 1.35 0.51 0.03 0.21 0.83 0.72
Arab Petroleum Invest. Corp. 0.67 0.81 1.29 0.41 1.36 0.58 0.05 0.38 1.76 0.81
Bank Al-Jazira 0.69 0.98 1.49 0.61 1.39 0.62 0.07 1.52 1.66 1.00
National Commercial Bank (The) 0.80 0.83 1.54 0.95 1.31 0.70 0.67 1.43 1.36 1.07
Riyad Bank 0.87 0.74 1.52 1.35 1.32 1.32 0.43 1.36 1.32 1.14
Saudi American Bank 0.62 0.30 1.60 1.59 0.03 1.39 0.32 1.24 1.22 0.92
Saudi British Bank (The) 0.58 0.37 1.63 0.15 0.33 1.58 0.20 1.07 0.99 0.77
Saudi Hollandi Bank 0.64 0.43 1.11 0.50 0.33 1.48 0.32 0.93 0.90 0.74
Saudi Investment Bank (The) 0.88 0.12 0.82 0.50 0.41 1.54 0.32 0.90 0.95 0.72
United Saudi Bank 1.30 0.69 0.75 0.61 0.44 1.51 0.16 0.94 0.91 0.82
Avg. 0.78 0.94 0.91 0.96 0.93 1.05 0.46 0.72 1.04 0.87
Source: Author's own estimation
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Table 6-30: Alternative Profit Efficiency scale elasticities estimates for Jordan, Egypt, Saudi
Arabia and Bahrain Banks over 1992-2000 - Individual Bank Estimates
Firm\Year 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 Avg.
Al Baraka IS BSC 0.48 1.28 0.09 0.55 0.13 0.12 1.13 0.94 2.80 0.83
Al-Ahli United Bank (Bahrain) B.S.C. 0.64 1.36 0.22 0.21 0.01 0.08 1.16 0.97 0.30 0.55
Alubaf Arab International Bank 0.68 1.51 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.03 1.31 0.48 0.57 0.53
Arab Banking Corporation BSC 0.82 1.63 0.01 0.03 0.22 0.19 1.51 0.07 1.39 0.65
Arab Financial Services Company - AFS 0.92 1.73 0.10 0.18 0.34 0.86 1.74 0.05 1.51 0.82
Bahrain Development Bank B.S.C. 0.46 1.91 0.15 0.33 0.64 0.11 3.06 0.21 1.77 0.96
Bahrain International Bank E.C. 0.43 1.89 0.18 0.73 1.22 1.31 3.24 0.24 0.66 1.10
Bahrain IS B.S.C. - 2.03 0.59 1.47 1.24 0.29 2.95 0.25 0.69 1.11
Bahraini Saudi Bank (The) BSC 0.32 0.56 0.31 1.36 1.17 0.26 3.06 0.30 0.32 0.85
Bank of Bahrain and Kuwait B.S.C. 0.23 0.68 0.11 1.40 1.07 0.32 3.06 0.31 0.59 0.86
BMB Investment Bank - BMEB 0.40 0.88 0.06 1.89 1.00 0.15 3.08 0.27 0.49 0.91
Commercial Bank of Bahrain B.S.C. 0.09 1.10 0.01 1.75 0.93 0.13 3.07 0.14 0.27 0.83
Gulf International Bank BSC 0.84 1.01 0.02 1.68 0.08 0.33 0.11 0.68 1.31 0.67
Investcorp Bank EC 0.17 0.63 0.13 1.93 0.14 0.93 1.03 0.32 1.71 0.78
National Bank of Bahrain 0.59 0.55 0.15 1.76 0.16 0.74 0.24 0.79 1.82 0.76
Shamil Bank of Bahrain EC - 0.45 0.30 1.35 0.06 0.25 0.10 0.54 1.57 0.58
TAIB Bank E.C. 0.62 0.41 0.26 0.15 0.23 0.48 0.37 0.69 1.64 0.54
United Gulf Bank (B SC) EC 0.74 0.39 0.64 0.17 0.14 0.07 0.44 0.89 1.49 0.55
Al Watany Bank of Egypt 0.48 0.26 1.14 0.37 0.04 0.30 0.44 0.84 0.83 0.52
Alexandria Commercial and Maritime Bank SAE 1.77 0.05 1.09 0.20 0.12 0.34 0.49 0.96 1.83 0.76
Arab African International Bank 1.00 0.19 0.51 0.10 0.27 0.35 0.46 0.36 1.87 0.57
Arab Banking Corporation - Egypt - 0.92 0.42 0.33 0.42 0.09 0.07 2.65 0.65
Arab International Bank - 0.34 0.86 0.60 0.65 0.03 0.21 0.28 2.86 0.77
Arab Investment Bank - FABFDI 1.01 0.19 0.87 0.75 0.11 0.28 0.52 0.49 2.63 0.76
Bank of Alexandria 0.97 0.13 0.83 1.45 0.30 0.35 0.58 0.51 2.73 0.87
Bank of Commerce & Development 1.07 0.17 1.00 1.32 0.37 0.58 0.54 0.79 2.67 0.95
Banque du Caire 0.99 2.17 0.84 1.32 0.52 0.53 0.81 0.73 0.85 0.97
Banque du Caire et de Paris SAE 2.75 2.34 0.04 0.54 0.63 0.41 0.72 0.81 0.84 1.01
Banque Misr 2.88 2.27 0.69 1.20 0.80 0.46 0.97 1.16 2.04 1.39
Cairo Barclays Bank SAE 2.92 2.39 0.59 0.99 0.73 0.51 1.04 1.25 2.16 1.40
Cairo Far East Bank 2.96 2.45 0.20 0.87 0.74 0.61 0.38 1.57 2.74 1.39
Commercial International Bank (Egypt) S.A.E. 2.89 2.64 0.14 0.90 0.16 2.15 0.60 1.55 2.86 1.54
Credit Agricole Indosuez Egypte 2.88 2.60 0.06 0.86 0.78 2.09 0.61 1.15 2.65 1.52
Delta International Bank 2.95 2.38 0.33 0.76 0.58 2.13 0.73 0.92 2.69 1.50
Egyptian American Bank 3.02 2.45 1.63 1.00 0.54 2.31 0.58 0.39 2.80 1.64
Egyptian Arab Land Bank 2.68 0.61 1.78 0.76 0.28 2.66 0.92 0.65 2.71 1.45
Egyptian Gulf Bank 0.88 0.76 1.83 0.57 0.53 2.67 0.73 0.45 2.73 1.24
Egyptian Saudi Finance Bank 0.54 0.92 2.01 1.27 0.49 2.62 0.55 0.50 1.90 1.20
Export Development Bank of Egypt 0.37 1.38 2.01 1.64 0.56 2.67 0.50 0.60 2.06 1.31
Faisal IS of Egypt 0.41 1.35 1.94 1.32 0.56 2.71 0.57 0.25 2.50 1.29
Housing and Development Bank 0.25 1.55 2.11 1.64 0.61 0.29 0.54 0.07 2.69 1.09
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Firm\Year 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 Avg.
HSBC Bank Egypt S A E 0.37 1.69 2.19 1.78 1.10 0.53 0.52 0.02 2.63 1.20
Misr America International Bank 0.45 1.46 2.17 0.49 0.58 0.17 0.80 0.43 1.73 0.92
Misr Exterior Bank 1.77 1.58 1.00 0.34 0.83 0.42 0.97 0.72 2.05 1.07
MISR International Bank 2.16 1.17 0.04 0.00 0.40 0.46 0.98 0.83 2.48 0.95
MISR Iran Development Bank 2.43 2.00 0.05 0.10 0.14 0.71 1.05 0.72 2.59 1.09
Misr Romanian Bank 0.85 1.96 0.07 0.07 0.27 0.75 1.08 0.75 1.77 0.84
Mohandes Bank 0.45 2.10 0.02 0.09 0.07 0.79 1.09 2.08 2.08 0.97
National Bank for Development 0.65 1.93 0.04 0.01 0.26 0.84 0.34 2.18 2.24 0.94
National Bank of Egypt 0.21 2.09 0.01 0.08 0.59 0.41 0.48 2.66 2.46 1.00
National Societe Generale Bank SAE 0.39 1.81 0.02 0.15 0.97 0.39 0.62 2.76 2.18 1.03
Nile Bank (The) 0.33 1.81 0.05 0.32 0.65 0.44 0.66 2.71 2.03 1.00
Port Said National Bank for Development - 1.96 1.51 0.02 0.09 0.33 0.87 2.69 2.61 1.15
Sociëte Arabe Internationale de Banque 0.15 0.66 1.23 0.08 0.09 0.17 1.58 2.78 2.85 1.07
Suez Canal Bank 1.15 0.51 1.40 0.24 0.08 0.01 1.51 2.80 2.78 1.17
Arab Bank PLC 0.50 0.64 1.56 0.30 0.08 0.11 1.97 2.81 0.78 0.97
Arab Banking Corporation (Jordan) 0.03 0.95 1.38 0.55 0.11 1.30 2.23 0.03 0.92 0.83
Arab Jordan Investment Bank 0.86 1.64 1.63 0.48 0.15 1.43 0.03 0.01 1.69 0.88
Bank of Jordan Plc 0.51 1.54 1.75 0.36 0.15 1.74 0.94 0.29 1.78 1.01
Cairo Amman Bank 0.72 1.58 1.67 0.39 0.38 1.66 1.02 0.24 1.89 1.06
Housing Bank for Trade & Finance (The) 1.03 0.76 1.22 0.03 0.03 1.74 0.99 0.36 1.85 0.89
Industrial Development Bank 0.92 0.63 0.32 0.15 0.01 1.25 1.46 0.63 1.92 0.81
Jordan Gulf Bank - 0.51 0.26 0.09 0.15 0.85 1.30 1.47 1.95 0.86
Jordan Investment & Finance Bank 1.16 1.09 0.11 0.07 0.04 0.89 1.31 1.55 2.02 0.92
Jordan IS for Finance and Investment 1.06 1.72 0.14 0.09 0.49 0.82 1.33 1.31 0.10 0.78
Jordan Kuwait Bank 0.94 0.36 0.36 0.43 0.54 0.74 1.08 0.18 0.32 0.55
Jordan National Bank Plc 0.69 1.40 0.21 0.46 0.04 0.76 0.11 0.31 0.98 0.55
Philadelphia Investment Bank 0.65 1.38 0.29 0.50 0.05 0.91 0.19 0.69 1.43 0.68
Union Bank for Savings & Investment 0.59 1.44 0.32 0.64 0.51 0.99 0.58 1.00 1.81 0.88
Al Bank Al Saudi Al Fransi 0.46 1.51 0.38 0.78 0.56 0.68 1.85 1.02 1.60 0.98
Al-Rajhi Banking & Investment Corporation 0.49 1.08 0.08 0.56 0.82 0.18 1.37 1.18 1.76 0.84
Arab Investment Company SAA (The) 0.03 0.35 1.76 0.60 1.01 0.10 0.88 1.11 1.82 0.85
Arab National Bank 0.04 0.20 1.61 0.50 1.51 0.34 0.41 1.26 1.85 0.86
Arab Petroleum Invest. Corp. 0.13 0.20 0.27 0.39 1.44 0.43 0.50 1.41 1.00 0.64
Bank Al-Jazira 0.24 0.41 1.91 0.13 1.35 0.31 0.59 1.14 1.63 0.86
National Commercial Bank (The) 0.63 0.14 1.99 0.23 1.44 0.31 0.73 1.88 2.20 1.06
Riyad Bank 0.68 0.74 2.09 0.12 1.62 0.15 0.36 2.52 2.45 1.19
Saudi American Bank 0.40 1.01 2.32 0.18 0.12 0.08 0.03 2.65 2.35 1.02
Saudi British Bank (The) 0.54 0.95 2.36 0.29 0.04 0.02 0.22 1.94 2.24 0.96
Saudi Hollandi Bank 0.44 1.36 1.75 0.02 0.37 0.17 0.39 1.91 2.25 0.96
Saudi Investment Bank (The) 0.78 0.51 0.72 0.12 0.52 0.25 0.59 2.21 2.26 0.89
United Saudi Bank 0.54 0.18 0.61 0.14 0.28 1.00 0.83 2.79 2.28 0.96
Avg. 0.91 1.18 0.80 0.61 0.48 0.73 0.98 1.01 1.84 0.95
Source: Author's own estimation
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Table 6-31: Cost Efficiency scale Inefficiency levels for Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain
Banks over 1992-2000 — Individual Bank Estimates
Firm\Year 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 Avg.
Al Baraka IS BSC 6 1 1 8 15 54 44 36 28 21
Al-Ahli United Bank (Bahrain) B.S.C. 3 4 0 19 0 1 3 1 10 5
Alubaf Arab International Bank 42 79 21 4 25 14 17 15 12 25
Arab Banking Corporation BSC 95 91 97 98 99 100 100 100 100 98
Arab Financial Services Company - AFS 93 84 50 2 25 3 14 41 51 40
Bahrain Development Bank B.S.C. 100 100 100 100 100 98 92 98 96 98
Bahrain International Bank E.C. 53 62 64 92 90 62 97 99 100 80
Bahrain IS B.S.C. 21 32 56 59 59 48 62 91 49
Bahraini Saudi Bank (The) BSC 0 0 2 2 1 16 15 17 12 7
Bank of Bahrain and Kuwait B.S.C. 89 85 90 80 71 69 50 51 65 72
BMB Investment Bank - BMEB 29 8 44 65 85 96 100 100 100 70
Commercial Bank of Bahrain B.S.C. 4 0 2 11 11 15 9 4 11 8
Gulf International Bank BSC 15 8 10 25 23 22 15 17 36 19
Investcorp Bank EC 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 99 99 100
National Bank of Bahrain 57 79 84 62 50 21 3 1 13 41
Shamil Bank of Bahrain EC 47 0 10 80 63 54 26 10 38
TAIB Bank E.C. 7 11 0 81 40 71 49 19 60 38
United Gulf Bank (B SC) EC 80 96 94 96 88 85 70 43 49 78
Al Watany Bank of Egypt 21 19 22 12 2 1 22 37 37 19
Alexandria Commercial and Maritime Bank SAE 40 12 8 10 8 7 7 1 1 10
Arab African International Bank 61 60 77 76 48 61 42 58 55 60
Arab Banking Corporation - Egypt 12 15 18 12 14 16 12 16
Arab International Bank 99 99 99 92 87 89 96 92 95
Arab Investment Bank - FABFDI 11 1 4 9 21 22 11 10 10 11
Bank of Alexandria 1 3 35 37 5 30 31 36 29 23
Bank of Commerce & Development 48 2 38 24 40 40 34 35 26 32
Banque du Caire 1 0 0 100 0 2 11 38 43 22
Banque du Caire et de Paris SAE 77 45 68 78 28 22 24 29 15 43
Banque Misr 14 4 12 24 42 45 19 61 89 35
Cairo Barclays Bank SAE 72 32 56 48 23 15 21 27 23 35
Cairo Far East Bank 4 10 34 64 85 58 55 57 56 47
Commercial International Bank (Egypt) S.A.E. 5 1 1 5 3 10 26 16 14 9
Credit Agricole Indosuez Egypte 35 23 33 33 12 15 19 20 29 24
Delta International Bank 4 2 5 7 19 17 12 9 4 9
Egyptian American Bank 40 17 19 2 7 19 28 24 23 20
Egyptian Arab Land Bank 23 72 35 33 86 99 99 91 81 69
Egyptian Gulf Bank 0 8 12 0 16 1 6 0 9 6
Egyptian Saudi Finance Bank 2 61 98 99 99 100 100 100 100 84
Export Development Bank of Egypt 11 6 2 2 0 10 20 60 67 20
Faisal IS of Egypt 96 95 96 97 98 99 98 98 51 92
Housing and Development Bank 72 80 80 64 90 94 93 94 93 84
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Firm\Year 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 Avg.
HSBC Bank Egypt S A E 56 40 53 40 35 40 0 1 5 30
Misr America International Bank 20 10 0 2 13 19 21 24 19 14
Misr Exterior Bank 1 0 23 23 6 29 50 62 54 27
MISR International Bank 0 0 16 0 0 5 17 30 19 10
MISR Iran Development Bank 18 12 6 8 22 36 32 24 23 20
Misr Romanian Bank 10 99 16 17 26 25 15 0 0 23
Mohandes Bank 13 24 1 0 17 47 60 75 75 35
National Bank for Development 0 3 18 26 30 49 55 72 74 36
National Bank of Egypt 2 11 41 72 77 92 96 100 100 66
National Societe Generale Bank SAE 0 5 16 10 3 0 0 3 1 4
Nile Bank (The) 0 0 1 0 1 16 8 16 17 6
Port Said National Bank for Development 1 67 73 62 55 58 47 53 46
Societe Arabe Internationale de Banque 8 7 24 12 11 3 12 20 17 13
Suez Canal Bank 10 2 3 8 28 16 22 42 51 20
Arab Bank PLC 0 1 13 2 2 22 37 49 54 20
Arab Banking Corporation (Jordan) 1 88 2 7 6 2 1 1 1 12
Arab Jordan Investment Bank 20 12 39 52 40 54 43 36 36 37
Bank of Jordan Plc 28 35 26 40 7 26 20 22 19 25
Cairo Amman Bank 23 10 21 37 7 11 7 16 1 15
Housing Bank for Trade & Finance (The) 6 64 85 79 93 81 46 41 17 57
Industrial Development Bank 18 0 5 11 5 2 1 3 70 13
Jordan Gulf Bank 1 28 100 97 67 21 30 38 44
Jordan Investment & Finance Bank 11 5 2 3 3 6 10 11 5 6
Jordan IS for Finance and Investment 34 59 74 84 91 87 80 67 50 70
Jordan Kuwait Bank 2 3 4 9 11 12 23 8 1 8
Jordan National Bank Plc 62 28 35 57 57 69 79 54 33 53
Philadelphia Investment Bank 69 57 2 2 5 7 12 26 19 22
Union Bank for Savings & Investment 3 0 8 0 7 31 37 10 2 11
Al Bank Al Saudi Al Fransi 2 0 3 5 3 3 0 1 1 2
Al-Rajhi Banking & Investment Corporation 25 39 86 86 98 99 77 91 81 76
Arab Investment Company SAA (The) 4 30 4 0 8 22 8 39 54 19
Arab National Bank 1 2 0 0 6 8 6 0 0 3
Arab Petroleum Invest. Corp. 6 0 0 2 2 51 55 58 92 29
Bank Al-Jazira 35 47 60 56 61 40 33 3 7 38
National Commercial Bank (The) 85 94 99 100 100 100 100 79 85 93
Riyad Bank 6 1 10 0 3 7 38 30 32 14
Saudi American Bank 10 2 5 4 1 1 20 96 95 26
Saudi British Bank (The) 6 1 0 3 5 11 0 3 2 4
Saudi Hollandi Bank 36 46 71 69 4 2 9 10 10 29
Saudi Investment Bank (The) 8 3 1 18 6 29 40 45 49 22
United Saudi Bank 31 14 8 3 0 2 10 6 8 9
Avg. 28 29 32 36 35 38 37 39 40 35
Source: Author's own estimation
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Table 6-32: Standard Profit scale Inefficiency levels for Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain
Banks over 1992-2000 — Individual Bank Estimates
Firm\Year 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 Avg.
Al Baraka IS BSC 6 96 34 46 42 15 10 0 95 38
Al-Ahli United Bank (Bahrain) B.S.C. 7 100 74 48 95 14 26 0 41 45
Alubaf Arab International Bank 6 93 94 40 97 32 46 89 15 57
Arab Banking Corporation BSC 6 64 97 65 91 34 29 75 49 57
Arab Financial Services Company - AFS 8 53 93 33 72 100 53 84 1 55
Bahrain Development Bank B.S.C. 2 39 86 15 95 1 63 69 2 41
Bahrain International Bank E.C. 2 35 88 40 3 99 60 62 93 53
Bahrain IS B.S.C. - 49 73 5 25 83 60 66 47 46
Bahraini Saudi Bank (The) BSC 1 23 46 1 17 64 49 73 50 36
Bank of Bahrain and Kuwait B.S.C. 39 13 32 1 14 66 43 57 52 35
BMB Investment Bank - BMEB 66 2 24 1 13 89 48 52 80 42
Commercial Bank of Bahrain B.S.C. 74 7 5 2 8 89 35 2 94 35
Gulf International Bank BSC '77 19 4 4 0 75 2 79 63 36
Investcorp Bank EC 99 18 7 2 0 79 1 28 22 28
National Bank of Bahrain 99 1 13 0 46 83 0 5 2 28
Shamil Bank of Bahrain EC 0 9 30 21 100 1 8 1 27
TAIB Bank E.C. 80 1 68 69 49 95 1 1 3 41
United Gulf Bank (B SC) EC 79 60 98 85 75 97 2 0 2 55
Al Watany Bank of Egypt 55 34 89 98 17 92 1 1 66 50
Alexandria Commercial and Maritime Bank SAE 0 25 98 54 83 71 1 10 2 38
Arab African International Bank 5 24 81 46 68 63 1 100 1 43
Arab Banking Corporation - Egypt - 87 77 83 85 1 15 56 47
Arab International Bank - 21 100 60 64 99 0 11 7 41
Arab Investment Bank - FABFDI 2 29 96 71 48 99 2 8 16 41
Bank of Alexandria 1 25 92 65 98 94 1 5 25 45
Bank of Commerce & Development 0 22 83 90 98 97 0 14 8 46
Banque du Caire 1 31 68 90 96 89 0 17 57 50
Banque du Caire et de Paris SAE 1 43 26 76 64 65 0 38 42 40
Banque Misr 3 54 74 100 54 71 0 95 27 53
Cairo Barclays Bank SAE 5 54 70 88 52 88 0 0 28 43
Cairo Far East Bank 0 59 32 90 71 97 3 98 64 57
Commercial International Bank (Egypt) S.A.E. 0 62 38 100 94 7 1 100 71 52
Credit Agricole Indosuez Egypte 0 54 25 96 47 1 1 96 93 46
Delta International Bank 0 38 0 34 45 1 1 96 91 34
Egyptian American Bank 1 33 93 24 36 2 1 77 76 38
Egyptian Arab Land Bank 0 98 94 15 29 6 1 55 88 43
Egyptian Gulf Bank 92 100 70 16 64 5 1 31 90 52
Egyptian Saudi Finance Bank 44 96 83 12 67 5 1 38 34 42
Export Development Bank of Egypt 99 100 83 18 64 2 1 56 52 53
Faisal IS of Egypt 95 50 94 35 56 1 7 12 73 47
Housing and Development Bank 99 58 81 34 76 59 3 2 100 57
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Firm\Year 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 Avg.
HSBC Bank Egypt S A E 64 70 95 38 95 66 10 4 97 60
Misr America International Bank 80 100 86 87 56 87 30 1 81 67
Misr Exterior Bank 47 100 100 77 81 61 28 0 46 60
MISR International Bank 77 4 32 27 48 38 15 0 73 35
MISR Iran Development Bank 1 11 30 31 75 33 8 0 62 28
Misr Romanian Bank 19 12 51 38 93 15 3 1 11 27
Mohandes Bank 21 15 40 44 94 13 2 4 77 34
National Bank for Development 52 15 47 46 77 14 39 8 93 43
National Bank of Egypt 30 21 6 11 97 66 11 48 91 42
National Societe Generale Bank SAE 33 20 6 1 91 71 8 64 100 44
Nile Bank (The) 82 20 5 56 95 72 25 91 99 61
Port Said National Bank for Development - 22 3 51 15 63 22 99 98 52
Societe Arabe Internationale de Banque 62 57 1 35 18 30 52 95 96 50
Suez Canal Bank 99 84 7 51 17 46 49 99 97 61
Arab Bank PLC 42 67 8 33 17 36 30 98 99 48
Arab Banking Corporation (Jordan) 8 95 1 28 18 75 35 95 100 51
Arab Jordan Investment Bank 28 74 10 40 8 85 28 80 73 47
Bank of Jordan Plc 3 97 11 48 3 99 2 10 81 39
Cairo Amman Bank 16 82 32 38 82 99 7 18 99 52
Housing Bank for Trade & Finance (The) 71 39 3 39 89 85 2 11 98 49
Industrial Development Bank 51 25 14 74 100 88 3 25 100 53
Jordan Gulf Bank 91 0 67 99 97 3 54 100 57
Jordan Investment & Finance Bank 44 67 16 73 85 77 1 75 100 60
Jordan IS for Finance and Investment 34 54 16 77 87 83 3 48 23 47
Jordan Kuwait Bank 13 65 52 86 84 91 2 0 24 46
Jordan National Bank Plc 13 97 13 68 99 86 1 0 65 49
Philadelphia Investment Bank 15 81 11 47 67 53 3 0 95 41
Union Bank for Savings & Investment 13 100 3 86 2 84 0 2 91 42
Al Bank Al Saudi Al Fransi 29 73 24 2 10 71 0 1 93 34
Al-Rajid Banking & Investment Corporation 22 66 16 3 37 22 0 43 92 33
Arab Investment Company SAA (The) 0 94 7 0 17 25 0 0 83 25
Arab National Bank 38 99 12 5 37 14 0 1 79 32
Arab Petroleum Invest. Corp. 40 75 50 6 34 23 0 4 1 26
Bank Al-Jazira 46 100 14 28 29 31 0 11 3 29
National Commercial Bank (The) 73 79 9 98 45 49 42 22 34 50
Riyad Bank 88 57 11 37 42 43 7 35 44 40
Saudi American Bank 30 2 5 6 0 28 2 62 68 23
Saudi British Bank (The) 24 4 4 0 2 7 1 96 100 26
Saudi Hollandi Bank 34 7 91 12 3 15 2 96 92 39
Saudi Investment Bank (The) 88 0 76 13 6 9 2 93 98 43
United Saudi Bank 48 45 61 29 8 12 0 98 94 44
Avg. 36 50 45 43 52 56 13 40 61 44
Source: Author's own estimation
318
Chapter 6: Methodology and empirical results
Table 6-33: Alternative Profit scale Inefficiency levels for Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and
Bahrain Banks over 1992-2000 — Individual Bank Estimates
Firm\Year 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 Avg.
Al Baraka IS BSC 44 79 8 54 10 10 95 99 0 44
AI-Ahli United Bank (Bahrain) B.S.C. 68 67 16 15 5 8 92 100 23 44
Alubaf Arab International Bank 74 45 9 7 7 6 75 44 57 36
Arab Banking Corporation BSC 91 30 5 6 16 14 46 7 63 31
Arab Financial Services Company - AFS 98 20 9 13 26 95 19 7 46 37
Bahrain Development Bank B.S.C. 41 8 11 26 68 9 0 15 17 22
Bahrain International Bank E.C. 37 9 13 80 86 75 0 17 70 43
Bahrain IS B.S.C. 4 60 52 84 22 0 18 75 40
Bahraini Saudi Bank (The) BSC 25 56 24 68 91 19 0 22 24 37
Bank of Bahrain and Kuwait B.S.C. 17 73 9 61 99 24 0 24 60 41
BMB Investment Bank - BMEB 34 96 7 9 100 11 0 20 45 36
Commercial Bank of Bahrain B.S.C. 8 97 5 19 99 10 0 11 20 30
Gulf International Bank BSC 92 100 5 25 8 26 9 73 74 46
Investcorp Bank EC 12 66 10 7 11 98 100 25 21 39
National Bank of Bahrain 60 54 12 1% 12 1)2 1% n vs 40
Shamil Bank of Bahrain EC 40 23 70 7 18 8 52 37 36
TAIB Bank E.C. 65 35 19 11 17 45 30 75 29 36
United Gulf Bank (B SC) EC 82 33 67 13 11 7 39 96 48 44
Al Watany Bank of Egypt 44 19 94 31 6 23 39 92 91 49
Alexandria Commercial and Maritime Bank SAE 17 6 98 15 10 27 46 100 12 37
Arab African International Bank 100 13 48 9 20 28 42 30 10 33
Arab Banking Corporation - Egypt 98 36 26 36 8 7 0 33
Arab International Bank 27 94 62 69 6 16 21 0 43
Arab Investment Bank - FABFDI 100 14 95 82 9 21 50 46 0 46
Bank of Alexandria 100 10 92 54 22 28 58 49 0 46
Bank of Commerce & Development 99 13 100 73 30 58 53 88 0 57
Banque du Caire 100 2 92 74 50 51 89 80 94 70
Banque du Caire et de Paris SAE o 0 6 52 67 34 79 90 93 47
Banque Misr o 1 75 88 89 41 100 92 4 54
Cairo Barclays Bank SAE o 0 60 100 80 49 100 83 2 53
Cairo Far East Bank o o 14 95 81 63 31 38 0 36
Commercial International Bank (Egypt) S.A.E. o o 11 97 12 2 62 40 0 25
Credit Agricole Indosuez Egypte 0 0 7 94 86 3 64 94 0 39
Delta International Bank 0 0 26 84 59 2 80 98 0 39
Egyptian American Bank 0 0 30 100 53 1 58 32 0 30
Egyptian Arab Land Bank 0 63 16 85 21 0 98 69 0 39
Egyptian Gulf Bank 96 84 13 58 51 0 80 41 0 47
Egyptian Saudi Finance Bank 53 98 5 80 45 0 54 47 9 43
Export Development Bank of Egypt 30 65 5 29 56 0 47 62 3 33
Faisal IS of Egypt 34 69 7 73 56 0 57 18 0 35
Housing and Development Bank 19 40 2 29 63 22 53 8 0 26
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Firm\Year 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 Avg.
HSBC Bank Egypt S A E 30 24 1 16 97 51 50 5 0 30
Misr America International Bank 40 53 2 45 58 13 88 38 20 40
Misr Exterior Bank 17 36 100 27 91 36 100 79 4 54
MISR International Bank 2 92 6 5 34 42 100 92 0 41
MISR Iran Development Bank 0 5 7 9 11 77 99 79 0 32
Misr Romanian Bank 93 6 7 7 20 82 98 83 17 46
Mohandes Bank 40 3 6 8 7 87 97 3 3 28
National Bank for Development 68 7 6 5 19 92 27 2 1 25
National Bank of Egypt 15 3 5 8 60 35 44 0 0 19
National Societe Generale Bank SAE 32 14 6 11 100 33 65 0 1 29
Nile Bank (The) 25 14 6 25 69 38 70 0 4 28
Port Said National Bank for Development 6 45 5 8 26 95 0 0 23
Societe Arabe Internationale de Banque 11 71 85 8 8 12 36 0 0 26
Suez Canal Bank 93 48 61 18 8 5 46 0 0 31
Arab Bank PLC 47 68 39 23 8 9 6 0 87 32
Arab Banking Corporation (Jordan) 6 99 65 54 9 76 1 6 98 46
Arab Jordan Investment Bank 94 29 30 44 11 57 6 5 24 33
Bank of Jordan Plc 48 41 19 30 11 19 99 22 16 34
Cairo Amman Bank 79 36 26 33 32 27 100 17 9 40
Housing Bank for Trade & Finance (The) 100 85 86 6 6 19 100 29 11 49
Industrial Development Bank 98 67 25 11 5 83 53 67 8 46
Jordan Gulf Bank - 48 19 8 12 93 76 51 6 45
Jordan Investment & Finance Bank 92 97 9 7 6 97 75 41 4 48
Jordan IS for Finance and Investment 99 21 11 8 46 90 72 75 9 48
Jordan Kuwait Bank 99 29 29 38 52 81 98 13 24 52
Jordan National Bank Plc 75 62 15 41 6 84 9 23 100 46
Philadelphia Investment Bank 69 65 22 46 6 97 13 75 57 50
Union Bank for Savings & Investment 60 56 25 68 48 100 58 100 14 59
Al Bank Al Saudi Al Fransi 41 46 31 87 56 73 12 100 34 53
Al-Rajlii Banking & Investment Corporation 45 98 8 56 91 13 66 91 17 54
Arab Investment Company SAA (The) 6 28 18 62 100 9 96 96 13 48
Arab National Bank 6 15 33 47 46 27 34 81 12 33
Arab Petroleum Invest. Corp. 10 14 20 32 56 38 47 60 100 42
Bank Al-Jazira 18 35 8 10 69 24 60 94 30 39
National Commercial Bank (The) 67 11 5 16 56 23 81 10 1 30
Riyad Bank 74 81 3 9 32 11 29 0 0 27
Saudi American Bank 33 100 1 13 9 8 6 0 0 19
Saudi British Bank (The) 52 99 0 21 6 6 16 7 1 23
Saudi Hollandi Bank 38 68 18 5 31 12 33 8 1 24
Saudi Investment Bank (The) 86 49 79 10 49 19 61 1 1 39
United Saudi Bank 52 13 64 11 21 100 92 0 1 39
Avg. 49 40 30 37 40 37 53 44 22 39
Source: Author's own estimation
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Table 6-34: DEA estimates of Cost Efficiency for the banking sectors of Jordan, Egypt, Saudi
Arabia and Bahrain over 1992-2000 (pooled data)
Firm
TE
CRS
AE CE TE
VRS
AE CE
SE NIRS
Al Baraka IS BSC 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Al-Ahli United Bank (Bahrain) B.S.C. 71 72 51 72 79 57 98 drs
Alubaf Arab International Bank 100 52 52 100 70 70 100
Arab Banldng Corporation BSC 85 82 70 100 100 100 85 drs
Arab Financial Services Company - AFS 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Bahrain Development Bank B.S.C. 86 38 32 100 73 73 86 irs
Bahrain International Bank E.C. 100 37 37 100 37 37 100
Bahrain IS B.S.C. 100 79 79 100 96 96 100
Bahraini Saudi Bank (The) BSC 90 69 62 90 82 74 100 drs
Bank of Bahrain and Kuwait B.S.C. 66 71 46 76 90 69 86 drs
BMB Investment Bank - BMEB 65 49 32 68 69 47 95 drs
Commercial Bank of Bahrain B.S.C. 88 50 44 97 46 45 90 irs
Gulf International Bank BSC 90 48 43 100 85 85 90 drs
Investcorp Bank EC 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
National Bank of Bahrain 84 43 36 94 66 62 90 drs
Shatnil Bank of Bahrain EC 70 96 68 74 93 69 95 irs
TAIB Bank E.C. 100 97 97 100 99 99 100
United Gulf Bank (BSC) EC 97 81 79 97 82 80 100 drs
Al Watany Bank of Egypt 83 58 49 85 57 49 98 irs
Alexandria Commercial and Maritime Bank SAE 84 63 53 87 62 54 97 irs
Arab African International Bank 91 82 74 100 100 100 91 drs
Arab Banking Corporation - Egypt 76 73 56 77 78 60 99 irs
Arab International Bank 68 37 25 87 84 73 78 drs
Arab Investment Bank - FABFDI 75 50 38 76 55 42 99 drs
Bank of Alexandria 100 45 45 100 82 82 100
Bank of Commerce & Development 81 84 69 83 83 69 98 irs
Banque du Caire 100 47 47 100 87 87 100
Banque du Caire et de Paris SAE 83 39 33 87 39 34 95 irs
Banque Misr 88 33 29 100 91 91 88 drs
Cairo Barclays Bank SAE 67 88 59 68 96 65 99 drs
Cairo Far East Bank 100 20 20 100 21 21 100
Commercial International Bank (Egypt) S.A.E. 86 49 42 90 77 69 95 drs
Credit Agricole Indosuez Egypte 97 62 61 100 62 62 97 irs
Delta International Bank 80 50 40 82 59 48 98 drs
Egyptian American Bank 88 29 25 98 53 52 90 drs
Egyptian Arab Land Bank 90 77 70 100 87 87 90 drs
Egyptian Gulf Bank 92 37 34 93 42 39 99 drs
Egyptian Saudi Finance Bank 100 39 39 100 50 50 100
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Firm
TE
CRS
AE CE TE
VRS
AE CE
SE MRS
Export Development Bank of Egypt 88 74 65 93 84 78 94 drs
Faisal IS of Egypt 99 61 61 100 85 85 99 drs
Housing and Development Bank 100 64 64 100 84 84 100
HSBC Bank Egypt S A E 77 76 59 77 76 59 100 drs
Misr America International Bank 85 45 38 86 52 45 98 drs
Misr Exterior Bank 92 27 25 100 39 39 92 drs
MISR International Bank 80 44 35 88 67 59 90 drs
MISR Iran Development Bank 62 78 49 65 83 54 96 drs
Misr Romanian Bank 100 46 46 100 48 48 100
Mohandes Bank 84 58 49 84 64 54 100 irs
National Bank for Development 81 68 55 89 83 74 91 drs
National Bank of Egypt 71 54 38 100 100 100 71 drs
National Societe Generale Bank SAE 89 47 42 89 50 44 100 drs
Nile Bank (The) 71 60 43 75 71 53 95 drs
Port Said National Bank for Development 84 76 63 100 92 92 84 irs
Sociëte Arabe Internationale de Banque 90 31 28 90 34 30 100 irs
Suez Canal Bank 100 42 42 100 67 67 100
Arab Bank PLC 82 49 40 100 89 89 82 drs
Arab Banking Corporation (Jordan) 60 76 46 60 77 46 100
Arab Jordan Investment Bank 76 35 27 78 42 32 98 drs
Bank of Jordan Plc 77 50 39 78 64 50 98 drs
Cairo Amman Bank 72 47 33 74 62 46 96 drs
Housing Bank for Trade & Finance (The) 87 46 40 96 66 63 91 drs
Industrial Development Bank 100 69 69 100 70 70 100
Jordan Gulf Bank 100 53 53 100 55 55 100
Jordan Investment & Finance Bank 60 47 28 100 29 29 60 irs
Jordan IS for Finance and Investment 65 74 48 73 86 63 89 drs
Jordan Kuwait Bank 75 48 36 77 57 44 98 drs
Jordan National Bank Plc 73 60 44 78 74 57 94 drs
Philadelphia Investment Bank 55 93 51 100 91 91 55 irs
Union Bank for Savings & Investment 73 48 35 74 48 36 98 irs
Al Bank Al Saudi Al Fransi 80 79 63 89 100 89 90 drs
Al-Rajhi Banking & Investment Corporation 90 81 73 100 100 100 90 drs
Arab Investment Company SAA (The) 63 98 62 90 91 81 71 drs
Arab National Bank 74 58 43 93 94 88 80 drs
Arab Petroleum Invest. Corp. 92 71 65 100 100 100 92 drs
Bank Al-Jazira 69 50 34 79 75 60 86 drs
National Commercial Bank (The) 68 90 61 100 100 100 68 drs
Riyad Bank 81 81 66 100 100 100 81 drs
Saudi American Bank 100 73 73 100 100 100 100
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Firm
Saudi British Bank (The)
Saudi Hollandi Bank
Saudi Investment Bank (The)
United Saudi Bank
Avg.
	
CRS	 VRS
SE MRS
TE AE CE TE AE CE
100	 100	 100	 100	 100	 100	 100
69	 54	 37	 84	 89	 75	 82	 drs
97	 61	 59	 100	 78	 78	 97	 drs
100	 57	 57	 100	 76	 76	 100	 -
84	 61	 51	 91	 75	 68	 93
Source: Author's own estimation
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7.1 Introduction and Summary
This thesis investigates the efficiency levels of various Arabian banking markets;
Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. These countries are emerging markets where
the governmental authorities have implemented major economic and financial reforms,
especially over the last decade. The empirical evidence on bank efficiency in these
markets aims to highlight the features associated with the role of economic
development and financial reforms that have taken place (in these countries).
The first part of this thesis (chapters 2 and 3) sets the scene by examining the main
features of Arabic economies, placing developments in Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia
and Bahrain in context. The Arabian nation comprises 21 countries whose people
speak the Arabic language and these countries can be classified economically into oil
and non-oil exporting countries. The area, population and living standards for
individual countries vary widely particularly in terms of per capita GDP and many of
these countries suffer in terms of their poverty levels, high rates of illiteracy and low
levels of human development. During the period 1982-91, the economic growth of
Arabian countries (as measured by real GDP) slowed averaging 1.6 percent compared
to 4 percent for other developing countries over the same period. Slow economic
growth led to low levels of investment and high levels of unemployment, also
associated with rising levels of external indebtedness and fiscal deficits, especially for
non-oil exporting countries. As a result, many of the Arabian countries have
undertaken macroeconomic reforms to promote economic growth and to face a new
economic climate.
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Over the last decade, the economic performance indicators of Arabia, including those
under present study (Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain), have generally
improved compared to the 1980s, despite the difficult situation faced by various
individual economies. Annual real GDP growth for the Arabic countries averaged 3.9
percent between 1992-1999 compared to 5.6 percent for all the world's developing
countries over the same period. The other main economic performance indicators
including those on trade, investment levels, rates of inflation, external debts and
external reserves have all witnessed improvements over the same period.
The financial sectors of Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain have witnessed
major financial reforms over the last decade. The reforms include liberalising the
financial systems, boosting banks' capitalisation in accordance with Basle standards,
enhancing the systems of banking supervision and updating regulatory frameworks.
The main aim of such deregulation is to improve the efficiency of banking firms as
these reforms are expected to enhance competition leading to price falls, output
increases, greater levels of innovation and improved productive efficiency. To date,
however, empirical studies provide mixed evidence on the impact of deregulation on
bank performance (European Commission, 1997; Cecchini, 1988; Gardener et al.,
1988).
The financial systems of Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain are characterised by
the dominance of commercial banks in the financial system; for instance, their share of
financial assets ranges from about 58 percent in Saudi Arabia to about 85 percent in
Bahrain. In addition, the banking systems of these countries are concentrated (for
instance, the share of the largest three banks ranged from about 49 percent of the
banking sector in Saudi Arabia to about 79 percent in Jordan over the last decade).
During the 1990s, the financial performance of banks operating in the countries under
study have shown improvements in terms of their asset quality, capital strength and
profitability. Furthermore, the financial sectors of these countries have become deeper
according to various financial sector indicators.
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The second part of this thesis (chapters 4 and 5) presents a theoretical overview and
empirical evidence on banking efficiency. The focus is on economies of scale and
productive efficiency — the most important areas relating to banking efficiency.
Productive efficiency defines the relationship between output levels and some
desirable objective functions such as cost minimisation, or revenue and profit
maximisation given certain levels of technology. Chapter 4 and 5 discusses various
types of methodological approaches that can be used to estimate cost, profit and
alternative profit efficiency in banking, these are used later in the empirical part of this
thesis. Finally, we provide an overview of the findings of the main empirical literature.
Overall, X-efficiency dominates scale economies in banking, and scope economies are
illusive. Our empirical evidence covers both parametric and non-parametric studies
and outlines briefly the impact of banking sector reforms on efficiency.
7.2 The results and contribution to knowledge
A major aim of this thesis is to estimate efficiency levels in various Arabic banking
sectors by applying various statistical analyses to a data set on Jordan, Egypt, Saudi
Arabia and Bahrain. As pointed out by Berger and Humphrey (1997), there have been
many studies that investigate banking sector efficiency using varying data periods,
methodologies and countries but, at the same time, there is no consensus on the
sources of the sizeable variation in measured efficiency. The undue variations in the
bank efficiency studies undertaken so far make it impossible to determine how
important the different efficiency concepts, measurement techniques and correlates
used are related to the outcomes of these studies.
This thesis, in its turn, employs three distinct economic efficiency concepts (cost,
standard profit, and alternative profit efficiencies), using a number of different
measurement methods (including the stochastic frontier approach, specification of the
Fourier-flexible functional form versus the translog form, and inclusion of bank's asset
quality and financial capital in a number of different ways) to a single data set. As far
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as we are aware, this is the first comprehensive analysis of banking sector efficiency in
Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain.
In choosing the 'preferred' cost and profit models, we follow the recent efficiency
methodologies that proceed by testing various model specifications to arrive at the
preferred model. Based on these preferred models for cost, standard profit and
alternative profit, different efficiency measures are reported for the banks in the
countries under study. Given cost efficiency, the preferred model is the Fourier-
truncated form that excludes the control variables (capital adequacy, asset quality and
the time trend) but includes all the environmental variables. Given the standard and
alternative profit function, the preferred model is the Fourier-flexible which includes
the control as well as the environmental variables.
Overall, this thesis finds that efficiency levels differ according to the three various
efficiency concepts that are used (cost, profit and alternative profit) and each method
adds some independent informational value. A somewhat interesting result is that the
choices made concerning the efficiency measurement method leads to somewhat
similar model specifications. Furthermore, the correlation between efficiency levels,
utilising the stochastic frontier and data envelopment analysis approaches, were around
40 percent despite the major differences in assumptions underlying each approach.
These findings suggest that the cost efficiency estimates are robust to differences in
methodology.
Based on the chosen preferred model, cost efficiency averaged around 95% over the
1992-2000 period. Given the standard and alternative profit function, technical
efficiency averaged 66% and 58% respectively over the same period. Islamic banks are
found to be the most cost and profit efficient, while investment banks are the least
(cost and profit efficient). Based on bank asset size, large banks seem to be relatively
more cost and profit efficient. Geographically, Bahrain is the most cost and profit
efficient while Jordan is the least (cost and profit efficient). It should be noted that
these results, in general, are similar to those found in other US and European banking
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studies. The results on scale efficiency also suggest that large banks are the most cost
and profit efficient. Saudi Arabian, and to a lesser degree the Egyptian, banks are
found to be the most cost and profit scale efficient.
Another major finding of this thesis is that there is little evidence to suggest that the
major economic and financial reforms undertaken in Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and
Bahrain over the last decade have had a noticeable impact on improvement in banking
sector efficiency. The main policy recommendation from this study, therefore, is that
these countries need to continue the reform process in order to enhance financial sector
performance.
7.3 Limitations of the present study
Although this thesis employs various contemporary methodologies in the field of
parametric frontier efficiency analysis, not all the different efficiency measurement
approaches [such as the Distribution Free Approach, Allen and Rai (1996); Berger and
Mester (1997); Berger et al. (1997) and the Thick Frontier Approach, Berger and
Humphrey (1991 and 1992a); Bauer et al. (1993); Berger (1993)] are used in the study.
A comparison of the results derived using these measures would provide stronger
support for our findings.
The thesis could also have used measures of economies of scope to calculate whether
there is product cost synergies in the banking systems. This research does not include
such calculations because of the limitations associated with scope economies estimate.
For instance, the main problem in estimating economies of scope concerns the
complexity of the estimation techniques used, insufficient data about firms
specialisation, and the risk of using data that are not on the efficient frontier, thus
confusing scope economies and X-efficiencies (see for example, Berger, Hunter and
Timme, 1993).
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Another shortcoming of the present study may relate to the sample size which is
confined to only four Arabian countries. It might be interesting to carry out the same
research over a larger number of Arabian countries to compare banking sector
efficiency across different Arabian regions. However, the lack of publicly available
data on various Arabic banking markets made this impractical.
Finally, one should always bear in mind that while frontier efficiency models have
advantages over traditional measures of efficiency, they must also be regarded as
imperfect measures. For instance, it is not possible to include every item or dimension
of a bank's output in model specifications, and banks that are producing a wide range
of outputs or providing specialised services could, therefore, be judged less efficient
than they really are (as these models do not take into account factors such as service or
product quality). While the multi-product nature of a banking firm is widely
recognised, there is still no agreement as to the explicit definition and measurement of
banking inputs and outputs. Usually, each definition carries with it a particular set of
banking concepts, relating to the production characteristics of the industry; in bank
efficiency studies, the way output is defined and measured may influence considerably
the results obtained (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). It should also be noted that this
thesis uses the intermediation approach, however the well-known production approach
could have been used for comparison purposes.
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